Misapplication of State Evidentiary Rules as a Federal Constitutional Violation: Sixth Circuit Solidifies Pathway to Habeas Relief

Introduction

In Louis Chandler v. Mike Brown, No. 23-1270 (6th Cir. July 31 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the State of Michigan’s request for rehearing en banc after a panel had granted habeas corpus relief to state prisoner Louis Chandler. Although the full court’s order was only a single paragraph, the 25-page dissent authored by Judges Thapar and Murphy (joined by Judges Griffin and Readler) exposes the significance of the denial: the panel opinion—now left undisturbed—creates binding Sixth Circuit precedent that (1) a state trial court’s misapplication of otherwise valid evidentiary and procedural rules may violate the federal constitutional “right to present a complete defense,” and (2) such a violation can be deemed “clearly established” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (AEDPA), thereby warranting federal habeas relief, even absent Supreme Court authority addressing that precise scenario.

The case involves the exclusion of testimony that Chandler sought to offer from prior foster parents and an expert witness, evidence he claimed was critical to show the complainant’s motive and tendency to fabricate accusations. The Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged state-law errors in excluding the evidence, yet held there was no federal constitutional violation and any error was harmless. A divided Sixth Circuit panel disagreed, and the denial of rehearing en banc allows that ruling to stand.

Summary of the Judgment

• Outcome: Petition for rehearing en banc DENIED; panel opinion granting habeas relief to Chandler remains precedential.
• Majority Action: No opinion; fewer than a majority of active judges voted to rehear.
• Dissent: Judges Thapar and Murphy, joined by Judges Griffin and Readler, argued that AEDPA deference bars relief because the Supreme Court has never clearly held that misapplication (as opposed to inherent unconstitutionality) of state evidentiary rules violates the federal Constitution.
• Practical Effect: Chandler’s conviction is overturned; the State must retry or release him, and future habeas petitioners in the Sixth Circuit may rely on misapplied evidentiary rules as a constitutional foothold.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) – Recognized arbitrary exclusion of an accomplice’s testimony violates compulsory-process rights.
• Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) – Found a combination of hearsay and “voucher” rules unconstitutional when they blocked crucial exculpatory evidence.
• Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) – Held that excluding evidence about circumstances of a confession impinged on the right to present a defense.
• Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) – Struck down a per-se ban on hypnotically-refreshed testimony.
• Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) – Invalidated rule barring third-party-culpability evidence when State’s forensic evidence was “strong.”
• United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) – Upheld per-se exclusion of polygraph evidence; emphasized balancing defendant’s interest against State’s interest in reliable trials.
• Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505 (2013) – Reversed Ninth Circuit; clarified that Supreme Court has “rarely held” that evidence exclusions violate the Constitution and that no clearly established law requires case-by-case balancing for routine evidentiary rules.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (AEDPA) – Sets a high bar for federal courts to overturn state convictions unless the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.

The dissent relies heavily on Jackson, Scheffer, and AEDPA’s strict standards, arguing that Chandler’s case falls squarely within territory where the Supreme Court has offered no clear guidance. The panel, now controlling precedent, distinguished those authorities and broadened the scope of “clearly established” law by synthesizing the common rationale of Washington through Holmes—namely, that evidentiary exclusions are unconstitutional when they are arbitrary or disproportionate to their purposes and negate a weighty defense interest.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Because the en banc court issued no majority opinion, the controlling reasoning remains that of the prior panel (Chandler v. Brown, 137 F.4th 525). Key strands include:

1. Identifying a Constitutional Violation. The panel held that exclusion of the Hamblins’ testimony and the expert effectively precluded Chandler from presenting a plausible motive-to-fabricate theory, thereby infringing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. “Clearly Established” Law Under AEDPA. The panel read the Supreme Court’s line of cases—from Washington through Holmes—as clearly establishing a broader principle: courts must not apply evidentiary rules in a manner that arbitrarily deprives a defendant of critical exculpatory evidence.
3. Application to Michigan Proceedings. Michigan’s trial court (a) used the wrong evidentiary framework (Rule 608(b) instead of examining Rule 404(b)), and (b) imposed an extreme sanction (witness preclusion) for untimely disclosure, despite having granted funds for the expert only days earlier. The panel concluded these applications were arbitrary and disproportionate.
4. Harmless-Error Review. Considering the strength of excluded evidence against the remaining prosecution case, the panel found the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The dissent counters each step, insisting that (a) AEDPA permits federal relief only when Supreme Court precedent is directly on point; (b) no case squarely holds that misapplication—as opposed to substance—of state rules violates the Constitution; and (c) a reasonable jurist could see the exclusion as non-prejudicial because Chandler cross-examined the complainant about prior allegations and introduced other impeachment material.

3. Impact on Future Litigation

• Within the Sixth Circuit. District courts must now treat erroneous, disproportionate application of state evidentiary or procedural rules as a potential federal constitutional issue, and may grant habeas relief where the excluded evidence was central to the defense. The decision thus narrows AEDPA deference in evidentiary-error cases.
• State-Court Trial Practice. State judges in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee (within the Circuit) will likely engage in more explicit on-the-record balancing when excluding defense evidence, to insulate their rulings from federal review.
• Potential Supreme Court Review. The strong dissent tees up a cert-worthy question: Does AEDPA permit federal courts to find a constitutional violation in the misapplication of ordinary evidentiary rules when the Supreme Court has never answered that question? Given the frequency with which the Court has summarily reversed the Sixth Circuit on habeas issues, certiorari is plausible.
• Victim-Witness Considerations. Retrials stemming from evidentiary misapplications will require victims—often children in sexual-abuse cases—to testify again, raising policy tensions between defendants’ rights and victims’ interests in finality.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• AEDPA Deference (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Federal courts may overturn a state conviction only if the state decision is (a) contrary to, or (b) an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. “Clearly established” means Supreme Court—not lower court—holdings existing at the time of the state decision.
• Right to Present a Complete Defense. Derived from the Sixth Amendment (compulsory process), Fourteenth Amendment (due process), and sometimes the Fifth Amendment, this right ensures defendants can introduce evidence and testimony that is essential to their theory of the case.
• Rule 404(b) vs. Rule 608(b) (Michigan & Federal Analogs).
  • 404(b) allows evidence of other acts to show motive, intent, scheme, or absence of mistake; it addresses substantive facts relevant to the case.
  • 608(b) limits use of extrinsic evidence solely to attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness; litigants generally may not call another witness to prove the prior conduct.
• Habeas Corpus. A civil proceeding in which a prisoner challenges the legality of state custody in federal court.

Conclusion

By denying rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit allowed the panel’s path-breaking opinion to become circuit law. The case establishes that when state courts misapply their own evidentiary or procedural rules in a way that arbitrarily blocks critical exculpatory evidence, federal courts may deem that misapplication a violation of the constitutional right to present a complete defense—and may grant habeas relief notwithstanding AEDPA’s stringent standards. The powerful dissent predicts Supreme Court intervention, but until then, defense counsel within the Sixth Circuit have a fortified tool for challenging wrongful convictions based on evidentiary exclusions, while prosecutors and trial judges must navigate the newly heightened constitutional scrutiny of such rulings.