Misrepresentation Without Intent: Fully Stayed Two‑Year Suspension for Systemic Appointed‑Counsel Billing Errors in Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins

Misrepresentation Without Intent: Fully Stayed Two‑Year Suspension for Systemic Appointed‑Counsel Billing Errors in Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins, Slip Opinion No. 2025‑Ohio‑5393 (Dec. 4, 2025), addresses a recurring and difficult problem in the disciplinary regulation of lawyers: how to sanction an attorney who has submitted grossly inaccurate, certified fee applications for court‑appointed work, but for whom there is no evidence of intentional overbilling or theft and substantial evidence of remediation and good character.

Respondent Cedric Preston Collins, a lawyer heavily engaged in juvenile and guardian ad litem appointments in Franklin, Licking, and Fairfield Counties, submitted hundreds of fee applications in 2021–2022 that, on their face, certified work in excess of 24 hours on multiple days and reflected systematic practices (such as “default” 0.5‑hour in‑court billing for multiple cases) inconsistent with accurate, case‑specific timekeeping. An audit by the Office of the Ohio Public Defender (OPD) triggered a grievance, an investigation by Disciplinary Counsel, and ultimately this disciplinary proceeding.

The opinion sits at the intersection of three key issues:

  • What constitutes “misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) when the misconduct stems from poor recordkeeping rather than a proven intent to defraud.
  • How the court calibrates sanctions where dishonesty‑type conduct is present, but significant mitigation and remediation exist.
  • How this case refines the sanction spectrum established by prior Ohio decisions involving court‑appointed fee abuses.

The court ultimately adopts a nuanced position: Collins’s conduct violates Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) as “misrepresentation,” but the absence of intentional fraud, combined with robust mitigation, justifies a two‑year suspension fully stayed, conditioned on no further misconduct. The case further clarifies how Ohio courts will treat systemic inaccuracy in appointed‑counsel billing where the lawyer’s motive is not selfish and the remedial response is substantial.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a per curiam opinion, held:

  • Collins violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,” by submitting numerous inaccurate, certified fee applications for court‑appointed work in three counties.
  • The court expressly characterizes his conduct as “misrepresentation,” and distinguishes it from intentional dishonesty, deceit, or fraud, noting there is no evidence Collins did not perform the services or intentionally overbilled.
  • One aggravating factor was present: a pattern of misconduct over two years. Four mitigating factors were found, including a previously unblemished disciplinary record, full cooperation, substantial restitution, and strong character evidence.
  • While the court reiterates that dishonesty‑related misconduct generally warrants an actual suspension, it finds that in this case an “abundance of mitigation” justifies a lesser sanction.
  • Accordingly, the court imposes a two‑year suspension from the practice of law, fully stayed on the sole condition that Collins engage in no further misconduct. If he violates the condition, the stay will be revoked and the full two‑year suspension will be served.

In reaching this result, the court carefully compares Collins’s conduct with a line of prior cases involving appointed‑counsel billing abuses—most notably Agopian, McCloskey, Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift— and explains why his case warrants a sanction more severe than a one‑year fully stayed suspension but less severe than a partial actual suspension.

III. Factual Background and Misconduct

A. Collins’s Practice and Workload

  • Admitted to the Ohio bar in 2012, Collins worked for approximately 11 years with the Ohio Department of Youth Services before opening a private practice.
  • Starting in October 2018, he began accepting court‑appointed cases. By 2021–2022, about 90% of his practice involved:
    • Defending indigent juveniles in delinquency and contempt proceedings, and
    • Serving as guardian ad litem in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases.
  • He was appointed in Franklin, Licking, and Fairfield Counties and typically billed $50–$75 per hour, depending on county and whether the time was in‑court or out‑of‑court.
  • The parties stipulated that he routinely worked 12–15 hours per day on weekdays, plus additional weekend hours—a significant workload, particularly in the wake of COVID‑19 docket backlogs.

B. The Fee‑Application Process and Recordkeeping Failures

To be paid for court‑appointed work, Collins was required to complete a standardized two‑page form created by the Ohio Public Defender Commission: “Motion, Entry, and Certification for Appointed Counsel Fees.”

The form requires the attorney to certify, among other things, that:

  • No other compensation has been received for the representation beyond what is disclosed;
  • Fees and expenses claimed are not duplicated on any other motion; and
  • The attorney or supervised counsel performed all itemized legal services.

The second page is a time log in which the attorney certifies that the listed time was expended and specifies:

  • Dates of service;
  • Hours in court;
  • Hours out of court.

Although Collins used office‑management software that included a timekeeping module, he failed to:

  • Enter contemporaneous time entries; or
  • Track total daily hours worked across his three appointed‑counsel counties; or
  • Record, in any systematic way, hours worked by other attorneys who occasionally covered matters for him.

Instead, for billing purposes he reconstructed his time retrospectively by reviewing:

  • Court dockets and entries;
  • Pleadings and hearing notices;
  • Emails, phone records, and text messages.

He then estimated both his own hours and the hours spent by covering attorneys. This practice inevitably produced numerous inaccurate—but nonetheless certified—fee applications.

C. The OPD Audits and Alarming Time Totals

1. The 2021 Audit

An OPD audit for 2021 revealed:

  • Collins submitted fee applications totaling 3,392.5 hours of appointed work for that year alone.
  • On the face of the applications, he certified that he had worked:
    • More than 24 hours in a day on 3 different dates;
    • 20–24 hours in a day on 14 dates; and
    • 16–20 hours in a day on 45 dates.
  • Collins’s 2021 fee applications contained 216 entries of “in court” time; of these, 148 entries (68.5%) were exactly 0.5 hours, suggesting a routinized rather than individualized approach to time recording.

2. The 2022 Audit

A subsequent OPD audit for 2022—facts Collins formally waived notice of under Gov.Bar R. V(10)(A)(1) and stipulated to—showed similarly troubling patterns:

  • Certified fee applications totaling 3,342.9 hours for 2022.
  • On their face, they certified that Collins worked:
    • More than 24 hours in a day on 1 date;
    • 20–24 hours in a day on 20 dates; and
    • 16–20 hours in a day on 65 dates.
  • Among 383 “in court” time entries, 280 (73.1%) were for 0.5 hours—again indicating a standardized increment divorced from contemporaneous tracking.

These data made clear that Collins’s billing practices created the appearance of physically impossible workloads and repeated, mechanical half‑hour billing increments, both inconsistent with accurate, case‑specific reporting.

D. The Grievance, Investigation, and Collins’s Response

In September 2023, OPD filed a grievance with Disciplinary Counsel. In response to the initial letter of inquiry, Collins:

  • Conceded that “recording inaccuracies unfortunately occurred,” and
  • Attributed them to his untimely review of case records and poor recordkeeping practices.

Notably:

  • Relator (Disciplinary Counsel) acknowledged—both in stipulations and at hearing—that it had no reason to believe:
    • Collins or the covering attorneys did not perform the services billed, or
    • Collins intentionally inflated his hours.
  • The misconduct was framed as the product of systemic recordkeeping failures, not a deliberate scheme to defraud.

E. Remedial Action and Restitution

Once alerted to the audit findings, Collins took several corrective measures:

  • Improved timekeeping (late 2023): He began using the time‑management features of his office‑management software to record contemporaneous time entries for himself and covering attorneys, and continued doing so thereafter.
  • Voluntary reimbursement (March 2025): He reimbursed the three counties a total of $19,695.50, calculated as the fees he had been paid for hours billed in excess of 16 hours per day, using the formula employed in McCloskey.
    • $8,661 to Franklin County;
    • $7,950.50 to Licking County;
    • $3,075 to Fairfield County.
    The parties stipulated that this reimbursement did not constitute an admission that those fees were unearned but an acknowledgment that his time records were unreliable.

After independently reviewing OPD’s documentation, Disciplinary Counsel calculated that Collins should refund $25,925. The difference from the OPD figure stemmed mainly from:

  • Inadvertent data‑entry errors; and
  • Overlap of certain dates across the two audits.

Rather than litigate the minutiae of the numbers, the parties agreed to “split the difference,” leading to an additional reimbursement of $3,114.75, allocated:

  • 45% to Franklin County;
  • 40% to Licking County;
  • 15% to Fairfield County.

A joint notice filed June 3, 2025 confirmed that these further payments had been made, bringing Collins’s total restitution to approximately $22,810.25.

F. Stipulations and Board Findings

  • The parties stipulated to extensive facts (166 joint exhibits), including the audits and Collins’s remedial steps.
  • Relator emphasized at hearing that Collins was honest and cooperative throughout the investigation, and that the case sounded in misrepresentation due to poor recordkeeping, not intentional overbilling.
  • The Board of Professional Conduct found that Collins’s conduct:
    “can only be described as misrepresentation, dishonest, deceitful, and/or fraudulent,”
    but agreed there was no evidence that Collins:
    • Intentionally overbilled, or
    • Did not perform the services claimed.
  • On clear and convincing evidence, the Board concluded Collins violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).

The Supreme Court adopts the Board’s finding of a violation and clarifies that it characterizes the misconduct as misrepresentation rather than “intentional dishonesty, deceitfulness, or fraudulent misconduct.”

IV. Legal Issues and Rules Applied

A. Core Legal Questions

The case presents two principal legal questions:

  1. Does a lawyer violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) where he submits grossly inaccurate, certified fee applications for court‑appointed work due to systemic recordkeeping failures, but without proof of intentional overbilling or theft?
  2. Assuming a violation, what is the appropriate sanction under Gov.Bar R. V, in light of:
    • The general rule that dishonesty‑type misconduct usually warrants actual suspension; and
    • The specific mitigating and aggravating factors present in this case?

B. Key Rules and Standards

  • Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c): Prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” This broad provision covers a range of misconduct from outright fraud to materially false statements and certifications.
  • Gov.Bar R. V(10)(A)(1): Provides a respondent’s right to written notice of alleged misconduct; Collins expressly waived notice regarding the 2022 audit and stipulated to the facts.
  • Gov.Bar R. V(13):
    • V(13)(B): Lists aggravating factors (e.g., pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, dishonest or selfish motive).
    • V(13)(C): Lists mitigating factors (e.g., absence of prior discipline, restitution, cooperation, character evidence).
  • Burden of proof: The Board and court must find violations by clear and convincing evidence, a high civil standard requiring that the truth of the allegations be highly probable.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. General Principle: Dishonesty Usually Warrants Actual Suspension

The court reiterates its long‑standing approach that dishonesty‑related misconduct generally requires an actual suspension, citing:

  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187 (1995) – Established the baseline that dishonest conduct toward clients or the court typically merits actual suspension.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraemer, 125 Ohio St.3d 49, 2010‑Ohio‑1556 – Applied and reaffirmed Fowerbaugh.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Karris, 129 Ohio St.3d 499, 2011‑Ohio‑4243 – Collected the rule that “misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation warrants an actual suspension.”

At the same time, the court invokes its line of cases recognizing that an “abundance of mitigating evidence” can justify a departure from this general rule:

  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003‑Ohio‑4129 – Observed that exceptional mitigation can support a lesser sanction in dishonesty cases.
  • Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77 (2000) – An earlier case relying on substantial mitigation to moderate sanction.

These authorities structure the court’s analysis: the starting point is an actual suspension, but the court then asks whether Collins’s mitigation is strong enough to displace that default.

B. Appointed‑Counsel Billing Cases: Comparative Framework

The court situates Collins within a continuum of Ohio disciplinary cases involving appointed‑counsel fee abuses.

1. Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006‑Ohio‑6510

In Agopian:

  • The respondent engaged in overbilling for court‑appointed work due to sloppy timekeeping, leading to requests reflecting more than 24 hours worked on three days.
  • Critically, evidence showed he often performed more work than he billed; there was no deceit or attempt to collect fees for unperformed work.
  • No aggravating factors were present; mitigation was substantial: clean record, full cooperation, and over 40 character letters.
  • Sanction: public reprimand.

The court in Collins explicitly states that Collins’s misconduct is more significant than Agopian’s. The systemic nature and sheer volume of inaccurate billing—across many days and cases over two years— distinguishes Collins from Agopian’s sloppiness that did not appear to result in systematic inflation of hours.

2. Disciplinary Counsel v. McCloskey, 2023‑Ohio‑3447

McCloskey forms the closest factual analogue:

  • Like Collins, McCloskey:
    • Submitted grossly inaccurate appointed‑counsel fee applications over about two years;
    • Did not keep contemporaneous time records;
    • Retrospectively reconstructed time using dockets and rough notes;
    • Frequently certified identical in‑court times for multiple clients regardless of actual time spent.
  • OPD audits showed:
    • More than 24 hours billed on 3 days;
    • 20–24 hours billed on 13 days; and
    • 16–20 hours billed on 22 days.
  • No aggravating factors were found, and the mitigation profile (clean record, cooperation, restitution, character evidence) mirrored Collins’s.
  • McCloskey refunded $6,430 representing all hours billed in excess of 16 hours per day over nearly two years.
  • Sanction: one‑year suspension, fully stayed, with conditions.

In comparing the two, the court emphasizes:

  • Collins’s misconduct was more pervasive:
    • Many more days with 16–24+ hours billed;
    • Many more total hours over two years;
    • Restitution of over $22,800—more than 3.5 times McCloskey’s.
  • Thus, the court reasons that consistency with McCloskey requires a sanction more severe than a one‑year stayed suspension.

3. The “More Severe” Tier: Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift

In three other appointed‑counsel billing cases, the court imposed a two‑year suspension with only one year stayed, i.e., a one‑year actual suspension:

  • Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Robinson, 2021‑Ohio‑2123;
  • Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stahlbush, 126 Ohio St.3d 366, 2010‑Ohio‑3823;
  • Dayton Bar Assn. v. Swift, 142 Ohio St.3d 31, 2014‑Ohio‑4835.

Each of these cases, however, involved intentional or knowing overbilling and additional aggravating circumstances:

a. Robinson
  • Robinson knowingly overbilled for appointed work during a period of severe medical hardship and inadequate health insurance coverage.
  • She was criminally convicted of a fifth‑degree felony theft charge related to the overbilling and ordered to pay nearly $30,000 in restitution, plus an additional $50,000 agreed to in the disciplinary case.
  • Sanction: two‑year suspension with one year stayed.
b. Stahlbush
  • Stahlbush:
    • Failed to keep any reasonable time records;
    • Submitted fee requests that deceptively inflated her hours and involved guesswork;
    • Billed over 3,450 hours in a year for appointed work and stipulated that some of this billing was “false and fraudulent.”
  • Aggravating factors included:
    • A dishonest or selfish motive;
    • A pattern of misconduct; and
    • Multiple offenses.
  • Mitigation: clean record, character evidence, some restitution and waiver of unpaid fees.
  • Sanction: two‑year suspension, second year stayed on conditions such as monitored probation.
C. Swift
  • Swift knowingly submitted false fee applications to courts and OPD, routinely billing in 0.5‑hour increments instead of the required 0.1‑hour increments, and guessed at time for hundreds of cases.
  • Violations extended beyond Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) to:
    • False statements of fact or law to a tribunal and to OPD;
    • Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and
    • Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice.
  • Swift stipulated that he owed $50,000 in restitution but had not paid it at the time of his hearing.
  • Sanction: two‑year suspension, second year stayed on conditions including monitored probation and full restitution before reinstatement.

The court in Collins expressly distinguishes these three cases on the basis of intent and knowledge:

“In each of those cases, there was an element of knowledge or intent that is simply not present here.”

Thus, Collins’s conduct is placed above McCloskey (in pervasiveness) but below Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift (in moral culpability and scope of violations).

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Establishing the 8.4(c) Violation: Misrepresentation by Certification

The court’s finding of a Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) violation turns heavily on:

  • The certification language on the OPD fee forms; and
  • The stark objective evidence that those certifications were repeatedly and materially inaccurate.

Even if Collins did not intend to steal or knowingly overstate time, signing a certification that the time listed “was expended” when that time was in fact based on rough reconstruction and pattern billing overlaid on incomplete records amounts to “conduct involving … misrepresentation.”

In other words:

  • The act of signing and submitting facially unreliable and frequently impossible time certifications is itself a misrepresentation.
  • The court does not require proof of a subjective intent to deceive; reckless indifference to accuracy suffices for 8.4(c) in this context.

The Board’s language that Collins’s conduct was “misrepresentation, dishonest, deceitful, and/or fraudulent” signals the seriousness with which such unreliable certified statements are viewed, even where financial gain is not definitively shown to have exceeded legitimate work.

B. Distinguishing Misrepresentation from Intentional Fraud

At ¶ 18, the Supreme Court draws a careful line:

“[W]e adopt the board’s finding of misconduct and conclude that Collins engaged in misrepresentation rather than intentional dishonesty, deceitfulness, or fraudulent misconduct.”

This phrasing is significant doctrinally:

  • It confirms that 8.4(c) encompasses gradations of wrongful conduct along a spectrum, from negligent or reckless misstatements up through deliberate fraud.
  • Here, the violation rests at the “misrepresentation” end of that spectrum; intentional dishonesty or fraud is not found on this record.
  • That distinction matters primarily at the sanction phase, even though the formal rule violated (8.4(c)) is the same.

C. Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Under Gov.Bar R. V(13), the court conducts a structured analysis:

1. Aggravating Factor

  • Pattern of misconduct (V(13)(B)(3)): Collins engaged in systematic, inaccurate billing over two years, across numerous cases and days. This goes beyond a few isolated misstatements.

2. Mitigating Factors

Four mitigating factors weighed heavily:

  • No prior discipline (V(13)(C)(1)): Collins had an otherwise clean professional record.
  • Timely good‑faith effort at restitution (V(13)(C)(3)): He voluntarily reimbursed substantial sums, even while stipulating that the payments did not concede that the refunded amounts were truly unearned.
  • Full cooperation and candor (V(13)(C)(4)): Disciplinary Counsel itself represented that Collins was honest throughout the investigation and fully cooperative in the process.
  • Good character and reputation (V(13)(C)(5)): Letters from three attorneys and a judge attested to his character and standing in the legal community.

The combination of a single (but serious) aggravator and robust mitigation moves the case away from the presumptive imposition of an actual suspension typical in dishonesty cases.

D. Sanction Selection and Calibration

The central sanction question is how far the court should depart from the usual rule that dishonesty warrants some period of actual suspension. The joint recommendation of the parties—and the Board’s recommendation—was a two‑year suspension, fully stayed.

The court:

  • Accepts the general principle from Karris, Kraemer, and Fowerbaugh that dishonesty normally triggers an actual suspension;
  • Recognizes, via Markijohn and Kinney, that “an abundance of mitigating evidence” can justify a non‑active sanction;
  • Uses Agopian, McCloskey, Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift to “benchmark” where Collins falls on the spectrum.

The resulting calibration is:

  • More serious than McCloskey:
    • More pervasive pattern;
    • Much larger restitution; and
    • Higher number of “impossible” days (20+ and 16+ hours billed).
    Therefore, a sanction more severe than a one‑year stayed suspension is appropriate.
  • Less culpable than Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift, where:
    • Knowing or intentional overbilling was established;
    • Additional rule violations (e.g., false statements to tribunals, prejudice to administration of justice) occurred;
    • Criminal convictions or especially large unpaid restitution obligations existed.
    Thus, a one‑year actual suspension would be disproportionate here.

Faced with these guideposts, the court opts for a two‑year suspension fully stayed. This:

  • Signals the seriousness of the misconduct—two years on the books—
  • But respects the substantial mitigation and absence of intentional fraud by foregoing an immediate period of actual suspension.

E. Conditions of the Stay and Future Risk

The stay is conditioned solely on Collins committing no further misconduct. If he reoffends, he must serve the entire two‑year suspension. The court does not impose:

  • Monitored probation; or
  • Additional conditions (such as further restitution or practice‑management monitoring) as in some prior cases.

The court’s restraint reflects:

  • Confidence in Collins’s remedial steps (improved timekeeping);
  • Timely and complete restitution under the parties’ agreed framework; and
  • Strong assurances from his professional community as to his character.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)

“Misrepresentation” in this context means making a statement or certification that is materially false or misleading. Importantly:

  • A lawyer’s intent may influence the sanction, but the rule can be violated even if the misstatement results from reckless indifference or systemic sloppiness rather than a conscious plan to deceive.
  • Signing and submitting a form certifying that certain hours were worked when:
    • Those hours are reconstructed guesses, and
    • They produce impossible totals (e.g., over 24 hours in a day),
    is a classic example of misrepresentation, even if the lawyer believed he had worked extremely long days.

B. “Clear and Convincing Evidence”

This standard of proof is higher than a “preponderance of the evidence” (more likely than not) but lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt” (used in criminal cases). It requires that the evidence make the truth of the allegation highly probable. In Collins, documents (billing forms, audit reports) and stipulations readily met this standard.

C. “Conditionally Stayed” Suspension

A suspension that is “conditionally stayed” means:

  • The court formally imposes a suspension, but it does not take effect so long as the lawyer complies with specified conditions.
  • If conditions are violated (here, if Collins commits further misconduct), the stay is lifted and the lawyer must serve the full suspension period.

In Collins’s case, the condition is narrow: no further misconduct. The absence of more complex conditions (e.g., mandated monitoring) underscores the court’s reliance on his remedial steps.

D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Discipline

In lawyer discipline, “aggravating factors” are circumstances that make misconduct more serious (e.g., prior discipline, selfish motive, pattern of misconduct), whereas “mitigating factors” are circumstances that make sanctions less severe (e.g., clean record, cooperation, restitution, good character).

These factors help the court individualize sanctions rather than applying a rigid rule for each violation.

E. Restitution without Admission of Unearned Fees

Collins’s case illustrates a practical approach to restitution in situations where precise overbilling cannot be identified:

  • The parties used a proxy (hours billed in excess of 16 hours per day) as a reasonable approximation of potentially unreliable or excessive billing.
  • Collins paid substantial sums under that formula while expressly not conceding that he had not worked those hours; instead, he acknowledged inadequate recordkeeping.

This allows the disciplinary system to protect public funds and address questionable billing without forcing a binary conclusion that all refunded fees were necessarily unearned.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. For Ohio Lawyers, Especially Appointed Counsel

The opinion sends several clear messages to lawyers engaged in court‑appointed work:

  • Contemporaneous timekeeping is essential. Reliance on reconstructed estimates from dockets, emails, and memory, especially when used to certify precise hours, is professionally unsafe and can lead to discipline under 8.4(c).
  • Facially implausible billing will draw scrutiny. Patterns such as:
    • Certifying more than 24 hours in a single day;
    • Frequently certifying 16–24‑hour days; or
    • Default half‑hour increments for nearly every in‑court event,
    are red flags that can trigger audits and disciplinary complaints.
  • Misrepresentation does not require corrupt intent. Lawyers cannot shield themselves by arguing “I worked long hours” or “I did the work” if their certifications are objectively unreliable and systemically inaccurate.
  • Remediation matters greatly. Prompt adoption of proper timekeeping systems, cooperation with investigations, and good‑faith restitution can dramatically affect whether an actual suspension is imposed.

B. Doctrinal Refinement: Sanction Spectrum for 8.4(c) Violations

Doctrinally, Collins refines the sanction spectrum in Ohio for misrepresentation in billing:

  • Least severe: Sloppy recordkeeping with minimal impact and strong mitigation may result in a public reprimand (as in Agopian).
  • Intermediate (non‑intentional but pervasive misrepresentation): Systemic, serious misrepresentation without evidence of intent to defraud, combined with robust mitigation and restitution, can justify a fully stayed multi‑year suspension (as here: two‑year suspension fully stayed).
  • Most severe: Knowing or intentional overbilling, especially combined with other rule violations, criminal conduct, or large unrepaid losses, typically draws a suspension with a substantial actual component (e.g., two years with one year stayed, as in Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift).

The case thus reinforces that “dishonesty” is not monolithic; sanction will track both the degree of moral culpability and the strength of mitigation.

C. Administrative and Systemic Implications

For OPD and county courts, the decision:

  • Implicitly validates the use of systematic audits of appointed‑counsel billing as a discipline‑triggering mechanism.
  • Encourages clear certification language in fee forms, since the court treats those certifications as legally significant representations under 8.4(c).
  • Supports the use of reasonable formulas (e.g., refund hours billed above 16/day) to approximate restitution where precise overbilling is difficult to pinpoint.

D. Public Confidence in the Justice System

Appointed‑counsel fee abuses are particularly sensitive because they involve public funds and potentially exploit vulnerable, indigent clients. The court’s decision:

  • Affirms that even “non‑intentional” misrepresentation in this area is serious enough to warrant a formal suspension (though stayed), reinforcing accountability;
  • Simultaneously signals that the disciplinary system can recognize and credit good‑faith, remedial behavior and not simply equate all billing irregularities with theft.

This balanced approach supports both deterrence and fairness, promoting public confidence in the regulation of the bar.

IX. Key Takeaways

  • Submitting certified, but materially inaccurate, fee applications for court‑appointed work constitutes “misrepresentation” under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), even without proof of an intent to defraud.
  • Systemic recordkeeping failures that yield impossible time totals (e.g., more than 24 hours billed in a day) can trigger disciplinary liability based on misrepresentation alone.
  • Although dishonesty‑type misconduct generally warrants an actual suspension, an “abundance of mitigating evidence” (clean record, cooperation, substantial restitution, strong character) can justify a fully stayed suspension.
  • Collins occupies a middle ground between lesser cases like Agopian and McCloskey and more serious intentional overbilling cases like Robinson, Stahlbush, and Swift.
  • The decision establishes that a two‑year suspension, fully stayed, is an appropriate sanction for pervasive but non‑intentional misrepresentation in appointed‑counsel billing accompanied by robust remediation.
  • For practitioners, the opinion underscores the non‑negotiable importance of contemporaneous, accurate timekeeping and the risks of relying on reconstructed estimates for certified fee applications.

X. Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Collins clarifies that Ohio’s Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) reaches systemic, reckless misrepresentation in appointed‑counsel billing even where the lawyer’s motive is not demonstrably selfish or fraudulent. At the same time, the court’s willingness to approve a fully stayed two‑year suspension, grounded in substantial mitigation and significant restitution, refines the sanction framework for such cases.

The decision stands as a cautionary precedent for any lawyer who signs certified billing statements without robust, contemporaneous time records, and as an instructive example of how sincere remediation can mitigate sanctions for serious but non‑intentional misconduct. It reinforces both the ethical imperative of honesty in billing and the capacity of the disciplinary system to differentiate between negligent misrepresentation and deliberate fraud.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Judge(s)

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