Minimal Explanation Suffices for Within-Range Revocation Sentences Under Plain Error Review: United States v. Lopez (2d Cir. 2025)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Date: November 3, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Denny Chin, Eunice C. Lee, and Beth Robinson

Disposition: Judgments of the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.) affirmed by Summary Order

Note on precedential status: This is a Summary Order under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1; it is citable but does not have precedential effect.

Introduction

This appeal arises from the revocation of supervised release and the imposition of a 24‑month prison term followed by a one‑year term of supervised release on Brandon Lopez, who was serving supervision on two prior convictions: felon-in-possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and escape (18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a), 4082(a)). After less than six months on supervision, Lopez was charged with multiple violations, including a serious narcotics violation connected to reckless flight from police, and several compliance failures (missed drug testing/treatment, failure to report, and marijuana use). The district court found five specifications proven, revoked supervision, and imposed concurrent 24‑month terms—capped by the statutory maximum—followed by one year of supervised release with previously imposed conditions.

On appeal, Lopez challenged his sentences as both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Procedurally, he argued the court failed to adequately explain its reasoning, to state it considered the applicable factors, and to explain why a longer term of imprisonment—not a longer term of supervised release—best served sentencing goals. Substantively, he argued the term was “shockingly high” and counterproductive to his need for treatment. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit affirmed the revocation sentences in a citable but non-precedential Summary Order. Applying plain-error review to the unpreserved procedural objections, the court held that the district court’s explanation—particularly in the revocation context—was sufficient when viewed in light of the entire record, including the evidentiary hearing, the parties’ submissions, and the court’s remarks emphasizing public safety concerns. The court reiterated that, in supervised release revocation proceedings, district courts are not required to utter formulaic references to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and may provide a minimal explanation where the sentence is within the recommended range.

On substantive reasonableness, the court emphasized the deferential standard—vacating only in “exceptional” cases where a sentence is “shockingly high” or otherwise unsupportable. Given Lopez’s quick reversion to serious criminal conduct and repeated noncompliance with supervision conditions, the 24‑month sentence (the statutory maximum and within the capped advisory range) fell comfortably within the range of permissible decisions. A footnote added that any failure to pronounce separate sentences for certain specifications was harmless because the court made clear the narcotics specification drove the sentence and the result would be the same regardless.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Ortiz, 100 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2024):
Ortiz supplies two key pillars: (1) plain-error review of unpreserved procedural challenges; and (2) the sufficiency of the sentencing court’s explanation when, considering the record as a whole, it shows a reasoned basis for the particular sentence. Lopez leverages Ortiz’s framing to argue for more explanation, but the panel uses Ortiz to stress that no specific formula or magic words are required—particularly in revocation cases—and that the record here sufficed.
United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020):
Smith defines procedural unreasonableness (failure to consider § 3553(a), reliance on clearly erroneous facts, or inadequate explanation) and underscores that revocation sentences require less specificity than plenary sentencing. Lopez’s claim that the court needed to explicitly recite factors or draw a detailed comparison of imprisonment versus extended supervision is undercut by Smith’s acknowledgment of a lower explanation threshold in revocation settings.
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008):
Verkhoglyad states that district courts need not expressly mention § 3553(a). The panel invokes this to reject Lopez’s contention that the court erred by not explicitly stating that it considered statutory sentencing factors.
United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012):
Cassesse is central in revocation cases: when a revocation sentence is within the recommended range, statutory explanation requirements can be minimal. This case provides the doctrinal anchor for sustaining succinct revocation explanations.
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018):
Although addressing sentence reductions, Chavez-Meza supplies a general principle used in Ortiz and echoed here: the adequacy of explanation is measured by the record as a whole. The panel deploys this to find sufficient reasoning even without extensive on-the-record exposition.
United States v. Constantinescu, 147 F.4th 299 (2d Cir. 2025), quoting United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2015):
These authorities support the proposition that Guidelines sentences are substantively reasonable in the “overwhelming majority” of cases. By characterizing Lopez’s 24‑month term as within the capped advisory range, the panel situates it within the zone that typically withstands substantive reasonableness challenges.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural Reasonableness

Standard of review: Because Lopez did not object to the adequacy of the explanation at sentencing, plain-error review applied (Ortiz). Under this stringent standard, relief requires an error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Explanation sufficiency in revocation: The court reiterated two related principles:

Revocation sentences require less specificity than initial (plenary) sentencings (Smith).
When a revocation sentence is within the recommended range, the required explanation may be “minimal” (Cassesse).

No formula or magic words required: The court relied on Ortiz and Verkhoglyad to reject the argument that the sentencing judge needed to explicitly recite the § 3553(a) factors or deliver a comparative analysis of incarceration versus extended supervised release. What matters is a reasoned basis apparent from the overall record (Ortiz; Chavez-Meza).

Record-based reasoning: The district court held an evidentiary hearing, canvassed the parties’ submissions, heard argument and allocution, and articulated a core rationale—public safety:

“[I]f you've proved one thing up to now, it is that you're a danger to the public when you're on the street and it would be a whole lot better if things were otherwise.”

Given that public protection is an expressly relevant revocation consideration under § 3583(e) (via § 3553(a)(2)(C)), the panel concluded the explanation was adequate.

2) Substantive Reasonableness

Deferential review: The court applied the familiar “range of permissible decisions” standard. Sentences are vacated only in exceptional situations where they are “so shockingly high [or low], or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law” that allowing them to stand would damage the administration of justice (Ortiz).

Within the capped advisory range: The policy-statement range for the most serious specification was 33–41 months, but 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped imprisonment at 24 months. The court imposed 24 months, which it treated as within the effective advisory framework (i.e., within the range as limited by statute). Under Constantinescu and Messina, such sentences are ordinarily substantively reasonable.

Facts driving the decision: The panel emphasized Lopez’s swift relapse into serious criminal conduct after release, his dangerous flight on a pedestrian-filled sidewalk, possession of multiple controlled substances (including heroin mixed with fentanyl), and repeated noncompliance with supervision (positive tests, missed appointments, failure to participate in programming, failure to report arrest). Against this backdrop, the district court’s choice of the statutory maximum was not “shockingly high.”

Treatment vs. incarceration: Lopez argued prison was “counterproductive” to his needs for drug, grief, and mental health treatment. The panel rejected the contention, noting the court’s discretion and the compelling public-safety and compliance record. The order does not indicate any Tapia problem (i.e., imposing or lengthening imprisonment to promote rehabilitation); the district court’s rationale was protection of the public, not rehabilitation-through-incarceration.

3) Harmlessness of any specification-by-specification pronouncement error

In a footnote, the panel observed that while the written judgments referenced certain specifications, the district court did not pronounce separate sentences for each specification. The government asked at sentencing whether the narcotics specification was “driving” the sentence; the court agreed and stated the sentence would be the same regardless of the other specifications. Any failure to pronounce separate sentences was therefore harmless—and, in any event, not challenged on appeal.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Revocation sentencings: lower explanation threshold, especially absent objection. This order reinforces that district courts need not deliver elaborate on-the-record analyses in revocation cases, particularly when the sentence is within the advisory policy statement range as capped by statute and there was no contemporaneous objection. Defense counsel who seek appellate review on explanation grounds must preserve the issue.
Deference to district court fact-finding and public-safety assessments. The panel’s emphasis on Lopez’s quick return to serious criminality and pattern of noncompliance illustrates the wide berth district courts receive in evaluating risk and tailoring revocation sanctions.
“Within-range” revocation sentences remain hard to upset as substantively unreasonable. By framing the 24‑month cap as the effective advisory benchmark and invoking Constantinescu/Messina, the order signals that attacks on revocation terms at or under the cap will face steep headwinds absent unusual facts.
Specification-by-specification pronouncements. While best practice is to be explicit for each specification, this order suggests that omission may be harmless where the record shows the same sentence would be imposed regardless.
Treatment arguments need concrete record support. Simply asserting the need for treatment will rarely carry the day where the conduct and compliance record point strongly to incapacitation and deterrence. Defendants should develop detailed treatment plans, availability, and compliance history to make such arguments compelling.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release: A post-prison monitoring period with conditions (e.g., drug testing, treatment, reporting). Violations can lead to revocation and additional imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
Revocation “specifications”: Discrete allegations of violations (e.g., new criminal conduct, failed tests, missed appointments). Each may be graded under the Sentencing Commission’s Chapter 7 policy statements, which inform the advisory range.
Advisory policy-statement range vs. statutory cap: In revocations, Chapter 7 provides an advisory imprisonment range tied to the violation grade and original criminal history category. But § 3583(e)(3) sets a maximum imprisonment term based on the class of the original offense. If the advisory range exceeds the statutory cap, the cap controls; courts often treat sentences up to that cap as “within” the effective advisory framework.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
- Procedural: Did the court follow the right process (consider the proper factors, rely on accurate facts, and adequately explain the sentence)?
- Substantive: Is the length of the sentence reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances?
Plain-error review: When a defendant fails to object at sentencing, appellate courts review for plain error. Relief requires an error that is clear, affects substantial rights (usually outcome-determinative), and seriously impugns the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. This is a difficult standard for defendants to satisfy.
Minimal explanation in revocation cases: Courts need not itemize or explicitly recite the § 3553(a) factors in revocation sentencings, especially when the term imposed is within the advisory range; the record must simply show a reasoned basis for the decision.
Public-safety focus: Protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C), incorporated by § 3583(e)) is a central revocation consideration. The district court’s explicit concern that Lopez posed a danger while on the street speaks to this factor.
Post-revocation supervision: Under § 3583(h), courts may impose a new term of supervised release after revocation, within statutory limits, taking into account time imposed for revocation imprisonment.
Tapia principle (rehabilitation and imprisonment): Courts cannot impose or lengthen imprisonment to promote rehabilitation. Here, the rationale was incapacitation/public safety, not rehabilitation, so no Tapia issue arises from the order.
Summary orders and citation: In the Second Circuit, summary orders filed after January 1, 2007 may be cited pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, but they are not precedential. Parties citing a summary order must serve it on any pro se adversary.

Conclusion

United States v. Lopez reaffirms a pragmatic principle in supervised release revocation practice: absent a preserved objection, a district court’s succinct explanation will suffice so long as the record shows a reasoned basis—especially where the sentence falls within the advisory policy-statement range as bounded by the statutory maximum. The Second Circuit’s analysis underscores the broad discretion and institutional advantages of district courts in weighing public safety and compliance histories in revocation contexts, and it again signals the high bar for overturning within-range revocation sentences as substantively unreasonable.

While citable but non-precedential, the order is instructive. Defense counsel seeking to challenge revocation sentences should preserve procedural objections, develop a robust record on treatment alternatives and availability, and be prepared to show why public-safety and deterrence concerns do not outweigh rehabilitative aims. District courts, for their part, can take some comfort that—particularly in revocation settings—concise explanations tethered to record-based public-safety concerns will generally withstand appellate scrutiny.