Miranda Violations After Arrest Are Harmless Where § 922(g) Elements Are Overwhelmingly Proven, and ACCA “Different Occasions” Is Not Defeated by Nonmaterial Date Variances

Case: United States v. Antoine Johnson (11th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication)
Core holdings: (1) Probable cause supported a bicycle-light traffic stop and a marijuana-based custodial arrest; (2) post-handcuff, unwarned statements were custodial under Miranda but their admission was harmless; (3) evidence sufficed for the ACCA “different occasions” finding despite a date discrepancy, given “on or about” proof and separateness of occasions.

I. Introduction

This appeal arose from a bifurcated jury trial in the Middle District of Florida in which Antoine Johnson was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and then found—via special verdict—to have three qualifying prior felonies committed on “occasions different from one another,” triggering the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

The case began when Officer Brett Naymik stopped Johnson after sunset for riding a bicycle across a public roadway without visible lights, allegedly violating Fla. Stat. § 316.2065(7). During the encounter, the officer observed a marijuana blunt behind Johnson’s ear, arrested him, and—during a search—found a revolver in Johnson’s waistband.

On appeal, Johnson raised two primary issues:

Fourth Amendment: Whether the stop, arrest, and search were unconstitutional, requiring suppression of the firearm and other evidence.
ACCA / Sufficiency: Whether the government failed to prove the three predicate offenses occurred on separate occasions because one predicate’s date in a state-court information conflicted with the “on or about” date alleged in the federal indictment and reflected in a booking sheet.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. It held:

Stop: Crediting the district court’s factfinding, the officer had probable cause to stop Johnson for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.2065(7) by riding without proper bicycle lights after sunset.
Arrest & Search: The visible marijuana blunt provided probable cause to believe Johnson illegally possessed marijuana; the custodial arrest was constitutional, and the firearm was discovered during a valid search incident to arrest. Johnson forfeited any argument contesting the search-incident-to-arrest ruling by not briefing it.
Miranda: Pre-handcuff questioning during the stop was not custodial for Miranda purposes, but post-handcuff questioning was custodial; nonetheless, admission of the post-arrest statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming proof of § 922(g)(1) elements.
ACCA “different occasions” / dates: The date discrepancy did not undermine sufficiency. The jury could find the predicate occurred “on or about” the charged date based on the booking sheet and Johnson’s own testimony; and, regardless, the predicates plainly occurred on separate occasions.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and appellate posture

United States v. Dixon and United States v. Barber supplied the mixed standard for suppression rulings (clear error for fact findings; de novo for legal conclusions), framing the panel’s deference to the district court’s credibility calls.
United States v. Bell and United States v. Watkins governed sufficiency review, emphasizing that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
United States v. Stancil and United States v. Roy reinforced that credibility determinations in suppression hearings are rarely disturbed absent clear error—critical to affirming the district court’s acceptance of the officer’s account that Johnson was riding without lights.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. was applied to hold that Johnson forfeited any challenge to the “search incident to arrest” rationale by not meaningfully contesting it on appeal.

2. Traffic stops, probable cause, and Fourth Amendment reasonableness

United States v. Purcell and Delaware v. Prouse established that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment “seizure.”
United States v. Harris and United States v. Chanthasouxat supplied the governing rule: a traffic stop is constitutional when supported by probable cause that a traffic violation occurred. The panel treated the bicycle-light violation as providing that probable cause.
United States v. Herzbrun supplied the definition of probable cause (“reasonable caution” based on trustworthy information), used to validate the stop under the credited facts.

3. Custodial arrest and marijuana-based probable cause

Virginia v. Moore (quoting United States v. Robinson) supplied the constitutional principle that a custodial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Gonzalez was cited consistent with Moore’s approach to custodial arrests supported by probable cause.
State v. Fortin was used for a Florida-law proposition with practical Fourth Amendment consequences: observation of marijuana outside medical-marijuana dispensary packaging can establish probable cause of illegal possession. The panel analogized the visible “marijuana blunt” to such unlawfully possessed marijuana.

4. Searches and Miranda doctrine

Terry v. Ohio appeared as a contrast: Johnson argued the search lacked justification as a “Terry frisk,” but the court affirmed on “search incident to arrest” grounds (and found the Terry issue beside the point).
Riley v. California was cited to describe the search-incident-to-arrest exception (even though Riley primarily limits digital searches, it restates the exception’s contours).
United States v. Luna-Encinas, Miranda v. Arizona, and United States v. Woodson supplied the custody framework: warnings are required only during custodial interrogation; custody is assessed objectively under the totality of circumstances.
Berkemer v. McCarty (and California v. Beheler) anchored the rule that ordinary traffic stops are not custodial for Miranda, but can evolve into custody when restraints approximate formal arrest.
United States v. Acosta supported the distinction between not being “free to leave” during a stop and being “in custody” for Miranda—an analytic move the panel used explicitly.
United States v. Street and United States v. Adams provided the harmless-error test for Miranda violations: whether, subtracting the improper statements, remaining evidence is so overwhelming that the verdict was unaffected beyond a reasonable doubt.

5. Elements of § 922(g) and knowledge of felon status

United States v. Funches supplied the elements of § 922(g)(1).
Greer v. United States (citing Rehaif v. United States) supplied the post-Rehaif requirement that the government prove the defendant knew of his felon status at the time of possession.
United States v. Reed supported inferring knowledge of felon status from a stipulation and related evidence, reinforcing the panel’s harmlessness conclusion.

6. ACCA “different occasions” after jury-trial requirement

Erlinger v. United States was the doctrinal trigger for the bifurcated trial’s second phase: a jury must determine whether ACCA predicates occurred on different occasions. This case applies Erlinger in a practical setting, including how juries are instructed and how documentary proof (informations, judgments, booking sheets, fingerprints) is used.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The stop: deference plus a straightforward probable-cause rule

The panel’s Fourth Amendment analysis turned on the district court’s credited factfinding that the officer observed Johnson “pedaling and riding” across the roadway after sunset without proper bicycle lights. Once that fact is accepted, the legal step is short: under United States v. Harris, observation of a traffic violation supplies probable cause for a stop. The opinion thereby treats Fla. Stat. § 316.2065(7) as an enforceable traffic-safety rule whose violation, when observed, justifies seizure.

2. The arrest: marijuana in plain view as probable cause, despite medical marijuana reforms

The opinion reinforces a key practical point in Florida enforcement post-medical-marijuana legalization: the state’s reforms do not eliminate probable cause where marijuana is observed in a plainly unlawful form (here, a blunt). By invoking State v. Fortin, the panel reasoned that marijuana outside dispensary packaging can support probable cause of illegality. That probable cause made the custodial arrest constitutionally reasonable under Virginia v. Moore.

3. The search: affirmed as incident to arrest, with forfeiture doing work on appeal

Although Johnson framed the issue as an unjustified Terry v. Ohio frisk, the district court upheld the firearm discovery as a search incident to arrest, and the panel affirmed—primarily because Johnson did not challenge that rationale on appeal and therefore forfeited it under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.. The result is a cautionary appellate lesson: even potentially substantial Fourth Amendment arguments can be lost if the appellant does not directly engage the district court’s stated basis.

4. Miranda: a careful split between “not free to leave” and “in custody”

The opinion distinguishes two related but different concepts:

Traffic stop constraint: Johnson was not free to leave during the traffic stop (as in Berkemer v. McCarty and United States v. Acosta).
Miranda custody: Miranda custody requires restraints and coercive pressure comparable to formal arrest (United States v. Woodson; United States v. Luna-Encinas).

Applying that framework, the panel found:

Pre-handcuff statements: Noncustodial—Johnson was unrestrained on his bicycle in public view near a highway; no weapons drawn; calm questioning typical of traffic-stop inquiry.
Post-handcuff statements: Custodial—the arrest, handcuffing, physical positioning (“straddled”), angry tone, and extended questioning created Miranda-type coercive pressures. The panel explicitly concluded these statements were obtained without warnings “in violation” of the Fifth Amendment.

5. Harmless error: how § 922(g) cases can absorb Miranda violations

Having found a Miranda violation, the court then applied harmless-error analysis under United States v. Street. The government’s § 922(g) case remained strong even without the post-arrest admissions:

Possession: Officer testimony and body-camera footage showed the revolver in Johnson’s waistband.
Interstate nexus: ATF expert testimony traced the revolver’s manufacture/import/shipping path.
Felon status and knowledge: Johnson stipulated he was a felon, and the jury heard a pre-arrest statement about a “strong-arm robbery” arrest, supporting knowledge under Greer v. United States / Rehaif v. United States principles, as reinforced by United States v. Reed.

This reasoning demonstrates the court’s willingness to recognize a constitutional error while still affirming when the remaining proof makes the verdict reliable beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. ACCA “different occasions”: date variance as a nonfatal proof issue

In the second trial phase required by Erlinger v. United States, the jury had to decide whether the three predicates occurred on different occasions. Johnson’s appellate sufficiency argument focused on a mismatch: the state information listed “October 21, 1998,” while the federal indictment and booking sheet pointed to late October 1999.

The panel’s answer was twofold:

“On or about” proof sufficed: The jury could find the predicate occurred “on or about” the charged date based on Johnson’s own testimony (he said 1999) and the booking sheet (arrest on Oct. 28, 1999). The district court’s supplemental instruction—government need only prove a date “reasonably close to the date alleged”—was re-emphasized to the jury.
Separateness mattered more than precision: Even if the first sale occurred in 1998 instead of 1999, it was still separate from the 2000 cocaine sale and 2002 robbery. Thus, the “different occasions” finding remained supported.

C. Impact

Practical enforcement of bicycle-light statutes: The decision underscores that an officer’s credited observation of riding without lights after sunset provides probable cause for a stop under ordinary traffic-stop principles, even when later video footage may show lights on after the stop begins.
Florida marijuana probable cause in the medical-marijuana era: By relying on State v. Fortin, the opinion signals that visible marijuana in forms inconsistent with lawful medical possession can still justify arrest and attendant searches.
Miranda litigation in § 922(g) prosecutions: The opinion is notable for expressly labeling post-arrest questioning as Miranda-violative, yet finding harmlessness due to independent evidence of possession, nexus, and knowledge. Future litigants may focus more on whether disputed statements were truly “overwhelmed” by other proof, especially in closer cases without video, stipulations, or strong Rehaif evidence.
Post-Erlinger ACCA trials and date variances: The case illustrates how “different occasions” can be proved through a mix of state charging documents, judgments, booking records, fingerprint linkage, and defendant testimony—and how juries can be guided to treat minor date discrepancies as nonfatal under “on or about” pleading and proof principles.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause vs. reasonable suspicion: Probable cause means enough facts to reasonably believe a law was broken; it can justify a traffic stop and an arrest. Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold that can justify a brief investigatory stop. Here, the court relied on probable cause (for the bicycle infraction and marijuana possession).
Search incident to arrest: Once a lawful custodial arrest occurs, officers may search the arrestee’s person without a warrant to find weapons and preserve evidence. That is different from a Terry v. Ohio frisk, which is a limited pat-down based on safety concerns during a stop.
Miranda “custody” is not the same as “not free to leave”: During a traffic stop you are typically not free to leave, but you are not necessarily “in custody” for Miranda. Miranda custody requires restraints and coercion comparable to formal arrest. In this case, custody began when Johnson was handcuffed and arrested.
Harmless error: Even if the court admits evidence that should have been excluded (like unwarned custodial statements), the conviction can stand if the appellate court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the mistake did not affect the verdict.
ACCA “different occasions”: The ACCA enhancement applies only if qualifying prior crimes were committed on separate occasions—separate criminal episodes—not merely charged separately. After Erlinger v. United States, a jury (not just a judge) must make that “different occasions” determination.
“On or about” dates: Indictments often allege a crime occurred “on or about” a date. The government generally need not prove the exact date—only a reasonably close one—so long as the variance does not change the nature of the charge or prejudice the defense.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Antoine Johnson affirms a § 922(g)(1) conviction and an ACCA enhancement by applying conventional Fourth Amendment rules (probable-cause stop; marijuana-based arrest; search incident to arrest), a nuanced Miranda custody analysis (noncustodial traffic-stop questioning versus custodial post-arrest interrogation), and a pragmatic approach to ACCA “different occasions” proof after Erlinger v. United States.

The decision’s most durable lessons are (1) the sharp doctrinal line between being detained and being in Miranda custody, (2) the appellate power of harmless error when independent evidence is strong, and (3) the limited significance of nonmaterial date discrepancies when the jury’s task is to determine separateness of criminal occasions and the proof supports “on or about” timing.