Misconduct Is Not Disability Discrimination: Second Circuit Reaffirms that the ADA Does Not Require Excusing Disruptive Conduct and Demands Plausible Causation for Discrimination, Accommodation, and Retaliation Claims in Youth Sports Settings

Case: Lafayette v. Blueprint Basketball, No. 25-775-cv

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order)

Date: October 15, 2025

Panel: Judges Guido Calabresi, Denny Chin, Eunice C. Lee

Disposition: Affirmed (Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))

Note: This is a Summary Order and does not have precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1; however, it is citable and carries persuasive value.

Introduction

In Lafayette v. Blueprint Basketball, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) arising out of a youth basketball program’s ban on a parent and the removal of his son from a team after an on-court incident. The case sits at the intersection of ADA Title III (public accommodations) and Title I (employment), in a nontraditional context involving a volunteer assistant coach and a privately operated youth sports organization.

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Lafayette alleged ADA discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation against Blueprint Basketball and others, following (i) his ejection from a game after criticizing a referee and (ii) subsequent bans barring him from practices and games and removing his son from the team. The district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims; the Second Circuit affirmed.

Although the Court expressly assumed arguendo several threshold issues (including whether the ADA applied to the defendants and whether Lafayette was a qualified person under the statute), it held that the pleadings did not plausibly allege disability-based discrimination, a failure to accommodate, or a causal nexus for retaliation. Central to the decision is the principle that the ADA does not require entities to excuse disruptive or rule-violative conduct—even if the conduct is related to a disability—and that requests to “forgive” past misconduct are not reasonable accommodations as a matter of law.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of Review and Pleading: The court reviewed de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting plausible allegations and construing pro se pleadings liberally to raise the strongest possible claims.
Title III Discrimination (Public Accommodations): Even assuming Lafayette was a qualified individual and Blueprint was subject to Title III, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the bans and the removal were “because of” disability; rather, Lafayette’s own allegations indicated action was taken due to his disruptive criticism of a referee.
Title I Discrimination (Employment): To the extent the complaint suggested an employment claim based on Lafayette’s role as a volunteer assistant coach, it failed for the same reason: the pleaded facts showed a non-discriminatory rationale—misconduct. The court emphasized that misconduct can be a legitimate basis for adverse action “even when such misconduct is related to a disability.”
Failure to Accommodate: The complaint neither identified a reasonable accommodation request that was denied nor alleged a duty to provide a proactive accommodation in this context. A prior accommodation (excusal from game bookkeeping duties) had been granted. Any attempt to frame an excusal of past misconduct as an accommodation fails as a matter of law.
Retaliation: The complaint failed to plead a plausible causal connection between any protected activity and adverse actions. The asserted chain of communications and consequences was too vague and attenuated to cross the plausibility threshold.
Pro se limitation regarding child’s claims: Because Lafayette is not an attorney, he could not pursue claims on behalf of his son, so the court did not address them.
State law claims: With federal claims dismissed, the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction; the Second Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Twombly and Iqbal (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)): The court invoked the plausibility standard, requiring more than a sheer possibility of unlawful conduct. Lafayette’s own narrative showed that the bans followed a referee-criticism incident, undercutting an inference of disability-based motive. The retaliation allegations were likewise too attenuated to “nudge” the claim across the plausibility line.
Costin v. Glen Falls Hosp., 103 F.4th 946 (2d Cir. 2024): Provides the prima facie framework for Title III (public accommodations) discrimination: disability, covered entity, and denial of participation or benefits “on the basis of” disability. The court assumed the first two and found the third unsatisfied.
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024): States the Title I elements: covered employer, disability or regarded-as, qualified to perform essential functions with/without accommodation, and adverse action because of disability. Again, the causation element failed based on the pleaded facts. The case also reinforces the solicitude afforded to pro se pleadings (raise strongest claims suggested).
McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012): A key foundation for the court’s approach to misconduct: workplace (and analogous) misconduct is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action “even when such misconduct is related to a disability.” McElwee further supports the principle that an accommodation cannot be an after-the-fact absolution of past misconduct.
Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023): Sets out Title I failure-to-accommodate elements: disability, notice to employer, ability to perform essential functions with accommodation, and refusal to provide such accommodation. The court found no viable allegation of a request and refusal.
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001): Clarifies Title III’s duty to make reasonable modifications unless doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the service. The court referenced this standard but found no pleaded failure to provide a necessary reasonable modification.
Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2019): Provides the elements for ADA retaliation: protected activity, knowledge, adverse action, and causal connection. Lafayette’s causation allegations were too conclusory and indirect to suffice.
Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1990): A non-attorney parent cannot litigate claims on behalf of a child. This cut out significant narrative harm centered on the son’s team status and playing time, keeping the focus on Lafayette’s personal claims.
Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 125 F.4th 371 (2d Cir. 2025): Confirms de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and standard inferences at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Threshold framing: Title III versus Title I

The court acknowledged uncertainty about whether Lafayette’s complaint invoked Title III (public accommodations) only, or also Title I (employment) based on his volunteer assistant coach role. Without resolving classification questions (e.g., whether Blueprint is a covered “public accommodation” or whether Lafayette should be deemed an “employee” for Title I purposes), the court proceeded on alternative grounds: even assuming applicability of either Title, the complaint failed under both.

b. Discrimination claims fail for lack of plausible disability-based motive

Title III (public accommodations): Lafayette alleged denial of access to team activities and Blueprint offerings. But central to the claim is disability-based causation—i.e., that the exclusion was “on the basis of” disability. The complaint itself attributed the bans to Lafayette’s criticism of a referee and the resulting incident, not to disability. Under Twombly/Iqbal, a plaintiff must plead facts supporting a plausible inference of discriminatory motive, not merely a possibility. The pleaded narrative showed a straightforward misconduct-based rationale.
Title I (employment): The same causation problem defeated any employment-based theory. Even if Lafayette could otherwise satisfy the employer/employee and qualification elements, the “because of disability” element was not plausibly alleged. The court reiterated McElwee’s rule: misconduct—whether or not tied to disability—can be a legitimate reason for adverse action.

c. Failure-to-accommodate claims fail for lack of a requested and refused accommodation

Title III: Title III requires reasonable modifications to policies when necessary to afford equal access, unless doing so would fundamentally alter the service. The complaint did not identify any particular modification that was necessary and refused. To the contrary, it alleged Blueprint had previously accommodated Lafayette by excusing him from “game bookkeeping duties.”
Title I: Under Tafolla, a plaintiff must plead a disability, notice to the employer, ability to perform essential functions with accommodation, and a refusal to accommodate. The complaint lacked a clear accommodation request that Blueprint denied. Framing leniency for the referee-criticism incident as an “accommodation” fails, because an accommodation cannot be a retrospective absolution for past misconduct. As McElwee holds, such “accommodations” are unreasonable as a matter of law.

d. Retaliation claims fail for lack of plausible causation

Even if Lafayette engaged in protected activity (e.g., expressing concerns or requesting accommodations) and suffered adverse actions, the complaint did not plausibly allege a causal link between the two. The narrative posited a chain of communications—Lafayette to Robertson; Robertson to the coach—and later reductions in the son’s playing time. But the allegations were too vague about what was communicated, who decided what, and how those decisions targeted Lafayette for his protected activity. Under Twombly/Iqbal, causal speculation is insufficient.

e. Pro se limitation on representing a child; supplemental jurisdiction

Applying Cheung, the court declined to consider claims on behalf of the son. This materially narrowed the case to Lafayette’s personal claims. With all federal claims dismissed, the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims; the Second Circuit agreed.

3. Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, this decision reinforces several well-settled ADA principles in an increasingly common setting—youth sports and community-based programs involving parents, volunteers, and private organizations.

Misconduct remains a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for exclusion: Organizations may lawfully enforce codes of conduct and remove disruptive participants or volunteers. The ADA does not compel excusing disruptive behavior simply because it may relate to a disability.
Pleading causation is critical: Plaintiffs must connect adverse actions to disability. Where allegations themselves show a policy-enforcement rationale (e.g., ejection for arguing with officials), courts will not infer discrimination.
Accommodations must be specific, prospective, and reasonable: A viable failure-to-accommodate claim requires identifying a concrete, reasonable modification or workplace accommodation that was sought and refused. A request to forgive past misconduct is categorically unreasonable.
Retaliation requires more than temporal proximity or conjecture: Plaintiffs should plead facts showing decision-maker knowledge of protected activity and a plausible causal link. Vague chains of communication or speculative inferences are insufficient.
Pro se parents cannot litigate children’s claims: This often narrows the case and remedies available. Parents must secure counsel for children’s claims or proceed only on their own claims.
Title boundaries can be left unresolved if claims fail on the merits: The court avoided deciding whether the youth program was a Title III “public accommodation” or whether a volunteer was a Title I “employee,” highlighting that threshold classification issues may be bypassed where the pleadings fail on causation or other core elements.
State law claims may be marooned: When federal claims are dismissed early, courts often decline to retain jurisdiction over state-law theories, pushing parties toward state courts or settlement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ADA Title I vs. Title III: Title I governs employment relationships and requires employers to avoid disability discrimination and to provide reasonable accommodations enabling qualified employees to perform essential job functions. Title III regulates public accommodations (e.g., many businesses and service providers) and requires reasonable modifications to policies and practices to ensure access for individuals with disabilities, absent “fundamental alteration.”
Plausibility (Twombly/Iqbal): A complaint must do more than assert legal conclusions; it must allege specific facts that make discrimination, failure to accommodate, or retaliation reasonably believable, not just possible or speculative.
Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason: If the facts show a neutral rule-enforcement rationale—such as discipline for disruptive conduct—courts will not infer discrimination. Plaintiffs must plausibly suggest that the stated reason is not the real reason or that disability was the real reason. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff’s own allegations can defeat causation if they show a neutral basis for the adverse action.
Reasonable accommodation vs. forgiving past misconduct: Reasonable accommodations are forward-looking adjustments that help a person meet rules or job functions going forward. They are not retroactive pardons for rule violations that already occurred.
Protected activity (retaliation): Actions like requesting an accommodation or complaining about disability discrimination are “protected.” But a retaliation claim still requires that the decision-maker knew about that protected activity and that the adverse action was taken because of it.
Pro se representation limits: Individuals may represent themselves but not others. A parent who is not a lawyer cannot bring a lawsuit on a child’s behalf.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary affirmance in Lafayette v. Blueprint Basketball underscores three enduring ADA lessons: (1) misconduct—even if related to a disability—can be a legitimate reason for exclusion or discipline; (2) a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a specific, reasonable request and a refusal, not a plea to erase past violations; and (3) retaliation claims must plausibly link protected activity to adverse action through concrete facts, not speculation.

The case also reaffirms the practical challenges of ADA litigation in youth sports and community programs, where roles may straddle volunteer and participant status, and where enforcement of codes of conduct is routine. Even with the generous construction afforded to pro se pleadings, the court required a plausible disability-based motive and a clear causal chain—requirements that were not met here. While non-precedential, the order is a clear, instructive application of Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards to ADA discrimination, accommodation, and retaliation claims, and a reminder that pro se parents cannot litigate on behalf of their children without counsel.