Mild Mental Limitations Need Not Appear in the RFC When the ALJ Explains Their Minimal Work Impact and Substantial Evidence Supports the Omission

Introduction

In Kenneth Kruckow v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the denial of supplemental security income to Kenneth Kruckow, a claimant with a history of seizures and brain tumors (meningiomas) requiring surgeries in 2019 and 2022. Although the administrative law judge (ALJ) found “mild” mental limitations at step two of the sequential evaluation—specifically in (1) interacting with others and (2) “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace”—the ALJ did not include mental restrictions in the residual functional capacity (RFC).

The appeal presented a recurring Social Security issue: when an ALJ identifies non-severe (mild) mental limitations at step two, must the RFC (and vocational expert hypotheticals) include corresponding mental limitations, or can the ALJ omit them if the decision adequately explains why they do not meaningfully affect work capacity?

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ALJ adequately addressed Kruckow’s mild mental limitations and that substantial evidence supported the finding that those limitations did not warrant RFC restrictions. The court emphasized that the ALJ discussed the mental-function evidence (including normal examinations, lack of ongoing mental-health treatment, and contrary evidence from Kruckow’s reported social activities) and reasonably concluded that any mental impairment caused no more than minimal work-related limitations. Because the ALJ sufficiently connected the mild step-two findings to the RFC analysis, the omission of mental limitations from the RFC was not error.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022)
The court relied on Wilder for two foundational points: (1) the framework of the five-step disability analysis (“See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)”), and (2) the standard of judicial review, including that the Appeals Council’s denial makes the ALJ decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Here, Wilder served as the procedural and review-standard anchor rather than the source of a new substantive rule.
Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498 (7th Cir. 2021)
Quoted via Wilder for the definition of “substantial evidence” (“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). This mattered because Kruckow’s challenge was essentially an evidentiary-sufficiency argument: he contended the ALJ’s own step-two findings compelled mental RFC restrictions. The court treated the question as whether the ALJ’s explanation and evidentiary citations cleared the deferential substantial-evidence threshold.
Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
Villano supplied the controlling principle that “the ALJ must evaluate all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe.” This is the doctrinal basis for Kruckow’s argument: once mild mental limitations were found, the ALJ had to account for them somewhere in the RFC analysis. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the principle but concluded it was satisfied on this record because the ALJ evaluated the mild limitations and rationally found they did not reduce work capacity.
Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)
Cited for the proposition that a failure to fully consider non-severe impairments “may warrant remand.” The court used Golembiewski to recognize the potential seriousness of the alleged omission, while still finding no such failure occurred here because the ALJ’s narrative showed she considered (and discounted) the functional impact of the mild mental limitations.
McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2011)
Cited for harmless-error principles: even if an ALJ errs, remand is not required if the error is harmless. While the Seventh Circuit ultimately found no error, the citation signals an alternative pathway the Commissioner often invokes—i.e., that the claimant must show the alleged omission mattered to the outcome (such as changing the jobs identified at step five).
Durham v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 1089 (7th Cir. 2022)
The court used Durham to emphasize burden: “Kruckow bore the burden of establishing that his specific limitations affected his ability to work.” This burden framing is pivotal in mild-impairment disputes; it is not enough for a claimant to point to a “mild” checkbox finding—he must connect that finding to concrete, work-relevant restrictions supported by record evidence.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps.

Step-two “mild” findings trigger consideration, not automatic RFC restrictions.
The court reiterated (via Villano v. Astrue) that non-severe impairments must be evaluated in the RFC. But it treated “evaluation” as a requirement of reasoned consideration and explanation—rather than a mechanical mandate to add limitations whenever mild difficulties are identified.
The ALJ’s decision text demonstrated consideration and an explanation for omission.
The court highlighted the ALJ’s step-two narrative: Kruckow alleged irritability/anxiety and concentration issues; the consultative examiner noted “some problems with working memory”; yet Kruckow reported robust social interaction at evening 12-step meetings and had no ongoing mental-health treatment. The ALJ also emphasized that the broader record repeatedly documented normal neurologic/psychiatric functioning. The court treated these statements as carrying forward into the RFC narrative, where the ALJ again reasoned that Kruckow’s allegations were inconsistent with “intact neurological and psychological presentation in examinations.”
The claimant did not carry his burden to identify evidence requiring functional accommodations.
The court concluded that Kruckow did not point to record evidence showing his mild limitations translated into specific work restrictions (e.g., limits on pace, task complexity, supervision, or social demands). Without that link, and given the ALJ’s explanation, the court held substantial evidence supported the RFC without mental limitations and, consequently, the vocational expert hypotheticals.

Impact

Although labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” the decision reflects and reinforces a practical rule frequently applied in Seventh Circuit Social Security cases: an ALJ may omit mild, non-severe mental limitations from the RFC when the ALJ (1) discusses the relevant functional areas, (2) explains why the evidence shows no more than minimal work impact, and (3) the claimant fails to identify record support for additional functional restrictions.

The opinion’s likely influence is most apparent in how it frames the litigation burden. Claimants challenging an RFC omission must do more than cite the step-two finding; they should identify what specific limitation (e.g., reduced pace, limited interactions, simple tasks) the evidence compels and why it would affect step-five job numbers. Conversely, the Commissioner can defend an omission by pointing to a coherent narrative linking mild findings to normal examinations, limited treatment, and activities inconsistent with disabling limitations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Five-step evaluation (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)): A standardized sequence the ALJ uses to decide disability—covering current work activity, severity of impairments, whether impairments meet “Listings,” the claimant’s RFC and past work, and whether other work exists.
Step two severity and “mild” limitations: “Mild” mental limitations indicate some functional difficulty but generally not enough, by themselves, to be considered “severe.” They still must be considered when deciding the RFC.
Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): The most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite medically determinable impairments. It drives the step-four and step-five analysis.
Substantial evidence: A deferential review standard. The court does not ask whether it would decide differently; it asks whether a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ based on the cited evidence.
Vocational expert hypotheticals: Questions posed to a vocational expert must reflect the limitations the ALJ accepts as supported. If the ALJ reasonably rejects alleged limitations (or finds they cause no functional restriction), they need not appear in the hypotheticals.
Harmless error: Even if a mistake occurred, a court will not remand if fixing the mistake would not change the outcome (for example, if the same jobs would remain available).

Conclusion

Kenneth Kruckow v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security affirms that step-two “mild” mental limitations do not automatically translate into mental RFC restrictions. What is required is a defensible, evidence-based explanation showing why the mild limitations impose no more than minimal work-related impact. The court’s analysis—grounded in Villano v. Astrue and enforced through the substantial-evidence lens of Wilder v. Kijakazi and Butler v. Kijakazi—underscores that successful challenges must identify record evidence tying mild findings to concrete functional restrictions that would change the step-five outcome.