Minor Inconsistencies and Clerical Errors Do Not Defeat Probable Cause: An In-Depth Commentary on Cleveland Harville v. City of Warren, Michigan

1. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Cleveland Harville v. City of Warren, No. 24-1953 (6th Cir. July 11 2025), addresses the perennial tension between individual Fourth Amendment protections and police officers’ qualified immunity. At issue was whether Detective James Twardesky lacked probable cause—and therefore lost immunity—when he sought a warrant against high-school football player Cleveland Harville for an alleged “broomsticking” assault. The district court denied summary judgment, finding factual disputes regarding probable cause. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that:

• Minor inconsistencies in a victim-eyewitness’s statements, when they do not undercut the material facts of the alleged offense, do not vitiate probable cause; and
• A clerical error in a warrant application (here, an incorrect date) likewise fails to negate probable cause absent evidence that the officer knowingly or recklessly misstated the fact.

Those holdings, though in a decision “Not Recommended for Publication,” clarify the boundaries of qualified immunity in the Sixth Circuit and will likely influence trial-level analysis of police affidavits, especially in school-related assault investigations.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel—Judges Siler, Kethledge (author), and Bush—reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss all federal claims. In doing so, the court:

1. Held Detective Twardesky had probable cause to arrest Harville based on the victim John Hunt Jr.’s statements, notwithstanding (a) Hunt’s evolving description of whether he was actually broomsticked and (b) the officer’s erroneous listing of the incident date as September 5 instead of August 29.
2. Held that, because probable cause existed, Harville’s false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims failed as a matter of law, entitling the detective to qualified immunity.
3. Rejected Harville’s equal-protection claim for lack of evidence that similarly situated white players were treated differently or that the detective acted with discriminatory intent.
4. Dismissed the municipal liability claim against the City of Warren, since no constitutional violation remained.
5. Remanded for the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the sole surviving—state-law—gross-negligence claim.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) – Framed the requirement that appellate courts accept the plaintiff’s version of disputed facts when reviewing qualified-immunity appeals. The Sixth Circuit duly “recite[d] the facts in the light most favorable to Harville,” yet still found immunity.
• Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) – Articulated that officials are shielded unless it is “apparent” that the circumstances do not constitute probable cause. The panel applied this baseline to evaluate Detective Twardesky’s knowledge.
• Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999) – Recognized that a single credible eyewitness, especially a victim, alone can suffice for probable cause unless reliability is clearly undermined. This case was central; the court analogized Hunt’s evolving statement to the victim’s recantation in Ahlers, concluding credibility remained intact.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) – Provided the “clearly established” test for qualified immunity (“unlawful in the situation confronted”). The Sixth Circuit found no precedent clearly prohibiting reliance on inconsistent yet materially corroborated victim statements.
• Gerics v. Trevino, 974 F.3d 798 (6th Cir. 2020) & Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007) – Reiterated that probable cause is a question of law when facts are undisputed, reinforcing the panel’s authority to reverse.
• Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2014) – Required knowledge of lack of probable cause for malicious-prosecution claims. Once probable cause was found, this precedent disposed of Harville’s second theory.
• Green v. City of Southfield, 925 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2019) – Set the test for selective enforcement/equal-protection claims; the panel applied it to reject Harville’s race-based allegation.
• Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. 2013) – Allowed the appellate court to reach the municipal liability issue pendent to the qualified-immunity ruling.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s analysis proceeded through the two-prong qualified-immunity framework:

1. Constitutional Violation?
   • False Arrest – Probable cause existed via Hunt’s signed statement and consistent identification of Harville as tackler.
   • Clerical error (wrong date) was deemed non-material.
   • Hunt’s “flip” on whether broomsticking occurred affected only the extent of harm, not the core assault elements.
   
   • Malicious Prosecution – Same probable-cause finding negated this claim because Harville could not show the detective knew probable cause was lacking.
   
   • Equal Protection – No evidence that white players were similarly situated or that race played a role.
   
2. Clearly Established Law?
   Nothing in Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent clearly forbade reliance on a victim-eyewitness’s statement that contained immaterial inconsistencies, nor was it clearly unlawful to misstate an incident date when the surrounding facts still established the elements of assault.
   

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

• Probable-Cause Assessments – The opinion underscores that courts will focus on whether disputed facts go to the elements of the crime. Minor discrepancies, especially about collateral details (date, victim’s follow-through on being assaulted), rarely defeat probable cause.
• Clerical Errors in Warrants – Investigators face less civil-liability risk for typographical or administrative mistakes provided the overall affidavit supports each crime element and the error is not knowingly false.
• School-Related Assault Investigations – Officers may lean on reluctant or embarrassed student witnesses; this case affirms they may still act when those witnesses later clarify or amplify allegations.
• Equal-Protection Policing Claims – Plaintiffs must marshal concrete comparators of a different race treated better under similar circumstances; unsupported assertions—without named comparators—fail at summary judgment.
• Municipal Liability – The decision reiterates that absent a predicate constitutional violation, Monell claims cannot stand, a recurring barrier for plaintiffs after an officer gains immunity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity

A legal doctrine shielding government officials from civil damages unless they violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time.

Probable Cause

Reasonable grounds—more than mere suspicion, less than proof—to believe a person committed a crime. It is judged objectively based on facts known to the officer at the time.

Assault (Michigan)

Either an attempted battery or an act that places another in reasonable fear of battery—no actual physical contact required.

Malicious Prosecution (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Federal claim requiring (1) prosecution without probable cause, (2) that the defendant caused or continued the prosecution, (3) that the prosecution ended in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) that it deprived the plaintiff of liberty.

Equal-Protection Selective-Enforcement Claim

Requires proof of discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose—i.e., similarly situated individuals of a different class were treated more leniently.

Monell Liability

A municipality is liable for constitutional torts only when execution of its policy or custom causes the injury; absent an underlying violation, the claim fails.

5. Conclusion

Cleveland Harville v. City of Warren reinforces a pragmatic approach to probable-cause determinations: so long as the material elements of an alleged offense are supported by at least one reasonably credible source, minor inconsistencies and benign clerical errors will not expose officers to civil liability. While unpublished, the opinion elegantly synthesizes existing precedent and provides a clear analytical roadmap for lower courts confronting similar qualified-immunity disputes. Practitioners should carefully evaluate whether discrepancies they intend to highlight are truly material to the crime’s elements, and municipalities may take solace that harmless paperwork mistakes, standing alone, are unlikely to invite successful § 1983 claims.