Moore v. Rubin: Punitive Damages and Consent Under the TVPA in Coercive BDSM Encounters

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s decision in Moore v. Rubin, No. 24‑2018‑cv (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), is a significant development in federal sex‑trafficking jurisprudence under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595.

The case arises from a long‑running pattern of sadomasochistic (BDSM) encounters orchestrated by Howard Rubin, a wealthy Wall Street bond trader, who—through paid assistants—recruited young women from around the country, flew them to New York, and subjected them to escalating physical and sexual violence in exchange for money. Six women brought a civil action under the TVPA and state tort law, alleging that Rubin used force, fraud, and coercion to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts, often far beyond anything they had agreed to and frequently while they were intoxicated, drugged, bound, or gagged.

After a seven‑day jury trial in the Eastern District of New York, the jury found Rubin liable to each plaintiff under the TVPA and awarded each woman $500,000 in compensatory damages. In a punitive‑damages phase, the jury awarded punitive damages ranging from $120,000 to $250,000 per plaintiff, for a total of $3,850,000. The jury rejected almost all state tort claims and all claims against Rubin’s key assistant, Jennifer Powers.

On appeal, Rubin challenged:

the sufficiency of the evidence under the TVPA, especially as to mens rea and lack of consent;
the correctness of the jury instructions on consent and withdrawal of consent; and
the legal availability of punitive damages under the TVPA’s civil remedy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595.

The Second Circuit (Judge Chin, joined by Judges Walker and Park) affirmed in full. In doing so, the court:

clarified how the TVPA’s mens rea requirement operates over time, including in repeated “patronizing” encounters, and accepted a “modus operandi” approach to knowledge;
rejected arguments that NDAs, initial consent to BDSM, or victims’ return visits necessarily negate coercion or lack of consent under the TVPA; and
held, as a matter of first impression in this Circuit, that punitive damages are available in civil TVPA actions under § 1595.

These holdings collectively extend and solidify the reach of the TVPA to abusive BDSM arrangements and to “demand‑side” purchasers of commercial sex, while significantly raising the civil exposure of traffickers through punitive damages.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Over roughly a decade, Rubin:

developed a parallel “secondary life” centered on increasingly violent BDSM encounters;
rented and outfitted a Manhattan penthouse with a “red room” or “sex dungeon” containing whips, chains, restraints, an X‑shaped cross, and electrical devices;
paid an ex‑girlfriend, Jennifer Powers, up to $15,000 per month as a personal assistant to recruit women, arrange travel, host them, and smooth over the aftermath;
used intermediaries, social media, and modeling platforms to identify young models and other women, many with histories of abuse, addiction, or financial distress;
lured them with promises of large payments, fancy dinners, first‑class flights, and “light fetish play” or mild BDSM; and
later deployed a form NDA/“consent contract” with a $500,000 liquidated‑damages clause for disclosure, often presented after alcohol or drug use, without meaningful opportunity for review or counsel.

The plaintiffs’ testimony described a recurring pattern:

initial meetings that sometimes appeared relatively consensual and consistent with “light” BDSM; followed by
subsequent episodes in which Rubin, after providing or condoning the use of alcohol, cocaine, oxycodone, Vicodin, Xanax, or other substances, brutally escalated the level of violence and sexual humiliation—using pool cues, glass dildos, electrical devices, ropes, gags, blindfolds, whips, fists, and threats—well beyond anything discussed;
the use of gags, restraints, and intoxication that rendered safe words or other expressions of non‑consent ineffective; and
continuation of beatings or rapes even after plaintiffs begged him to stop, screamed, cried, or tried to squirm away.

Several plaintiffs described returning for later encounters due to:

financial dependence;
addictions exacerbated by Rubin’s provision of opioids;
psychological hold tied to histories of sexual abuse that Rubin exploited; and
fear of his wealth, influence, and the NDA’s threatened $500,000 penalty for speaking out.

All six plaintiffs testified to significant psychological trauma, including PTSD, depression, anxiety, nightmares, and in some cases relapse into substance abuse. Some described permanent physical injuries.

B. Procedural Posture

The plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint alleged:

civil sex‑trafficking claims under the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595; and
state‑law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

After trial, the jury:

found Rubin liable under the TVPA to each plaintiff;
awarded each woman $500,000 in compensatory damages;
found almost no liability on the state‑law tort claims (besides a battery finding for Moore, with zero damages awarded on that count); and
acquitted Powers on all claims.

In a punitive‑damages phase, the jury awarded:

$120,000 in punitive damages to each of five plaintiffs; and
$250,000 to one plaintiff (Moore), for a total of $850,000 in punitive damages.

The district court denied Rubin’s post‑trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial under Rules 50 and 59. Rubin appealed.

C. Holdings

The Second Circuit:

Sufficiency of the evidence: Held that ample evidence supported the TVPA verdicts. The court emphasized Rubin’s established modus operandi of recruiting vulnerable women under the guise of light BDSM, then subjecting them—repeatedly and for pay—to nonconsensual, violent sexual acts using force, fraud, and coercion.
Mens rea under § 1591: Clarified that:
- the statute’s knowledge/reckless‑disregard requirement (“knowing…that means of force…will be used”) does not require certainty about future events; and
- knowledge can be inferred from a defendant’s recurring pattern of conduct, and can arise while he is “patronizing” the victim, not only at initial recruitment.
Consent and BDSM: Accepted consent as an affirmative defense but held that Rubin failed to carry his burden. The court made several key points:
- initial consent to commercial sex or light BDSM is not permanent and does not encompass later, more extreme acts;
- NDAs—especially those rushed, signed under intoxication, and containing draconian penalties—do not conclusively prove consent;
- victims’ return visits, friendly texts, or recruitment of other women are compatible with coercion, given psychological, financial, and addiction‑related vulnerabilities; and
- the jury could reasonably find that plaintiffs did not consent to the later, abusive conduct, and that Rubin knew or recklessly disregarded this.
Jury instructions: Concluded that the TVPA instruction, including the consent and BDSM components, accurately stated the law. A supplemental instruction on withdrawal of consent—prompted by a jury question about Powers—was, at worst, harmless and did not warrant reversal.
Punitive damages under § 1595: As a matter of first impression in the Second Circuit, held that punitive damages are available in civil TVPA actions. The court:
- relied on the general principle that, absent clear congressional direction to the contrary, courts may award any appropriate relief in a federal statutory cause of action;
- read “damages” in § 1595 to include punitive damages; and
- aligned the Second Circuit with the Ninth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits in allowing punitive damages for TVPA violations.

III. Legal Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: §§ 1591 and 1595

1. Section 1591: Criminal Sex Trafficking

Section 1591 makes it a crime to:

“knowingly…in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce…recruit[], entice[], harbor[], transport[], provide[], obtain[], advertise[], maintain[], patronize[], or solicit[] by any means a person…knowing, or…in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion…will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.”

Key definitions:

Commercial sex act: “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” § 1591(e)(3).
Coercion: includes threats of serious harm or physical restraint; schemes intended to make a person believe that failure to perform will cause serious harm or restraint; and “abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.” § 1591(e)(2).
Serious harm: “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm,” that would compel a reasonable person with the victim’s background, in the victim’s circumstances, to perform or continue performing commercial sex to avoid that harm. § 1591(e)(5).

Congress has repeatedly broadened § 1591 since 2000, notably in 2015, when it added “patronizes or solicits” to reach not only suppliers (pimps, “madams,” traffickers) but also purchasers of forced commercial sex. The legislative history quoted by the panel confirms that Congress intended to cover “persons who purchase illicit sexual acts.”

2. Section 1595: Civil Remedy

In 2003, Congress enacted § 1595(a), authorizing any victim of conduct prohibited by § 1591 to bring a civil action and “recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.” Early drafts explicitly mentioned “actual damages, punitive damages, [and] other litigation costs,” but the enacted version uses the generic term “damages.” The opinion reads that choice as inclusive, not restrictive, a crucial point for punitive damages.

B. Mens Rea Under § 1591: Timing and Modus Operandi

1. The Statutory Phrase “Will Be Used”

Rubin argued that § 1591’s mens rea element—“knowing…that means of force, threats of force, fraud, [or] coercion…will be used”—must be satisfied at the time of recruitment, and that there was no evidence he knew or recklessly disregarded that force or coercion would be used when he initially arranged these encounters.

The Second Circuit acknowledged that the future‑tense phrase “will be used” implies some forward‑looking awareness. But it rejected Rubin’s attempt to freeze that awareness at the recruitment stage. Relying in part on out‑of‑circuit criminal cases, the court held:

the statute also covers defendants who patronize or maintain victims, and those verbs are inherently contemporaneous (i.e., they apply while the sexual activity is ongoing or being repeated); and
a defendant can form the requisite mental state during the course of the sexual relationship, especially where there is a recurring pattern of violent, coercive encounters.

In other words, a purchaser like Rubin can violate § 1591 not only by recruiting women with pre‑formed intent to use force, but also by:

continuing to patronize them for commercial sex while knowing, based on past practice, that he will deploy force or coercion in future encounters; or
deciding, in the course of a particular encounter, to cross the line into nonconsensual, forcibly maintained sex acts.

2. Precedents on Knowledge and Future Conduct

The panel invoked several key precedents:

United States v. Garcia‑Gonzalez (5th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Jungers (8th Cir. 2013) – both criminal cases reading “will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act” to mean:
- the statute does not require that the commercial sex act have already occurred; the crime is complete once the defendant acts with the requisite knowledge that force/fraud/coercion will be used to cause such acts in the future; and
- purchasers can be liable, not just traditional traffickers.
United States v. Todd (9th Cir. 2010) – the opinion quotes Todd’s crucial clarification that when a federal statute speaks in terms of knowledge of future events, it does not require certainty:

“[N]othing is completely stable, no plan is beyond alteration. When an act of Congress requires knowledge of a future action, it does not require knowledge in the sense of certainty as to a future act.”
Instead, knowledge is satisfied by a defendant’s awareness of an “established modus operandi” that will in the future cause commercial sex acts.
United States v. Maynes (4th Cir. 2018) – confirming that the crime is complete when the defendant acts with knowledge that prohibited means will be used, even if the coercion has not yet actually caused the sex act.
Noble v. Weinstein (S.D.N.Y. 2018) – a civil TVPA case cited for the idea that a plaintiff can satisfy § 1591’s knowledge requirement by alleging that the defendant enticed the plaintiff with a known modus operandi involving force or fraud.

By endorsing this modus operandi approach, the Second Circuit confirms that patterned abusive conduct—especially where the defendant deliberately cultivates a system of recruitment, intoxication, and escalating violence—can prove the required mental state for both criminal and civil TVPA liability.

3. Application to Rubin

The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Rubin:

ran a “sophisticated operation” to recruit young, often vulnerable women with promises of money, flights, and “light fetish play”;
habitually provided or condoned heavy alcohol and drug use, undermining their capacity to consent or object;
routinely escalated the level of violence beyond anything discussed or contemplated—using gags, restraints, electrical devices, and extreme humiliation; and
continued to abuse women despite their screams, pleas, safe‑word attempts, or obvious distress, sometimes for extended periods.

Given this pattern, the court concluded that Rubin had a clear modus operandi and that the jury could reasonably infer that when he recruited, transported, and continued to patronize these women, he knew or at least recklessly disregarded that he would use force and coercion to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts to which they did not consent.

Notably, the court explicitly recognized that Moore v. Rubin is “not the typical sex trafficking case originally contemplated by the TVPA,” but stressed that Congress’s amendments—including the addition of “patronizes or solicits” and coverage of purchasers—were designed to reach precisely such conduct.

C. Consent, BDSM, and Coercion Under the TVPA

1. Consent as an Affirmative Defense

Rubin asserted consent as an affirmative defense: arguing that the plaintiffs agreed to BDSM sex for money and that he did not know of any withdrawal of consent. The court treated consent that way as well, emphasizing:

consent is not part of the plaintiff’s prima facie TVPA case; rather, it is a defense Rubin had the burden to prove; and
the jury reasonably found that he did not carry that burden.

The opinion underscores that consent is “not permanent” and “has boundaries”. It can be limited to certain activities or intensities and can be withdrawn. Once withdrawn, continued sexual acts obtained by force, threats, fraud, or coercion are nonconsensual for purposes of § 1591.

2. NDAs and the Illusion of Consent

A central factual and legal battleground was Rubin’s use of NDAs that purported to:

memorialize the women’s “voluntary” agreement to engage in BDSM that could be “hazardous and on occasion cause injury”; and
impose a $500,000 “penalty” if they disclosed “confidential information.”

Rubin argued that these contracts proved he reasonably believed the plaintiffs consented to even extreme BDSM acts. The Second Circuit rejected that inference, stressing:

the NDAs were often presented after alcohol or drug consumption, with no chance to consult counsel, no negotiation, and no copies retained;
many plaintiffs had limited education and were acutely disadvantaged in bargaining power compared to a multi‑millionaire with legal resources;
the punitive clause of $500,000 for disclosure strongly contributed to plaintiffs’ fear of legal and financial retaliation; and
the contracts did not spell out, in any concrete way, the specific acts Rubin later inflicted (electrical shocks, pool cues, forced assaults on third parties, etc.).

The court effectively treats the NDAs as evidence of imbalance and coercion rather than genuine informed consent. Although the panel does not explicitly label the NDA penalty as “abuse of law or legal process” under § 1591(e)(2)(C), its reasoning tracks that concept: the use of a civil legal instrument for an improper coercive purpose (to silence victims and deter reporting) fits comfortably within the TVPA’s definition of coercion.

3. Vulnerability, Return Visits, and “Apparent” Willingness

Rubin also relied heavily on:

text messages in which some plaintiffs thanked him or Powers and said they had “fun” and wanted to “do it again”;
instances where plaintiffs recruited friends to meet Rubin; and
the fact that several plaintiffs voluntarily returned for additional encounters.

The court held that none of this compelled a finding of consent. Relying on United States v. Rivera (2d Cir. 2015) and similar cases, the panel reaffirmed that a jury assessing coercion and “serious harm” may consider the “particular vulnerabilities” of victims, including:

childhood sexual abuse (as with Hopper), which Rubin exploited by reenacting the abuse during BDSM encounters;
substance dependence (e.g., Hassen’s oxycodone addiction, which Rubin helped initiate, and Lytell’s dependence on Xanax and Percocet);
economic desperation and lack of education, which made the large payments and “finder’s fees” particularly coercive; and
fear of Rubin’s wealth, power, and the NDA’s threatening penalty.

Within this context, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that:

texts and apparent friendliness were strategies to secure much‑needed money or to mitigate potential retaliation, not expressions of genuine consent;
return visits do not negate coercion, especially where addiction, psychological control, or financial need are in play; and
victims may continue to participate in some commercial sex acts voluntarily but still be trafficked when forced or coerced into additional acts they did not agree to.

The court cited United States v. Pollok (2d Cir. 2025) and United States v. Cephus (7th Cir. 2012) for the proposition that even individuals who appear to enter prostitution voluntarily can be victims of trafficking when violence, threats, or exploitation of vulnerabilities compel them to perform unwanted acts. It also referenced district‑court and scholarly commentary emphasizing that “willing” sex workers may be trafficked when later subjected to conditions beyond what they accepted.

4. BDSM, Safe Words, and Exceeding the Scope of Consent

The court took care to distinguish between consensual BDSM and trafficking:

consensual BDSM may involve force, restraints, and pain within mutually understood limits and with the ability to withdraw consent (e.g., via safe words);
Rubin’s practices went far beyond that paradigm:
- he frequently ignored safe words or rendered them unusable by gagging and binding plaintiffs;
- he escalated to extreme conduct (e.g., electric shocks, public beatings, assaults on third parties) never disclosed in advance;
- he continued after pleas to stop or after plaintiffs lost consciousness; and
- he leveraged NDAs and vulnerabilities to suppress complaints.

The court’s instruction—“if you find that the plaintiff consented to the BDSM act, then by definition, neither force nor coercion were used”—was framed to assure the jury that consensual BDSM alone is not trafficking. But the factual record allowed the jury to find that Rubin routinely moved well beyond any consensual BDSM boundaries, and that the force and coercion used to compel additional acts fell squarely within § 1591.

D. Jury Instructions on Mens Rea, Consent, and Withdrawal of Consent

1. General Instruction

The court reviewed the jury charge as a whole. On the TVPA claim, the district judge instructed that plaintiffs had to show Rubin:

recruited, enticed, transported, provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited the plaintiffs; and
did so “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that force, the threat of force, fraud or coercion, will cause the plaintiff to engage in a commercial sex act in which the plaintiff would not otherwise have willingly engaged.”

The court then gave a detailed consent instruction, including:

“Consent isn’t permanent”;
consent can be limited to certain acts and not others;
consent obtained by fraud, duress, coercion, or while lacking capacity is invalid; and
jurors should consider “surrounding facts and circumstances, including subsequent conduct and statements.”

Rubin had requested an instruction that he was not liable if he “reasonably believed” the plaintiffs consented. The panel held that the charge, taken as a whole, effectively conveyed this standard by tying the absence of liability to the presence of genuine consent and explaining how consent is communicated and limited.

2. The Supplemental Instruction on Withdrawal of Consent

During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question:

“Sex Trafficking. If a person is not present when consent is withdrawn, is consent still a defense for that person?”

The court, clearly thinking about Powers (who was not physically present in the dungeon during most acts), answered:

“Where consent has been given and then a person is not present when the consent is withdrawn, the person who is not present must know, or recklessly disregard, the withdrawal of the consent during the commercial sex act to be liable for that act of sex trafficking.”

Rubin seized on this answer to argue that the jury was misled about his own liability, claiming it suggested liability even without his knowledge of withdrawal of consent. The Second Circuit rejected that reading for several reasons:

the question (and answer) plainly concerned a defendant who was “not present” when consent was withdrawn—Powers, not Rubin, who was present during the acts;
as to Rubin, the earlier instructions already made clear that he must know or recklessly disregard that force or coercion would cause nonconsensual commercial sex acts; and
the jury could—and likely did—find that Rubin’s conduct never fell within the scope of initial consent, so there was no “withdrawal” issue as to many acts.

Even assuming some ambiguity, the panel held any error harmless: the evidence strongly supported the finding that Rubin knew, in real time, that the plaintiffs were not consenting to the extreme violence he inflicted.

E. Punitive Damages Under § 1595: A New Second Circuit Precedent

1. The Franklin Default Rule and the Text of § 1595

Whether punitive damages are available under the TVPA’s civil remedy provision was the central doctrinal question on appeal.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), establishes a default: absent clear congressional direction to the contrary, courts may award “any appropriate relief” in an implied or express federal cause of action. In tort‑like statutory schemes, that generally includes punitive damages where the defendant’s conduct is outrageous or malicious.

Section 1595(a) allows victims to “recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.” Rubin argued that because an earlier draft had explicitly mentioned “punitive damages,” and Congress later deleted that term, this signaled an intent to exclude punitive damages from the final statute.

The Second Circuit disagreed, reading the legislative history differently:

Congress removed both “actual” and “punitive” from the earlier draft, replacing that detailed list with a generic “damages”;
had Congress wanted to forbid punitive damages, it could have retained “actual damages” and omitted any reference to punitive relief; and
instead, the shift to “damages” suggests an intent to leave the remedial palette to courts under the Franklin default, including both compensatory and punitive components.

2. Court of Appeals Consensus and Adoption of Ditullio

The Second Circuit aligned itself with:

Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that because § 1595 creates a cause of action that “sounds in tort,” punitive damages are available absent contrary congressional direction;
Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017);
Francisco v. Susano, 525 F. App’x 828 (10th Cir. 2013); and
Warfaa v. Ali, 1 F.4th 289 (4th Cir. 2021) (implicitly affirming a punitive award under the TVPA).

The court found particularly persuasive the reasoning that:

the TVPA targets reprehensible, criminalized conduct, and Congress expressly intended to “ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers”;
a civil remedy that mirrors tort law naturally includes punitive damages for egregious misconduct; and
excluding punitive damages would undercut the statute’s deterrent and expressive purposes.

By holding that the TVPA “sounds in tort” and that “damages” includes punitive awards, the Second Circuit made clear that:

punitive damages are legally available in civil TVPA actions in this Circuit; and
the ordinary common‑law standards for punitive awards (e.g., malice, willful and wanton misconduct, or reckless indifference to rights) govern their imposition and amount.

The panel also noted that Rubin’s conduct—systematic exploitation, physical torture, leveraging NDAs to silence victims—falls squarely within the kind of “outrageous” behavior that justifies punitive damages, although it did not separately review the amount awarded for excessiveness.

F. Likely Impact on Future Litigation and Practice

1. Expansion of TVPA Liability to “Private” BDSM and High‑End Buyers

Historically, many TVPA cases have involved:

organized prostitution rings;
street‑level pimping; or
labor trafficking in agriculture, domestic work, or foreign contracting.

Moore v. Rubin is notable because:

the defendant was not a traditional “pimp” but a wealthy, private individual who purchased sex for his own use;
the recruits were not framed as conventional sex workers at the outset, but as models, Playmates, or companions invited to “fetish” shoots and “light” BDSM; and
the abuse occurred in a private penthouse dungeon, with NDAs and high‑end trappings drawn in part from mainstream erotic media (Fifty Shades of Grey).

The decision sends a clear message: TVPA liability extends to sophisticated, “white‑collar” buyers who orchestrate private sexual violence masked as consensual BDSM or modeling work, especially when they exploit NDAs, vulnerabilities, and drugs.

2. Evidentiary Focus on Patterns, Vulnerability, and Power Imbalances

The opinion highlights several forms of evidence that practitioners in future TVPA cases should focus on:

Patterns of conduct (modus operandi): repeated recruitment script, recurring escalation, same tools or devices, common use of substances, consistent disregard of safe words or pleas.
Digital communications: text, social media messages, internal chats between defendants and their assistants about recruiting, managing, or “handling” victims.
NDAs and contracts: especially those with heavy penalties, signed under intoxication or duress, and framed as “BDSM contracts” drawn from popular media.
Victim vulnerabilities: histories of abuse, addiction, or financial desperation, and evidence that the defendant knew and exploited those vulnerabilities.
Post‑event behavior: apologetic or friendly texts from victims (which may be attempts to secure payment, avoid blame, or placate abusers), continued contact, and return visits, all of which must be interpreted in light of coercion and trauma rather than at face value.

Courts are likely to increasingly accept that the presence of money, NDAs, and apparently “high‑status” settings does not negate trafficking; instead, these can be evidentiary indicators of sophisticated coercion.

3. Strategic Significance of Punitive Damages

By authorizing punitive damages under § 1595, the Second Circuit:

raises the potential exposure for individual and corporate defendants, especially where systemic or corporate‑sponsored trafficking schemes are alleged (e.g., hospitality, platforms, recruiting agencies);
strengthens plaintiffs’ settlement leverage in civil TVPA cases, given the unpredictability and potential scale of punitive awards; and
incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring TVPA claims (with fee‑shifting) in cases that might previously have been framed solely under state tort or contract law.

For defense counsel, this heightens the importance of:

early evaluation of punitive‑damages exposure;
documenting and enforcing robust compliance policies where organizations might be accused of “benefiting” from trafficking ventures; and
careful handling of NDAs or “consent forms,” which may be treated as evidence of coercion rather than protection.

4. Doctrinal Clarification on Consent in Commercial Sex Contexts

The opinion further cements a line of authority, both in the Second Circuit and nationally, that:

prior involvement in sex work or pornography does not negate victim status; and
“consent to commercial sex” at one moment does not license subsequent forced sex or extreme violence.

This has important implications for:

cases involving escorting, exotic dancing, online pornography, and “sugar” relationships;
arguments that victims “knew what they were getting into” because they were in the industry; and
jury instructions, which must emphasize that consent is situational, revocable, and constrained by coercion and vulnerability.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

The following brief explanations may help non‑specialist readers better understand the legal concepts at play:

1. What is the TVPA?

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act is a federal law aimed at combating human trafficking, including sex trafficking. It has:

criminal provisions (like § 1591), used by prosecutors; and
civil remedies (§ 1595), allowing victims to sue traffickers for money damages and attorneys’ fees.

2. “Commercial Sex Act”

A “commercial sex act” is any sexual act where something of value is given or received—money, drugs, rent, gifts, or other benefits. It does not require formal prostitution; any quid pro quo sexual arrangement can qualify.

3. “Coercion” and “Serious Harm”

Coercion means using threats, pressure, or legal maneuvers to force or strongly pressure someone into sex acts. It can be physical (threats, locking doors) or non‑physical (threats to ruin reputation, financial ruin, deportation, or legal penalties).
Serious harm is any harm that, given the person’s background and situation, would reasonably make them feel they must go along—physical injury, psychological trauma, financial devastation, social disgrace, etc.

4. “Knowledge” and “Reckless Disregard”

To violate § 1591, a defendant must either:

know that force, threats, fraud, or coercion will be used; or
act in reckless disregard: consciously ignoring a substantial risk that such means will be used.

“Knowledge” here does not require certainty about the future. Repeatedly behaving in a way that uses force or coercion, and continuing the arrangement, is enough to show knowledge or reckless disregard.

5. “Modus Operandi”

A modus operandi is a pattern or method of behavior a person uses again and again. In this case, Rubin’s pattern of recruiting, intoxicating, and then escalating violence in a controlled environment is his modus operandi. Courts can infer knowledge and intent from such patterns.

6. Affirmative Defense

An affirmative defense is a legal argument where the defendant says, “Even if everything the plaintiff says is true, I still win because of this additional fact.” The defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Here, Rubin’s claim that plaintiffs consented is treated as such a defense.

7. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are extra money damages awarded not just to compensate victims, but to punish particularly bad behavior and deter others. They are reserved for conduct that is malicious, willful, or shows reckless indifference to others’ rights. Under Moore v. Rubin, such damages are available in civil TVPA cases in the Second Circuit.

V. Conclusion

Moore v. Rubin is a far‑reaching decision that:

confirms that the TVPA reaches private, high‑end buyers who orchestrate coercive BDSM encounters for money;
clarifies that the TVPA’s mens rea requirement can be satisfied by a defendant’s ongoing modus operandi and need not be fixed solely at the recruitment stage;
emphatically rejects the argument that NDAs, initial consent to commercial sex, or victims’ return visits negate coercion or lack of consent, especially where vulnerabilities and power imbalances are present; and
establishes, for the first time in the Second Circuit, that punitive damages are available under the TVPA’s civil remedy provision, aligning the court with sister circuits and reinforcing the statute’s deterrent purpose.

As a precedent, the decision will shape both civil and criminal sex‑trafficking litigation in the Second Circuit and beyond. It offers a detailed roadmap for applying the TVPA to non‑traditional trafficking environments—particularly those involving purportedly consensual BDSM, modeling, or high‑end escorting—where the trappings of wealth and “contracts” mask serious exploitation. At the same time, it underscores that the law’s central concern remains the same: protecting vulnerable individuals from being driven, through force, fraud, or coercion, into sexual acts they did not want and did not freely choose.