Mootness by Statutory Amendment and Rooker–Feldman Limits in Post‑Conviction DNA‑Testing Litigation: DeLoge v. Hill (10th Cir. 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Date: November 6, 2025

Disposition: Appeal dismissed in part as moot; remaining judgment affirmed

Note: Nonprecedential order and judgment; persuasive value only (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Tenth Circuit’s decision in DeLoge v. Hill, where a Wyoming prisoner’s federal civil rights challenge to the state’s post‑conviction DNA‑testing scheme was dismissed in part as moot and otherwise affirmed on jurisdictional grounds. The case sits at the intersection of post‑conviction access to DNA testing, Article III justiciability (standing and mootness), and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine’s bar on lower federal court review of state‑court judgments.

Steven A. DeLoge, convicted in 2000 of multiple counts of second‑degree sexual assault and serving six consecutive life sentences, sought additional DNA testing under Wyoming’s Post‑Conviction DNA Testing Act and its companion Factual Innocence Act. After a state court denied his motion under then‑existing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7‑12‑303(d) (imposing a due‑diligence gate for those convicted after January 1, 2000), he brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit challenging the statute’s constitutionality and alleging due process and First Amendment violations tied to the state court’s handling of his request and to state‑court filing restrictions previously imposed on him. The district court screened and dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and DeLoge appealed.

While the appeal was pending, the Wyoming Legislature amended § 7‑12‑303(d), expanding the class of convictions exempted from the due‑diligence requirement to those “on or before July 1, 2008.” Because DeLoge’s conviction predated that date, the Tenth Circuit held his constitutional attack on § 7‑12‑303(d) moot. The court affirmed as to his remaining claims, concluding they were barred by Rooker–Feldman because they in substance attacked state‑court decisions in his case, and reaffirmed that prior challenges to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s filing restrictions were already foreclosed.

Summary of the Opinion

Mootness via statutory amendment: The 2025 amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7‑12‑303(d) exempts individuals convicted on or before July 1, 2008 from the statute’s due‑diligence limitation. Because DeLoge was convicted in 2000, the due‑diligence barrier no longer applies to him. His equal protection challenge to § 7‑12‑303(d) was therefore moot and dismissed.
Standing caution: The court emphasized that Article III forbids adjudicating the rights of others not before the court; now that § 7‑12‑303(d) does not apply to DeLoge, he cannot attack it on behalf of later‑convicted inmates.
Rooker–Feldman controls the rest: The court affirmed the dismissal of his due process and First Amendment “access to courts” claims because they effectively sought federal review of state‑court rulings—namely, decisions on appointment of counsel and the court’s refusal to accept a DNA‑testing stipulation—and because a prior Tenth Circuit decision already rejected his challenge to state‑court filing restrictions.
No need to reach other issues: The court did not decide the district court’s alternative standing analysis (based on alleged lack of “concrete harm”) or the merits of whether further testing could show “actual innocence” under Wyoming law; those questions were unnecessary given mootness and Rooker–Feldman.
Procedural notes: The court construed DeLoge’s motion about the amended statute as a Rule 28(j) letter and denied the motion as unnecessary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011):
Skinner permits a § 1983 action to seek access to DNA testing as a challenge to state post‑conviction procedures (distinct from a habeas attack on the conviction). The district court acknowledged Skinner and treated DeLoge’s procedural challenge as theoretically cognizable. The Tenth Circuit’s decision does not undermine Skinner; rather, it underscores that even when Skinner allows the vehicle, Article III and Rooker–Feldman may still foreclose federal adjudication depending on the posture and nature of the claims.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021):
TransUnion’s requirement of a “concrete” injury informed the district court’s standing dismissal of the equal protection claim (reasoning that, given admitted DNA on a rape‑kit swab, further testing could not establish actual innocence as required by Wyoming law). The Tenth Circuit did not affirm on that ground, resolving instead on mootness; but it reiterated the standing principle that federal courts cannot adjudicate laws that no longer affect the plaintiff.
PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010):
Defines Rooker–Feldman’s scope: lower federal courts cannot function as appellate tribunals reviewing state‑court judgments. The court relied on this framework in holding that claims predicated on the state court’s appointment‑of‑counsel decisions and rejection of a stipulation were barred.
Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992):
Sets out the mootness principle that appellate courts must dismiss when events make it “impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief.” The legislative amendment rendered relief on the equal protection claim pointless; dismissal for mootness followed.
Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2001), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Reinforces that federal courts adjudicate actual controversies and do not issue advisory opinions or invalidate statutes absent injury to the litigant before the court. This undergirded the Tenth Circuit’s refusal to entertain equal protection arguments benefiting others convicted after July 1, 2008.
Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005):
Highlights the heightened significance of standing when federal courts review state laws, reflecting separation‑of‑powers and federalism concerns; it bolstered the court’s restraint here.
Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2009) and Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008):
Provide standards for de novo review of § 1915A dismissals and liberal construction of pro se filings, setting the appellate lens through which the panel viewed the case.
DeLoge v. Davis, No. 21‑8025, 2021 WL 6143719 (10th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021):
Prior appeal in which the Tenth Circuit held that Rooker–Feldman barred challenges to Wyoming Supreme Court filing restrictions. That ruling foreclosed a renewed “access to courts” attack here, including as applied to DNA‑testing efforts.

Legal Reasoning

Post‑appeal statutory change moots the constitutional challenge:
In 2025, Wyoming amended § 7‑12‑303(d) to expand the exemption from the due‑diligence bar to those convicted on or before July 1, 2008. DeLoge’s 2000 conviction places him within this expanded carve‑out. Under Church of Scientology, the court must dismiss questions that no longer admit of effectual relief. Because the due‑diligence condition no longer applies to him, there is no live dispute about its constitutionality as to this plaintiff.

The panel added a standing corollary: the court cannot opine on whether § 7‑12‑303(d) violates equal protection as to others (such as those convicted after July 1, 2008) because Article III forbids advisory opinions. The “ultimate question of constitutionality” is distinct from the “antecedent issue” of whether this plaintiff has standing; he does not, once the statute stops injuring him.
Rooker–Feldman bars claims targeting state‑court rulings in the DNA‑testing proceedings:
Though framed as due process and access‑to‑courts challenges, the second and third claims hinged on the state court’s specific rulings: appointing public‑defender counsel over conflict objections, limiting scope of representation, and declining to accept a stipulated testing order in favor of a hearing. Because those alleged injuries arise from judgments rendered in DeLoge’s case, they are functionally attempts to appeal state‑court decisions in federal district court. Under PJ ex rel. Jensen and Rooker–Feldman’s core rule, such collateral review is unavailable in lower federal courts. The same doctrine forecloses renewed attacks on Wyoming Supreme Court filing restrictions already rejected in DeLoge’s 2021 appeal.
Issues the panel did not reach:
The district court alternatively held that DeLoge lacked standing because, in light of admitted DNA on a rape‑kit swab and Wyoming’s “actual innocence” threshold (§ 7‑12‑303(c)(ix)), further testing could not exonerate him. The panel expressly declined to address that reasoning, leaving the merits of “actual innocence” under Wyoming law for potential state‑court proceedings under the amended statute.

Potential Impact

Strategic effects of legislative amendments:
DeLoge illustrates that mid‑appeal statutory changes can—and often will—moot constitutional challenges, especially equal protection attacks on categorical cut‑offs. Litigants and state actors should be alert to how legislative fixes can eliminate live controversies. Plaintiffs whose claims are mooted by amendments may need to pivot to renewed state‑court applications under the updated framework rather than press federal constitutional challenges.
Boundaries of Skinner‑authorized § 1983 suits:
While Skinner permits § 1983 actions to seek access to DNA testing, DeLoge underscores that two jurisdictional gates persist: (a) Article III justiciability (standing and mootness); and (b) Rooker–Feldman. When the gravamen of the federal claim is the propriety of state‑court adjudicative acts in the plaintiff’s case (appointment of counsel, discretionary refusal to accept stipulated orders, etc.), Rooker–Feldman will frequently bar relief. Practitioners must carefully craft claims as facial or systemic challenges to procedures, not as de facto appeals of case‑specific rulings.
Wyoming’s DNA‑testing regime post‑2025:
The amendment to § 7‑12‑303(d) meaningfully expands access: those convicted on or before July 1, 2008 need not show due diligence to obtain DNA testing. Nevertheless, other statutory predicates remain, including the requirement that proposed testing has the potential to establish actual innocence (§ 7‑12‑303(c)(ix)), and likely chain‑of‑custody, availability, and materiality showings. The Tenth Circuit did not opine on those merits.
Continuing force of filing restrictions and federalism limits:
The decision reinforces that challenges to state‑court filing restrictions belong in the state system and cannot be collaterally attacked via § 1983 in lower federal courts. Prior Tenth Circuit authority binds this plaintiff and signals a broader, consistent application of Rooker–Feldman to state high court administrative orders affecting litigant access.
Practical roadmap for similarly situated inmates:
For Wyoming inmates convicted on or before July 1, 2008, the appropriate next step is a renewed motion in state court under the amended statute, focusing on satisfying the “potential to establish actual innocence” threshold and other statutory criteria. Federal § 1983 suits remain available for facial challenges to unconstitutional procedures not tied to particular case outcomes, but they are ill‑suited to re‑litigating state‑court decisions in a specific case.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness vs. Standing:
Standing asks whether the plaintiff was injured by the challenged conduct at the time the suit was filed. Mootness asks whether subsequent events have eliminated the court’s ability to grant meaningful relief. Here, a legislative amendment during the appeal mooted the equal protection claim because the revised statute no longer affected the plaintiff.
Rooker–Feldman Doctrine:
Lower federal courts (district and circuit courts) cannot act as appellate courts reviewing state‑court judgments. If the federal claim’s injury flows from a state‑court decision, and the requested relief would effectively undo that decision, Rooker–Feldman generally bars the suit. The right avenue for relief is through the state appellate system and, if federal issues remain, a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Skinner’s § 1983 pathway for DNA testing:
Skinner allows prisoners to use § 1983 to challenge unconstitutional state procedures that block access to DNA testing. Success on such a claim doesn’t itself invalidate the conviction, so habeas is not required. But Skinner does not override jurisdictional limitations like standing, mootness, or Rooker–Feldman.
Wyoming’s “actual innocence” threshold:
Wyoming’s DNA‑testing statute requires that proposed testing have the potential to establish the movant’s actual innocence. This is a forward‑looking plausibility threshold: the movant must show how the results, if favorable, could exculpate them—not merely that testing might be interesting or produce cumulative evidence.
Section 1915A screening:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, district courts must screen prisoner complaints against governmental defendants and dismiss those that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek relief from immune defendants. Appellate review of such dismissals is de novo.
Rule 28(j) letters:
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) allows parties to advise a court of significant and relevant authorities that come to light after briefing, including statutory amendments. The Tenth Circuit treated DeLoge’s “judicial notice” motion as a 28(j) submission and considered it in resolving mootness.

Conclusion

DeLoge v. Hill offers a crisp illustration of two powerful jurisdictional constraints in civil rights litigation surrounding post‑conviction DNA testing. First, when a legislature amends a statute mid‑appeal to remove the plaintiff from the challenged category, constitutional attacks on that provision become moot and must be dismissed. Second, even after Skinner opened § 1983 as a vehicle for procedural challenges to DNA‑testing regimes, Rooker–Feldman still bars claims that, in substance, seek federal review of state‑court decisions in a particular case.

On the merits, the Tenth Circuit expressed no view about whether additional DNA testing could potentially establish actual innocence under Wyoming law or whether the district court correctly assessed standing on that issue. Instead, it left those questions where they belong post‑amendment: in the Wyoming courts under the revised statute. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder to distinguish between facial, prospective attacks on systemic procedures (potentially cognizable under § 1983) and as‑applied dissatisfaction with state‑court rulings (foreclosed by Rooker–Feldman), and to anticipate how legislative change can eliminate a federal controversy altogether.

Mootness by Statutory Amendment and Rooker–Feldman Limits in Post‑Conviction DNA‑Testing Litigation: Commentary on DeLoge v. Hill (10th Cir. 2025)