Minor v. Commonwealth: Clarifying Kentucky’s Domestic-Violence Parole Exemption and the “In-Custody Video” Prejudice Test

Introduction

In Devin J. Minor v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed a 30-year sentence for first-degree manslaughter and second-degree fetal homicide arising from the shooting death of the defendant’s pregnant partner, Darriona Jones, and her unborn child. Although designated “Not To Be Published,” the opinion canvasses a number of evidentiary and sentencing questions that Kentucky trial courts confront frequently: the admissibility of graphic autopsy photographs, relevance of firearm evidence, prejudicial effect of showing a defendant in shackles or handcuffs on video, hearsay in the guise of “investigative verbal acts,” cumulative-error claims, and, most notably, the scope of the KRS 439.3401(6) domestic-violence parole-eligibility exemption.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court, per curiam, rejected all six assignments of error and affirmed every aspect of the trial court’s rulings:

The single autopsy photo of the fetus was relevant to corpus delicti and not unduly prejudicial under KRE 403.
Evidence that Minor possessed a second handgun (9mm) and sold firearms in the days leading to the crime was sufficiently connected to the case to pass the KRE 401 / 403 test.
An eight-minute bathroom-stall body-camera video showing Minor in handcuffs was not “inherently prejudicial” under Deal v. Commonwealth; the context neutralised any taint.
A multi-layer hearsay statement offered as an “investigative verbal act” was properly excluded; exclusion did not violate Minor’s right to present a complete defense.
No cumulative error existed because none of the individual rulings were erroneous or substantially prejudicial.
The defendant failed to prove he qualified as a “victim of domestic violence or abuse” under KRS 439.3401(6); therefore, he must serve 85 percent of his 30-year sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court relied on a well-curated line of Kentucky and federal cases:

Burdette v. Commonwealth, 664 S.W.3d 605 (2023) & Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 (2014) — confirm admissibility of autopsy photos to prove corpus delicti.
Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117 (2012) — weapons may be admitted if potentially connected to the crime.
Deal v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d 652 (2020) — two-step “inherent prejudice / essential state interest” framework when jurors see a defendant in restraints.
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) — cited in Deal for due-process analysis of courtroom practices.
Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288 (2008) & Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (2006) — narrow “investigative verbal acts” hearsay exception.
Commonwealth v. Crowe, 610 S.W.3d 218 (2020) — standard of review for domestic-violence parole exemption.
Ky. State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298 (1972) — substantial-evidence rule for fact-finding.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Autopsy Photo

The Court applied the familiar three-part KRE 403 balancing test. Because the fetus’s image was “clinical,” used only once, and chosen by the defense from six alternatives, the probative weight (establishing the unborn child’s death) outweighed any emotional danger.

b. Second Handgun Evidence

Although the fatal bullet was .40 caliber, the admissibility of Minor’s 9mm handgun rested on relevance to state of mind: his retention of one gun while “disposing” of the .40 suggested consciousness of guilt, under the flight/concealment theory (see Wellborn v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W.3d 608 (2005)).

c. In-Custody Video

Drawing heavily from Deal, the Court concluded the eight-minute video was not “inherently prejudicial”:

Minor wore street clothes, not jail garb;

The jury already knew he had been arrested and interviewed;

The timing (same night) neutralised any implication of “dangerousness” beyond the charge itself;

Length and clarity were minimal, unlike the 35-minute video disapproved in Deal.

Because there was no inherent prejudice, the Court never needed to weigh an “essential state interest,” but noted that playing only audio was not feasible—context would be lost and the recording difficult to hear.

d. Exclusion of Trowell’s Statement

The “investigative verbal acts” doctrine is limited to showing why police acted, not to prove the underlying facts. Trowell’s statement contained triple hearsay layers and did not explain subsequent police conduct, so it was excluded. The Court emphasised that Rule 802 controls unless every layer of hearsay slots into a recognised exception.

e. Domestic-Violence Parole Exemption

The statutory analysis proceeded in two prongs per Crowe:

Victim determination (fact question, clear-error review): Minor’s evidence (two alleged “stabbings,” dismissed EPO) was thin. Substantial contrary evidence showed he was the aggressor.
Relation to the offense (mixed question, de novo): Even assuming he had once been a victim, the Court found no nexus between any abuse by Jones and Minor’s lethal act on July 24, 2022.

Because Minor failed at step one, the 85-percent parole requirement remained intact.

3. Potential Impact

Domestic-Violence Exemption Gatekeeping. Trial courts now have a published-like roadmap for weighing sparse or one-sided evidence of reciprocal violence. Defendants must present concrete, contemporaneous proof; uncorroborated anecdotes and dismissed EPOs may be insufficient.
In-Custody Video Evidence. The opinion reinforces that brief, contextualised footage of a defendant in handcuffs does not automatically trigger a Deal hearing. Counsel seeking exclusion must concretely show “inherent prejudice.”
Autopsy & Firearm Evidence. The Court’s reiteration of lenient relevancy thresholds signals continuity: prosecutors may continue introducing single autopsy photos and ancillary weapon evidence, provided they tie it—however inferentially—to consciousness of guilt or mens rea.
Verbal-Acts Hearsay. The decision tightens the “short leash” on that doctrine, cautioning trial courts against admitting layered hearsay simply because an officer says “this is what I was told.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

KRE 401 / 403 Balancing: Evidence is admissible if it makes a fact “more or less probable” (401) unless its unfair prejudice “substantially outweighs” its value (403). Think of a set of scales—if prejudice tips sharply, the judge removes it.
Corpus Delicti: Latin for “body of the crime.” In homicide, the prosecution must prove someone is dead and died from a criminal act. Photographs can supply that proof.
Inherently Prejudicial: A courtroom or trial practice so suggestive (e.g., shackling) that jurors may think the defendant is already judged guilty or dangerous.
Domestic-Violence Parole Exemption: Kentucky’s 85-percent service rule for violent felonies can be relaxed only if the defendant was a domestic-violence victim and the crime occurred “with regard to” that abuse. It is a safety valve, not a blanket reduction.
Hearsay within Hearsay: A statement repeating another person’s statement. Each rung must climb into a recognised exception, or the entire ladder falls.

Conclusion

Although technically “non-precedential,” Minor v. Commonwealth delivers substantial guidance on five recurring trial issues and, most importantly, clarifies the evidentiary burden a defendant must shoulder to unlock the domestic-violence parole exemption. By affirming the trial court’s cautious fact-finding and by drawing a bright line between mere allegations and corroborated domestic abuse, the Court preserves the legislative intent behind KRS 439.3401 while honouring the defendant’s due-process rights. Practitioners should heed the opinion’s twin lessons: first, admissibility hinges on precise contextual relevance and a measured weighing of prejudice; second, extraordinary sentencing relief demands extraordinary, concrete proof. In that sense, Minor may not be cite-able, but its reasoning undoubtedly foreshadows how Kentucky courts will navigate similar evidentiary and sentencing disputes in the years ahead.