Monson v. Monson: Independent TEDRA Actions and Party Joinder in Idaho Estate Disputes

Monson v. Monson: Independent TEDRA Actions and Party Joinder in Idaho Estate Disputes

I. Introduction

Monson v. Monson, No. 51838-2024 (Idaho Dec. 23, 2025), is a significant Idaho Supreme Court decision clarifying the scope and operation of the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”), codified in title 15, chapter 8, Idaho Code. The case arises out of a bitter intra-family dispute over the estate of Hal Monson and the ownership and proceeds of an LLC he founded, Tautphaus Park Storage, LLC (“TPS”).

Two siblings, Ryan and Nancy Monson, are equal beneficiaries under their father Hal’s will. Nancy, an attorney, served as Hal’s lawyer, power of attorney, and later personal representative of his estate. She also became manager and claimed to be the majority owner of TPS through a sequence of operating agreement amendments, including two controversial, retroactive amendments she executed after Hal’s death. Those amendments recast Hal’s original capital contribution as a loan and shifted the economic benefits of TPS to Nancy.

Ryan challenged these actions, seeking:

  • a judicial determination of what belonged in Hal’s estate, including any interest in TPS,
  • damages for breach of Nancy’s fiduciary duties as personal representative,
  • a fraud remedy, and
  • appointment of a receiver over TPS.

The litigation was procedurally tangled because two separate proceedings—(1) a probate case before a magistrate judge and (2) a TEDRA civil action filed in district court—were treated informally as if consolidated, reassigned repeatedly, and the boundaries between “probate” and “civil” issues were blurred. Ultimately, both the magistrate and the district courts dismissed Ryan’s substantive claims, concluding that questions about estate administration and Nancy’s conduct as personal representative belonged exclusively in probate and that certain parties (Nancy individually and TPS) need not be parties to the TEDRA case.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed. It:

  • held that Ryan’s claims for judicial determination of estate assets and breach of fiduciary duty are properly brought under TEDRA,
  • confirmed that TEDRA actions may be brought as separate civil proceedings even while probate is pending,
  • held that Nancy (individually) is a necessary party and that TPS is a proper (nominal) party,
  • reinstated Ryan’s fraud and receiver claims dismissed at the magistrate level, and
  • awarded Ryan his attorney fees and costs on appeal, payable personally by Nancy.

This commentary analyzes the decision in depth, explains how the Court interpreted TEDRA, and assesses the practical implications for Idaho estate, trust, and probate practice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holdings

  1. TEDRA actions may proceed independently of probate proceedings.
    The Court held that TEDRA expressly authorizes a judicial proceeding to be commenced “as a new action” or “as an action incidental to an existing judicial proceeding” related to the same estate or nonprobate asset (I.C. § 15-8-202(2)). The district court erred by treating Ryan’s TEDRA claims as belonging exclusively to the probate court.
  2. Ryan’s claims fall squarely within TEDRA “matters.”
    Ryan’s causes of action for:
    • a judicial determination of what assets belong in the estate, and
    • breach of fiduciary duty by Nancy as personal representative,
    are “matters” under I.C. § 15-8-103(1), including questions regarding:
    • who is interested in an estate or nonprobate asset,
    • directions to or review of a fiduciary, and
    • questions arising in administration of an estate or in the disposition of nonprobate assets.
    • Nancy is a necessary party; TPS is a proper nominal party.
      Applying Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20 (made applicable to TEDRA by I.C. § 15-8-203), the Court held:
      • Nancy individually is a necessary party because she personally claims the disputed TPS ownership and sale proceeds; complete relief cannot be accorded without adjudicating her individual interest.
      • TPS is a nominal, but proper, party because its existence and records are central to the dispute and the claims arise out of the same series of transactions, making joinder appropriate under Rule 20(a).
    • Reversal of dismissals of fraud and receiver claims.
      The Court vacated the magistrate court’s orders:
      • dismissing Ryan’s cause of action seeking appointment of a receiver over TPS, and
      • dismissing Ryan’s fraud claim against Nancy as personal representative.
      Those claims must be litigated on remand.
    • Attorney fees and costs.
      The Court:
      • vacated the district court’s award of costs to Nancy as prevailing party, because Nancy is no longer the prevailing party,
      • declined to reach Nancy’s cross-appeal seeking fees in the trial courts, and
      • awarded Ryan his reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal under I.C. § 15-8-208(1), payable from Nancy’s personal funds, not from estate assets.

B. Procedural Disposition

The Supreme Court:

  • vacated the judgments of both the magistrate and district courts,
  • reversed all orders dismissing Ryan’s claims (judicial determination, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, receiver),
  • reversed the dismissal of Nancy (individually) and TPS from the TEDRA action, and
  • remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

III. Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. TEDRA’s purpose and structure

TEDRA, enacted in 2005 (I.C. § 15-8-101(2)), is designed to provide:

“generally applicable statutory provisions for the resolution of disputes and other matters involving trusts and estates.”

Key structural features of TEDRA highlighted by the Court include:

  • Supplemental, not exclusive: TEDRA:
    “shall not supersede, but shall supplement, any otherwise applicable provisions and procedures contained in title 15, Idaho Code, or other Idaho law.” (I.C. §§ 15-8-101(2), 15-8-201(2))
  • Broad judicial power: Courts have:
    “full and ample power and authority under [TEDRA] to administer and settle all matters concerning a decedent’s estate and assets, including nonprobate assets and powers of attorney.” (I.C. § 15-8-102(1)(a))
    Even if the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) is:
    “inapplicable, insufficient or doubtful,”
    the court:
    “nevertheless has full power and authority to proceed” in any manner that “seems right and proper” to ensure matters are “expeditiously administered and settled.” (I.C. § 15-8-102(2))
  • TEDRA as declaratory mechanism: Citing Vouk v. Chapman, 171 Idaho 324, 521 P.3d 712 (2022), the Court reaffirmed that:
    “At its core, TEDRA provides a statutory cause of action for a declaratory judgment.”
    TEDRA authorizes “[a]ny party” to seek “a judicial proceeding for the declaration of rights or legal relations” as to any TEDRA “matter” (I.C. § 15-8-201(1)).
  • Who is a “party”? Under I.C. § 15-8-103(3), “party” broadly includes:
    • personal representatives, trustees,
    • heirs and beneficiaries, and
    • “[a]ny other person who has an interest in the subject of the particular proceeding.”
  • What is a “matter”? TEDRA’s definition of “matter” in I.C. § 15-8-103(1) is sweeping. It includes:
    • determining “any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin, or other persons interested in an estate, trust, [or] nonprobate asset”;
    • directing a fiduciary “to do or abstain from doing any act in a fiduciary capacity”;
    • “any question arising in the administration of an estate or trust, or with respect to any nonprobate asset” (including construction of instruments, accountings, fiduciary fees, etc.); and
    • a series of issues regarding “nonprobate assets” and “any other asset or property interest passing at death,” including ordering custodians to release records and resolving questions about ownership and distribution.

2. TEDRA proceedings as new civil actions

Crucially for Monson, TEDRA does not confine dispute resolution to the pending probate proceeding. Instead, I.C. § 15-8-202(2) states:

“A judicial proceeding under this chapter may be commenced as a new action or as an action incidental to an existing judicial proceeding relating to the same trust or estate or nonprobate asset.”

Further:

  • Such actions may (but need not) be consolidated with an existing proceeding, or “converted to a separate action,” upon motion or the court’s own initiative (I.C. § 15-8-202(3)).
  • TEDRA proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.C. §§ 15-8-202(4), -203). Under Rule 3(b), a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint, petition, or application.

The Supreme Court therefore read TEDRA as giving litigants flexibility: they may proceed inside the probate case or by filing a new civil action, depending on case complexity, procedural needs, and the mix of probate and nonprobate issues.

3. Interaction with the probate jurisdiction provisions

The district court relied on probate jurisdiction statutes:

  • I.C. § 15-3-105: giving the probate court “exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how decedents’ estates…are to be administered, expended and distributed.”
  • I.C. § 15-3-106: allowing the probate court to hear “any other controversy” arising under the probate code.

The Supreme Court accepted these provisions but emphasized that they are not a jurisdictional bar to TEDRA actions in district court:

  • The Idaho Constitution grants district courts original jurisdiction “in all cases, both at law and in equity” (Idaho Const. art. V, § 20; see also I.C. § 1-705(1)).
  • Magistrate judges are given primary responsibility over probate matters by statute (I.C. § 1-2208(2)), but this allocation is an assignment of functions, not a prohibition on district court jurisdiction over TEDRA civil cases.
  • TEDRA explicitly supplements, rather than displaces, UPC procedures, and expressly contemplates independent civil actions under its framework.

Thus, the Court rejected the district court’s view that Ryan’s claims “must” be decided only in probate.

B. Application to Ryan’s Claims

1. Judicial determination of estate assets

Ryan’s central contention was that Hal retained a 99% membership and economic interest in TPS at his death. That interest, according to Ryan, was an estate asset subject to equal distribution between the siblings. Nancy asserted that Hal’s interest had been effectively reassigned to her before death or, at most, that only a 1% residual economic interest remained, which she then allocated to herself in her capacity as personal representative.

To evaluate this, Ryan sought an adjudication under TEDRA of:

  • Whether Hal’s membership and/or economic interest in TPS existed at death and in what percentage;
  • Whether post-death amendments Nancy executed (fourth and fifth amendments, backdated to 2017) were effective to alter ownership or simply self-serving after-the-fact maneuvers;
  • Whether the $3 million TPS sale proceeds in 2022 belonged, in whole or in part, to the estate; and
  • How various contested items (real property, timeshares, reimbursement claims, and Nancy’s claimed compensation) should be characterized in the estate inventory.

These questions clearly fit within multiple subparts of the TEDRA “matter” definition, including:

  • I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(a): “determination of any class of…heirs…or other persons interested in an estate…or nonprobate asset”;
  • I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(c): “determination of any question arising in the administration of an estate…or with respect to any nonprobate asset”;
  • I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(f): multiple questions relating to nonprobate assets and “any other asset or property interest passing at death,” including ordering custodians of records to disclose TPS documents.

The Supreme Court underscored that Ryan’s use of TEDRA was particularly appropriate because Nancy, wearing multiple hats (attorney, power of attorney, personal representative, TPS manager), consistently resisted disclosure of TPS records in both probate and the TEDRA action. TEDRA explicitly allows courts to order custodians of records relating to nonprobate assets to produce those records (I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(f)(ii)).

2. Breach of fiduciary duty by the personal representative

Ryan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim alleged several ways in which Nancy, as personal representative, violated her duties to the estate and its heirs:

  • Asserting that Hal’s 99% interest in TPS belonged to her personally rather than to the estate;
  • Executing retroactive operating agreement amendments post-death to shift economic benefits from Hal/the estate to herself;
  • Selling TPS’s assets and treating the proceeds as her own property;
  • Claiming unusual compensation formulas (e.g., a percentage of the increase in estate property value) for her services;
  • Permitting a valuable timeshare interest to be lost to foreclosure.

Under I.C. § 15-3-703(a), a personal representative must observe the standards of a trustee; trustees, in turn, must act prudently and loyally, and use any special skills they hold (I.C. § 15-7-302). TEDRA expressly allows proceedings to:

  • direct a fiduciary “to do or abstain from doing” certain acts (I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(b));
  • resolve “any question arising in the administration of an estate” (I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(c));
  • address fiduciary compensation and accountings (I.C. § 15-8-103(1)(c)(iv)-(v)).

Thus, Ryan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim was not, as Nancy argued, a purely “tort” claim about corporate management. It was inextricably tied to administration of estate assets and review of the personal representative’s actions. The Court held that this too is a TEDRA “matter” properly brought in a TEDRA civil proceeding.

3. Rejecting the “probate exclusive” theory

The district court had dismissed Ryan’s TEDRA claims on the theory that:

  • only the probate court could adjudicate the administration of Hal’s estate, and
  • any claim against Nancy in her capacity as personal representative was time-barred by I.C. § 15-3-1003, because Nancy had filed a closing statement in probate.

The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning on both structural and textual grounds:

  • Structural: Probate courts (magistrate division) and district courts share the same underlying judicial power; jurisdictional allocations do not negate TEDRA’s explicit authorization of independent actions.
  • Textual: I.C. § 15-8-202(2) explicitly permits TEDRA actions to begin as “new” actions. The Court treated this as dispositive: Ryan’s suit was procedurally proper even though probate was ongoing.

Consequently, the Court held that “because Ryan’s claims for judicial determination of the estate and breach of fiduciary duty fall within TEDRA’s definition of ‘matters’ and may be raised in a separate civil action, the district court erred in dismissing them as belonging solely to the probate court.”

C. Party Joinder: Necessary and Nominal Parties

1. Nancy as a necessary party under Rule 19

The Court applied Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(1), which requires joinder of any person:

  • “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties,” or
  • who claims an interest in the subject of the action and whose absence may either impair their ability to protect that interest or expose existing parties to multiple or inconsistent obligations.

Nancy herself claimed to be the 100% owner of TPS through amendments executed as manager; she also asserted capital and in-kind contributions to TPS and argued that these justified her retention of the proceeds of the 2022 sale.

Adjudicating whether:

  • Hal’s interest in TPS was an estate asset, and
  • Nancy’s post-death amendments were effective or invalid,

necessarily impacts Nancy’s personal ownership claims. The Court noted that Nancy expressly distinguished between:

  • her role as manager of TPS (in which she executed the amendments), and
  • her role as personal representative (under which she later purported to allocate a remaining interest to herself).

If Nancy were present only in a representative capacity, the court could not fully adjudicate her individual ownership claims. Leaving her out as a personal defendant would:

  • impede her ability to protect her asserted ownership interest, and
  • risk inconsistent obligations between what the estate owns and what Nancy claims personally.

The Court therefore held Nancy is a necessary party to the TEDRA action and that the magistrate court erred by dismissing her individually.

2. TPS as a nominal but proper party under Rule 20

At oral argument, Nancy conceded TPS was at least a nominal party. The Court quoted Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 806, 436 P.3d 627 (2019), which in turn cited Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage, defining a nominal party as:

“one, who, having some interest in or title to the subject matter of the lawsuit, will not be affected by the judgment.”

The issue then becomes whether a nominal party may be joined. Under Rule 20(a)(2), defendants may be joined if:

  • the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions, and
  • any common question of law or fact will arise.

Here, all contested issues—ownership of TPS interests, effectiveness of amendments, allocation of sale proceeds, and Nancy’s fiduciary conduct—arose from a single set of related events. TPS’s records and structure are at the heart of the dispute. Even if TPS is not itself an “estate asset,” the estate may own an interest in it, and TPS’s own books and tax filings (e.g., K-1s) are critical evidence.

The Court distinguished permissive joinder under Rule 20 from necessary-party status under Rule 19. While TPS might not be strictly “necessary” in the Rule 19 sense, it is properly joined and should not have been dismissed.

D. Reversal of Dismissals of Fraud and Receiver Claims

The magistrate court had:

  • granted Nancy’s motion (as personal representative) for partial summary judgment on Ryan’s fraud claim, and
  • granted Nancy’s motion to dismiss the receiver claim.

In its May 31, 2022 decision, the magistrate court characterized Ryan’s allegations about Nancy’s reimbursement claims and inventory issues as “not fraud or breaching a fiduciary duty” but merely “a difference of opinion.” It also concluded that Ryan had suffered no injury because the estate remained open and no improper distribution had occurred.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the overall approach and reversed:

  • the order dismissing Ryan’s cause of action for appointment of a receiver, and
  • the order (in Nancy’s personal representative capacity) granting summary judgment on the fraud claim.

While the Court did not undertake a detailed element-by-element fraud analysis in this opinion, its action sends two important signals:

  1. Premature rejections of claims, especially amid discovery obstruction, are disfavored.
    The record shows a long pattern of resistance to discovery regarding TPS, including:
    • refusals to recognize or answer questions about probate inventory documents,
    • broad assertions of privilege (attorney-client, accountant-client), and
    • repeated motions to compel and sanction orders against Nancy.
    In that context, dismissing fraud claims for lack of particularity or lack of injury before full factual development was improper.
  2. Receiver claims can be appropriate in estate-related business disputes.
    Ryan’s receiver claim under I.C. § 8-601 alleged likely injury to TPS’s assets from Nancy’s disputed control and ownership assertions. In complex estate–LLC situations, a receiver may be warranted to preserve value pending resolution of ownership. The Court’s reinstatement of this claim leaves open that possibility on remand.

E. Precedents and Standards of Review

The Court applied several familiar doctrinal tools:

  • Statutory interpretation: The Court, quoting Elsaesser v. Black Diamond Compost, LLC, 170 Idaho 511, 513 P.3d 447 (2022), reiterated that statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo, with emphasis on:
    • plain language,
    • ordinary meaning of words, and
    • reading the statute as a whole.
    TEDRA’s unambiguous language—especially §§ 15-8-101, -102, -103, -201, and -202—drove the outcome.
  • Summary judgment and Rule 12(b)(6): Following Frizzell v. DeYoung, 163 Idaho 473, 415 P.3d 341 (2018), and Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826 (2012), the Court reviewed dismissals and summary judgments de novo.
  • Abuse of discretion: For attorney fee and cost awards, the Court applied the Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018), four‑part framework. While it did not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee denial (it simply mooted that issue by vacating the underlying judgment), it exercised its own discretion under TEDRA’s fee provision on appeal.
  • TEDRA precedents: Vouk v. Chapman, 171 Idaho 324, 521 P.3d 712 (2022), was invoked to reinforce TEDRA’s nature as a broad declaratory-judgment-style mechanism for resolving estate and trust disputes comprehensively.
  • Probate and magistrate jurisdiction: The opinion references Miller v. Estate of Prater, 141 Idaho 208, 108 P.3d 355 (2005), and O’Holleran v. O’Holleran, 171 Idaho 671, 525 P.3d 709 (2023), to explain:
    • the breadth of controversies a probate court may hear, and
    • the magistrate court’s jurisdictional limits over tort claims exceeding $10,000 (which triggered removal to district court here).
  • Nominal parties: Jackson v. Crow, 164 Idaho 806, 436 P.3d 627 (2019), provided the definition of “nominal party,” illustrating that entities like TPS may be joined for completeness even if the ultimate judgment does not directly run against them.

F. Attorney Fees Under TEDRA and Personal Liability of Fiduciaries

Idaho Code § 15-8-208(1) allows courts to award costs and reasonable attorney fees:

  • “to any party,”
  • from:
    • another party,
    • estate or trust assets, or
    • a nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceeding.

Citing In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), and Vouk, the Court emphasized that TEDRA fee awards are equitable and depend “primarily on the form of relief pursued and granted.”

Here:

  • Ryan invoked TEDRA throughout, explicitly relying on I.C. §§ 15-8-102 and 15-8-202 as the basis for his judicial proceeding concerning the estate.
  • He prevailed on appeal—obtaining reversal of all dispositive rulings against him and reinstatement of his claims and parties.
  • The record documented substantial delays and added expense caused by Nancy’s procedural maneuvers and resistance to discovery.

Exercising its discretionary authority, the Court awarded Ryan his reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal, and crucially:

“we order that those fees and costs be paid by Nancy personally, and not from estate assets.”

This aspect of the ruling is noteworthy. It signals that where a fiduciary’s litigation conduct is adverse to another interested party (rather than for the benefit of the estate), the financial consequences may fall on the fiduciary personally, not on the estate.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. TEDRA vs. traditional probate

Traditional probate (UPC-based) focuses on:

  • proving the will,
  • appointing a personal representative,
  • collecting and inventorying estate assets,
  • paying debts and taxes, and
  • distributing remaining assets to heirs and devisees.

TEDRA provides a flexible dispute-resolution overlay:

  • It allows disputes about trusts, estates, powers of attorney, and nonprobate assets to be resolved either:
    • inside a probate case, or
    • through a separate civil action (as in Monson).
  • It authorizes declaratory-style relief—clarifying who owns what and what fiduciaries must do.
  • It permits consolidation or separation of proceedings to manage complexity and judicial resources.

2. Estate vs. nonprobate assets

Probate estate assets are those that pass under the will or by intestacy—property titled in the decedent’s individual name without beneficiary designations or survivorship provisions.

Nonprobate assets include:

  • joint tenancy property with right of survivorship,
  • POD or TOD accounts,
  • life insurance proceeds payable to named beneficiaries, and
  • interests governed by contract (e.g., certain retirement accounts, partnership or LLC membership interests), depending on structure.

In Monson, TPS is a separate LLC. The company itself is not the estate; instead, membership interests in TPS may be estate assets. TEDRA allows courts to resolve disputes over those interests and to order disclosure of the company’s records to determine what belongs in the estate.

3. Personal representative and fiduciary duty

A personal representative (executor) administers the estate. Under Idaho law:

  • The personal representative must act as a trustee would—honestly, prudently, and solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
  • The P.R. should not use the office to self-deal or prefer personal interests over the estate’s.

In this case, Nancy’s dual roles—as attorney, P.R., TPS manager, and alleged majority owner of TPS—created major conflict-of-interest questions. Ryan’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim challenged whether Nancy’s actions met the required standard of loyalty and prudence.

4. Necessary vs. nominal parties

  • A necessary party is someone whose interest is so directly at stake that:
    • the court cannot provide complete relief without them, or
    • adjudicating without them would impair their rights or risk multiple or inconsistent obligations.
    Under Rule 19, they must be joined if feasible.
  • A nominal party has some connection to the subject matter but will not be directly bound or substantially affected by the judgment. They may be joined for completeness but are not essential to the court’s capacity to decide the core dispute.

In Monson:

  • Nancy individually is a necessary party because her personal ownership claims in TPS are directly contested.
  • TPS is nominal but properly joined since the dispute turns on its structure and records.

5. Receivership

A receiver is a neutral third party appointed by the court to take possession and control of property or a business to preserve its value during litigation. Under I.C. § 8-601, a receiver may be appointed when:

  • property or its rents/profits are in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, or
  • the rights of one or more parties need protection before final judgment.

Ryan sought a receiver over TPS to prevent what he saw as continued misappropriation of assets while the ownership dispute remained unresolved. The Supreme Court allowed this claim to proceed, leaving the factual question of necessity to be decided on remand.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying TEDRA’s independent role

The most important doctrinal contribution of Monson is its clear statement that:

  • TEDRA is not confined to the probate forum; and
  • Litigants may file independent TEDRA actions in district court even while probate is pending in magistrate court.

This will matter most in:

  • Complex estates involving contested business interests, extensive nonprobate assets, or multiple fiduciary roles (like Nancy’s).
  • Cases requiring robust discovery and civil-procedure tools (e.g., depositions of third-party accountants, broader discovery orders, potential jury trials).

Practitioners should now be more confident in using TEDRA as a stand-alone procedural vehicle when traditional probate mechanisms are inadequate to resolve intertwined probate and nonprobate issues.

2. Guidance for lower courts on consolidation and jurisdiction

The district court in this case described the proceedings as “confusing and convoluted,” noting:

  • the absence of a formal consolidation order,
  • the marking of the probate case as “closed” in the case management system without a formal order, and
  • miscellaneous filings directed into the TEDRA case “without order of the court.”

The Supreme Court’s opinion essentially endorses the district court’s suggestion that trial courts must:

  • either keep probate and TEDRA cases separate, with clear stays or sequencing, or
  • formally consolidate them with a clear order and unified management.

This is a practical directive: administrative reassignment and informal treatment as “if consolidated” is not a substitute for proper consolidation orders and jurisdictional clarity.

3. Fiduciary accountability and personal exposure to fees

By imposing appellate attorney fees on Nancy personally (rather than on the estate), the Court sends a strong message:

  • Personal representatives who litigate primarily to preserve or advance their own contested interests risk bearing the financial costs personally.
  • Obstructionist discovery tactics and inconsistent positions about the relevance of key records will be viewed unfavorably in the fee-allocation analysis under TEDRA.

Estate fiduciaries and their counsel should assume that when their interests conflict with the estate’s or co-heirs’, they may not safely charge all defense costs to the estate.

4. Estate–business interface: LLC interests as estate assets

Monson does not fundamentally change Idaho LLC law, but it reinforces that:

  • The estate may hold a membership interest in an LLC, which is itself an asset subject to estate administration, even if the LLC’s assets are not directly titled to the decedent.
  • Disputes over whether, and to what extent, such interests exist at death are appropriate TEDRA subjects.
  • Court-ordered access to LLC operating agreements, tax filings, and financial records may be necessary to determine the character and extent of the estate’s interest.

This is particularly important where a family member has been given managerial control of the entity and seeks to treat the business as their own, to the potential detriment of other heirs.

VI. Conclusion

Monson v. Monson is a foundational Idaho Supreme Court decision on the operation of TEDRA. It establishes that:

  • TEDRA provides a broad, flexible, and independent mechanism to resolve estate- and nonprobate-related disputes, including fiduciary-duty questions and ownership of business interests;
  • TEDRA actions may be brought as separate civil proceedings alongside probate, not confined to the probate forum;
  • Heirs and fiduciaries with competing claims to assets—especially complex assets like LLC interests—can and should be joined as parties under Rules 19 and 20 to ensure complete relief;
  • Premature dismissal of fraud and receiver claims, particularly amid serious discovery resistance, is inappropriate; and
  • Courts have broad equitable authority under I.C. § 15-8-208 to allocate attorney fees and costs, including imposing them personally on fiduciaries whose litigation conduct is adverse to other beneficiaries.

On remand, the district court must now engage with the substantive merits: determining Hal’s true interest in TPS at death, assessing Nancy’s fiduciary conduct, and, if necessary, crafting remedial orders to restore estate assets and protect the interests of both heirs. More broadly, Monson will guide Idaho courts and practitioners in structuring and litigating complex estate disputes where probate and civil issues intertwine.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Idaho

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