Missouri Supreme Court Upholds Firearm Restrictions for Nonviolent Felons

Missouri Supreme Court Upholds Firearm Restrictions for Nonviolent Felons

Introduction

The case of State of Missouri v. Pierre Clay (481 S.W.3d 531) addresses the constitutionality of Missouri's statute, section 571.070.1, which prohibits nonviolent felons from possessing firearms. This commentary examines the Supreme Court of Missouri's en banc decision, which reversed a lower court's dismissal of Clay's firearms possession charge. The core issue revolves around whether the Missouri Constitution's Article I, Section 23, as amended by Amendment 5 in 2014, prohibits the legislature from enacting laws restricting firearm possession by nonviolent felons.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that section 571.070.1, which bans nonviolent felons from possessing firearms, does not violate the Missouri Constitution as amended by Amendment 5. The trial court had dismissed Clay's possession charge, interpreting Amendment 5 to restrict legislative authority excessively. However, the Supreme Court held that Amendment 5 allows the legislature to regulate firearm possession by nonviolent felons, provided such regulations pass strict scrutiny. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case, affirming the constitutionality of the firearm restrictions for nonviolent felons.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced several key cases that shape the legal framework for firearm regulations and constitutional rights:

  • State v. Merritt (467 S.W.3d 808, 2015)
  • State v. McCoy (468 S.W.3d 892, 2015)
  • Dotson v. Kander (464 S.W.3d 190, 2015)
  • District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570, 2008)
  • McDonald v. Chicago (561 U.S. 742, 2010)

These cases collectively underscore the recognition of the right to bear arms as fundamental, necessitating strict scrutiny for any legislative restrictions. Particularly, Merritt and McCoy were pivotal in establishing that Missouri's firearm regulations survive strict scrutiny when they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests like public safety.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's reasoning hinged on several key points:

  • Amendment 5 Interpretation: Amendment 5, adopted in 2014, explicitly allows the legislature to enact laws restricting firearm possession by convicted violent felons and those deemed dangerous due to mental disorders. The amendment requires strict scrutiny for any restrictions on the right to bear arms but does not explicitly prevent regulation of nonviolent felons.
  • Strict Scrutiny Application: The Court affirmed that any regulation under Amendment 5 is subject to strict scrutiny—a rigorous standard requiring the law to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored. The State demonstrated that section 571.070.1 accomplishes this by targeting individuals with a higher propensity for violent crimes.
  • Legislative Authority: The Court emphasized that unless the Constitution explicitly prohibits a legislative action, the legislature possesses broad authority to regulate. Since Amendment 5 did not expressly forbid regulating nonviolent felons, the legislature retained this power.
  • Prospective vs. Retroactive Application: Referring to Merritt and McCoy, the Court clarified that Amendment 5 applies prospectively, allowing the legislature to regulate based on the constitutional provisions effective at the time of regulation.

Impact

The decision has significant implications for Missouri's firearm regulations and potentially other jurisdictions with similar constitutional provisions:

  • Affirmation of Legislative Power: The ruling upholds the legislature's authority to enact firearm restrictions for nonviolent felons, reinforcing the balance between individual rights and public safety.
  • Precedent for Strict Scrutiny: By affirming that strict scrutiny applies and that certain firearm regulations can pass this standard, the decision provides a clear framework for assessing future laws affecting Second Amendment rights.
  • Scope of Firearm Regulations: The judgment delineates the boundaries of permissible firearm regulations, ensuring that laws targeting specific categories of individuals (e.g., nonviolent felons) align with constitutional standards.
  • Judicial Deference: The decision emphasizes judicial deference to legislative judgments in matters of public safety, provided the laws adhere to constitutional scrutiny levels.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review used by courts to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that infringe upon fundamental rights or involve suspect classifications. For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must:

  • Serve a Compelling State Interest: The law must address a goal of utmost importance, such as public safety.
  • Be Narrowly Tailored: The law must be specifically designed to achieve its objective without unnecessary or excessive restrictions.

In this case, strict scrutiny was applied to determine if restricting firearms for nonviolent felons genuinely serves Missouri's vital interest in public safety and if the regulation is sufficiently precise to address that interest without overreaching.

Amendment 5 of Article I, Section 23

Amendment 5 to Missouri's Constitution introduced additional language to the existing Article I, Section 23 concerning the right to keep and bear arms. Key additions include:

  • Unalienable Rights: The right to bear arms is declared unalienable, meaning it cannot be taken away except as specified.
  • Strict Scrutiny Requirement: Any restrictions placed upon this right must undergo strict scrutiny to ensure they are justified and narrowly tailored.
  • Legislative Authority: The amendment explicitly permits the legislature to impose general laws that limit firearm possession by convicted violent felons and individuals deemed dangerous due to mental health issues.

Importantly, the amendment does not explicitly address nonviolent felons, leaving room for legislative discretion in regulating this group.

Conclusion

The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pierre Clay solidifies the constitutionality of restricting firearm possession for nonviolent felons under section 571.070.1. By interpreting Amendment 5 as allowing legislative regulation of firearm ownership for specific classes of individuals—while requiring such laws to pass strict scrutiny—the Court strikes a balance between upholding fundamental Second Amendment rights and addressing public safety concerns.

This judgment reaffirms the principle that while the right to bear arms is fundamental, it is not absolute and can be subject to carefully considered restrictions aimed at mitigating risks to society. Future cases involving firearm regulations in Missouri and potentially other jurisdictions will likely reference this decision, particularly regarding the application of strict scrutiny to laws affecting constitutional rights.

Note: The dissenting opinion by Judge Richard B. Teitelman highlights ongoing debates about the breadth of firearm restrictions and the necessity of robust evidence supporting such legislative actions. While the majority upheld the statute based on existing interpretations and legislative authority, the dissent underscores concerns about the potential overreach and lack of specific evidence linking nonviolent felons to increased public safety risks.

Case Details

Year: 2016
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc .

Judge(s)

Laura Denvir Stith

Attorney(S)

The state was represented by Veronica Harwin and Aaron Levinson of the St. Louis circuit attorney's office in St. Louis, (314) 622–4941. Clay was represented by David E. Roland of the Freedom Center of Missouri in Mexico, (314) 604–6621, and Nick A. Zotos, an attorney in St. Louis, (314) 534–1797. The city of St. Louis was represented by Winston E. Calvert, Erin McGowan and Matthew S. Dionne of the St. Louis city counselor's office in St. Louis, (314) 622–3361. The St. Louis Regional Chamber was represented by J. Bennett Clark, Lee Marshall, Jason Meyer and Mary Longenbaker of Bryan Cave LLP in St. Louis, (314) 259–2000, and Jason R. Hall of the regional chamber in St. Louis, (314) 444–1175. The St. Louis archdiocese was represented by Thomas M. Buckley of St. Louis, (314) 792–7075. The Demetrious Johnson Charitable Foundation was represented by Douglas P. Dowd and Lia Obata Dowd of Dowd & Dowd PC in St. Louis, (314) 621–2500. SSM Health was represented by J. Andrew Walkup of St. Louis, (314) 994–7800. The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation was represented by Anthony E. Rothert and Jessie Steffan of the ACLU in St. Louis, (314) 652–3114, and Gillian R. Wilcox of the ACLU in Kansas City, (816) 470–9933.

Comments