Moore v. Commonwealth: Re-Drawing the Line Between Police Narrative and “Investigative Hearsay” in Kentucky

Introduction

On 20 June 2025, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in a not-to-be-published opinion, affirmed the Bath Circuit Court’s conviction and fifty-year sentence of Kevin Ray Moore for trafficking in methamphetamine and fentanyl, possession of a firearm by a felon, and persistent felony offender status. Although the opinion itself carries no precedential weight under RAP 40(D), the Court’s detailed discussion refines two recurrent evidentiary problems:

• Whether an officer’s testimony describing the sequence of an investigation impermissibly transmits hearsay to the jury, and
• Whether such testimony violates the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

The Court re-emphasised—building on Ruiz v. Commonwealth—that “investigative hearsay” is an oxymoron and that Kentucky evidence law already contains all necessary tools to police this area. The judgment therefore offers a valuable refresher on how practitioners should treat police narrative evidence at trial.

Summary of the Judgment

Moore challenged his convictions on two inter-related grounds:

1. The trial court allegedly allowed Officer McDaniel to convey inadmissible hearsay by implying that the occupants of a stopped Honda Civic had identified Moore as their drug supplier.
2. This implied statement, Moore argued, also violated his confrontation rights because the Honda’s occupants did not testify.

The Supreme Court held:

• No hearsay was admitted because the officer never quoted or summarised the occupants’ statements; his testimony merely explained the investigative steps that led to the search warrant.
• Consequently, no Confrontation Clause issue arose; even if one had, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming physical evidence of trafficking.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ruiz v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 675 (Ky. 2015)
  Rejected the term “investigative hearsay” and emphasised strict adherence to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE). Moore relies heavily on Ruiz to reaffirm that there is no special hearsay exemption for police testimony.
• Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2016)
  Held that an officer’s “summary” of non-testifying witnesses’ statements is hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter. In Moore, the Court distinguished Dickerson, noting McDaniel did not summarise any statements.
• Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) (overruled on other grounds)
  Earlier condemnation of “investigative hearsay” and police summaries. Again distinguished for same reason.
• Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) & Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)
  Core Confrontation Clause precedents: testimonial out-of-court statements are inadmissible absent cross-examination. The Court found no “testimonial” statement here.
• Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) & Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2014)
  Provide the constitutional harmless-error framework applied hypothetically by the Court.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in two steps.

1. Hearsay Analysis under KRE 801 & 802
   • A statement is hearsay only if (a) an out-of-court assertion is repeated or paraphrased, and (b) it is offered to prove its truth.
   • Officer McDaniel never disclosed what the car’s occupants told him; he stated only that, based on “information” from the stop, he sought a search warrant.
   • Such testimony explains police conduct and is relevant regardless of its truth; therefore it is non-hearsay. The Court analogised to the routine admissibility of an officer saying “I received a dispatch call and responded,” which is offered to explain actions, not the truth of the call.
2. Confrontation Clause Inquiry
   • Because no testimonial statement was conveyed, the Sixth Amendment was not implicated.
   • Even assuming error, the overwhelming physical evidence—over 68 grams of controlled substances, digital scales, a firearm, and $5,000 cash—rendered any putative confrontation violation harmless beyond reasonable doubt.

Impact of the Judgment

Although unpublished, the decision succinctly clarifies the boundaries of permissible police narrative testimony in Kentucky trial practice:

• Police may testify to actions taken (e.g., obtaining a warrant) without detailing the underlying hearsay, so long as the testimony is not offered for its truth.
• Defense counsel must object where an officer’s narrative crosses the line into summarising statements; generic references to “information received” are usually safe for the prosecution.
• The opinion further discourages the use of the discredited label “investigative hearsay,” steering lawyers back to orthodox hearsay analysis under KRE.
• The harmless-error discussion signals the Court’s willingness to uphold convictions when overwhelming physical evidence dwarfs any evidentiary misstep.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hearsay (KRE 801): Any out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts. Think of it as “second-hand information” being used as actual proof.
• “Investigative Hearsay”: A colloquial—now condemned—term once used to justify police summaries of non-testifying witnesses. The Court says: stop using it.
• Confrontation Clause: Constitutional right to face (“confront”) accusers who make testimonial statements. If no statement is conveyed, the right is not triggered.
• Harmless Error: Even if a legal mistake occurred, a conviction stands if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the mistake had no impact on the verdict.

Conclusion

Kevin Ray Moore v. Commonwealth does not innovate new doctrine; rather, it polishes existing principles. The Supreme Court reaffirms that:

1. There is no separate evidentiary doctrine of “investigative hearsay.”
2. Police officers may explain their investigative steps without necessarily opening the hearsay or confrontation doors, provided they avoid relaying the content of out-of-court statements for their truth.
3. Where overwhelming physical evidence exists, minor evidentiary ambiguities will likely be deemed harmless.

For trial lawyers in Kentucky, the takeaway is practical: train officers to describe actions, not statements; object crisply when the line blurs; and abandon the term “investigative hearsay” in favour of traditional KRE analysis. Even though the opinion is unpublished, the Court’s message is loud, clear, and instructive for future litigation.