Misreading Rule 15 Is Not a “Mistake”: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Relation-Back, Notice-of-Appeal Specificity, and Affirms Kentucky’s One-Year Limitations for § 1983 Claims

Introduction

In Jennie V. Wright and Saul Wright, on behalf of Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett v. Louisville Metro Government, et al., No. 24-5965 (6th Cir. July 16, 2025), a published opinion authored by Judge Thapar, the Sixth Circuit addressed a cluster of recurring procedural issues in § 1983 litigation arising from a home search by Louisville Metro Police Department officers. The case involved four plaintiffs: Jennie and Saul Wright, and their great-nephews, Jawand Lyle and Brendon Burnett. The suit originally named Louisville Metro Government and “unknown police officers,” and—after removal and dismissal—the Wrights amended to name specific officers more than three years after the incident.

The opinion resolves three principal issues:

Appellate jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 where a notice of appeal named only certain plaintiffs, leaving out pro se co-plaintiffs whose claims the district court had also dismissed;
The timeliness of § 1983 claims against individual officers added by amendment, focusing on Rule 15(c) “relation-back” when original defendants were “unknown police officers,” equitable tolling, and whether 28 U.S.C. § 1658 provides a federal statute of limitations for § 1983 via § 1988; and
The sufficiency of Monell allegations against Louisville and whether a post-judgment Department of Justice report could be used on appeal via judicial notice to save those claims.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Jennie and Saul Wright’s claims as time-barred and inadequately pleaded, and held it lacked jurisdiction over the nephews’ claims because they were not appellants under the notice of appeal. Notably, the court identified a potential Rule 60(b)(1) route for the nephews to seek relief from the district court given the manner in which their claims were dismissed.

Summary of the Opinion

Notice of Appeal and Jurisdiction: The notice of appeal designated only Jennie and Saul as appellants. Because Jawand and Brendon—by then pro se—were not named and could not be represented by Jennie and Saul, the court lacked appellate jurisdiction over their claims. Liberal construction of notices under Rule 3(c)(7) did not cure the omission.
Untimely claims against individual officers: Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury limitations period governs § 1983 claims. The amended complaint (adding named officers more than three years after the search) did not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Substituting named officers for previously “unknown” defendants is not a qualifying “mistake” for relation-back. Equitable tolling was forfeited and, in any event, would fail.
No federal four-year period via § 1658: The court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to use 28 U.S.C. § 1658’s four-year statute of limitations through § 1988. Supreme Court precedent requires borrowing state personal-injury periods for § 1983; a one-year period is not per se inconsistent with federal civil-rights enforcement (see also 42 U.S.C. § 1986).
Monell dismissal affirmed: The original complaint’s failure-to-train and policy/custom theories were conclusory and lacked factual content linking a Louisville policy, custom, or training deficiency to the Wrights’ alleged injury, as required by Iqbal. The court refused to take judicial notice of the contents of a later DOJ report to supplement the record on appeal.
Remedial note for the nephews: Although the district court dismissed all claims notwithstanding defendants’ motion aimed only at Jennie and Saul, the nephews may seek relief via Rule 60(b)(1) within one year, because judicial legal errors qualify as “mistakes” under Kemp v. United States.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

FRAP 3 and naming appellants: Smith v. Barry and Rule 3(c) require that notices of appeal specify the parties taking the appeal. Sixth Circuit decisions (Willis, Owens) endorse liberal construction, especially for pro se litigants. But liberal construction cannot replace the required showing of a party’s intent to appeal when the caption and body refer only to “the above-named plaintiffs” (Jennie and Saul) and both sign as the sole appellants. The court also emphasizes 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Olagues v. Timken to bar non-lawyers from representing others, especially relevant once the nephews were proceeding pro se.
Relief for district court overreach: Relying on Kemp v. United States, the panel notes that a judge’s legal errors count as “mistakes” under Rule 60(b)(1), providing a potential avenue for the nephews to correct a dismissal entered without a motion directed to their claims.
Borrowing state limitations periods under § 1983: The court follows Wallace v. Kato, Burnett v. Grattan, and long-standing Sixth Circuit practice (Collard v. Kentucky Board of Nursing) to apply Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury limitations period (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a)).
Relation-back and “mistake” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C): The panel leans on Zakora v. Chrisman and Cox v. Treadway to hold that substituting a named defendant for an unknown “Doe” does not satisfy the Rule’s “mistake” requirement. The court distinguishes “mistakes of law” that do qualify (e.g., suing an immune institution instead of a proper individual, or suing only in the wrong capacity, as reflected in Black-Hosang and Hill v. Shelander) from a plaintiff’s misunderstanding of Rule 15 itself—an error that does not relate back.
Equitable tolling: The panel cites Rembisz v. Lew, Nitch v. Eastern Gateway Community College, and Graham-Humphreys to hold the argument forfeited and meritless in any event; pro se status or attorney mistakes rarely justify tolling, and “federal courts sparingly bestow equitable tolling.”
Rebuffing § 1658 as a “suitable” federal statute of limitations via § 1988: The court underscores Burnett’s direction to borrow state limitations. It also notes that Congress has prescribed a one-year period in § 1986—undercutting arguments that a one-year period is categorically too short for civil-rights enforcement.
Monell pleading and judicial notice: Under Monell, Alkire v. Irving, and Iqbal, the complaint must plausibly allege a policy/custom or inadequate training and a causal link. The court relies on Jackson v. City of Cleveland for the failure-to-train elements. On judicial notice and record supplementation, the panel invokes Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider, Rule 201, and FRAP 10(e) to reject reliance on the DOJ report’s disputed assertions to cure pleading gaps on appeal. It also cites Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation to confirm that plaintiffs did not need to replead the already-dismissed Monell claim in the amended complaint to preserve appellate review.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is methodical and tracks the procedural posture through the lens of well-settled rules:

Rule 3(c) and the scope of the appeal: The notice’s caption and body identify only Jennie and Saul as “the above-named plaintiffs” taking the appeal, both of whom signed. Because the nephews were by then pro se, they could not be represented by Jennie and Saul; nor did the notice evince the nephews’ intent to appeal. Liberal construction cannot expand the notice to include unnamed parties. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit lacks jurisdiction over the nephews’ claims.
Erroneous global dismissal below; Rule 60(b)(1) as a corrective: Although defendants’ motion to dismiss targeted only Jennie and Saul, the district court dismissed “all remaining claims,” thereby sweeping in the nephews’ claims. The panel notes that, on the most natural reading, the judgment did dismiss the nephews’ claims; if, alternatively, it did not, then the court’s denial of pending motions as moot would be error. Either way, the nephews may seek relief via Rule 60(b)(1) based on the district court’s legal error, in line with Kemp.
One-year limitations period and relation-back: Under § 1988 and Supreme Court precedent, the court borrows Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury limitations period. The original complaint was timely but named only the municipality and “unknown” officers. The amended complaint added identified officers more than three years later, which is untimely unless it relates back. Under Zakora and Cox, lack of knowledge of the defendants’ identities is not a “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). The court rejects plaintiffs’ effort to turn their misunderstanding of the Rule into a qualifying “mistake of law.” The cognizable “mistake of law” for Rule 15 purposes is one that misidentifies the proper target of the cause of action (e.g., suing only an immune entity or in the wrong capacity), not an error about whether the Rule permits Doe substitutions to relate back.
Equitable tolling: The court holds the argument forfeited and, in any event, insufficient. Pro se litigants’ ignorance and counsel’s missteps generally do not warrant tolling. The magistrate’s later instruction to identify officers could not change a limitations deadline that had already expired while plaintiffs still had counsel.
Rejecting § 1658 via § 1988: Plaintiffs argue the post-1990 four-year federal catchall, § 1658, is a “suitable” federal limitations period. The court declines, explaining that Burnett and subsequent practice fix the borrowing of state personal-injury periods for § 1983. It also notes Congress’s choice of a one-year period in § 1986, undermining claims that one year is inherently inadequate for civil-rights enforcement.
Monell claims fail under Iqbal/Twombly: The complaint offered bare conclusions about failure to train and amorphous policies/customs (including allegations of disproportionate impact in African American neighborhoods), but no factual content describing the training program, its inadequacies, deliberate indifference, or causal connection to the Wrights’ injuries. The court rejects reliance on a 2023 DOJ report, both because appellate courts cannot use judicial notice to inject new, disputed facts into the record and because the report’s assertions are subject to reasonable dispute. A remand to consider the report would effectively invite post-judgment amendment, which must proceed through Rules 59 or 60 in the district court.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Relation-back doctrine in the Sixth Circuit: This published opinion reinforces and clarifies Zakora and Cox: substituting named officers for previously “unknown” defendants does not qualify as a Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “mistake.” The court further narrows attempts to recharacterize a misreading of Rule 15 as a “mistake of law” about a defendant’s identity. Plaintiffs must identify individual officers within the limitations period or have a viable tolling/suspension theory grounded in preserved and compelling facts.
Appellate practice for multi-plaintiff cases: Notices of appeal must clearly list every appellant. Generic references like “plaintiffs” will not rescue unnamed parties when the caption and body specify only “the above-named plaintiffs.” Pro se litigants must file or be named. This decision is a cautionary tale for cases with transitioning representation.
District court case-management: The panel’s Rule 60(b)(1) discussion signals careful scrutiny where district courts enter global dismissals on motions targeted to fewer parties or claims. Parties should promptly move for relief within one year where a judgment sweeps in claims not squarely before the court.
§ 1983 limitations landscape remains stable: Efforts to invoke § 1658’s four-year period through § 1988 will be nonstarters in the Sixth Circuit absent Supreme Court or congressional change. Practitioners must plan investigations and pre-suit discovery accordingly, especially in jurisdictions like Kentucky with a one-year period.
Monell pleading standards and extra-record materials: Threadbare policy/custom or failure-to-train allegations will not survive Iqbal/Twombly. Parties cannot use appellate judicial notice to supply factual content via investigative reports whose assertions are disputable. If new evidence emerges post-judgment, seek relief in the district court under Rules 59 or 60.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Relation-Back (Rule 15(c)(1)(C)): Lets an amended complaint “relate back” to the original filing date if the amendment corrects a mistake about the defendant’s identity. Not knowing who to sue (e.g., using “John Doe/unknown officers”) is not a “mistake.” Correctable mistakes include suing the wrong legal entity or the wrong capacity when the right target received notice and won’t be prejudiced.
“Mistake of Law” for Rule 15: A qualifying mistake is about who can be sued (e.g., mistakenly suing an immune institution) rather than misunderstanding Rule 15 itself. Misreading the relation-back rule is not a “mistake” concerning a defendant’s identity.
Borrowing State Limitations for § 1983: Because § 1983 has no limitations period, courts borrow the state’s general personal-injury period (one year in Kentucky). The federal catchall, § 1658, generally does not apply to § 1983 claims, which predate 1990.
Equitable Tolling: An exception that pauses a limitations clock in extraordinary circumstances. Courts rarely grant it. Pro se status or ordinary attorney error typically isn’t enough.
Monell Liability: A municipality is liable only if an official policy, custom, or failure to train (reflecting deliberate indifference) caused the constitutional injury. Conclusory allegations won’t suffice; plaintiffs must plead facts showing the policy/custom or training deficiency and a causal link to their injury.
Judicial Notice vs. Record Supplementation: Courts can take notice of indisputable facts, not the truth of disputed assertions in documents. Parties cannot use appellate judicial notice to introduce new, contested evidence to patch pleading defects.
Rule 3 Notices of Appeal: A notice must name each appellant in the caption or body. Liberal construction helps with minor defects but cannot add parties whose intent to appeal is not apparent on the face of the notice.
Rule 60(b)(1) Relief for Judicial Error: A district court’s legal error can be a “mistake” warranting relief from judgment, but a motion must be filed in the district court within one year of the judgment.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s published decision delivers clear procedural guidance on multiple fronts. First, it underscores that a notice of appeal must unambiguously name all appellants; pro se parties cannot be swept in through generic descriptors where the notice identifies only “the above-named plaintiffs.” Second, the court cements the Sixth Circuit’s approach to Rule 15(c) relation-back: substituting named officers for previously “unknown” defendants is not a “mistake” concerning identity, and a litigant’s misreading of Rule 15 cannot transform that non-mistake into a timely claim. Third, Kentucky’s one-year personal-injury limitations period continues to govern § 1983 claims, and § 1658 offers no backdoor to a longer federal period. Fourth, Monell claims demand factual heft; conclusory references to policies, customs, or training failures—unsupported by well-pleaded facts connecting the city’s conduct to the plaintiff’s injury—will not survive. Finally, the opinion pragmatically points to Rule 60(b)(1) as a corrective for district court judgments that inadvertently encompass claims not properly presented, provided litigants act within the one-year window.

For civil rights practitioners in the Sixth Circuit, the message is unmistakable: move quickly within short state limitations periods; diligently identify individual officers; draft Monell allegations with factual specificity and causal links; file precise notices of appeal naming every appellant; and if a judgment sweeps too broadly, promptly pursue Rule 60(b)(1) relief in the district court. The opinion both consolidates existing doctrine and offers crisp clarifications likely to shape § 1983 practice across the Circuit.