Miranda Custody, Child Hearsay, and U‑Visa Motive: Commentary on State v. Lazaro C.-D., 30 Conn. 1 (2025)

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I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision in State v. Lazaro C.-D., 30 Conn. 1 (2025), addresses four distinct but important criminal procedure and evidence questions:

• When a stationhouse interview becomes “custodial” for Miranda purposes;
• How strictly courts must apply the “spontaneous utterance” (excited utterance) hearsay exception, especially for young child sexual assault victims;
• The permissible scope of expert testimony about the federal U‑visa program to show a complaining witness’ possible bias or motive to fabricate; and
• The extent of the prosecution’s duty to disclose impeachment material from a police witness’ personnel file under Giglio.

Although the judgment of conviction was affirmed, the opinion refines existing Connecticut law in several ways:

• It reiterates that a voluntary interview at a police station is not automatically “custodial,” even in the absence of an explicit “you are free to leave” advisement, and applies the State v. Mangual custody factors outside the home context.
• It insists that, even for very young victims, the state must prove that a hearsay statement was made under the continuing stress of the event to qualify as a spontaneous utterance; age alone cannot substitute for this foundational requirement.
• It delineates a middle ground on U‑visa evidence: broad cross-examination and basic expert explanation are required to permit bias impeachment, but courts may limit cumulative or marginally probative details about administrative verification processes.
• It confirms the procedure for in camera review of confidential personnel material for potential Giglio disclosure, emphasizing relevance to the witness’ role in the case.

The case arises from the sexual assault of a five-year-old child by a family member and involves sensitive factual and immigration-related issues. The Court’s opinion attempts to balance the protection of child victims and the integrity of immigration-relief programs against the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, to be free from unwarned custodial interrogation, and to confront and impeach adverse witnesses.

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II. Case Background and Procedural Posture

A. Facts

The jury reasonably could have found the following:

• On December 31, 2018, a five-year-old child (the victim) and her mother, A, were staying at A’s sister’s apartment in New Britain after arriving from the Dominican Republic.
• The defendant, Lazaro C.-D., was married to A’s niece and lived with his wife in a studio at the back of the same apartment.
• At approximately 5 p.m., while A and other family members were preparing for a New Year’s Eve party, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim in his bedroom—kissing her neck and vagina.
• Later that evening, at the party (around 10–11 p.m.), the victim told A she had a “secret” and reported that the defendant had kissed her earlier that day. Back at home, when questioned by A and A’s sister, the victim disclosed that the defendant had kissed her neck and vagina.
• The next day, A confronted the defendant. He claimed the child had “climbed on top of him and seduced him.” In a later text, he admitted kissing the victim.
• A relative reported the incident to New Britain police. Detective McDermott contacted the defendant and arranged an interview. After the defendant requested a Spanish-speaking officer, Detective Bjorklund participated as interpreter.
• On March 27, 2019, the defendant voluntarily came to the station, was interviewed for approximately 56 minutes in a recorded session, and confessed to inappropriate sexual contact with the victim. He then left the station. He was later arrested on a warrant.

B. Charges, Trial, and Sentence

The defendant was charged by substitute information with:

• Sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a‑70(a)(2); and
• Risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53‑21(a)(2).

A jury found him guilty on both counts. The trial court (Baldini, J.) sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment, execution suspended after 11 years, followed by 10 years of probation and lifetime sex offender registration.

He appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Connecticut under General Statutes § 51‑199(b)(3).

C. Issues on Appeal

The defendant raised four principal issues:

1. Miranda custody: Whether his statements to detectives at the police station should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” without Miranda warnings.
2. Spontaneous utterance: Whether the victim’s statements to A at the New Year’s Eve party were properly admitted under the spontaneous utterance (excited utterance) exception to the hearsay rule.
3. U‑visa expert testimony / right to present a defense: Whether limits on the testimony of his immigration-law expert, Attorney Justin Conlon, about U‑visa verification processes and alternative immigration options violated his due process right to present a defense.
4. Giglio / personnel file: Whether confidential material from Detective Bjorklund’s personnel file contained impeachment evidence that should have been disclosed under Giglio v. United States.

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III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice D’Auria, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the conviction but found one non-prejudicial evidentiary error.

• Miranda custody: The Court held that the defendant was not in custody during the stationhouse interview. Although the setting and failure to tell him he was free to leave were coercive elements, they were outweighed by the voluntary nature of his appearance, the conversational tone, the absence of threats or accusations, and his free-flowing narrative responses. No Miranda warnings were required.
• Spontaneous utterance: The trial court abused its discretion by admitting the victim’s statements to A at the party as spontaneous utterances under § 8‑3(2). The five‑ to six‑hour delay and the lack of evidence that the child was still under the “stress of excitement” of the assault meant the foundational requirement was not met. However, the error was harmless in light of the defendant’s confessions and other overwhelming evidence.
• U‑visa expert testimony / right to present a defense: The trial court acted within its discretion in limiting parts of Conlon’s expert testimony about U‑visa verification procedures and hypothetical immigration options. The defense was allowed extensive cross-examination of A and substantial expert testimony about the nature, requirements, and benefits of U‑visas. Any additional restriction did not violate the defendant’s due process right to present a defense and, in any event, did not substantially affect the verdict.
• Giglio / personnel file: After independently reviewing the sealed internal affairs materials from Detective Bjorklund’s file, the Court agreed with the trial court that the documents were not relevant to her role in this case and did not require disclosure under Giglio.

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IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Miranda Custody in Voluntary Stationhouse Interviews

1. Legal Framework and Precedents

Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), statements obtained during custodial interrogation are generally inadmissible unless preceded by warnings about the right to remain silent, to counsel, and the consequences of waiving those rights.

The Court restates the familiar two-part threshold:

1. The suspect must be in custody; and
2. The statements must be the product of police interrogation.

The interrogation element was undisputed. The key issue was custody—a “term of art” focusing on circumstances that present a “serious danger of coercion” (citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 (2012)).

The test is whether, under the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would:

• feel not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave; and
• experience restraints on freedom of movement akin to a formal arrest.

Key controlling and cited precedents include:

• Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) – clarifies that not all restraints on movement are “custody”; courts must also ask whether the environment presents the “inherently coercive pressures” associated with the Miranda stationhouse paradigm.
• Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) – holds that an interview at a police station is not automatically custodial; a suspect is not “in custody” simply because the questioning occurs at a station house or because the police suspect him.
• Connecticut cases on custody factors:
  • State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182 (2014), which articulated a nonexclusive, multi-factor test (location, duration, restraints, weapons, advisements, who initiated encounter, etc.).
  • State v. Brandon, 345 Conn. 702 (2022), reaffirming that suspects who voluntarily agree to meet with officers and are not threatened or restrained are often not in custody, even when interviewed in secure buildings by armed officers.
  • State v. Arias, 322 Conn. 170 (2016), and State v. Dabate, 351 Conn. 428 (2025), applying Mangual factors in stationhouse and hospital settings, respectively.
  • Earlier stationhouse cases such as State v. Northrop, 213 Conn. 405 (1990); State v. Turner, 267 Conn. 414 (2004); and State v. Edwards, 299 Conn. 419 (2011), emphasizing the importance of telling suspects they are free to leave.

Mangual’s nonexclusive factors, now explicitly applied beyond in-home interviews, include (311 Conn. at 197):

1. Nature, extent, and duration of questioning;
2. Whether suspect was handcuffed or physically restrained;
3. Whether officers explained that the suspect was free to leave or not under arrest;
4. Who initiated the encounter;
5. Location of the interview;
6. Length of detention;
7. Number of officers present;
8. Whether officers were armed;
9. Whether weapons were displayed or force threatened/used;
10. Degree of isolation from friends, family, and the public.

The Court emphasizes these are guides, not a rigid checklist; their weight varies with context.

2. Application in Lazaro C.-D.

Several factors weighed against custody:

• Voluntary appearance and scheduling:
  • The defendant was telephoned by Detective McDermott and agreed to meet at the station.
  • He later requested a Spanish-speaking detective; the interview was rescheduled to accommodate him.
  • He arrived at the station without police escort, entering by the public entrance.
  • He had approximately one month between initial contact and the actual interview, giving ample time to reflect, reconsider, or decline.
• Manner and tone of questioning:
  • The interview lasted roughly 56 minutes—a moderate duration.
  • Both detectives were in plain clothes, armed, and wearing badges, but they did not brandish weapons, use handcuffs, or threaten him.
  • The tone was consistently cordial and conversational; no raised voices, accusations, or confrontations with incriminating evidence.
  • The officers used open-ended, nonleading, nonaccusatory questions. The defendant often gave extensive, uninterrupted narrative responses—including one stretch of over 22 minutes in which he eventually confessed.
  • The defendant himself first brought up the accusations after about 13 minutes, not the officers.
• End of interview:
  • After the interview, the detectives escorted him out of the room, and he left the station—he was not arrested that day.

Factors with a coercive cast included:

• The interview occurred in a closed-door interrogation room within the secure area of a police station.
• Two armed officers were present.
• The detectives never told the defendant he was free to leave, not under arrest, or could decline to answer questions.

However, the Court held that these coercive elements did not rise to “a restraint on [his] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” (quoting Mangual, 311 Conn. at 194–95). The absence of threats, accusations, or trickery, combined with the defendant’s voluntary attendance and apparent desire to tell his story, weighed decisively against a finding of custody.

3. Significance of the “Free-to-Leave” Advisement

The defendant anchored his custody argument on the failure of officers to tell him he was free to leave. The Court acknowledged:

• Advising a suspect that he is free to terminate the interview is “[t]he most obvious and effective means” of demonstrating noncustodial status (quoting Mangual, 311 Conn. at 204).
• Such an advisement “weighs heavily against a finding of custody” and is often decisive in cases like Edwards, Turner, and Northrop.
• The State’s counsel conceded at oral argument that the “better practice” would have been to tell the defendant he was free to leave, and that not doing so “created a closer case out of an otherwise conspicuously consensual interview.”

Nonetheless, the Court refused to transform this factor into a de facto requirement:

• Failure to give a “free-to-leave” warning does not automatically make an interview custodial when the other circumstances plainly indicate a consensual encounter (citing State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62 (1993)).
• Conversely, explicitly telling someone he is not under arrest may not prevent a custody finding when other factors (e.g., being handcuffed in one’s home by multiple armed officers) point strongly toward arrest-like restraint (citing United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004)).

The decision thus reaffirms a totality-of-circumstances test rather than a formulaic rule based on any single factor, including advisements.

4. Immigrant Status and Individual Characteristics

The defendant argued that, as an immigrant from El Salvador with little experience in the American criminal justice system, he would not reasonably have felt free to leave. The Court addressed this argument cautiously:

• It acknowledged that under J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011), certain objective personal characteristics, such as a suspect’s age, must be considered when they would affect how a reasonable person in that suspect’s position would perceive his freedom to leave.
• It also noted its own precedent (State v. Castillo, 329 Conn. 311 (2018)) requiring consideration of a juvenile’s age in the custody analysis.
• But the Court emphasized that, in this case, the record contains no evidence about how the defendant’s immigration background or prior experience with law enforcement actually bore on the circumstances of the interview.

Because the record was inadequate, the Court declined to reach the broader legal question of whether immigration status, cultural background, or familiarity with the justice system can or should be treated as relevant “objective circumstances” in the custody analysis. The door is left open for future litigation with a more developed factual foundation.

5. Impact and Guidance

For law enforcement:

• The decision confirms that voluntary, cordial, nonaccusatory interviews at the station can be conducted without Miranda warnings, provided there are no restraints approximating formal arrest.
• However, the Court strongly signals that officers should expressly advise interviewees that they are free to leave and not under arrest to avoid close calls and suppression litigation.

For defense counsel:

• Arguments focusing solely on the stationhouse setting and absence of explicit advisements will rarely suffice; concrete evidence of coercive tactics, restraints, or inability to leave will be required.
• In future cases seeking to incorporate immigration status or cultural factors into custody analysis, the record must be carefully developed—through testimony and perhaps expert evidence—showing how such characteristics would objectively affect a reasonable person in the suspect’s position.

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B. Spontaneous Utterance and Child Sexual Assault Hearsay

1. The Legal Standard: § 8‑3(2) Spontaneous (Excited) Utterance

Section 8‑3(2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence recognizes a hearsay exception for:

“[A] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”

The rationale is that such spontaneous statements, made under the stress of a startling event, are less likely to be fabricated because there is no time for “reasoned reflection” (citing Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence § 8.14.2).

Connecticut case law (e.g., State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23 (2001)) requires that:

1. The declaration follows a startling occurrence;
2. The declaration refers to that occurrence;
3. The declarant personally observed the occurrence; and
4. The declaration is made under circumstances negating the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication.

The fourth requirement is the focus here. Courts must determine whether, despite any time lapse, the declarant was still under the stress of the event such that reflection and fabrication were unlikely.

Key precedents:

• State v. Stange, 212 Conn. 612 (1989) – statements 15–30 minutes after a shooting admitted where declarant was found covered in blood, rocking in a fetal position, screaming.
• State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361 (2006) – statements within about 30 minutes of a violent confrontation admitted where declarant remained extremely emotional and fearful.
• State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790 (1997), aff’d, 244 Conn. 761 (1998) – statement one hour after shooting admitted where declarant was frantic and shaking.
• State v. Cayouette, 25 Conn. App. 384 (1991) – statements 10–20 minutes after an assault admitted where declarant was in “a kind of catatonic state.”
• State v. McNair, 54 Conn. App. 807 (1999) – statements 30 minutes after event excluded where the declarant’s agitation, given the lapse of time, did not rise to the level necessary to negate opportunity for fabrication.

From these cases, the Court reiterates:

• There is no “discrete time interval” beyond which statements automatically lose their spontaneity (Kirby), but
• The longer the time lapse, the more critical it becomes to show continuing stress or trauma through evidence of the declarant’s emotional and mental state.

2. Application to the Child’s Disclosure

The contested statements were made:

• Approximately five to six hours after the assault (from about 5–6 p.m. to about 10–11 p.m.).
• Initially at the New Year’s Eve party (“he kissed me”), and then, at home that night during questioning by A and A’s sister, more fully describing that he kissed her neck and vagina.

The trial court admitted the victim’s statements to A as spontaneous utterances, relying primarily on:

• The relatively short (in the court’s view) 5–6 hour delay; and
• The victim’s very young age (five years old).

On appeal, the Supreme Court held this was an abuse of discretion for lack of foundation:

• The only evidence of the child’s demeanor at the party was that she was “playing, like a child would.”
• There was no evidence that she was visibly traumatized, upset, withdrawn, or otherwise still under the stress of the assault at the time of her disclosure.
• Given the significant lapse of five to six hours, and by comparison to cases involving much shorter delays, the state was required to present stronger evidence of continuing emotional upheaval.

The Court rejected the state’s argument that the child’s young age alone justified a relaxed temporal and emotional requirement. Although young children may be less likely to fabricate sexual abuse and may express trauma differently, § 8‑3(2) still requires proof that:

“the declarant made the statement while still under the continuing stress of the startling event.”

Age does not relieve the proponent of providing evidence of the child’s state of mind at the time of the statement.

3. Relationship to the “Tender Years” Exception (§ 8‑10)

The Court notes, in a significant doctrinal clarification, that Connecticut already has a separate hearsay exception more tailored to delayed child abuse disclosures:

• § 8‑10 of the Code—the so-called “tender years” exception—permits admission of trustworthy, non-testimonial statements of young children about sexual or physical abuse, even when not made contemporaneously with the event.
• This exception was developed precisely because “child victims of abuse are less likely than adults to exclaim spontaneously or to seek timely medical treatment,” making traditional exceptions like spontaneous utterance (§ 8‑3(2)) and statements for medical diagnosis (§ 8‑3(5)) ill-suited to many child abuse cases (citing State v. Maguire, 310 Conn. 535, 574–76 (2013)).

In Lazaro C.-D., the state did not invoke § 8‑10 and relied solely on § 8‑3(2). The Court does not criticize that litigation choice explicitly, but the opinion implicitly warns that prosecutors should consider the tender years rule, not stretch the spontaneous utterance exception to cover delayed child disclosures.

4. Harmless Error Analysis

Having found the hearsay ruling erroneous, the Court next considered prejudice. Because the error was nonconstitutional, the burden was on the defendant to show a “reasonable likelihood” that it affected the verdict.

The Court found the error harmless for two main reasons:

• • The defendant’s video-recorded confession to police, in which he admitted inappropriate sexual conduct with the victim, was played for the jury.
  • He also made inculpatory admissions to A, including conceding that he had kissed the victim.
  • The victim’s hearsay statements to A were generally consistent with these confessions.
• Redundancy:
  • The inadmissible statements did not supply new, uniquely inculpatory details; they largely duplicated the substance of admissible evidence.
  • Consistent with cases like State v. Walsh, 52 Conn. App. 708 (1999), admission of inadmissible evidence can be harmless where “permissible evidence to the same effect” was properly before the jury.

While the Court took the foundational error seriously, it concluded that, in this case, the victim’s improperly admitted out-of-court statements did not likely affect the outcome.

5. Impact and Practical Guidance

The decision sends clear signals to trial courts and litigants:

• For prosecutors:
  • Do not rely solely on the declarant’s youth to satisfy the “stress of excitement” requirement under § 8‑3(2).
  • When there is a substantial time lapse between event and disclosure (measured in hours rather than minutes), you must:
    • Present concrete evidence of the child’s emotional and mental state at the time of disclosure (crying, regression, abnormal behavior, withdrawal, visible fear, etc.); or
    • Consider using the tender years exception (§ 8‑10) instead, which is doctrinally better suited to delayed child abuse disclosures.
• For defense counsel:
  • Challenge child hearsay proffered under § 8‑3(2) where:
    • The time lapse is significant; and
    • The state has not established continuing stress through demeanor or surrounding circumstances.
  • Preserve objections on both foundational and constitutional grounds (e.g., confrontation concerns if the child does not testify).

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C. U‑Visa Expert Testimony and the Right to Present a Defense

1. The U‑Visa Program in Brief

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), Congress created a special nonimmigrant status—commonly called the “U‑visa”—for:

• Noncitizens who have suffered substantial mental or physical abuse as victims of certain qualifying crimes; and
• Who are, have been, or are likely to be helpful to law enforcement or prosecutors in investigating or prosecuting those crimes.

Key features (as described by expert Conlon and in State v. Juan A. G.-P., 346 Conn. 132 (2023)):

• Minor crime victims, and sometimes their guardians or family members, may qualify.
• Applicants must obtain a certification (Form I‑918 Supplement B) from a law enforcement or prosecutorial entity attesting to their victim status and cooperation.
• Certain benefits may attach at different stages:
  • If USCIS determines the application is “bona fide,” applicants can obtain employment authorization and are typically protected from removal while the petition is pending.
  • If the U‑visa is ultimately granted, recipients can obtain lawful status and later apply for permanent residency and citizenship.
• Certification can be revoked if the applicant ceases to cooperate.

Because of these potential immigration benefits, evidence that a complaining witness has applied for or obtained a U‑visa can be powerful impeachment evidence, suggesting a motive to fabricate or to maintain a certain narrative to stay in the United States.

2. Evidence Presented at Trial

The trial court allowed broad exploration of A’s immigration motives:

• A admitted:
  • She and the victim had entered the United States on a tourist visa and overstayed, leaving them without lawful status and at risk of deportation.
  • She learned about the U‑visa program months after the assault and applied for a U‑visa in May 2020.
  • She understood that U‑visas provide temporary protection from removal and a path to permanent residence.
  • She knew U‑visa applicants must cooperate with law enforcement and testify truthfully, and that failing to cooperate could lead to denial or revocation of the visa.
  • However, she did not know in detail who, or how, her cooperation and truthfulness would be verified.

To deepen the jury’s understanding of A’s potential motives, the defense offered expert testimony from Attorney Conlon. In an extensive offer of proof (outside the jury’s presence), Conlon testified he would explain:

• General U‑visa eligibility, including for minor sexual assault victims and their guardians.
• The need for law enforcement certification of the applicant’s helpfulness.
• That USCIS can and sometimes does verify cooperation by contacting law enforcement or the applicant’s attorney; and that certification can be revoked.
• The immigration benefits at different procedural stages (bona fide determination, employment authorization, deferred action, eventual lawful permanent residence and citizenship).
• The limited immigration options available to someone who has overstayed a tourist visa (e.g., asylum, marriage to a U.S. citizen, U‑visa or other crime-victim programs), and how overstay can foreclose other common avenues (employment visas, student visas).

3. Trial Court’s Limitations and Supreme Court’s Review

Relying in part on People v. Hernandez, 2016 WL 1688338 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2016), the trial court:

• Permitted Conlon to testify about:
  • The basic nature and purpose of U‑visas;
  • Eligibility criteria, including the requirement of cooperation;
  • The general benefits U‑visas confer (protection from removal, work authorization, path to permanent status).
• Precluded Conlon from:
  • Going into further detail on how USCIS verifies cooperation or defines “reasonable cooperation,” and the specific internal processes of USCIS; and
  • Answering a hypothetical question about what immigration options a person who had overstayed a tourist visa might have, beyond general references to asylum, marriage, or victim-based relief.

The Court of Appeals reviewed these decisions for abuse of discretion and also considered the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.

Key points from the Supreme Court’s reasoning:

• Expert admissibility standard: Under § 7‑2 of the Code and cases such as State v. Williams, 317 Conn. 691 (2015), expert testimony is admissible if:
  • The expert has special skill or knowledge relevant to a matter in issue;
  • That knowledge is not common to the average juror; and
  • The testimony will help the jury understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.
• No abuse of discretion:
  • The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court allowed substantial expert testimony: the jury learned what a U‑visa is, its requirements, the need for cooperation, and its immigration benefits.
  • The expert was even allowed (without objection) to say that law enforcement reviews the applicant’s cooperation.
  • Given A’s extensive cross-examination and Conlon’s testimony, the jury was sufficiently equipped to infer that A might have a motive to support the prosecution in hopes of immigration benefits.
  • The excluded details about USCIS’s internal verification procedures and the precise contours of “reasonable cooperation” would have been, in the Court’s view, only marginally additive and risked confusion or undue focus on administrative minutiae.
• Hypothetical overstay question:
  • The trial court did not explain on the record why it barred the hypothetical about legal options after overstaying a tourist visa.
  • The Supreme Court noted that, on appeal, the defendant bears the burden to provide an adequate record (e.g., via a motion for articulation) if he believes the trial court’s reasoning was flawed (State v. Crumpton, 202 Conn. 224 (1987)).

The Court contrasted this case with State v. Juan A. G.-P., where the trial court entirely barred questions about U‑visa applications in front of the jury, depriving the defendant of a core line of bias impeachment. Here, by contrast, the defendant had more than an hour of cross-examination on the topic and meaningful expert corroboration.

The Court concluded:

• The restrictions did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation of the right to present a defense or to confrontation.
• Any potential error was nonconstitutional and harmless, given both:
  • The strong independent evidence of guilt; and
  • The substantial impeachment material about A’s U‑visa already before the jury.

4. Impact and Practical Guidance

Lazaro C.-D. provides a calibrated approach to U‑visa evidence:

• For defendants:
  • You have a right to explore whether a complaining witness has applied for, or is contemplating, a U‑visa or similar status, and to introduce expert testimony to explain:
    • The existence of the program;
    • Its eligibility criteria and cooperation requirement; and
    • The potential immigration benefits that could motivate testimony.
  • However, courts may restrict:
    • Highly detailed or technical descriptions of USCIS’s internal practices; and
    • Speculative hypotheticals about legal options that go beyond the facts in evidence.
• For trial courts:
  • Ensure that defendants have a “meaningful opportunity” to impeach based on immigration motives, consistent with Juan A. G.-P..
  • At the same time, exercise discretion under § 4‑3 to limit:
    • Cumulative or marginally probative expert detail; and
    • Evidence that may confuse the issues or mislead the jury.
• For prosecutors:
  • Be prepared to disclose U‑visa-related information for key witnesses as potential bias evidence.
  • Consider stipulations about the general nature of such programs to streamline expert testimony and limit undue focus on immigration.

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D. Giglio, Personnel Files, and In Camera Review

1. Legal Framework

Under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the prosecution must disclose evidence that could impeach the credibility of a government witness, including:

• Prior dishonesty or misconduct bearing on truthfulness;
• Promises of leniency or benefits; and
• Other information affecting reliability.

In Connecticut, General Statutes § 54‑86c(b) allows a trial court to review certain confidential records (including personnel records of police witnesses) ex parte and in camera to determine whether they contain material that must be disclosed under Giglio.

State v. Santos, 318 Conn. 412 (2015), sets out the standard of review: appellate courts examine the sealed records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the documents did not contain information “especially probative of the witness’ ability to know and correctly relate the truth.”

2. Application in Lazaro C.-D.

In this case:

• The State initially requested a Giglio review of Detective Bjorklund’s file from the New Britain police. It was told there was nothing in her file.
• Later, the State learned she was on administrative leave, triggering concerns about undisclosed material. Defense counsel then requested ex parte in camera review by the court.
• The trial court examined sealed internal affairs records related to an investigation involving Bjorklund and concluded they did not require disclosure.
• Bjorklund’s role in the case was:
  • Calling the defendant to schedule the interview;
  • Serving as interpreter during the recorded stationhouse interview; and
  • Testifying at the suppression hearing (not at trial).

On appeal, the Supreme Court independently reviewed the sealed documents (now part of the appellate record as a court exhibit) and agreed:

• The materials had no relevance to:
  • Her ability to translate;
  • The content or voluntariness of the defendant’s statements (given that the interview was video-recorded); or
  • Her credibility in any way that would bear on issues in this case.
  • Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order disclosure.

  For future cases, Lazaro C.-D. confirms:

  • Defense requests for Giglio material in personnel files are properly channelled through ex parte, in camera judicial review under § 54‑86c(b).
  • Disclosure is required only when the materials are relevant to the witness’ role in the specific case and probative of honesty or perception.

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  V. Complex Concepts Simplified

  A. What Does “In Custody for Miranda Purposes” Mean?

  “Custody” in the Miranda context does not mean every interaction with police. You are in custody when:

  • You reasonably feel you are not free to stop the questioning and leave; and
  • Your freedom is restrained to a degree similar to a formal arrest.

  Important clues:

  • Being handcuffed, locked in a room, or surrounded by several armed officers;
  • Being told you are under arrest or that you cannot leave;
  • Threats, shouting, or trick questions designed to force a confession.

  By contrast, a voluntary meeting at a police station, where you are not restrained and the conversation is polite, may not be “custodial,” even if it feels intimidating.

  B. “Spontaneous Utterance” vs. “Tender Years” Hearsay

  • Spontaneous (excited) utterance (§ 8‑3(2)): A statement made:
    • Right after a shocking event (e.g., a car crash, shooting, or assault);
    • While the speaker is still under the stress of that event (e.g., crying, shaking, hysterical);
    • Before they have a chance to calmly think about or plan what to say.
  • Tender years (§ 8‑10): A special rule for young children’s statements about abuse when:
    • Those statements are reliable (e.g., consistent, age-appropriate, spontaneously made to a caregiver); and
    • The child is too young or too traumatized to speak immediately after the event.

  In Lazaro C.-D., the problem was that the state tried to fit a delayed child disclosure (5–6 hours later) into the spontaneous utterance category, without proof that the child was still visibly upset at the time.

  C. U‑Visas and Bias Motive

  A U‑visa is:

  • A special status for certain crime victims without legal immigration status;
  • Available only if they help the police or prosecutors investigate or prosecute those crimes; and
  • Potentially a pathway to work authorization, legal status, and eventually a “green card.”

  If a witness has applied for or obtained a U‑visa based on an alleged crime, the defense can argue that:

  • The witness has a strong reason to:
    • Report the crime;
    • Cooperate with law enforcement; and
    • Maintain testimony consistent with the prosecution’s case.
  • This creates a possible motive to exaggerate or fabricate, which the jury is entitled to consider.

  Courts must allow some evidence and cross-examination on this topic but can limit overly technical or speculative details.

  D. Giglio Material and In Camera Review

  “Giglio material” is:

  • Information that could make a government witness look less credible (e.g., lying in the past, bias, deals with the prosecution).

  Because police personnel and internal affairs records are often confidential, the standard procedure is:

  1. The defense asks the court to review the file;
  2. The judge looks at it privately (in camera) to see whether anything would significantly affect the witness’ credibility in this case; and
  3. If so, the judge orders that part disclosed to the defense.

  In Lazaro C.-D., the internal affairs material about the interpreter-detective was found irrelevant to what she did in the case (and her role was limited and recorded on video), so nothing had to be turned over.

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  VI. Broader Impact and Future Directions

  A. Reinforcing but Refining Miranda Custody Doctrine

  The decision:

  • Reaffirms a contextual, totality-of-circumstances approach to custody, using the Mangual factors broadly (not just in-home interrogations).
  • Strongly encourages—but does not mandate—an explicit free-to-leave advisement as best practice.
  • Signals openness to considering certain personal traits (like age and possibly immigration background) as “objective” circumstances in future cases, provided the record is adequately developed.

  B. Tightening Foundations for Child Hearsay Under § 8‑3(2)

  The Court’s insistence on a solid foundation for spontaneous utterances—especially where hours have passed—will likely:

  • Discourage overuse of § 8‑3(2) for delayed child disclosures;
  • Push litigants toward the more appropriate tender years exception (§ 8‑10) in sexual abuse prosecutions; and
  • Lead trial courts to require concrete evidence of a child’s emotional state at the time of disclosure.

  C. Structuring U‑Visa Evidence

  As U‑visa awareness grows, more child-abuse and domestic-violence cases will present these issues. Lazaro C.-D. charts a middle course:

  • Defendants must be allowed to:
    • Show that a witness has applied for a U‑visa; and
    • Explain, with expert help, why that might influence testimony.
  • Courts retain authority to:
    • Preclude unnecessary detail that distracts from the core issues; and
    • Prevent “mini-trials” on immigration law.

  This framework, building on Juan A. G.-P., should help trial courts strike a fair balance between exposing bias and avoiding undue prejudice or confusion.

  D. Clarifying Giglio Obligations for Ancillary Police Witnesses

  The ruling underscores that:

  • Not all negative information in a police officer’s personnel file is Giglio material.
  • Relevance turns on whether the information is probative of:
    • Truthfulness; or
    • The witness’ ability to perceive and relate facts in this particular case.
  • For officers with limited, recorded roles (such as interpreters in a videotaped interview), impeachment value is typically low unless the materials specifically implicate honesty or translation abilities.

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  VII. Conclusion

  State v. Lazaro C.-D. is significant not because it dramatically reshapes any single area of law, but because it provides clear, practical refinements across several important doctrines:

  • Miranda custody: The Court reinforces that voluntary, noncoercive stationhouse interviews may proceed without warnings, while strongly endorsing explicit advisements as best practice and reaffirming the flexible multi-factor approach of Mangual.
  • Child hearsay and spontaneous utterances: The decision draws a firm line: the spontaneous utterance exception does not become more elastic simply because the declarant is a child. When hours have passed since the event, the state must demonstrate ongoing stress or turn to the tender years exception.
  • U‑visa-based bias evidence: The Court confirms that immigration-relief motives are a legitimate line of impeachment and that experts can assist juries in understanding those motives, while preserving trial courts’ discretion to limit overly intricate or speculative testimony.
  • Giglio and internal affairs records: The opinion reaffirms the role of in camera review and the centrality of case-specific relevance in determining whether confidential personnel material must be disclosed.

  Taken together, these holdings provide useful guidance to trial courts, law enforcement, and criminal practitioners. They underscore a consistent theme in Connecticut jurisprudence: protecting defendants’ constitutional rights to fair procedures and effective impeachment, while allowing the admission of reliable evidence and preserving trial courts’ discretion to manage the scope and focus of criminal trials.