Mossy Lake, Public Trust Waters, and Sixteenth Section School Lands: Mississippi Supreme Court Clarifies That Pre‑Statehood Public Waters Never Accrued to the Sixteenth Section Trust

I. Introduction

In Kyle Dew and Mossy Woods & Waters, LLC v. Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District and Mossy Brake Hunting Club (Miss. Oct. 16, 2025), the Mississippi Supreme Court confronted a core question at the intersection of two powerful trust doctrines:

• the sixteenth section school lands trust, created to support public education; and
• the public waters trust, rooted in the public trust doctrine and the equal footing doctrine.

The dispute arose over Mossy Lake, an oxbow lake in Leflore County, part of whose surface overlies a sixteenth section. The local school district, which manages that sixteenth section, had leased the lake area to a private hunting club and sought to exclude a neighboring littoral landowner, Kyle Dew, from using the waters overlaying the sixteenth section.

The case presented the Court with a deceptively simple but legally significant question: Can a school district, by virtue of its management of sixteenth section school lands, exercise exclusive control over the surface of a navigable oxbow lake that has been in the public waters trust since statehood?

The Court answered no. It held that because Mossy Lake was already part of the public waters trust at Mississippi’s statehood, it never accrued to the sixteenth section school lands when the federal government later surveyed and reserved those lands. As a result, the school district cannot exclude members of the public—including adjacent littoral landowners—from lawfully accessing and using the waters of Mossy Lake.

This decision clarifies, in a direct and categorical way, that pre‑statehood public trust waters do not become sixteenth section school land merely because they lie within the geographic footprint of a surveyed section. It has important implications for public access to inland lakes and rivers, for school-land leasing practices, and for property disputes at the interface of land and water across Mississippi.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. The Parties and the Disputed Property

The plaintiffs below were:

• Greenwood Leflore Consolidated School District (the “School District”), which manages sixteenth section school lands in the relevant township; and
• Mossy Brake Hunting Club, a non-profit corporation holding a lease from the School District for a portion of Mossy Lake for hunting, fishing, and trapping.

The defendants below were:

• Kyle Dew, a littoral landowner whose property abuts Mossy Lake; and
• Mossy Woods & Waters, LLC, an entity associated with Dew.

The dispute centers on Mossy Lake, an oxbow lake—previously identified as “Cypress Lake” in historical surveys—that arcs across multiple sections in Township 17, Range 2 West, near Swiftown, Mississippi. A fraction of the lake overlies the sixteenth section of that township. The School District had leased that fraction to Mossy Brake Hunting Club.

B. The Lawsuit and the Chancellor’s Decision

On April 21, 2023, the School District and the Hunting Club filed a complaint to quiet and confirm title to the fraction of Mossy Lake overlying the sixteenth section and sought injunctive relief against Dew. They alleged that Dew was trespassing when he was found on the disputed portion of Mossy Lake on January 8, 2023, in a boat (¶2).

Dew counterclaimed, asserting that:

• Mossy Lake is a public waterbody in the public waters trust;
• as a littoral landowner whose property abuts the lake, he has the right to use the entire lake;
• the public waters trust supersedes the sixteenth section trust; and
• the School District and Hunting Club’s efforts to exclude him were unlawful.

He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserted claims of public nuisance and adverse possession, and requested attorneys’ fees (¶4).

Both sides moved for summary judgment and/or declaratory judgment (¶¶4–5). After a hearing and a site visit, the chancery court ruled for the School District:

• It found that the sixteenth section trust is superior to the public waters trust when the two conflict (¶6).
• It rejected Dew’s claim that his littoral status gave him access rights over the sixteenth section portion of the lake (¶7).
• It held that Dew had neither adversely possessed nor acquired prescriptive rights to the sixteenth section portion (¶6).
• It confirmed and quieted title to the disputed portion of the surface and lakebed in favor of the School District and the Hunting Club, enjoined Dew and others from entering, and validated the lease and the posting of no‑trespassing signs (¶7).

C. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Dew raised six issues (¶8), the core of which were:

1. Whether it was error to treat Mossy Lake’s status as a public waterbody as irrelevant;
2. Whether the chancery court erred by declaring the sixteenth section trust superior to the public waters trust and the equal footing doctrine;
3. Whether title could properly be quieted in favor of the School District as to the surface and bed of the lake within the sixteenth section;
4. Whether Dew was correctly found to have committed trespass;
5. Whether the injunction against Dew’s use of part of the lake was lawful; and
6. Whether the award of attorneys’ fees to the School District was proper.

The Mississippi Supreme Court, reviewing the chancery court’s legal conclusions de novo (¶10), reversed on all issues and remanded (¶9, ¶30).

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Mississippi Supreme Court’s central holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Mossy Lake is a navigable oxbow lake that has been part of the public waters trust since Mississippi’s admission to the Union. (¶¶20–21, ¶25–26)
2. Because the lake was already in the public waters trust at statehood, it did not and could not “accrue” to the sixteenth section when that section was later surveyed and reserved for school lands. (¶¶21–23, ¶28)
3. There is no conflict or hierarchy between the sixteenth section trust and the public waters trust in this context, because the sixteenth section grant never included public trust waters in the first place. (¶28)
4. The School District therefore has no right, under the sixteenth section trust, to exclude the public from the waters of Mossy Lake. It cannot rely on its school-land status or its lease to the Hunting Club to prevent Dew or any other member of the public from using the lake, so long as they reach it without trespassing on private uplands (¶27–28).
5. A littoral landowner who can lawfully reach a public lake has a right to use the entire surface of that lake for boating and fishing, subject only to reasonable regulation and equal use by others. (¶27, citing State Game & Fish Comm’n v. Louis Fritz Co.)
6. The chancery court’s quiet title judgment, trespass finding, injunction, and fee award were all premised on an erroneous understanding of the School District’s property rights and are reversed. (¶9, ¶29–30)

In short, the Court held that public trust waters are conceptually and legally distinct from sixteenth section school lands. Public trust waters, including oxbow lakes formed from river channels existing at statehood, remain public regardless of how surrounding land is later surveyed, titled, or managed.

IV. Legal Framework

A. The Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust

Under the Land Ordinance system and subsequent federal and state enactments, each township is divided into 36 sections, with section 16 historically reserved “for the support of schools” (¶12–13). As the Court explains, Congress’ 1817 Land Sales Act continued this policy, reserving “the section No. 16 in each township … for the support of schools therein” (¶13).

Mississippi law today codifies that:

“Sixteenth section school lands … constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools” under the control of county school boards.

This is known as the sixteenth section trust, and the state (through school districts) is a trustee with fiduciary duties to manage these lands to support public education. The Court has reaffirmed this in recent decisions such as North Bolivar Consolidated School District v. Jones (¶14).

Critically, however, the opinion draws a key temporal and substantive limit: the sixteenth section grant is a grant of “land,” and title to such land vests only after the land has been surveyed and the section identified (¶22, citing Cooper v. Roberts, United States v. Morrison, and Wisconsin v. Lane). Until survey, no one can know where section 16 lies, so its grant cannot include any property interests that had already vested elsewhere.

B. The Public Waters Trust & the Equal Footing Doctrine

The public waters trust (a species of the public trust doctrine) arises from the equal footing doctrine. Upon admission to the Union, each new state takes title to its navigable waters and the soil beneath them in trust for the public, on equal footing with the original thirteen states (¶15–16).

The Court, relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, reiterates that:

• The original states, by virtue of state sovereignty, held “the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them” (¶16, quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell and PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana); and
• Later-admitted states like Mississippi acquired the same sovereign title under the equal footing doctrine (¶15–16, citing Pollard v. Hagan, Corvallis Sand & Gravel, Utah Division of State Lands).

Mississippi case law, especially Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, Ryals v. Pigott, and Secretary of State v. Wiesenberg, has developed this into a robust doctrine:

• Upon statehood, Mississippi received title to all “tidelands and navigable waters” in trust for the people (¶21, citing Cinque Bambini and Wiesenberg).
• These public trust waters are committed to public purposes such as navigation, fishing, bathing, and broader modern uses like recreation, environmental protection, and resource development (¶19, citing Treuting and Cinque Bambini).
• The state may not abdicate or alienate these trust resources for private purposes inconsistent with the trust (¶17–18, citing Ryals, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, International Paper Co. of Moss Point v. Mississippi State Highway Department, and Treuting).

Most importantly for this case, the Court emphasizes that:

“Waters which are public by virtue of the Constitution and the Equal Footings Doctrine may not—by legislative enactment or judicial decree—be withdrawn from public use.”

C. Navigability and Oxbow Lakes

The Court notes the complexities of defining “navigable waters” in American law, but for this case it relies on a minimal, well-established principle: waters that are navigable in fact are navigable for legal purposes (¶20, citing Ryals).

The record shows that Mossy Lake:

• is large (approximately 196 acres according to the parties’ stipulation, and more than a mile long);
• supports boating, which both parties acknowledge (¶25); and
• has long been used for boating, fishing, and related recreation.

The Court therefore finds Mossy Lake is “navigable in fact” and hence legally navigable (¶25).

Additionally, Mossy Lake is an oxbow lake, a remnant of a former river channel formed by avulsion (¶26). Mississippi precedent in Dycus v. Sillers held that:

• When a river changes course by avulsion, the public nature of the waters remains (¶26, quoting Dycus);
• Public rights in oxbow lakes are the same as in other public waters; and
• “Each person who can without trespass reach the waters of an oxbow lake may of right fish there to his heart’s content,” subject only to equal use by others and reasonable state regulation (¶26, citing Dycus and State Game & Fish Comm’n v. Louis Fritz Co.).

Dycus expressly held that all oxbow lakes are within the public waters trust (¶26). The Court applies that rule to Mossy Lake.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. The Temporal Priority of the Public Waters Trust Over Sixteenth Section Grants

The Court’s most important analytical move is temporal. It asks: At what moment did title to each category of property vest in the State? The answer determines whether one type of interest could ever encompass the other.

1. Public Trust Waters Vest at Statehood.
   When Mississippi entered the Union in 1817, title to “tidelands and navigable waters” previously held by the United States immediately vested in Mississippi in trust for the public (¶21, citing Wiesenberg and Cinque Bambini).
2. Sixteenth Section Lands Vest at Survey.
   By contrast, the sixteenth section grant becomes legally effective only once the township is surveyed, the sixteenth section identified, and the survey confirmed (¶22, citing Cooper, Morrison, and Lane).

This means that public trust waters pre‑existed the sixteenth section trust as vested interests. At statehood, those waters—and the beds beneath them—were already dedicated to the public trust. Only after that did sixteenth section lands vest in the state as school lands.

From this sequence, the Court draws a key conclusion: the sixteenth section grant cannot retroactively pull into the school trust any waters already held in the public trust. The public waters trust is not carved out of sixteenth section lands; rather, sixteenth section lands are carved out of the remaining federal domain excluding public trust waters.

B. Surveying Practices and Meander Lines: Waters Were Never Part of the Section Land

The Court reinforces its conclusion by invoking federal surveying practice and the doctrine of meander lines (¶23).

When the federal government surveyed public lands, surveyors:

• divided the land into townships and sections; and
• ran meander lines along the edges of bodies of water to calculate the area of uplands to be sold.

Citing the Bureau of Land Management’s Manual of Surveying Instructions and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hardin v. Jordan, the Court explains:

• Meander lines are drawn “for the purpose of ascertaining the exact quantity of the upland to be charged for,” not for limiting title to that line (¶23, quoting Hardin).
• The actual boundary of a parcel that abuts a water body is the water itself, not the meander line (¶23).
• Thus, “the waters themselves constitute the real boundary” (¶23, quoting Hardin).

Applied here, this means that when the United States surveyed Township 17, Range 2 West and identified Section 16, it did not include Mossy Lake itself—already a public trust waterbody—as part of the Section 16 “land” reserved for school purposes. The meander line around the lake bounded the section, but did not transfer the lakebed or water to the section’s grantee.

In the Court’s words:

“When the land was surveyed, and the United States government sold it, the waters were not part of the section sold.” (¶23)

C. The Status of Mossy Lake: Navigable, Public Trust, Oxbow Lake

The Court next applies its legal framework to the specific geography and history of Mossy Lake (¶24–27).

• Historical identity: Mossy Lake was previously known as Cypress Lake and, at the time of the 1832 survey, formed a sideways U-shaped channel crossing multiple sections, including Section 16 (¶24).
• Navigability: Evidence of boating and the lake’s size supports a finding that the lake is navigable in fact (¶25).
• Oxbow/avulsion: The lake is an oxbow formed when a river altered its course before statehood (¶26). Under Dycus, waters formed by avulsion retain their public character (¶26).

From these facts, the Court concludes:

1. Mossy Lake is navigable and thus within the scope of the public waters trust (¶25).
2. As an oxbow lake, it falls squarely under Dycus, which held that oxbow lakes are public trust waters and that those who can access them without trespass may freely fish and boat there (¶26).
3. Because Mossy Lake was a navigable waterway at the inception of the state, it was part of the public waters trust from the moment of statehood (¶28).

D. No Conflict Between the Two Trusts: Public Waters Never Became Sixteenth Section Land

Dew invited the Court to decide which trust is “superior”: the sixteenth section trust or the public waters trust (¶28). The chancery court had answered that question by declaring the sixteenth section trust superior (¶6).

The Supreme Court, however, finds that this framing is misguided:

“Dew asks the Court to determine which trust is superior—sixteenth section trust or public waters trust. However, such a determination is unnecessary because Mossy Lake never accrued to the sixteenth section land in the first place.” (¶28)

The key points:

• The sixteenth section trust covers land reserved for schools under § 29-3-1, but “land” in this sense does not include pre-existing public trust waters.
• Because Mossy Lake was already in the public waters trust at statehood, it was never part of the sixteenth section school lands.
• As a result, there is no direct conflict between the trusts to resolve: each governs a different corpus of property.

This is the opinion’s most important doctrinal clarification: public trust waters constitute a separate category of state-held property that is not absorbed into later-created land trusts like the sixteenth section trust, even when physically overlapping.

E. Littoral Rights and the Public’s Use of Mossy Lake

The Court then addresses the rights of Dew, as a littoral landowner, and of the public generally (¶27).

Relying on State Game & Fish Comm’n v. Louis Fritz Co., the Court emphasizes two concepts:

1. No private ownership of the water itself.
   Water “in its ordinary or natural state … is neither land, nor tenement, nor susceptible of absolute ownership” but is a “movable, wandering thing … of a transient, usufructuary property” (¶27, internal quotation from Louis Fritz).
2. Right to use the entire surface of a public lake.
   Because there is no private ownership in the water or the fish, if there are multiple riparian or littoral owners, each “and every other inhabitant who can gain access thereto without trespass, may use the surface of the whole lake” for boating and fishing, as long as they do not interfere with others’ reasonable use (¶27, quoting Louis Fritz Co.).

Accordingly:

• Dew, as a littoral owner whose property abuts Mossy Lake, may lawfully access the lake from his own property and then use the entire surface of the lake, including areas overlying the sixteenth section (¶27).
• The School District’s and Hunting Club’s efforts to exclude him from a “fraction” of the lake are inconsistent with the public trust and with established littoral rights.
• Any exclusive rights the Hunting Club may have flow from its lease of school land and do not include the power to exclude the public from the waters of a public lake.

F. Application to the Chancery Court’s Rulings

Once the Court determines that Mossy Lake is public trust water and never accrued to the sixteenth section, the chancery court’s rulings collapse:

• Quieting title in the School District and Hunting Club.
  The chancery court had quieted title to the surface and lakebed of the sixteenth section portion of Mossy Lake in favor of the School District and its lessee (¶7). Because those waters are in the public trust, there is no basis for such an exclusive title. The judgment is reversed (¶29–30).
• Trespass finding against Dew.
  Dew was accused of trespass solely for being on the lake in a boat (¶2, ¶25). But on a public lake, accessed from Dew’s own littoral property or other lawful access points, such use is lawful. The trespass finding was premised on an erroneous assumption of School District ownership and cannot stand.
• Injunction and no-trespassing signs.
  The injunction barring Dew from using a portion of Mossy Lake and the authorization to post no-trespassing signs on the lake itself are incompatible with the public’s right to use public trust waters (¶7, ¶29). Those portions of the judgment are reversed.
• Attorneys’ fees.
  Since the School District and Hunting Club are no longer the prevailing parties, the fee award—which was tethered to their supposed success—must also be reversed (¶9, ¶30).

The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the recognition that Mossy Lake’s waters are public and not part of sixteenth section school lands (¶29–30).

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State (491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986))

Cinque Bambini is a cornerstone of Mississippi’s public trust doctrine. The Court there held that:

• Upon statehood, Mississippi acquired title to tidelands and navigable waters in trust for the public; and
• Once property is held in the public trust, it can be alienated only by legislative act and only if the alienation is consistent with the public purposes of the trust (¶18–19).

In this case, Cinque Bambini is used to:

• Confirm that public trust title vested at statehood (¶21);
• Show that the public trust includes a range of public purposes beyond traditional navigation and fishing (¶19); and
• Underscore that no legislative enactment has transferred Mossy Lake out of the public waters trust to the School District (¶29).

B. Dycus v. Sillers (557 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1990))

Dycus involved an oxbow lake formed by the Mississippi River and dealt directly with public rights in such lakes. It established that:

• Oxbow lakes formed by avulsion remain part of the public waters trust;
• The public has rights to fish and boat in those waters, provided they access them without trespass; and
• Public rights in such waters are as strong as in any other public waterbody (¶26).

The Court explicitly relies on Dycus to hold Mossy Lake within the public trust and to articulate the scope of public use rights (¶26).

C. State Game & Fish Commission v. Louis Fritz Co. (193 So. 9 (Miss. 1940))

Louis Fritz is the primary source for the proposition that:

• Water, as such, is not susceptible of absolute private ownership; and
• All riparian or littoral owners, and others who can reach a lake without trespass, may use the entire lake’s surface for boating and fishing (¶27).

The Court uses Louis Fritz to explain why Dew’s littoral status entitles him to traverse the entire lake, not just the waters immediately adjacent to his property, and why the School District cannot fence off a “private” portion of a public lake (¶27).

D. Ryals v. Pigott (580 So. 2d 1140 (Miss. 1990))

Ryals reiterates that the state holds public trust waters under a constitutional imperative and that these waters cannot be withdrawn from public use by statute or judicial decree (¶17). The Court uses Ryals to emphasize that:

• Public trust status is legally entrenched; and
• The chancery court’s attempt to treat Mossy Lake as if it were private school land conflicts with that entrenched status.

E. Treuting v. Bridge & Park Commission of Biloxi (199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967))

Treuting recognized that:

• The state may dispose of submerged lands under tidal waters only to the extent that disposition does not interfere with public rights of navigation, swimming, and similar uses (¶18–19); and
• Tidelands are held in trust for such public purposes (¶19).

This reinforces the principle that even when the state or a public body “transfers” some interests in submerged lands, it cannot confer on private parties a right to exclude the public from public trust uses—an important backdrop to the invalidation of the School District’s asserted exclusivity.

F. Federal Public Land and Equal Footing Cases

The Court relies on several federal decisions to frame the timing and nature of state title:

• Martin v. Lessee of Waddell and PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana – affirming state sovereignty over navigable waters (¶16).
• Pollard v. Hagan, Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., and Utah Division of State Lands – codifying the equal footing doctrine and delineating the state’s title to navigable waters upon admission (¶16, ¶21).
• Cooper v. Roberts, United States v. Morrison, Wisconsin v. Lane – clarifying that sixteenth section lands vest only when surveys are completed (¶22).
• Hardin v. Jordan – explaining meander lines and the fact that waterbodies are not part of upland conveyances; they are boundaries, not part of the measured tract (¶23).

Together, these cases provide the federal law foundation for the Court’s conclusion that public trust waters and sixteenth section school lands are distinct and that waters like Mossy Lake never became part of the latter.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. For School Districts and Sixteenth Section Land Management

The decision constrains how school districts may treat bodies of water that lie within or adjacent to sixteenth section lands:

• School districts cannot claim exclusive ownership or control over public trust waters simply because those waters overlie or abut sixteenth section land.
• Leases of “sixteenth section waters” for exclusive hunting, fishing, or recreational use are legally suspect if the underlying waters are in the public trust.
• School districts may still lease uplands and other non-public trust assets, but such leases cannot lawfully exclude the public from exercising public trust rights on adjacent waters.

Practically, this will likely require:

• Reexamination of existing leases involving lakes, oxbows, and other waterbodies intersecting sixteenth sections;
• Adjustment of signage and enforcement practices that treated water surfaces as “no trespass” zones under school-land authority; and
• More nuanced drafting of leases to distinguish between upland, shoreline, and water-surface rights, consistent with public trust obligations.

B. For Littoral and Riparian Landowners

The decision strongly affirms the rights of littoral and riparian owners along public lakes and rivers:

• Where a waterbody is in the public trust, littoral owners may launch boats and fish from their property and then use the entire surface of the public lake or waterway (¶27).
• Neighboring public entities (such as school districts) cannot carve out “exclusive” areas of a public waterbody that they control as if privately owned.
• However, these rights remain subject to state regulation (e.g., fishing licenses, boating regulations) and to the equal rights of other users.

C. For Public Access and Outdoor Recreation

For the general public, the case is a reaffirmation and clarification of access rights:

• If a member of the public can reach a public trust waterbody without trespassing on private land—for example, via public ramps, rights-of-way, or their own littoral property—they may use the water for traditional public trust purposes, including boating and fishing (¶26–27).
• Government bodies managing adjacent lands cannot convert portions of these public waters into de facto private lakes by leasing them to private clubs and enforcing no-trespass policies on the water itself.

D. For Future Litigation and Public Trust Jurisprudence

This opinion will likely play a central role in future cases where:

• The boundaries between public waters and various state-held trusts (school lands, parks, etc.) are contested;
• Oxbow lakes and abandoned river channels intersect with private or trust lands;
• Public access claims are raised against government entities or lessees asserting exclusive control over water surfaces.

It does not narrow the definition of public waters; the Court expressly disclaims any intent to limit prior definitions and notes that non-navigable tidewaters can still be within the public trust where consistent with historical public uses (¶20 n.5). Instead, the decision clarifies how that broad public trust interacts with sixteenth section lands.

Expect litigants on both sides—public bodies and private users—to cite this case as authority on:

• the timing of vesting for different categories of state-held property;
• the non-overlap of public trust waters with sixteenth section grants; and
• the scope of public use rights in inland lakes and rivers, especially oxbows.

VIII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Equal Footing Doctrine

When new states join the United States, they do so “on an equal footing” with the original thirteen states. This means, among other things, that they inherit the same sovereign rights:

• They own the beds of navigable waters within their borders; and
• They hold those waters and beds in trust for their people.

Mississippi, upon statehood in 1817, received title to all its navigable waters under this doctrine (¶15–16).

2. Public Waters Trust / Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine is the idea that certain resources—like navigable waters—are owned and managed by the state on behalf of the public, for shared uses such as:

• navigation and transportation;
• fishing, hunting, and recreation;
• bathing, swimming, and boating;
• and modern public uses including environmental protection.

The state cannot simply give these resources away for private benefit if that would interfere with public uses (¶17–19).

3. Sixteenth Section School Lands / Sixteenth Section Trust

In each surveyed township, Section 16 was reserved by the federal government and later granted to states like Mississippi to support public schools. Mississippi holds these lands in a trust for education, managed by local school boards (¶12–14).

However, this trust extends to the land of Section 16, not to navigable waters that already belonged to the state under the public trust at statehood.

4. Navigable in Fact

“Navigable in fact” means that a waterbody can be used, in its natural condition, as a highway for commerce or transportation—often evidenced by boat use. Courts treat such waters as “navigable” for legal purposes, making them part of the public trust (¶20, ¶25).

5. Oxbow Lake and Avulsion

An oxbow lake is formed when a river cuts a new, shorter channel, leaving behind a crescent- or U-shaped segment of the old channel. When this occurs suddenly, it’s called avulsion. Under Mississippi law:

• Waters formed by avulsion (like oxbow lakes) remain public trust waters; and
• Public use rights in those waters are the same as in any other public waters (¶26, citing Dycus).

6. Littoral vs. Riparian Owner

A riparian owner owns land along a river or stream; a littoral owner owns land along a lake or the sea. In this context, Dew is a littoral owner on Mossy Lake (¶3, ¶27).

Where the lake is public trust water, a littoral owner:

• may access the lake from his property without trespass; and
• may then use the entire surface of the lake, not just the area in front of his lot, subject to the rights of others (¶27, citing Louis Fritz).

7. Meander Lines

In land surveys, a meander line is a line run along the edge of a waterbody to calculate how much upland is being sold or reserved. It is not the actual property boundary; the boundary is the water’s edge itself (¶23, citing Hardin).

So, when the United States surveyed Section 16 and ran a meander line around Mossy Lake, it did not include the lake’s waters or bed in the Section 16 grant.

8. Quiet Title

A quiet title action is a lawsuit asking a court to declare who owns a particular piece of property and to “quiet” (eliminate) competing claims. Here, the School District sought to quiet title to the portion of Mossy Lake and its bed overlying the sixteenth section (¶2).

Because the Court held that those waters are part of the public trust and not the sixteenth section, the School District’s quiet title claim failed (¶29–30).

IX. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

This opinion significantly clarifies the relationship between Mississippi’s public waters trust and its sixteenth section school lands trust.

The key takeaways are:

1. Timing and nature of title matter: Navigable waters and their beds vested in the state as public trust resources at statehood. Sixteenth section lands vest later, upon survey, and cannot include pre-existing public trust waters.
2. No absorption of public waters into sixteenth section lands: Even when a navigable lake overlies a sixteenth section, the water and bed remain in the public trust and are not part of the sixteenth section school lands.
3. No need to rank trusts: There is no “superiority” contest between the sixteenth section trust and the public waters trust in this context because they apply to different assets. Public trust waters simply never became sixteenth section land.
4. Robust public rights in oxbow lakes: Oxbow lakes like Mossy Lake, formed from pre-statehood river channels, are public trust waters. Members of the public, including littoral owners, have rights to use their entire surface, subject to lawful regulation and equal use.
5. Limits on school district and lessee authority: School districts and their lessees cannot lawfully exclude the public from public trust waters, even where they manage adjacent sixteenth section lands and lease those lands for recreation.

By reversing the chancery court’s quiet title judgment, trespass finding, injunction, and attorney’s fee award, the Mississippi Supreme Court has strengthened and clarified the public’s rights in inland navigable waters and oxbow lakes. It has also placed important limits on how sixteenth section school lands may be leveraged for exclusive private use, ensuring that the constitutional and historical commitments embodied in the public waters trust remain intact.