Moon v. County of Columbia (2025): Civil Service Law § 75(2) Representation Rights Do Not Attach to Neutral HR Fact-Finding, and Narrative Hearing Reports Can Suffice Without Charge-by-Charge Guilty Findings

Introduction

In Matter of Moon v. County of Columbia, 2025 NY Slip Op 06233 (3d Dept Nov. 13, 2025), the Appellate Division, Third Department, confirmed a disciplinary termination of a county probation officer following a Civil Service Law § 75 hearing. The case is a comprehensive treatment of multiple recurring issues in New York public sector discipline: the substantial evidence standard in CPLR article 78 review; when Civil Service Law § 75(2) representation rights attach during employer questioning; the adequacy of a hearing officer’s report that does not expressly render a charge-by-charge verdict; the permissible use of uncharged misconduct for credibility assessments and penalty; the standards governing alleged hearing officer bias and the disqualification of a final decisionmaker; and the proportionality of termination under the “shocks the conscience” framework.

The petitioner, a probation officer, faced three sets of specifications tied to workplace violence prevention and anti-harassment policies, arising from (1) an April 2022 confrontation with a probationer, (2) a March 2023 interaction with a coworker after playing a loud language tutorial and sending an aggressive email, and (3) an April 2023 incident involving close following and taunting of another coworker in the workplace stairwell. A hearing officer sustained the charges and recommended dismissal; the Department Director adopted the recommendation. After transfer of the CPLR article 78 proceeding to the Appellate Division under CPLR 7804(g), the court confirmed the determination in all respects.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department held:

• Substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s findings that the petitioner engaged in unprofessional, threatening, and intimidating conduct contravening county workplace violence and anti-harassment policies.
• The hearing officer’s 30-page report—though not organized as a formal “guilty/not guilty” determination for each enumerated charge—was sufficiently detailed, tracked the charges’ factual specifications, and clearly conveyed findings that established guilt on all charges, thereby enabling meaningful judicial review.
• The hearing officer’s references to uncharged incompetence did not taint the determination because the officer expressly recognized that incompetence was not charged and based the recommendation only on charged misconduct. Uncharged dishonesty admitted by petitioner could be considered appropriately for credibility and penalty.
• Civil Service Law § 75(2) representation rights did not attach during an initial HR assistant’s neutral, information-gathering interview because at that time petitioner had not been identified as a potential subject of discipline and the assistant was not a disciplinary decisionmaker. Once the HR manager determined the petitioner could be subject to discipline, the county provided representation rights for further questioning.
• Claims of hearing officer bias failed; the presumption of impartiality prevailed because petitioner did not show that any alleged bias affected the outcome. Likewise, the Director was not required to disqualify himself merely for initiating charges; he lacked extensive or personal involvement in the underlying events and did not testify.
• Termination did not shock the court’s sense of fairness in light of petitioner’s pattern of aggressive conduct, the credibility findings, and his refusal to accept responsibility or to indicate willingness to change.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Substantial evidence standard:
  • Matter of Wales v City of Saratoga Springs, 200 AD3d 1262, 1264 (3d Dept 2021) — The court reiterated that substantial evidence is a “minimal standard,” requiring only a rational basis in the record as a whole, and is less than a preponderance.
  • Matter of Foster v Saratoga Springs City School Dist., 16 AD3d 824, 825–826 (3d Dept 2005); Matter of Gadway v Connelie, 101 AD2d 974, 975 (3d Dept 1984) — Reinforce deferential review and the centrality of credibility resolutions by the hearing officer.
• Adequacy of hearing officer’s report, sufficiency for judicial review:
  • Matter of Lory v County of Washington, 77 AD3d 1265, 1266 (3d Dept 2010); Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 251 AD2d 866, 867 (3d Dept 1998) — A report need not be a formal charge-by-charge verdict if its detailed findings sufficiently apprise the employee of the determinations and permit intelligent challenge and judicial review. The court relies on these authorities to uphold the narrative format used here.
• Uncharged misconduct and incompetence:
  • Matter of Finigan v Lent, 189 AD2d 935, 939 (3d Dept 1993), appeal dismissed 81 NY2d 1067, lv denied 82 NY2d 657 — A determination cannot be founded on uncharged incompetence. The hearing officer here explicitly acknowledged this limit and did not base the recommendation on incompetence.
  • Matter of Nichols v Village of Malone, 229 AD2d 721, 722 (3d Dept 1996) — Similar boundary between charged and uncharged bases of liability.
  • Bigelow v Board of Trustees of Inc. Vil. of Gouverneur, 63 NY2d 470, 474–475 (1984); Matter of Boyea v Board of Educ. of Madrid-Waddington Cent. School Dist., 209 AD2d 852, 853 (3d Dept 1994), lv denied 85 NY2d 804; Matter of Murano v Village of Goshen, 193 AD2d 1011 (3d Dept 1993) — Uncharged misconduct may be considered for credibility and penalty assessment, even if it cannot support findings of guilt. The court cites and applies Bigelow’s principle to uphold considering petitioner’s admitted dishonesty in evaluating credibility and sanction.
• Civil Service Law § 75(2) interview representation rights:
  • NYC Transit Auth. v NYS Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 8 NY3d 226, 233–234 (2007) — Recognizes representation rights for public employees; supports the statutory and labor-law context for when questioning implicates representational entitlements.
  • Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v Division of N.Y. State Police, 43 AD3d 125, 131 (3d Dept 2007), affd 11 NY3d 96 (2008) — The trigger for § 75(2) turns, at least in part, on whether the initial questioning is part of the disciplinary process or separate, neutral fact-finding. The court applies this test to conclude the HR assistant’s initial “fact-finding mission” did not implicate § 75(2).
  • Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d 764, 766–767 (3d Dept 1996) — Supports the conclusion that early-stage, general inquiries, absent identification of a target of discipline, do not require § 75(2) representation.
• Bias and decisionmaker disqualification:
  • Matter of Warder v Board of Regents, 53 NY2d 186, 197 (1981), cert denied 454 US 1125 — Administrative adjudicators are presumed impartial; appearance alone is insufficient; proof must show outcome flowed from bias.
  • Matter of Compasso v Sheriff of Sullivan County, 29 AD3d 1064, 1065 (3d Dept 2006); Matter of Zlotnick v City of Saratoga Springs, 122 AD3d 1210, 1212 (3d Dept 2014); Matter of Hardy v Kraham, 224 AD3d 946, 948 (3d Dept 2024) — Apply the Warder presumption; petitioner failed to show bias affected the result.
  • Matter of Baker v Poughkeepsie City School Dist., 18 NY3d 714, 718 (2012); Matter of Ashe v Town Bd. of the Town of Crown Point, 97 AD3d 1022, 1023 (3d Dept 2012) — A final decisionmaker extensively involved in building the case must disqualify. The court distinguishes Baker and holds the Director’s limited role (initiating charges, peripheral involvement in one incident, no testimony) did not mandate disqualification.
  • Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d at 767; Matter of Ost v Supervisor of Town of Woodstock, 251 AD2d 724, 726 (3d Dept 1998), lv denied 92 NY2d 817; Matter of Agugliaro v Commissioner of DOT, 135 AD2d 711 (2d Dept 1987), lv denied 72 NY2d 801 — Reinforce that mere initiation of charges or formal review does not equal extensive or personal involvement requiring recusal.
• Penalty and proportionality:
  • Matter of McLean v City of Albany, 13 AD3d 851, 853 (3d Dept 2004); Matter of Bottari v Saratoga Springs City School Dist., 3 AD3d 832, 833 (3d Dept 2004) — Applying the Pell proportionality doctrine, the court held termination was not so disproportionate to shock the conscience where a pattern of aggressive misconduct was established and the employee showed no remorse or inclination to change.
  • Matter of Wojewodzic v O’Neill, 295 AD2d 670, 672 (3d Dept 2002); Matter of Brown v Saranac Lake Cent. School Dist., 273 AD2d 785, 786 (3d Dept 2000) — No need to remit for separate penalty allocations per charge where substantial evidence supports all charges underpinning the penalty.

Legal Reasoning and How the Court Reached Its Decision

The court’s analysis proceeds along classic Article 78 lines, applying deferential substantial evidence review and strong deference to credibility determinations by the hearing officer.

• Substantial evidence and credibility: The record included multiple witnesses and an audio recording corroborating the petitioner’s adversarial and intimidating interactions with a probationer and coworkers. The hearing officer found petitioner “wholly incredible” and credited the County’s witnesses. The court deferred to those credibility findings and concluded that a rational basis supported each specification, easily meeting the “minimal” substantial evidence threshold.
• Adequacy of the hearing report: Although best practice would state explicit guilty/not guilty findings per charge, the 30-page report carefully recounted which facts were proven and mapped those facts to the policy violations alleged. It expressly found misconduct that violated the workplace violence prevention policy (charge two) and, despite a mislabeling, found conduct creating a hostile and intimidating environment that matched the anti-harassment policy elements (charge three), while also finding general misconduct (charge one). This level of detail afforded petitioner adequate notice and permitted meaningful review.
• Uncharged matters:
  • Incompetence: The hearing officer’s observation that the conduct could suggest incompetence did not infect the result because the officer recognized that incompetence was not charged and limited the recommendation to charged misconduct.
  • Dishonesty: Petitioner admitted to false statements in a complaint about the April 2023 incident. Under Bigelow and progeny, such uncharged misconduct may be weighed for credibility and penalty. The hearing officer used it precisely that way, not as an independent basis for liability.
• Civil Service Law § 75(2): when do representation rights attach?
  • The HR assistant’s interview immediately after the March 2023 incident was part of a neutral, preliminary fact-finding across multiple employees; the assistant had no role in deciding discipline, and no employee had yet been identified as a potential subject of discipline.
  • Only after the HR manager completed fact-finding and determined petitioner could be disciplined did the County provide representation for a further interview, complying with § 75(2).
  • Applying the PBA State Troopers framework, the court held § 75(2) rights had not attached at the initial, non-disciplinary inquiry stage because the questioning was not yet part of the disciplinary process and petitioner had not been identified as a potential subject.
• Bias and disqualification:
  • Hearing officer bias: The law presumes impartiality; a petitioner must show that the outcome flowed from bias. Given the “compelling proof” of guilt credited below, petitioner could not demonstrate causation, and his failure to raise bias at the hearing further undermined the claim.
  • Director’s role: Under Baker and Ashe, extensive, personal involvement in building the case compels recusal. The Director’s conduct—initiating charges, being tangentially involved in one episode, not testifying, lacking firsthand knowledge—fell short of that threshold. He could therefore adopt the hearing officer’s recommendation.
• Penalty: The court emphasized petitioner’s pattern of aggressive and unprofessional conduct, disruption of workplace civility, and refusal to accept responsibility or change. Within Pell’s proportionality framework, termination did not shock the conscience, and no remittal for charge-by-charge penalty apportionment was necessary because all supporting charges were sustained.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although the court largely applied settled principles, two clarifications have meaningful operational effect for New York public employers, unions, and practitioners:

• Triggering § 75(2) representation rights: The opinion underscores that neutral, preliminary fact-finding—even when it includes the eventual charged employee—does not, without more, trigger § 75(2). Rights attach when the employer has identified the employee as a “potential subject of disciplinary action” and the questioning is part of the disciplinary process. Employers should:
  • Structure early inquiries as neutral, information-gathering across witnesses;
  • Separate the fact-finder from disciplinary decisionmakers;
  • Provide formal representation notices once a potential subject is identified and before any disciplinary-interrogation stage begins.
  Unions and employees should be alert that not every HR conversation guarantees representation under § 75(2); however, Weingarten-type rights under the Taylor Law may present parallel considerations depending on the circumstances—counsel should assess both frameworks.
• Form of the hearing officer’s report: The court confirms a substance-over-form approach. A well-reasoned narrative that clearly establishes which facts are proven and how they satisfy the charged specifications can be sufficient even without an express verdict per enumerated charge. Nonetheless, agencies should still strive for charge-by-charge clarity to minimize litigation exposure.

Additional consequences include:

• Credibility and uncharged conduct: Bigelow remains robust: admitted dishonesty may weigh heavily against a petitioner’s credibility and increase the penalty.
• Decisionmaker neutrality: Merely initiating charges does not automatically disqualify a final decisionmaker; only extensive, personal involvement in the investigation or prosecution does. Agencies can safely route decisions to the appointing authority who did not investigate or testify.
• Workplace conduct standards: The decision affirms strong judicial support for enforcing workplace violence prevention and anti-harassment policies against public employees, particularly where a pattern of intimidating behavior and refusal to reform is shown.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial evidence: A deferential standard. The court asks only whether there is a reasonable amount of evidence in the record to support the decision—not whether the agency had the “most” evidence. If there is a rational basis, the agency wins.
• Civil Service Law § 75(2) representation rights: New York civil service employees covered by § 75 have the right to representation when they are being questioned in a disciplinary process as a potential subject of discipline. Neutral, early-stage information-gathering that hasn’t targeted anyone yet generally does not trigger this right.
• Uncharged misconduct vs. charged conduct: Agencies must prove what they charged. However, other uncharged bad acts (for example, admitted dishonesty) can legitimately be used to decide whether the employee is believable and what the penalty should be, but not to prove guilt of the charged offenses.
• Bias and disqualification: Hearing officers are presumed fair. To overturn a decision for bias, a petitioner must show not just potential bias but that the biased conduct actually affected the outcome. A final decisionmaker must recuse only if heavily involved in building the case (e.g., investigating or prosecuting the matter).
• Pell proportionality (“shocks the conscience”): A court will disturb a penalty only if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense in light of the employee’s record and the proven misconduct. Termination is permissible where there is a pattern of serious misconduct and no evidence of rehabilitation potential.

Conclusion

Moon v. County of Columbia comprehensively affirms a public employer’s authority to discipline for workplace aggression and harassment, while clarifying two practical points of law. First, Civil Service Law § 75(2) representation rights do not attach to neutral, preliminary fact-finding interviews where no disciplinary target has been identified and the interviewer lacks decision authority; those rights arise when questioning becomes part of the disciplinary process directed at a potential subject. Second, a detailed narrative hearing report that squarely links proven facts to charged specifications can suffice for judicial review even if it does not list a formal guilty/not guilty verdict for each charge.

The court also reinforces familiar boundaries: uncharged misconduct may inform credibility and sanction but not liability; hearing officers enjoy a presumption of impartiality; initiating charges alone does not disqualify an appointing authority from adopting a recommendation; and termination withstands Pell review where a pattern of serious misconduct and unwillingness to reform is proven. For public employers, unions, and counsel, Moon supplies practical guidance on structuring HR inquiries, drafting hearing reports, and preserving the integrity of the adjudicative process, all while signaling strong judicial support for the enforcement of workplace civility norms in public service.