Montreal Convention Exclusivity and Maritime Joint-and-Several Liability as Gap-Fillers for International Air Crash Damages

Introduction

In Richard Murphy, III v. Airway Air Charter, Inc. (11th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a $2.3 million judgment arising from a Miami-to-Bahamas round-trip charter flight that ditched into the ocean after fuel starvation. The plaintiffs, passenger Richard C. Murphy, III and his wife Kathleen T. Murphy, sued multiple defendants, including the pilot (Alex Gutierrez) and the charter company (Airway Air Charter, Inc., d.b.a. Noble Air Charter).

The appeal raised four central issues: (1) whether the case was properly tried under the Montreal Convention despite the complaint referencing the Warsaw Convention; (2) whether the pilot could be held jointly and severally liable alongside the charter company; (3) whether the verdict form and instructions had to include allocation of fault to a nonparty manufacturer (Cessna); and (4) whether the district court improperly admitted “zoomed-in” versions of preflight videos under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c).

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

The Montreal Convention was the operative treaty and the exclusive remedy for the passenger’s injuries on this international itinerary, even though the Bahamas is not a State Party, because Article 1(2) covers certain round trips with an “agreed stopping place” abroad.
Pleading the “Warsaw Convention” rather than the Montreal Convention was not fatal where the complaint pleaded facts providing fair notice and the defendants showed no prejudice; Rule 8 does not require perfect identification of the legal theory.
Because the Montreal Convention is silent on allocation of liability between a carrier and its agents, the court “passed through” to the law that would apply absent the treaty; for this ocean ditching between Florida and the Bahamas, that law was general maritime tort law, which applies joint and several liability after judgment.
The district court did not err by omitting Cessna from the apportionment portion of the verdict form; the Montreal Convention provides exoneration only if a third party is the sole cause (as relevant here), and the jury instructions already covered the third-party “sole cause” defense.
Admission of the zoomed-in videos was within the district court’s discretion; any disclosure deficiency was harmless because the videos were “virtually identical” to those previously disclosed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Treaty choice, exclusivity, and interpreting “Warsaw” as an evolving regime

The panel anchored its treaty framework in established Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit authority describing the Warsaw system’s evolution and the Montreal Convention’s exclusivity. It cited E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), for the Warsaw Convention’s purpose—uniform rules for international air transportation—and for the treaty’s historical amendments. It cited El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999), as part of that lineage, reinforcing that the Warsaw system developed through protocols and related instruments. On the Montreal Convention as the modern, controlling framework, it relied on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Air Exp. Int'l USA, Inc., 615 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2010), and Pierre-Louis v. Newvac Corp., 584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009), the latter for the strong proposition that the Montreal Convention “is the exclusive means” to seek passenger injury damages when it applies.

The court’s Article 1(2) analysis—covering a U.S. round-trip itinerary with an agreed stopping place in another State even if that State is not a party—was supported by the Convention’s text itself and supplemented by secondary authority (8A Am. Jur. 2d Aviation § 139). This is significant: the opinion treats Montreal’s applicability as turning on the “agreed stopping place” structure, not on whether the destination state has ratified Montreal.

2) Applying current law at decision time; identifying the governing treaty

To justify applying the operative treaty in force rather than the plaintiff’s label, the panel invoked Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), for the general rule that courts apply the law in effect at the time of decision absent “manifest injustice” or contrary direction. It also cited Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2008), to illustrate that Warsaw-as-amended or Montreal applies depending on the instrument effective at the relevant time. Although Sompo Japan is from another circuit, the panel used it to normalize the treaty-sequencing method: identify which instrument governed the incident date and apply it.

3) Pleading standards: wrong treaty label, right factual notice

The court’s refusal to penalize the plaintiff for citing the Warsaw Convention rather than Montreal rests on modern notice-pleading doctrine. It cited Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014), emphasizing that Rule 8 does not permit dismissal for an “imperfect statement of the legal theory.” It relied on circuit authority in MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 60 F.4th 1314 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sams v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, 866 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1989)), that a complaint need only put the defendant on notice of the claim and grounds. The panel also invoked persuasive out-of-circuit cases—Doss v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 834 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979)) and Hatmaker v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010)—to reinforce the principle that citing the wrong statute/treaty is not fatal absent prejudice.

To blunt any claim of substantive surprise, the panel highlighted doctrinal continuity: it compared Warsaw and Montreal Article 17 claim elements via El Al and Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014), and cited Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Cover Note B0753PC1308275000 v. Expeditors Korea Ltd., 882 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2018), for the proposition that Warsaw case law remains persuasive when interpreting Montreal.

4) Gap-filling under the Convention: “pass-through” to non-treaty substantive law

The key methodological precedent is Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996). The panel applied Zicherman’s instruction that when the Convention does not resolve a question, courts should apply the law that would govern “in the absence” of the Convention, rather than inventing treaty-common-law for the sake of uniformity.

Determining the “absent-the-Convention” law required an admiralty-jurisdiction/nexus analysis. The panel cited Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990), and Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), for the “potential hazard to maritime commerce” concept, and Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), for the requirement that airplane accident claims have a “significant relationship to traditional maritime activity” to be cognizable in admiralty absent legislation. It cited LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide Inc., 980 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2020), to distinguish DOHSA’s categorical reach in death cases from the separate maritime nexus inquiry in non-DOHSA cases. Finally, it relied on circuit precedent Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984), holding that travel between the United States and the Bahamas bears the requisite maritime relationship.

5) Joint and several liability in maritime tort after comparative fault

On the liability-allocation rule, the panel cited Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), for the traditional joint and several liability principle for indivisible maritime injuries, and McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994), for the proposition that joint and several liability remains a “well-established principle” in maritime cases after judgment against multiple defendants.

Responding to the pilot’s comparative-fault argument, the panel discussed United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), and Sunderland Marine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weeks Marine Const. Co., 338 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2003), clarifying that maritime comparative fault and joint and several liability are not mutually exclusive. It used McDermott to explain that proportionate fault does not abolish joint and several liability; it reallocates certain risks (e.g., insolvency) onto defendants rather than the plaintiff.

6) Preservation, jury instructions, and evidentiary discretion

The panel cited Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004), to decline a newly raised post-judgment reduction theory. On jury instructions, it cited United States v. Mayweather, 991 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2021), for the standard governing refusal of requested instructions. On discovery sanctions and harmlessness, it cited Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.4th 1237 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Murphy v. Magnolia Elec. Power Ass'n, 639 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1981)), along with Taylor v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 940 F.3d 582 (11th Cir. 2019), and Crawford v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2020), to underscore the district court’s broad discretion and the high bar for reversal.

Legal Reasoning

A) Why Montreal applied (and why the Bahamas’ status did not defeat coverage)

The court treated the Montreal Convention as the “current version” of the Warsaw system “in force in the United States” and applied Montreal’s own coverage provision. Under Montreal Convention art. 1(2), carriage can qualify even when the travel is “within the territory of a single State Party” if there is an “agreed stopping place” in another State. That textual hook allowed the court to classify Murphy’s Florida-based round trip to the Bahamas as covered international carriage, notwithstanding that the Bahamas has not signed the Convention.

B) Pleading “Warsaw” did not bar trying the case under Montreal

The court reframed the dispute as a notice/prejudice question, not a label question. Applying Rule 8 principles from Johnson v. City of Shelby and Eleventh Circuit notice pleading cases, the panel held that a complaint can survive and proceed under the correct legal regime if it alleges facts that plausibly state the claim and put defendants on fair notice.

The prejudice analysis was practical. The panel emphasized that (1) the elements of an Article 17 claim are materially the same under Warsaw and Montreal (using El Al and Campbell); (2) Montreal interpretation often relies on Warsaw case law (citing Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Cover Note B0753PC1308275000 v. Expeditors Korea Ltd.); and (3) the pilot actually pursued the core defense Montreal permits—showing the accident was not due to his negligence and instead attributable to a third party (here, Cessna).

Even the shift in “exoneration” framing did not move the needle: the court acknowledged textual differences between earlier Warsaw-era defenses and Montreal art. 21(2), but treated them as functionally similar for purposes of the defense the pilot actually tried.

C) Joint and several liability: treaty silence plus maritime “pass-through” equals full exposure post-verdict

The opinion’s most jurisprudentially consequential move is its Zicherman-based gap-filling analysis for co-defendant allocation. The Montreal Convention preempts state-law causes of action within its scope (art. 29) and sets conditions and limits of liability, but it does not specify how liability is distributed between a carrier and its agents when both are defendants.

Rather than adopting an atextual “uniform treaty rule,” the panel asked what law would apply “in the absence” of Montreal. Because the accident involved an ocean ditching with a U.S.–Bahamas maritime nexus, the panel concluded general maritime tort law would govern (citing Sisson, Exec. Jet Aviation, Miller). Under that background law, when multiple defendants are found liable for an indivisible injury, joint and several liability applies (citing Edmonds and McDermott).

The court also carefully separated concepts that are often conflated: comparative fault (allocating percentages) and joint and several liability (allowing plaintiff to collect the whole from any liable defendant). Using Reliable Transfer and McDermott, it explained that maritime law can assign percentages of fault while still permitting full collection against any judgment debtor, shifting insolvency/collection risk away from the injured plaintiff.

D) Cessna on the verdict form: “sole cause” is a defense, not a partial apportionment mandate

The pilot’s strategy sought a jury finding that Cessna bore some share of responsibility. The panel’s response was doctrinally tight: Montreal art. 21(2)(b) (as characterized in the opinion) contemplates exoneration beyond the strict-liability threshold only if a third party’s negligence was the sole cause of the damage. The Convention does not require (and the court did not recognize) a mechanism for partial reduction of liability based on a nonparty’s partial fault within this treaty framework.

Importantly, the district court still allowed the defendants to argue third-party causation to the jury, and its instructions placed that theory before the jury as a complete-exoneration pathway. Under United States v. Mayweather, refusal to add a specific requested instruction is reversible only if the request is correct, not otherwise covered, and vital to the defense. Here, the panel concluded the given instructions substantially covered the defense theory: if Cessna were truly the sole cause, the jury could have found Noble and Gutierrez not responsible.

E) Zoomed-in videos: harmlessness under Rule 37(c)

The panel accepted the district court’s characterization that the challenged videos were the same videos, merely zoomed, with no pixel-level “enhancement.” Under Rule 37(c), exclusion is not required if the failure to disclose is “substantially justified or is harmless.” Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review (citing Henderson, Taylor, Crawford), the panel held the admission was within the district court’s discretion, particularly where the defense did not identify substantive differences beyond zoom level.

Impact

Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is a useful synthesis for practitioners litigating international flights that intersect with U.S. admiralty jurisdiction:

Montreal coverage can attach to U.S.-based round trips with foreign stopping places even when the foreign destination is not a State Party, so long as Montreal art. 1(2)’s structure is satisfied, making Montreal the exclusive remedy for passenger injury claims.
Mislabeling the governing treaty is unlikely to be case-dispositive when the factual allegations clearly plead an Article 17-type accident claim and the defendant cannot show concrete prejudice. The opinion reinforces a litigation reality: discovery and trial strategy should anticipate Montreal when international carriage is in play, even if the pleading says “Warsaw.”
Where Montreal is silent, courts may “pass through” to maritime law when the accident has the requisite maritime nexus, affecting remedies and allocation rules—including joint and several liability exposure for individual pilots/agents when sued alongside the carrier.
Nonparty fault allocation is not guaranteed in Montreal cases, at least where the defense is framed as third-party “sole cause” exoneration rather than a comparative apportionment entitlement under the governing substantive law.
Derivative demonstrative evidence (e.g., zoomed versions) may be treated as harmless for Rule 37(c) purposes if it is materially the same as disclosed evidence—encouraging parties to make specific records of how a modified exhibit differs and why that difference matters.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Montreal Convention vs. Warsaw Convention: The Warsaw Convention (1929) was the original treaty framework for international air carriage liability. The Montreal Convention (1999) modernized and consolidated that system. For flights it covers, Montreal supplies the exclusive cause of action and preempts alternative state-law theories (see art. 29).
Article 17 “accident” liability (passenger injury): Article 17 is the core provision making carriers liable for passenger bodily injury caused by an “accident” during international carriage, subject to treaty conditions and limits. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the practical continuity of Article 17 elements across Warsaw and Montreal.
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs): An SDR is an IMF-based unit used in treaties to express monetary limits without pegging them to a single currency. Here, Montreal’s framework (as described) imposes strict liability up to a specified SDR threshold and then allows limited exoneration above it under art. 21(2).
“Pass-through” gap filling (from Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.): If the treaty does not answer a particular question (e.g., how to split liability between co-defendants), courts apply the law that would govern if the treaty did not exist, rather than creating a new treaty-based common law rule.
Admiralty (maritime) nexus for aircraft accidents: Not every airplane crash is “maritime.” Admiralty jurisdiction can apply when the incident threatens maritime commerce and bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. The Eleventh Circuit treated U.S.–Bahamas travel as meeting that relationship under Miller v. United States.
Comparative fault vs. joint and several liability: Comparative fault assigns percentages of responsibility. Joint and several liability is a collection rule: the plaintiff can recover the entire judgment from any liable defendant, and defendants sort out contributions among themselves. The opinion stresses that maritime law can use both at once.
Rule 37(c) “harmless” nondisclosure: If a party fails to disclose evidence as required by Rule 26, the default sanction is exclusion—unless the failure is substantially justified or harmless. Minor, non-substantive variations (like a zoomed version of an already-disclosed video) can be deemed harmless.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in Richard Murphy, III v. Airway Air Charter, Inc. reinforces three operational rules for international aviation tort litigation: (1) when Montreal applies, it is the exclusive remedial framework even if pleadings invoke “Warsaw”; (2) treaty silence on intra-defendant allocation can trigger a Zicherman pass-through to maritime law in ocean-ditching cases, bringing joint and several liability with it; and (3) trial management decisions—nonparty omission from verdict forms and admission of minimally modified exhibits—are unlikely to be reversed absent a clear showing of legal error, lack of coverage in the instructions, or concrete prejudice.