Miller-Fix and the Eighth Amendment: Restricting Juvenile Life-Without-Parole to the Rarest Offender

Introduction

State of North Carolina v. Tristan Noah Borlase (No. 33A24, filed March 21, 2025) reached the North Carolina Supreme Court on appeal from a divided Court of Appeals panel. The case involved a juvenile offender—just shy of his eighteenth birthday—convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for killing his mother and father. At sentencing, the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole under North Carolina’s “Miller-fix” statute, N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A–D. Borlase argued that his Eighth Amendment and state-constitutional rights were violated because the sentencing court did not make a specific finding of “permanent incorrigibility” and allegedly failed to consider meaningful mitigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying the scope of juvenile life-without-parole sentences under federal and state law.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Berger, writing for the majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that:

Under Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460 (2012)), a discretionary sentence of life without parole for a juvenile is permissible if the sentencing court considers youth and attendant circumstances. No on-the-record finding of “permanent incorrigibility” is required.
North Carolina’s “Miller-fix” statutes—N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A–D—track and satisfy Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana (577 U.S. 190 (2016)) by giving the trial judge discretion to weigh enumerated mitigating factors.
Appellate review of a juvenile life sentence under this scheme is for abuse of discretion. There is no requirement for an explicit refusal to consider mitigation; rather, the record must show the judge exercised discretion in weighing the statutory factors.
The trial court’s findings demonstrated that it (a) considered the nine enumerated factors—including age, immaturity, mental health, familial or peer pressure and rehabilitation potential—and (b) properly exercised its discretion to conclude that the defendant’s crimes reflected irreversible incorrigibility.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012): Held that mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, but discretionary sentences remain possible if youth and mitigating circumstances are considered.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016): Clarified that life without parole for juveniles must be reserved for “the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021): Declined to require a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility, reaffirming that Miller’s procedure suffices so long as discretion to consider youth is afforded.
State v. Sims, No. 297PA18 (N.C. Mar. 21, 2025): Held that North Carolina’s Miller-fix statutes comply with Miller and do not contravene the Eighth Amendment when judges weigh the statutory factors and exercise discretion.
State v. James, 371 N.C. 77 (2018): Interpreted the Miller-fix statute to treat the choice between life with parole and life without parole as “two equally appropriate sentencing alternatives,” requiring consideration of enumerated mitigating factors.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in key steps:

Lockstep Analysis: Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution is “locked in” with the Eighth Amendment, so federal Eighth Amendment precedents govern state constitutional review of juvenile life sentences.
No Irreducible Finding of Incorrigibility: Miller and Montgomery do not mandate an “on-the-record finding” of permanent incorrigibility. They require only that the sentencer follow a procedure: consider youth and attendant circumstances and retain the discretion to impose a lesser penalty.
Miller-Fix Statute Comports with Miller: N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A–D set out a hearing, nine non-exhaustive mitigating factors, and a requirement that the court “include findings on the absence or presence of any mitigating factors.” The statute does not presume one sentence over the other.
Appellate Standard—Abuse of Discretion: Because the Legislature gave trial judges discretion to weigh the factors, appellate courts review juvenile life-without-parole orders for abuse of discretion. A purely discretionary choice—even if another judge might weigh factors differently—is not reversible.
Application to Borlase: The sentencing judge made thorough findings on age, immaturity, risk awareness, intellectual capacity, prior record, mental health, familial/peer pressure, rehabilitation potential, and a catchall factor. He credited some mitigation (no prior record, depression) and rejected other mitigation (immaturity, familial pressure) as unsupported or outweighed by aggravating circumstances. This was a proper exercise of statutory discretion.

Impact

State v. Borlase confirms and clarifies juvenile life sentencing in North Carolina:

It affirms that life without parole remains available for a juvenile only after a discretionary, factor-based analysis consistent with Miller and the state “Miller-fix.”
It lowers appellate oversight to abuse-of-discretion review, signaling deference to sentencing courts’ judgment calls on the weight of youth-related mitigation.
It precludes any requirement of a specific “incorrigibility” finding, so long as the judge considered all mitigating factors and had discretion to choose a lesser sentence.
For defense counsel, it highlights the importance of producing concrete, specific evidence of youth-related factors—particularly familial or peer pressure—so that trial judges cannot dismiss them as general or too attenuated.
For sentencing judges, it underscores the need to enter clear findings on each statutory factor, but it also grants wide latitude in weighing them.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miller v. Alabama – A Supreme Court case that forbids mandatory life without parole for all juvenile offenders, but allows individualized sentencing if youth is considered.
Permanent Incorrigibility – The notion that a young offender is beyond rehabilitation. Miller and Montgomery said only the “rarest” juvenile should receive life without parole, but they did not require judges to label offenders as permanently incorrigible.
Miller-Fix Statute (N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A–D) – North Carolina’s legislative response to Miller, creating a hearing with nine listed mitigating factors (e.g., age, immaturity, mental health, family pressure) and two sentencing outcomes (life with parole or life without parole).
Abuse of Discretion – A highly deferential appellate standard. A ruling is reversed only if it is “manifestly unsupported by reason” or “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.”
Lockstepping – Treating the state constitutional provision (Art. I, § 27) as offering no greater juvenile-sentencing protections than the federal Eighth Amendment.

Conclusion

State v. Borlase cements North Carolina’s approach to juvenile life sentences under the Eighth Amendment. By endorsing the Miller-fix statute and confirming that no separate finding of “permanent incorrigibility” is needed, the Court balances constitutional safeguards for youth with deference to legislative policy and sentencing discretion. Going forward, juvenile defense attorneys must marshal robust, case-specific evidence of each mitigating factor—especially familial or peer pressure—to ensure that sentencing courts cannot too readily dismiss youth-related circumstances. In the broader legal landscape, Borlase illustrates how courts can respect Miller’s substantive protections for juveniles while upholding a system of individualized, discretionary sentencing aligned with both Supreme Court and General Assembly mandates.