MidFirst Bank v. Young: Mortgagors’ Lack of Standing to Challenge Mortgage Assignments and Limits on Restricting Access to Court Audio Recordings

MidFirst Bank v. Young: Mortgagors’ Lack of Standing to Challenge Mortgage Assignments and Limits on Restricting Access to Court Audio Recordings

I. Introduction

The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in MidFirst Bank v. Young, 2025 ND 206, addresses two significant questions at the intersection of foreclosure law, civil procedure, and open courts:

  1. Whether a mortgagor has standing to challenge the validity of a mortgage assignment based on alleged fraud (including “robo-signing” or forgery) when the mortgagor was not a party to that assignment.
  2. Under what circumstances a district court may deny a litigant access to audio recordings of court proceedings, in light of the North Dakota Supreme Court Administrative Rules on court records and transparency.

The Court unequivocally holds that a borrower who is not a party to a mortgage assignment lacks standing to assert a fraud claim attacking that assignment. Parallel to this, the Court clarifies that trial courts may not deny access to audio recordings of proceedings without a case-specific restriction that complies with N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(4)(a). Although the denial of audio access was declared an abuse of discretion, it was deemed harmless error in this case.

The case thus establishes important precedent in North Dakota on:

  • The standing of homeowners in foreclosure to challenge assignments of their mortgages.
  • The relationship between the promissory note and the mortgage in determining who has foreclosure rights.
  • The scope of judicial bias claims arising from a judge’s tone, management of self-represented parties, and reliance on procedural rules.
  • The right of parties to access audio recordings of court proceedings, and the standards governing restrictions on that access.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Loan and Mortgage

In April 2016, James and Tahnee Young executed:

  • A promissory note in the amount of $275,793.
  • A mortgage on residential property in Fargo, North Dakota, securing that note.

The original lender was The Mortgage Company, Inc. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) was named in the mortgage as nominee, a common structure in modern mortgage securitization where MERS appears of record as mortgagee for purposes of registration, while beneficial interests in the note may be transferred among financial institutions.

B. Transfer to MidFirst and Default

MidFirst Bank took ownership of the note in July 2022. The Youngs made their last payment in February 2023. After payment stopped:

  • MidFirst served the Youngs with a foreclosure notice in December 2023.
  • In February 2024, MidFirst served and filed a foreclosure complaint.

C. The Borrowers’ Defenses and Counterclaims

In their answer, the Youngs asserted a range of counterclaims, including:

  • Fraudulent misrepresentation (focused on the validity of the mortgage assignment).
  • Violations of the:
    • Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
    • Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), and
    • Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
  • Unjust enrichment.
  • Coercive collection practices.
  • Constructive fraud.

Their core theory centered on an alleged defect in the assignment of the mortgage to MidFirst. The Youngs alleged the assignment was either:

  • “Robo-signed” – i.e., mechanically or mass-signed by someone who did not actually review or have authority over the document, or
  • Outright forged.

To support this theory, they submitted affidavits from three purported handwriting experts. They argued that, if the assignment was fraudulent, MidFirst lacked authority to foreclose.

D. Summary Judgment Proceedings in the District Court

Both sides moved for summary judgment. In July 2024, the district court:

  • Granted MidFirst’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
  • Denied the Youngs’ own motion for summary judgment.
  • Denied the Youngs’ request for audio recordings of two hearings, reasoning that the transcript is the official record.

The district court held:

  1. The Youngs lacked standing to assert fraud in the mortgage assignment.
  2. The other claims, including FDCPA, FCRA, and RESPA claims, were without merit or barred by res judicata.

The Youngs, self-represented, appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Standing and the Mortgage Assignment

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that:

  • The Youngs, as borrowers/mortgagors, were not parties to the assignment of the mortgage to MidFirst.
  • Because they were nonparties, they lacked standing to assert fraud claims attacking that assignment under N.D.C.C. § 9-03-08 and general standing principles.
  • Therefore, even if the assignment was “robo-signed” or forged, the Youngs suffered no legal injury from that alleged fraud in the context of the assignment contract.
  • Without standing to pursue their central fraud theory, the Youngs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat MidFirst’s motion for summary judgment.

B. MidFirst’s Right to Foreclose

The Court further held that MidFirst was entitled to foreclose as a matter of law because:

  • MidFirst held the promissory note secured by the mortgage.
  • Under North Dakota law, ownership of the mortgage follows the note (N.D.C.C. § 35-03-01.2(7)).
  • A party holding the note may pursue foreclosure under the terms of the mortgage.
  • There was no showing that MidFirst violated any contractual terms or laws in foreclosing.

C. Judicial Bias and Conduct Toward Self-Represented Litigants

The Youngs claimed the district judge was biased because she:

  • Suggested that they obtain counsel.
  • Emphasized procedural rules and pressed them to ground their motions (e.g., for sanctions) in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court rejected this claim, concluding that:

  • The record did not demonstrate judicial bias.
  • Recommending that a self-represented party obtain counsel is not bias; it often promotes fairness and efficiency.
  • The judge’s insistence on adherence to procedural rules reflected normal judicial management, especially where the court even granted a recess to help the Youngs find legal authority.

D. Denial of Audio Recordings and Harmless Error

On the issue of access to audio recordings of the April 23 and May 30 hearings, the Court held:

  • Under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 40(2)(a), parties and their attorneys may obtain audio recordings without charge, unless access is restricted by court order.
  • Under Admin. R. 41(3)(a), court records are presumptively open and accessible.
  • Restriction of access to such records must comply with Admin. R. 41(4)(a), including a case-specific determination under Rule 41(4)(a)(3).
  • The district court denied the Youngs’ request solely on the ground that the transcript is the official record, echoing Admin. R. 40(3), but did not explain why access to audio was being restricted under Rule 41.
  • This failure to apply Rule 41(4)(a)(3) meant that the district court’s denial of audio was an abuse of discretion.

However, the Court found this abuse of discretion to be harmless error because:

  • Even if the audio revealed the tone and context the Youngs alleged, the high bar for proving judicial bias would still not have been met.
  • The Youngs failed to use the proper procedure (N.D.R.App.P. 10(h)) to seek correction of the transcript and offered no concrete example of specific missing statements.
  • The presumption of regularity in the preparation of transcripts therefore controlled.

E. Other Issues: Appellee’s Brief and Federal Claims

The Supreme Court also:

  • Refused to revisit the Chief Justice’s prior decision (under N.D.R.App.P. 27(d)) declining to strike MidFirst’s appellee brief as untimely, because the Youngs did not timely seek reconsideration by the full Court.
  • Affirmed dismissal of federal statutory claims:
    • FDCPA and FCRA claims were barred by res judicata, having been litigated in Young v. Midland Mortg., No. 3:23‑cv‑119, 2023 WL 8582604 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2023), adopted 2023 WL 8567154 (D.N.D. Dec. 11, 2023).
    • RESPA claim failed because the Youngs did not prove actual damages.
  • Concluded any remaining arguments were inadequately briefed or without merit.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standing and Contract Fraud – N.D.C.C. § 9‑03‑08 and Albrecht

The Court’s standing analysis rests on two pillars:

  • General standing doctrine, as explained in Albrecht v. Albrecht, 2020 ND 105, ¶¶ 9–10, 942 N.W.2d 875:
    • A party must have suffered injury from the challenged action.
    • The party must assert their own legal rights and interests, not those of third parties.
    • Standing is a question of law, reviewed de novo.
  • N.D.C.C. § 9‑03‑08, which provides that a party to a contract whose consent was obtained by fraud, mistake, duress, menace, or undue influence has their consent “not real” or “voidable.” Nonparties have no contractual rights under the instrument and thus no claim for fraud in that contract.

The Court applies these principles to hold that because the Youngs were not parties to the assignment contract between the assignor and MidFirst, they could not claim that their own legal rights were infringed by alleged fraud in that assignment.

2. Out-of-Jurisdiction Cases on Mortgagor Standing to Challenge Assignments

The opinion aligns North Dakota with a broad national consensus that borrowers generally lack standing to challenge mortgage assignments to which they are not parties. The Court cites:

  • Quale v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 561 F. App’x 582, 583 (8th Cir. 2014): held that a mortgagor lacked standing to challenge a mortgage assignment; the mortgagor was neither assignor nor assignee and thus suffered no legal injury from alleged defects in that assignment.
  • Gerlich v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 10‑4520, 2011 WL 3920235 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011): a federal case cited in Quale for the same rule.
  • Dixon v. Stern & Eisenberg, PC, No. 5:14‑CV‑4551, 2015 WL 3833782 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2015), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 128 (3d Cir. 2016): held that a mortgagor similarly lacked standing to challenge a mortgage assignment.
  • Newman v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc., 994 N.W.2d 852, 857–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2022): reaffirmed that challenges to assignment are properly brought by assignors or assignees, not third parties such as borrowers.

These authorities emphasize a core concept: fraud in the transfer between two others does not usually give the borrower a claim, unless that fraud directly impairs some legal right of the borrower independent of the assignment itself.

3. Note–Mortgage Relationship – N.D.C.C. § 35‑03‑01.2(7) and Bray v. Bank of America

The Court relies on:

  • N.D.C.C. § 35‑03‑01.2(7): establishes that in North Dakota, the mortgage “passes” with the note. When ownership of the note changes, ownership of the mortgage follows automatically.
  • Bray v. Bank of Am., No. 1:09‑CV‑075, 2011 WL 30307, at *5 (D.N.D. Jan. 5, 2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 685 (8th Cir. 2013): recognizes that a party holding a note secured by a mortgage may pursue foreclosure under the mortgage’s terms.

These authorities underpin the Court’s conclusion that MidFirst’s right to foreclose was grounded in its status as holder of the promissory note, not solely in the assignment document that the Youngs attacked. Even if there had been some irregularity in the assignment, the fact that MidFirst held the note itself was sufficient to establish its entitlement to foreclose.

4. Harmless Error and Abuse of Discretion – Haider, Senger

On the audio-recording issue, the Court applies familiar standards:

  • Haider v. Moen, 2018 ND 174, ¶ 6, 914 N.W.2d 520: explains that a trial court abuses its discretion when it:
    • Acts arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably,
    • Fails to engage in a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination, or
    • Misinterprets or misapplies the law.
  • Senger v. Senger, 2022 ND 229, ¶ 12, 983 N.W.2d 160: reiterates that an error is harmless if it does not affect the outcome of the case or a party’s substantial rights, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 61.

The Court found that the district court misapplied the law (by denying access based only on the “official record” concept in Admin. R. 40(3) without engaging in the Rule 41(4)(a)(3) analysis), thereby abusing its discretion. Yet it was harmless, because the outcome and the Youngs’ substantial rights were unaffected.

5. Judicial Bias – Evenstad and Volkswagen “Clean Diesel”

For judicial bias, the Court references:

  • Evenstad v. Buchholz, 1997 ND 141, ¶ 11, 567 N.W.2d 194: holds that general allegations are insufficient to prove judicial bias; concrete evidence is required.
  • In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 3d 535, 554 (N.D. Cal. 2020): notes that expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or even anger can occur in the courtroom and are usually within the bounds of judicial behavior without constituting bias.

The Court thus set a high bar and concluded that neither the suggestion to obtain counsel nor strict adherence to procedure met that standard.

6. Open Courts and Audio Access – Admin. R. 40 & 41; Williamson

The Court’s analysis of access to audio recordings draws heavily on:

  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 40(2)(a): states that parties and attorneys may obtain audio recordings of trial court proceedings without charge, unless access is restricted by court order.
  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 40(3): provides that transcripts, not audio, are the official record of proceedings.
  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(3)(a): establishes a presumption of open and accessible court records.
  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(4)(a): authorizes courts to restrict access to records, but only via an order that is case-specific and addresses particular considerations, including those in Rule 41(4)(a)(3).
  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(5)(c)(2): prohibits record custodians from inquiring into the requester’s motive or reason for seeking access.
  • Williamson v. State, 2023 ND 179, ¶ 3, 996 N.W.2d 312: illustrates that audio recordings may be used to evaluate the accuracy of transcripts, particularly when parties seek correction under N.D.R.App.P. 10(h).

The Court clarifies that the fact that transcripts are the “official record” does not justify denying access to audio. Access may only be restricted based on Rule 41’s criteria, and even then, only via an appropriately reasoned order.

7. Presumption of Regularity – N.D.C.C. § 31‑11‑03(15), Admin. R. 39(5), Coulter

To reject the Youngs’ contention that the transcripts were missing statements, the Court invokes:

  • N.D.C.C. § 31‑11‑03(15): codifies the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed.
  • N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 39(5): charges district court staff with preparing transcripts in accordance with appellate rules, reinforcing their official duty.
  • Coulter v. Ramberg, 55 N.W.2d 516, 518 (N.D. 1952): holds that evidence is required to overturn the presumption of regularity in official actions.

Because the Youngs neither offered specific examples of omitted statements nor sought formal correction under N.D.R.App.P. 10(h), the presumption controlled and the Court accepted the transcript as accurate.

8. Appellate Motions – N.D.R.App.P. 27(d)

On the issue of the timeliness of MidFirst’s brief, the Court references:

  • N.D.R.App.P. 27(d): authorizes a single justice of the Supreme Court to entertain and dispose of motions under the appellate rules, and permits the moving party to request reconsideration by the full Court.

Because Chief Justice Jensen had already denied the Youngs’ motion to strike MidFirst’s brief, and because the Youngs did not request full-Court reconsideration, the Supreme Court refused to revisit that decision indirectly through the merits brief.

9. Res Judicata – Young v. Midland Mortg.

The Court agreed with the district court that the Youngs’ FDCPA and FCRA claims were barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), based on:

  • Young v. Midland Mortg., No. 3:23‑cv‑119, 2023 WL 8582604 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8567154 (D.N.D. Dec. 11, 2023).

Though the North Dakota Supreme Court does not elaborate on the federal case’s details, it accepts the district court’s determination that those federal statutory claims had already been litigated and resolved, preventing relitigation in this state foreclosure action.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Summary Judgment Framework

The Court applies a standard summary judgment framework (citing Kulczyk v. Tioga Ready Mix Co., 2017 ND 218, ¶ 9, 902 N.W.2d 485):

  • Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
  • The moving party must demonstrate both:
    • Absence of material factual disputes, and
    • Legal entitlement to judgment.
  • The Supreme Court reviews summary judgment de novo on the record.

The key move in the Court’s reasoning is to treat the Youngs’ central factual contention—whether the assignment was forged or robo-signed—as legally irrelevant to their claims, because they lack standing to challenge the assignment. If the alleged irregularity is irrelevant as a matter of law, then no “genuine issue of material fact” exists.

2. Standing Analysis and Its Consequences

The Court’s standing analysis proceeds in a few steps:

  1. Identify the alleged injury: The Youngs claimed injury from an allegedly fraudulent mortgage assignment.
  2. Ask whether this injury affects their own legal rights:
    • The assignment is a contract between an assignor and assignee (MidFirst).
    • The Youngs, as borrowers, are not parties to that assignment.
  3. Apply N.D.C.C. § 9‑03‑08:
    • Fraud affecting consent to a contract gives a party to that contract a voidable consent claim.
    • Nonparties, such as the borrowers, have no legally protected interest in the integrity of that separate contract between other parties.
  4. Conclude no standing:
    • Because they were not parties to the assignment, the Youngs had no cognizable legal injury stemming from alleged fraud in that assignment.
    • Thus they lack standing to sue on that theory.

This reasoning renders the Youngs’ handwriting expert affidavits irrelevant to the question of summary judgment. Even if every factual assertion about forgery or robo-signing were true, it would not give them a legally cognizable claim. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

3. Independent Basis for MidFirst’s Foreclosure Right

The Court then strengthens its conclusion by emphasizing a separate, independent basis for MidFirst’s foreclosure rights:

  • MidFirst holds the promissory note executed by the Youngs.
  • Under N.D.C.C. § 35‑03‑01.2(7), the mortgage follows the note as a matter of law.
  • Under Bray and general principles, the holder of the note may enforce the mortgage through foreclosure.
  • The record shows no violation by MidFirst of the terms of the mortgage or relevant law in its foreclosure process.

Thus, even if the assignment were defective, MidFirst’s status as note holder alone is enough to sustain its foreclosure rights. The assignment issue is effectively a red herring from the perspective of the borrower’s defenses.

4. Judicial Bias and Management of Pro Se Litigation

On bias, the Court undertakes a two-part analysis:

  1. Review the specific conduct alleged:
    • The judge asked whether Mr. Young intended to obtain an attorney and recommended he do so.
    • The judge insisted that, for a sanctions motion, Ms. Young identify the specific portion of Rule 11 being invoked and then granted a recess to allow them time to do so.
  2. Evaluate under the high standard for bias:
    • The Court reiterates that bias is not shown by mere dissatisfaction, impatience, or strict enforcement of procedural rules.
    • Here, the judge’s comments were either:
      • Designed to help the unrepresented litigants (suggesting counsel and giving them extra time), or
      • Normal judicial efforts to ensure that motions are grounded in the rules.

Accordingly, the Court finds no bias and notes the Youngs failed to meet the rigorous standard for overturning a judgment on that ground.

5. Audio Recordings: Misapplication of Rules 40 and 41

The Court’s reasoning on the audio issue is doctrinally significant:

  • The district court relied solely on the proposition that the transcript is the official record (Admin. R. 40(3)) to deny the request for audio.
  • The Supreme Court highlights that this is only half of the picture:
    • While transcripts are the official record, Admin. R. 40(2)(a) explicitly contemplates parties’ access to audio recordings.
    • Access may be limited under Admin. R. 41, but only when the court issues a restriction order consistent with Rule 41(4)(a).
    • The district court never engaged in that analysis, nor did it issue a restriction order addressing the factors in 41(4)(a)(3).

Thus:

  • The district court misapplied the law by treating the “official record” rule as if it implied that audio is non-accessible.
  • This misapplication constituted an abuse of discretion.

Yet, because:

  • The alleged missing statements were not specified,
  • No Rule 10(h) motion was filed to correct the record, and
  • Even a harsher judicial tone on audio would not have met the high bar for bias,

the Court held that this abuse of discretion was harmless.

6. Federal Statutory Claims and Res Judicata

For the FDCPA and FCRA claims, the Court defers to the district court’s conclusion that they were barred by res judicata due to prior federal litigation. The essential logic of res judicata is:

  • Once a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment on the merits on a claim between the same parties (or those in privity),
  • The parties cannot relitigate that claim or any other claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that was or could have been raised in the prior action.

With respect to the RESPA claim, the Court endorses the district court’s conclusion that the Youngs failed to prove actual damages, a necessary element of a private RESPA action. Without evidence of concrete financial loss or demonstrable harm attributable to a RESPA violation, the claim fails.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Foreclosure Litigation and “Robo-Signing” Challenges in North Dakota

This decision carries substantial implications for foreclosure defense strategies in North Dakota:

  • The Court’s holding that mortgagors lack standing to challenge mortgage assignments where they are not parties to the assignment sharply limits “robo-signing” or forgery-based attacks on assignments as a defense to foreclosure.
  • Borrowers can no longer rely on allegations of defect in the assignment itself—no matter how serious—to forestall foreclosure unless they can link those defects to a direct, legally cognizable injury to their own rights.
  • This substantially aligns North Dakota with the prevailing rule in many federal and state courts, reducing uncertainty and discouraging assignment-based collateral attacks.

In practical terms, foreclosure defense in North Dakota will have to focus on:

  • Substantive defenses relating to:
    • Payment disputes,
    • Compliance with contractual notice and cure provisions,
    • Compliance with statutory foreclosure requirements,
    • Loan origination issues that directly involve the borrower (e.g., misrepresentation at loan inception).
  • Questions about who holds the note, rather than technical objections to assignments that do not affect the borrower’s obligations.

2. Clarifying the “Mortgage Follows the Note” Principle

By invoking N.D.C.C. § 35‑03‑01.2(7), the Court reaffirms that ownership of the mortgage is tied to ownership of the note. This has several consequences:

  • Challenges to standing to foreclose that rely solely on alleged irregularities in the recorded assignment will often fail if the foreclosing party can show it holds the note.
  • Real-party-in-interest disputes in foreclosure actions are refocused on the status of the note (e.g., possession, endorsement, allonge) rather than on recorded assignment chains.
  • Courts and litigants alike may place less emphasis on the formalities of assignment documents when the note-holder’s identity is clear and undisputed.

3. Access to Court Audio and Open Justice in North Dakota

The decision significantly clarifies North Dakota law on access to audio recordings of court proceedings:

  • It cements the principle that:
    • Even though transcripts are the official record,
    • Audio recordings are court records presumptively open to parties under Admin. R. 40(2)(a) and 41(3)(a).
  • A trial court may restrict access to audio only via a proper order under Admin. R. 41(4)(a), which must:
    • Be case-specific, and
    • Address the specific considerations listed in Rule 41(4)(a)(3).
  • Simply stating that the transcript is the official record is not a legally sufficient reason to deny audio access.

This has broader implications:

  • Parties who suspect transcription errors or who seek to understand tone and context now have stronger support for accessing recordings.
  • Court administrators and judges must be careful to comply with Rules 40 and 41 when considering limitations on public or party access to audio.
  • The decision reinforces North Dakota courts’ transparency obligations and provides clearer roadmap for litigants seeking audio access, particularly when pursuing transcript corrections under N.D.R.App.P. 10(h).

4. Treatment of Self-Represented Litigants

The Court’s discussion of bias and the judge’s interactions with the Youngs offers important guidance:

  • Courts may, and often should, encourage pro se litigants to seek legal counsel, particularly in complex matters like foreclosure. Doing so does not demonstrate bias.
  • Judges remain entitled—indeed, obligated—to require compliance with procedural rules, including asking self-represented parties to identify precise rule citations supporting motions like sanctions.
  • Reasonable accommodations, such as granting a recess to allow a pro se party to locate and understand relevant rules, are consistent with fair, impartial adjudication.
  • Allegations of bias must rest on more than subjective perceptions of unfairness or frustration with procedural requirements.

For self-represented litigants, this decision underscores:

  • The importance of understanding procedural rules and seeking legal assistance when possible.
  • The difficulty of overturning judgments based on perceived judicial hostility or tone absent concrete evidence of prejudgment or improper motive.

5. Enforcement of Federal Consumer-Protection Judgments in Parallel State Actions

Through its brief treatment of the FDCPA/FCRA res judicata issue, the Court confirms that:

  • Federal court judgments on consumer protection claims bind parties in subsequent state-court proceedings under ordinary claim-preclusion principles.
  • Borrowers cannot repackage or relitigate the same federal statutory claims in a state foreclosure case after having had their day in federal court.

This encourages:

  • Finality in consumer-protection litigation and prevents iterative, parallel attacks on lenders across different forums.
  • Careful strategic planning by borrowers and their counsel when choosing where and how to litigate FDCPA, FCRA, and RESPA claims.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Standing

Standing is a threshold requirement to bring a lawsuit or a particular claim. To have standing, a person must:

  • Show they suffered or will suffer a concrete injury (not just a generalized grievance).
  • Show that the injury is traceable to the challenged action.
  • Show that the court can provide a remedy (like damages or an injunction).

In MidFirst Bank v. Young, the key problem was that the Youngs tried to complain about a contract (the assignment) between other parties. Because they were not parties to that contract, they could not show that the alleged fraud in that contract injured a legal right of their own.

2. Fraud in a Contract – N.D.C.C. § 9‑03‑08

Under N.D.C.C. § 9‑03‑08, consent to a contract is not real (and is therefore voidable) when obtained through:

  • Fraud,
  • Mistake,
  • Duress,
  • Menace, or
  • Undue influence.

However, only parties to the contract can usually claim that their consent was defective. Outsiders to the contract normally have no right to sue for fraud in the making or execution of that contract.

3. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a procedure that allows a court to decide a case without trial when:

  • There is no genuine dispute of material fact, and
  • One party is entitled to win as a matter of law.

A “material fact” is one that could affect the outcome under the law. If, even assuming all facts in favor of the non-moving party, that party still cannot win legally (as here, due to lack of standing), then summary judgment is appropriate.

4. “Mortgage Follows the Note”

The rule that the “mortgage follows the note” means:

  • The promissory note is the borrower’s primary promise to repay.
  • The mortgage is security for that promise—giving the lender rights in the property if the borrower defaults.
  • When the note is transferred to a new holder, the mortgage usually automatically follows, even if paperwork for the mortgage assignment is imperfect.

Thus, the identity of the note holder is usually more important legally than the precise chain of recorded mortgage assignments.

5. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)

Res judicata (claim preclusion) prevents parties from relitigating:

  • The same claim, or
  • Any other claim that could have been brought,

when:

  • There has been a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  • The same parties (or those in privity) are involved.

In this case, because the Youngs previously litigated FDCPA and FCRA claims in federal court, they were barred from bringing the same (or closely related) claims in state court later.

6. Harmless Error

Not every mistake by a trial court justifies reversal. Under the harmless error doctrine:

  • An error is considered harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the case or the substantial rights of a party.

Here, the denial of audio recordings was an error, but the evidence did not show it changed the outcome or prevented the Youngs from effectively asserting their rights. Therefore, the Supreme Court treated it as harmless.

7. Judicial Bias

To prove judicial bias, a party must do more than show that:

  • The judge was impatient,
  • Asked difficult questions,
  • Suggested obtaining counsel, or
  • Strictly enforced rules.

They must show:

  • A deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible, or
  • Some objective evidence that the judge had prejudged the case or was acting on improper motives.

This is a very demanding standard, rarely met.

8. Official Record vs. Access to Recordings

The distinction between the official record and access to other versions of that record is important:

  • The official record is the authoritative version used by courts to decide cases (in North Dakota, the transcript of proceedings).
  • But parties may still access other records, like audio recordings, for various legitimate purposes:
    • Checking transcript accuracy,
    • Understanding tone and context,
    • Preparing post-judgment or appellate strategies.
  • Access can be restricted, but only consistent with open-courts principles and specific administrative rules.

VI. Conclusion

MidFirst Bank v. Young is a consequential decision that clarifies and consolidates North Dakota law on several fronts.

First, the Court squarely holds that mortgagors lack standing to challenge the validity of a mortgage assignment based on alleged fraud when they are not parties to that assignment. This ruling effectively curtails “robo-signing” and forgery-based assignment challenges as foreclosure defenses by borrowers, aligning North Dakota with the majority of jurisdictions and emphasizing that the note holder’s identity and rights are central to foreclosure.

Second, the Court sharpens the doctrinal connection between the note and the mortgage under N.D.C.C. § 35‑03‑01.2(7): ownership of the mortgage passes with ownership of the note. Foreclosure rights are thereby grounded firmly in note ownership, not in technical disputes over assignment paperwork where the borrower is a nonparty.

Third, the decision serves as a strong reaffirmation of the presumption of open courts and access to court records. Although the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Youngs access to audio recordings without a Rule 41-based analysis, the Supreme Court clarified that:

  • Parties may obtain audio recordings of their proceedings,
  • Restrictions must be case-specific and grounded in Rule 41(4)(a), and
  • The “official record” status of transcripts does not justify blanket denial of audio access.

Fourth, the Court’s treatment of judicial bias and pro se litigants confirms that:

  • Judges may encourage parties to obtain counsel,
  • May insist on procedural compliance, and
  • May display some degree of impatience or firmness without crossing into impermissible bias.

Finally, the decision underscores the binding effect of prior federal judgments on related federal-law claims in state foreclosure actions and reiterates the necessity of proving actual damages in RESPA claims.

In the broader legal landscape, MidFirst Bank v. Young will likely stand as a key North Dakota precedent on:

  • Limiting borrowers’ standing to attack mortgage assignments,
  • Emphasizing the centrality of the note in foreclosure litigation, and
  • Reinforcing transparency and procedural rigor in North Dakota courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota

Judge(s)

Tufte, Jerod E.

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