Minimum Contacts and Revocation-on-Divorce: Jurisdictional Limits on Clawing Back Nonprobate Assets from Nonresident Ex‑Spouses

I. Introduction

In Estate of Cunningham, 2025 S.D. 59, the South Dakota Supreme Court addressed a recurring but under‑litigated problem at the intersection of probate, divorce, nonprobate transfers, and personal jurisdiction: when may a South Dakota estate use the state’s revocation‑on‑divorce statute to recover an individual retirement account (IRA) already paid to a nonresident ex‑spouse?

Roger Cunningham opened a rollover IRA during his marriage, naming his then‑wife, Sheila, as the beneficiary. The couple later divorced in Tennessee under a Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) that expressly awarded Sheila a fixed dollar sum from the IRA and stated that she “relinquishes and waives any claim, interest, right or title she may have to this account.” Roger moved to South Dakota before the Tennessee divorce was final, but he never changed the IRA beneficiary designation. Upon Roger’s death in South Dakota, the IRA custodian paid the account to Sheila as the named beneficiary.

Roger’s daughter Susan, serving as personal representative of his estate (the “Estate”), then invoked South Dakota’s revocation‑on‑divorce statute, SDCL 29A‑2‑804, arguing that Roger and Sheila’s divorce had automatically revoked Sheila’s IRA beneficiary designation years earlier. On that theory, the Estate asked the South Dakota probate court to declare that the IRA belonged in the Estate rather than to Sheila.

Sheila, a Tennessee resident, appeared specially and moved to dismiss, arguing:

• that South Dakota courts lacked personal (or in rem) jurisdiction over her; and
• that the Estate could not obtain a declaratory judgment through a motion filed within the probate proceeding, but instead needed to bring a separate civil action.

The circuit court relied on broad statutory language about probate jurisdiction, declined to analyze Sheila’s contacts with South Dakota, and ruled for the Estate on the merits of the revocation‑on‑divorce claim. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed, vacating the declaratory order and remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The decision establishes a notable principle: a South Dakota court cannot enforce SDCL 29A‑2‑804 to claw back a nonprobate asset from a nonresident former spouse without first satisfying the constitutional “minimum contacts” standard for personal (or in rem) jurisdiction. The mere facts that the decedent died domiciled in South Dakota and that the asset is conceptually treated as property located in South Dakota are insufficient if the ex‑spouse herself has not purposefully established meaningful contacts with the state.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

• Roger and Sheila Cunningham married in 1981 and lived largely in Tennessee.
• In 1996 Roger opened a rollover IRA at Charles Schwab (managed by Delta Asset Management), naming Sheila as the primary beneficiary.
• The couple divorced in Tennessee in 2015 under an MDA:
  • Sheila was awarded $757,473.81 from the IRA.
  • The MDA provided that Roger would retain sole ownership of all remaining funds.
  • Sheila “relinquishes and waives any claim, interest, right or title she may have to this account.”
• Before the divorce was finalized, Roger moved to Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Sheila remained in Tennessee.
• As part of the divorce arrangements, Sheila agreed to execute a quitclaim deed to Roger’s new Sioux Falls residence.
• After the divorce, Roger updated his will (naming his daughter Susan as personal representative) but did not change the IRA beneficiary designation.
• Roger died in Sioux Falls in March 2024. The IRA custodian confirmed that Sheila remained the primary beneficiary and transferred the IRA to an inherited IRA in Sheila’s name.

B. Procedural History

• Susan filed an informal probate of Roger’s will in Minnehaha County, South Dakota.
• Within that probate, the Estate moved for a declaration that:
  • SDCL 29A‑2‑804(b)(1) (the revocation‑upon‑divorce statute) had automatically revoked Sheila’s beneficiary status when the couple divorced; and
  • Therefore the IRA should be treated as part of Roger’s estate, to be distributed under his will.
• Notice of the motion and hearing was mailed to Sheila in Tennessee.
• Sheila specially appeared and moved to dismiss, arguing:
  • lack of personal jurisdiction over her;
  • lack of jurisdiction over the IRA funds; and
  • improper use of a motion for declaratory judgment within a probate proceeding.
• The circuit court:
  • Relied on SDCL 29A‑3‑105, which grants probate courts authority over “any other action or proceeding concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, may be a party, including actions to determine title to property,” to hold that it had jurisdiction.
  • Did not analyze Sheila’s minimum contacts with South Dakota.
  • Held that SDCL 29A‑2‑804 automatically revoked Sheila’s IRA beneficiary designation on divorce and declared the IRA funds part of Roger’s estate.
• Sheila appealed.

C. Issues on Appeal

1. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate Sheila’s interest in the IRA.
2. Whether the circuit court erred by granting declaratory judgment via motion in the probate, rather than requiring a separate action.

D. Holding

• The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s declaratory judgment and remanded with instructions to grant Sheila’s motion to dismiss.
• The Court held that:
  • Although the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over probate matters, it lacked constitutionally sufficient jurisdiction (personal or in rem) over Sheila, a nonresident with only minimal, derivative connections to South Dakota.
  • Due process requires a minimum‑contacts analysis under International Shoe and Shaffer even in in rem or probate‑style proceedings.
  • Sheila’s limited Tennessee‑based actions (signing the MDA, executing a quitclaim deed, and passively receiving IRA funds) did not constitute purposeful availment of South Dakota’s laws.
• Because it resolved the case on jurisdictional grounds, the Court did not reach the procedural question regarding use of motions for declaratory relief within a probate proceeding.

III. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Subject Matter vs. Personal (and In Rem) Jurisdiction

The Court began by distinguishing between:

• Subject matter jurisdiction – the court’s power to hear a class of cases; and
• Personal (in personam) or property-based (in rem / quasi in rem) jurisdiction – the court’s power over the parties or the property at issue.

South Dakota circuit courts are courts of general subject matter jurisdiction under Article V, § 1 of the South Dakota Constitution and SDCL 16‑6‑9, which includes:

• “all actions at law or in equity”; and
• “all matters of probate, guardianship, conservatorship, and settlement of estates of deceased persons.”

The Court emphasized that no one disputed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of Roger’s estate. The question was whether the court could constitutionally adjudicate rights in an IRA that had been paid to a Tennessee resident who herself had very limited connections to South Dakota.

Citing Miller v. Weber, 1996 S.D. 47, ¶13, 546 N.W.2d 865, 868–69, the Court reiterated the baseline rule: a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void, and litigation requires both subject matter jurisdiction and some form of adjudicative authority over the person or property.

B. Post‑Shaffer Framework: In Rem Proceedings Are Not Jurisdictionally Self‑Executing

Historically (under Pennoyer v. Neff), courts could assert in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over property located in the state, largely without regard to the owner’s own contacts with the forum. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), however, the United States Supreme Court fundamentally altered that landscape.

In Shaffer, the Court held that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction—including in rem and quasi in rem—must satisfy the “minimum contacts” standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). South Dakota’s Supreme Court in Estate of Cunningham explicitly adopts this view:

• It notes that post‑Shaffer, the label “in rem” does not automatically validate jurisdiction; instead courts must consider whether exercising jurisdiction is consistent with due process.
• Although supervised probate actions have been described as in rem proceedings (citing In re Estate of Ager, 2024 S.D. 55, ¶8, 11 N.W.3d 878, 880), that characterization does not dispense with the need to apply International Shoe when an order is sought against an out‑of‑state person.

In short, probate’s in rem character does not override the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts when the court seeks to affect the interests of a particular individual located outside the state.

C. The Three‑Part Minimum Contacts Test

The Court applied its familiar three‑step due process test (from Davis v. Otten, 2022 S.D. 39, ¶20, 978 N.W.2d 358, 366):

1. Purposeful availment: The defendant must purposefully avail herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
2. Relatedness: The cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities directed at the forum state.
3. Reasonableness: The defendant’s acts must have such a substantial connection with the forum state that exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable and consistent with fair play and substantial justice.

This test implements the core International Shoe requirement that “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 326 U.S. at 316.

D. Application to Sheila Cunningham

1. Sheila’s purported “contacts” with South Dakota

The Court identified only three arguable connections between Sheila and South Dakota:

• She continued negotiating the MDA with Roger after he had already moved to Sioux Falls.
• She executed a quitclaim deed to Roger’s new Sioux Falls residence, as part of the Tennessee divorce arrangements.
• She ultimately received the proceeds of Roger’s IRA into an inherited IRA in her own name.

Sheila remained at all times a Tennessee resident. None of these events involved her physically entering South Dakota or engaging in business there, and each was derivative of Roger’s unilateral choice to relocate.

2. No purposeful availment

Under the first prong of the test, the Court held that Sheila had not “purposefully avail[ed] [herself] of the privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Davis, 2022 S.D. 39, ¶20 (quoting Kustom Cycles, Inc. v. Bowyer, 2014 S.D. 87, ¶10, 857 N.W.2d 401, 407).

Key points:

• Sheila’s execution of the MDA and quitclaim deed:
  • occurred in the context of a Tennessee divorce proceeding;
  • were “necessitated by Roger’s unilateral decision to move to South Dakota”; and
  • did not reflect any deliberate effort by Sheila to obtain the benefits or protections of South Dakota law.
• Her receipt of the IRA proceeds was similarly passive:
  • Sheila’s residual beneficiary status existed only because Roger failed to change the designation—not because she did anything directed toward South Dakota.
  • The Supreme Court characterizes her role as resulting from “Roger’s inaction and failure to remove her—not anything Sheila did to ‘deliberately . . . engage[] in significant activities within [the] state.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1985), via State v. American Bankers Ins., 374 N.W.2d 609, 612 (S.D. 1985)).

Because jurisdiction cannot be based on “the unilateral activity of another party or a third person,” Davis, 2022 S.D. 39, ¶22 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475), Roger’s move to South Dakota and subsequent failure to change the IRA beneficiary cannot be imputed to Sheila as contacts.

3. Relatedness and fairness

Even though the dispute concerned funds “situated with Roger in South Dakota” (in the sense that the IRA was his personal property while he was domiciled there), the Court emphasized:

• that contact is insubstantial from Sheila’s perspective; and
• her own limited actions do not create the “substantial connection” necessary to make jurisdiction reasonable.

The Court’s bottom line:

Sheila did not have sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Accordingly, the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction—whether framed as personal jurisdiction over Sheila or as in rem jurisdiction over the IRA—violated due process.

E. The Revocation‑on‑Divorce Statute and the “Fait Accompli” Argument

1. Operation of SDCL 29A‑2‑804

SDCL 29A‑2‑804(b)(1) is South Dakota’s version of the Uniform Probate Code’s revocation‑upon‑divorce provision. It provides that, upon divorce, a former spouse’s beneficiary designations and similar dispositions in “governing instruments” are automatically revoked:

A divorce “[r]evokes any revocable . . . disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to a former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual’s former spouse.”

The United States Supreme Court in Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018), characterized such statutes as embodying a legislative presumption: after divorce, a decedent’s failure to change a beneficiary designation is treated as inattention rather than intention. Accordingly, the law automatically treats the ex‑spouse as if he or she had disclaimed the interest.

South Dakota previously applied this principle in Buchholz v. Storsve, 2007 S.D. 101, ¶17, 740 N.W.2d 107, 112–13, holding that SDCL 29A‑2‑804 revoked a decedent’s pre‑divorce designation of an ex‑spouse as beneficiary of his retirement plan.

2. The Estate’s theory: revocation as a historical fact

The Estate advanced a clever but ultimately unsuccessful argument:

• It asserted that SDCL 29A‑2‑804 automatically revoked Sheila’s IRA beneficiary designation at the time of the divorce in 2015.
• On this view, by 2024—the time of Roger’s death—Sheila legally was not a beneficiary at all.
• Without a valid beneficiary, the IRA would pass into Roger’s estate under the governing instrument and applicable default rules (reinforced by SDCL 29A‑2‑804(d), which treats the revoked ex‑spouse as having disclaimed).
• Thus, the Estate argued, the court’s declaration was a mere “historical recognition” of legal consequences that had already occurred long before Roger died: a fait accompli, so to speak.

The Estate further argued that because the statute’s operation was complete at the time of divorce, jurisdictional concerns about reaching Sheila in 2024 should be minimized or irrelevant.

3. The Court’s response: jurisdiction is about who you can bind today

The Court did not reject the Estate’s reading of the substantive operation of SDCL 29A‑2‑804. Instead, it focused on the practical reality: the money is in Sheila’s account now.

Whatever the statute may have done conceptually in 2015, to effectuate that alleged revocation in 2024 the Estate needs an order that:

• binds Sheila; and
• effectively compels her to surrender funds already distributed to her as the apparent beneficiary.

That is, the Estate was not merely asking the court to interpret a will or declare an abstract property right; it was seeking to “wrest the money from [Sheila’s] possession.” This is precisely the kind of assertion of authority over an out‑of‑state party that must satisfy minimum‑contacts due process requirements.

The Court therefore rejected the Estate’s attempt to side‑step jurisdictional scrutiny by characterizing its request as a backward‑looking recognition of a pre‑existing legal status. Even if, as a matter of statutory interpretation, revocation occurred automatically in 2015, enforcing that revocation against a nonresident now is subject to International Shoe and Shaffer.

F. Procedural Question Left Unresolved

Sheila also argued that the Estate’s use of a motion for declaratory judgment within the existing probate—as opposed to initiating a separate action framed by pleadings—was procedurally improper. The circuit court had effectively treated the motion as an independent declaratory claim and ruled upon it.

Because the Supreme Court disposed of the case on jurisdictional grounds, it explicitly declined to reach this procedural question. Thus, the decision leaves open:

• Whether, and in what circumstances, an estate may properly obtain declaratory relief through motion practice within a probate file; and
• What pleading and notice requirements apply to such efforts, especially when they affect persons who are not already parties to the probate proceeding.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Federal Jurisdiction Cases

• International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
  • Established the “minimum contacts” standard: a defendant must have contacts with the forum such that maintaining the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
  • Forms the core constitutional test applied in Estate of Cunningham.
• Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
  • Held that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction—including in rem and quasi in rem—must be evaluated under International Shoe.
  • Undercuts the older view that the mere presence of property in the state suffices for jurisdiction.
  • Estate of Cunningham relies on this to reject any attempt to treat probate’s in rem character as jurisdictionally decisive.
• Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)
  • Reinforced that property-based assertions of jurisdiction cannot bypass the minimum contacts requirement.
  • Cited in Estate of Cunningham for the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” formulation.
• Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)
  • Elaborated on purposeful availment, emphasizing that jurisdiction cannot be based on the “unilateral activity of another party or a third person.”
  • Estate of Cunningham invokes this principle to emphasize that Roger’s relocation and inaction cannot be attributed to Sheila as contacts with South Dakota.
• Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. 811 (2018)
  • Upheld Minnesota’s revocation‑on‑divorce statute under the Contracts Clause.
  • Described revocation‑on‑divorce laws as presuming that a decedent’s post‑divorce failure to change beneficiaries is more likely due to “inattention” than “intention.”
  • Cited to frame how SDCL 29A‑2‑804 operates conceptually.

B. South Dakota Jurisdiction Cases

• Miller v. Weber, 1996 S.D. 47, 546 N.W.2d 865
  • Explained that a valid judgment requires both subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the person or property; judgments entered without jurisdiction are void.
• Davis v. Otten, 2022 S.D. 39, 978 N.W.2d 358
  • Supplied the three-part “purposeful availment / relatedness / reasonableness” test applied in Estate of Cunningham.
  • Also reaffirmed that a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo.
• Alone v. C. Brunsch, Inc., 2019 S.D. 41, 931 N.W.2d 707; Cable v. Union County Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2009 S.D. 59, 769 N.W.2d 817; Lippold v. Meade Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2018 S.D. 7, 906 N.W.2d 917; Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Brookings Cnty. Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 2016 S.D. 48, 882 N.W.2d 307
  • These cases collectively emphasize that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by constitution or statute and is distinct from personal jurisdiction.
  • They set the background for the Court’s statement that South Dakota circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
• Farmer v. Farmer, 2022 S.D. 47, 979 N.W.2d 173; Engel v. Geary, 2023 S.D. 69, 1 N.W.3d 644
  • Reiterated that questions regarding subject matter and personal jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.
• State v. American Bankers Ins., 374 N.W.2d 609 (S.D. 1985)
  • Applied purposeful availment principles from Burger King; quoted in Estate of Cunningham to frame what constitutes “deliberate” engagement with the forum.
• In re Estate of Ager, 2024 S.D. 55, 11 N.W.3d 878
  • Described supervised probate proceedings as in rem, a characterization Estate of Cunningham acknowledges but then places in the modern Shaffer framework.

C. South Dakota Revocation‑on‑Divorce Precedent

• Buchholz v. Storsve, 2007 S.D. 101, 740 N.W.2d 107
  • Held that SDCL 29A‑2‑804 automatically revoked a former spouse’s beneficiary designation under a retirement plan upon divorce.
  • Signaled that South Dakota’s revocation‑on‑divorce statute applies broadly to nonprobate transfers, including retirement accounts.
  • Estate of Cunningham cites Buchholz to acknowledge that the statute does reach IRA beneficiary designations—but then turns to the separate question whether the court can enforce that revocation against a nonresident ex‑spouse.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. In Personam vs. In Rem vs. Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction

• In personam jurisdiction:
  • Power over a person.
  • Allows a court to impose personal obligations (e.g., money judgments, injunctions).
• In rem jurisdiction:
  • Power over a particular item of property (the “res”) located in the forum state.
  • Traditionally said to determine the rights of all persons in that property (e.g., a condemnation proceeding).
• Quasi in rem jurisdiction:
  • Jurisdiction over a person’s interest in a particular property, used to resolve specific claims between particular parties.
  • Historically allowed courts to reach nonresidents by attaching property located in the state.

Since Shaffer, even in rem and quasi in rem assertions of jurisdiction must satisfy the same minimum‑contacts due process test as in personam jurisdiction. In modern law, the labels matter less than whether the defendant has adequate purposeful contacts with the forum.

B. Minimum Contacts and Purposeful Availment

“Minimum contacts” is a constitutional shorthand for the idea that:

• Defendants should not be surprised to be sued in a forum where they have deliberately engaged in activities; and
• It would be unfair to subject someone to suit in a state with which they have no meaningful relationship.

Key components:

• Purposeful availment: The defendant must have taken actions that deliberately connect her to the forum state (e.g., doing business there, entering contracts governed by its law, owning property, or maintaining a physical presence).
• Relatedness: The lawsuit must arise out of or be related to those forum-directed activities.
• Fair play and substantial justice: Even if contacts exist, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable given the burden on the defendant and the forum’s interest.

In Estate of Cunningham, Sheila’s actions were:

• Centered in Tennessee;
• Triggered largely by Roger’s unilateral relocation; and
• Not directed toward invoking South Dakota law.

Hence, no purposeful availment, no sufficient minimum contacts.

C. Revocation‑on‑Divorce Statutes

Revocation‑on‑divorce statutes like SDCL 29A‑2‑804 reflect a simple policy:

• Most people do not want their ex‑spouses to remain as beneficiaries of their wills, insurance policies, or retirement accounts.
• But many people fail to update these documents after divorce.

So the statute steps in and says, in effect:

• Upon divorce, any revocable disposition (such as a will bequest or beneficiary designation) to the former spouse is automatically treated as revoked.
• The law treats the ex‑spouse as though he or she had predeceased the decedent or had disclaimed the benefit.

This operates across a wide range of “governing instruments,” including wills, trusts, insurance policies, retirement plans, and IRAs.

D. Probate Proceedings and Nonprobate Assets

• Probate assets:
  • Pass under a decedent’s will or by intestacy.
  • Are gathered and distributed by the personal representative under court supervision (in supervised estates) or under statutes (in unsupervised estates).
• Nonprobate assets:
  • Pass outside of probate, typically by contract or operation of law.
  • Examples: life insurance proceeds payable to a named beneficiary; joint tenancy property with right of survivorship; payable‑on‑death (POD) accounts; IRAs and retirement plans with designated beneficiaries.

In Estate of Cunningham, the IRA was a nonprobate asset that passed directly to Sheila under the beneficiary designation—unless SDCL 29A‑2‑804 is applied to treat that designation as revoked. The Estate’s motion effectively sought to convert the IRA into a probate asset by invoking the revocation‑on‑divorce statute.

E. Declaratory Judgment Within a Probate Proceeding

A declaratory judgment is a court order that clarifies parties’ rights and obligations without necessarily ordering coercive relief (like damages or an injunction). The Estate sought such a declaration that:

• Sheila’s status as beneficiary had been revoked by law; and
• The IRA was part of Roger’s estate.

However, procedural rules typically require:

• A formal complaint or petition initiating an action;
• Service of process complying with rules for personal jurisdiction; and
• Opportunity for the defendant to respond by answer or motion.

Sheila argued that the Estate’s decision to seek declaratory relief via a motion inside the existing probate file sidestepped these requirements. The Supreme Court, having found no jurisdiction, did not resolve this procedural issue, leaving some uncertainty about the proper vehicle for similar claims in the future.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Limits on South Dakota Probate Courts’ Reach Over Nonresident Beneficiaries

The central practical consequence of Estate of Cunningham is that South Dakota estates cannot automatically enforce SDCL 29A‑2‑804 against nonresident ex‑spouses simply because the decedent died domiciled in South Dakota and the relevant asset is conceptually “located” there.

Going forward:

• Personal representatives who want to claw back nonprobate transfers from out‑of‑state former spouses (or their relatives) must:
  • either demonstrate that the former spouse has sufficient minimum contacts with South Dakota; or
  • pursue relief in the courts of the former spouse’s home state.
• Simply characterizing the probate as an in rem proceeding or invoking generic statutory authority to determine title to property (e.g., SDCL 29A‑3‑105) will not suffice.

B. Estate Planning and Divorce Practice

The decision also underscores the importance of proactive estate and beneficiary planning around divorce.

• For divorcing spouses:
  • Even if a marital dissolution agreement waives an ex‑spouse’s rights in an asset (as here), those waivers may not automatically influence third‑party custodians like IRA administrators.
  • Parties (and counsel) should ensure that actual beneficiary designations are updated to align with the MDA and the decedent’s wishes.
• For estate planners:
  • Relying solely on revocation‑on‑divorce statutes as a backstop may be risky, particularly when:
    • beneficiaries live out of state; or
    • assets are held or administered in multiple jurisdictions.
  • More robust planning—such as contemporaneous changes to beneficiary forms and coordination with divorce counsel—reduces the likelihood of post‑death jurisdictional obstacles like those in this case.

C. Interstate Dimensions and Choice‑of‑Forum Strategy

The opinion has important interstate implications:

• Where a decedent has ex‑spouses or other potential claimants residing elsewhere, South Dakota estates may need to:
  • analyze contacts systematically to see whether South Dakota can exercise jurisdiction; or
  • litigate in the nonresident’s home state if contacts with South Dakota are insufficient.
• It may be strategically preferable to file actions in the ex‑spouse’s domicile, where personal jurisdiction is clearly present, rather than risk dismissal in South Dakota.

The Court’s insistence on minimum contacts reinforces a broader principle of federalism and comity: one state’s courts cannot unilaterally impose obligations on residents of another state absent meaningful ties to the forum.

D. Procedural Uncertainty Around Declaratory Relief in Probate

Although not decided, the unresolved question about using motions for declaratory judgment within a probate file is significant:

• Practitioners should be cautious in assuming that such motions will be deemed procedurally proper, particularly when they affect nonparties to the probate.
• Filing a separate civil action for declaratory relief (with a complaint, service of process, and full adherence to civil procedure rules) may provide a more secure path in contentious or interstate matters.

E. Substantive Reach of SDCL 29A‑2‑804 Remains Intact—but Not Self‑Executing Across Borders

Importantly, Estate of Cunningham does not curtail the substantive scope of SDCL 29A‑2‑804:

• The Court assumes, consistently with Buchholz, that the statute can apply to revoke IRA beneficiary designations upon divorce.
• The decision is about who the South Dakota courts may bind and where that enforcement must occur, not about whether the statute reaches a given kind of disposition.

In effect, the statute may operate as a matter of substantive law, but its practical enforcement against a nonresident recipient of nonprobate assets still depends on personal jurisdiction constraints.

VII. Conclusion

Estate of Cunningham confirms and sharpens a key constitutional limit on the reach of South Dakota’s probate courts: labeling a proceeding as “in rem” or invoking broad probate jurisdiction statutes does not eliminate the need to establish minimum contacts with nonresident parties whose rights are at stake. When an ex‑spouse living in another state obtains nonprobate assets—such as IRA proceeds—by virtue of a beneficiary designation, South Dakota’s revocation‑on‑divorce statute cannot be enforced against that person in South Dakota courts without first satisfying International Shoe and Shaffer.

For practitioners, the case underscores:

• the enduring importance of analyzing personal jurisdiction even in probate contexts;
• the need for thorough estate and divorce planning to ensure that beneficiary designations are updated in fact, not just in law; and
• the potential necessity of litigating in the nonresident beneficiary’s home state when their contacts with South Dakota are minimal.

By vacating the declaratory judgment and directing dismissal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reinforces that constitutional due process principles remain a necessary gateway for any attempt to reallocate nonprobate assets from out‑of‑state recipients—even when state probate law, like SDCL 29A‑2‑804, would otherwise favor the estate’s position.