Minimal Efforts Are Not Diligent Efforts: The New York Court of Appeals Elevates Language-Access and Tailored-Services Obligations Before Terminating Parental Rights

Introduction

In Matter of K.Y.Z. (W.Z.), 2025 NY Slip Op 05781 (Oct. 21, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals reversed an order terminating a father’s parental rights on the ground of permanent neglect, dismissing the petition after finding that the foster care agency failed, as a matter of law, to make “diligent efforts” to reunify father and child. Writing for the Court, Judge Rivera held that the agency’s conduct—particularly its failure to provide interpretation during visitation, to meaningfully accommodate the father’s primary language (Fuzhou), to notify or include him (with interpretation) in medical and developmental care, to timely deliver dyadic therapy, and to assist with employment/housing barriers it itself identified—fell far short of the statute’s exacting requirements. The decision forcefully rejects a “minimal but reasonable” conception of diligence and re-centers the statutory, constitutional, and regulatory imperatives that agencies must satisfy before pursuing the “total and irreversible” severance of parental rights.

The case arises from the early removal of a newborn (K.Y.Z.) from his Chinese immigrant parents following findings related to the mother’s schizophrenia. Years later, after a petition to terminate both parents’ rights (only the father’s termination is before the Court), Family Court concluded the agency’s “minimal” efforts were nonetheless “reasonable,” and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that minimal efforts cannot meet the State’s “first obligation” to reunify families and that the clear-and-convincing proof requirement applies with rigor to an agency’s threshold burden to prove diligent efforts.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: The agency did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that it made “diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship” as required by Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a). The petition to terminate the father’s parental rights is dismissed.

Core reasons:

Language access failures: No interpreter was provided during family visits, depriving father of feedback and basic communication with the caseworker and foster parents; the agency delayed securing a Fuzhou interpreter despite learning father’s primary language; the father was not consistently notified of medical appointments or provided interpretive access to them. These failures contravened statutory “diligent efforts” and implicated state regulations requiring primary-language communication (18 NYCRR 423.2[b]; 423.4[m][2]) and ACS’s own Language Access Policy.
Untailored services to identified barriers: Although the agency deemed father’s “lack of insight” into the mother’s mental illness its “primary concern,” it never referred him to individual counseling or support groups; it delayed dyadic therapy for years; and it failed to assist with employment/housing despite being aware that father’s out-of-state, low-wage work impeded visitation.
Standard clarified: Minimal efforts do not satisfy the statutory duty. Agencies must undertake “affirmative, repeated, and meaningful” steps tailored to the parent’s particular obstacles (Matter of Sheila G., 61 NY2d 368, 385 [1984]). The sufficiency of proof to meet the clear-and-convincing standard is a question of law reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
Child’s special needs not an excuse: The child’s developmental and speech delays did not absolve the agency of providing language access or attempting to expose the child to the parent’s language in appropriate settings during critical years for language acquisition.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000): Establishes that a parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of their child is a fundamental liberty interest. The Court uses this constitutional backdrop to underscore why the statutory diligent-efforts requirement is stringent.
Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982): Requires clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights. The Court reaffirms that this heightened standard applies to the agency’s threshold obligation to prove diligent efforts. It emphasizes that the severe and irreversible nature of termination demands rigorous proof.
Matter of Sheila G., 61 NY2d 368 (1984): The cornerstone New York case defining “diligent efforts.” Agencies must identify the parent’s particular barriers and make “affirmative, repeated, and meaningful” efforts to assist. The Court leans heavily on Sheila G. to reject “minimal” efforts and to require tailored, service-oriented engagement.
Matter of Jamie M., 63 NY2d 388 (1984): Agencies cannot simply impose standard plans on impoverished parents; they must attempt to assist with employment and housing if those are barriers to reunification. The Court applies Jamie M. in concluding the agency did not adequately address father’s economic realities (out-of-state shifts that impaired visitation) or housing issues.
Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 NY2d 136 (1984) and Matter of Hailey ZZ., 19 NY3d 422 (2012): Articulate deference to Family Court’s affirmed findings when supported by the record, but also frame the legal contours of diligent efforts. Here, the Court differentiates between deferential factual review and the legal sufficiency of proof under a clear-and-convincing standard.
Matter of Westchester County Med. Ctr. [O’Connor], 72 NY2d 517 (1988): Cited for the principle that the clear-and-convincing standard forbids reliance on “loose, equivocal or contradictory” evidence. The majority uses this to justify reviewing sufficiency as a question of law.
Matter of Michael B., 58 NY2d 71 (1983): Supports the proposition that whether the record meets the heightened standard is a legal question the Court of Appeals can review.

Statutory, Regulatory, and Policy Framework the Court Enforced

Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), (f): Defines “permanent neglect” and “diligent efforts.” Diligent efforts are “reasonable attempts” including consultation, suitable visitation, services to resolve barriers, and informing parents of the child’s progress. The Court interprets these provisions in light of Sheila G. to demand tailored, sustained efforts—not minimal check-the-box steps.
“First obligation” clause (§ 384-b[1][a][iii]): The State’s first obligation is to prevent breakup or reunite the family if the child has left home. This animates the Court’s insistence on meaningful, parent-specific services.
18 NYCRR 423.2(b) and 423.4(m)(2): Require reasonable efforts to communicate with the family in their primary language in services intended to facilitate return home. The Court highlights the agency’s apparent noncompliance (no interpretation at visits; inadequate primary-language support) and uses the regulations as benchmarks for diligence.
ACS Language Access Policy (2021): Directs staff to proactively ascertain the family’s preferred language. The Court cites this policy to underscore both the feasibility and the expectation of language-access planning—particularly salient given father’s Fuzhou primary language and limited literacy.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: (1) reaffirming the constitutional gravity and statutory structure of termination proceedings, (2) clarifying the standard and scope of review, and (3) applying the refined diligence benchmark to the record.

Constitutional and statutory premise: Termination is uniquely severe and irreversible; therefore, the agency bears a heavy threshold burden to prove diligent efforts by clear and convincing evidence before the court may assess the parent’s planning or contact failures.
Standard and scope of review: While factual findings are generally reviewed for record support, whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard on the threshold diligence element is a question of law the Court can review. The majority rejects the dissent’s view that it is reweighing facts; it insists that identifying deficiencies in proof is part of sufficiency review under a heightened standard.
Application—why the agency’s proof failed:
- Language-access deficits: No interpreter during visits; delayed and incomplete accommodation of father’s Fuzhou language; inadequate notice of medical appointments and no interpreted participation; no proactive steps to expose the child to father’s language or to enable real-time, two-way communication with foster parents and providers. The Court labels this “linguistic isolation” that thwarted bonding and planning—contrary to statute, regulation, and policy.
- Services not tailored to identified barriers: The agency’s primary stated concern—father’s “lack of insight” into mother’s schizophrenia—was never addressed through referrals to individual counseling or support groups, nor by structured, interpreted engagement with providers. The agency also delayed dyadic therapy for years, with sessions beginning only as the petition was filed, and did not assist in finding childcare even when father proactively suggested he would hire help.
- Economic and logistical barriers: The agency knew father’s out-of-state shifts impeded visitation and that he often took exhausting same-day bus trips to maintain contact, yet it made no effort to assist with local employment or housing—even though those obstacles were part of the agency’s own reunification calculus and are recognized in Jamie M. as requiring assistance.
- No recalcitrance by the parent: The record reflected cooperation—attendance at conferences and classes, willingness to engage in therapy, and repeated efforts to visit—undercutting any argument that the agency’s efforts were thwarted by father’s “utterly unco-operative or indifferent” stance (Sheila G.).
Key doctrinal clarifications:
- Minimal ≠ diligent: The Court rejects Family Court’s and the Appellate Division’s “minimal but reasonable” formulation. Diligence requires affirmative, repeated, and meaningful efforts tailored to the actual barriers.
- Child’s nonverbal state not a defense: Developmental delays do not excuse the absence of language access or efforts to expose the child to the parent’s language during critical acquisition years.
- Temporal scope: Diligent efforts are assessed in the pre-petition period; here, the record did not show adequate efforts before filing.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Doctrinal impact:

Raised floor for “diligent efforts” proof: Agencies must now assume that “minimal” engagement will not pass muster. Documentation must show problem-specific, iterative efforts that respond to language, cultural, economic, and logistical realities.
Language access is integral to diligence: Interpreted visitation, interpreted inclusion in medical and developmental services, and documented primary-language communication are part of the diligence inquiry. Expect more judicial scrutiny of compliance with 18 NYCRR 423.2(b) and 423.4(m)(2) and local language-access policies.
Standard-of-review clarity: Sufficiency of clear-and-convincing proof on the diligent-efforts threshold is a question of law. This invites closer appellate oversight where trial courts accept sparse efforts.
Poverty-aware practice: Following Jamie M., the Court reiterates that agencies must make “some attempt” to assist with employment and housing where those are barriers to reunification. Expect increased emphasis on transportation, local job referrals, housing navigation, and visit scheduling tailored to irregular work.

Operational impact on agencies:

Build and use rosters of interpreters for less-common languages and dialects (here, Fuzhou), including during visitation, casework meetings, and provider appointments.
Proactively identify and record the parent’s primary language and literacy; offer services and classes (parenting, counseling) in that language; explain why English acquisition, if requested, is relevant and assist access.
Ensure timely referrals and start dates for dyadic therapy and other parent–child bonding services; avoid multi-year delays.
Include parents in medical and developmental care with interpreted participation; provide timely notice of appointments; solicit provider engagement with interpreters.
Assess and mitigate economic barriers: offer transportation support, explore local employment resources, and adjust visitation to shift work; assist with housing search if identified as a reunification condition.
Document everything contemporaneously; tailor permanency plans; update them as needs evolve.

Litigation and practice considerations:

Parents’ counsel should contemporaneously demand interpreters for visits and provider appointments, object to language-access gaps, and build a record of requested but undelivered services.
Agencies should avoid relying on generalized assertions of “diligence” and instead marshal concrete, dated steps that address each identified barrier.
Although the father did not raise anti-discrimination claims, practitioners should consider preserving language-access claims under Title VI, the ADA, and city/state language-access mandates in parallel with § 384-b diligence arguments.
Expect more searching trial-level inquiries into whether diligent efforts would have been “detrimental to the best interests of the child” if agencies seek to excuse efforts; such a showing must be specific and documented.

Unresolved or bounded aspects:

The Court does not require cultural or linguistic matching placements per se; rather, it requires agencies to mitigate language barriers (e.g., interpreters at visitation and appointments) and, where feasible, to expose children to a parent’s language.
The decision is confined to § 384-b and does not adjudicate ADA/Title VI claims or craft remedies for language-access violations beyond dismissal where diligence proof fails.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Permanent neglect: A ground for terminating parental rights when, for at least one year after a child enters foster care, a parent fails to maintain contact with or plan for the child, despite being able to, and despite the agency’s diligent efforts to strengthen the parent–child relationship.
Diligent efforts: Not just “some” efforts. Statutorily defined “reasonable attempts” including consultation, arranging visitation, providing services to resolve barriers, and keeping the parent informed, implemented in an “affirmative, repeated, and meaningful” way tailored to the family’s needs.
Clear and convincing evidence: A high standard of proof requiring firm belief or conviction—more than a preponderance and less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence that is “loose, equivocal, or contradictory” does not satisfy it.
Language access (LEP parents): Ensuring parents with limited English proficiency can understand and be understood in their primary language, including through professional interpretation and translation during visits, meetings, and appointments.
Dyadic therapy: Parent–child therapy focused on strengthening attachment, communication, and relational patterns—often crucial for rebuilding bonds during foster care.

Key Takeaways

Minimal efforts are not diligent efforts. Agencies must show sustained, tailored actions directed at the specific barriers they identify.
Language access is a core component of diligence. Interpreted visitation and medical/developmental participation cannot be afterthoughts.
Economic obstacles matter. If work schedules, low wages, or housing impede reunification, agencies must attempt to help mitigate those conditions.
The sufficiency of the agency’s diligence proof under the clear-and-convincing standard is a question of law reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
Where agencies fail to meet this threshold burden, termination cannot stand—even if lengthy foster placements and adoption plans create understandable pressures to finalize permanency.

Conclusion

Matter of K.Y.Z. (W.Z.) is a consequential recalibration of the “diligent efforts” requirement in New York termination-of-parental-rights practice. Grounded in constitutional due process and the Legislature’s express prioritization of family preservation and reunification, the decision insists that agencies move beyond minimal or generic efforts and instead implement—and document—affirmative, repeated, and meaningful steps that account for a parent’s language, culture, literacy, economics, and logistics. Language access is no longer a peripheral compliance issue; it is central to diligence itself. By treating the sufficiency of diligence proof as a legal question commensurate with the clear-and-convincing standard, the Court signals heightened appellate scrutiny and invites more rigorous trial-court records.

The immediate result is reversal and dismissal of the termination petition. The broader legacy is a stronger, clearer benchmark: before the State takes the drastic step of severing the parent–child bond, it must prove that it truly did all that the statute, regulations, and constitutional principles demand to help reunite the family.