MFIJ v. Knudsen:
Requiring a Substantive Written Determination Before the Attorney General May Rewrite Montana Ballot Statements

I. Introduction

In Montanans for Fair and Impartial Judges & Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen, 2025 MT 285, the Montana Supreme Court issued a significant opinion clarifying the limits of the Attorney General’s authority over ballot language and the scope of who may invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction under Montana’s ballot initiative statutes.

The case arose from a dispute over the “statement of purpose and implication” (hereafter “Statement”) drafted for Constitutional Initiative 131 (CI‑131), a proposed constitutional amendment that would enshrine nonpartisan elections for Montana Supreme Court justices and district court judges in the state constitution. Petitioners Montanans for Fair and Impartial Judges (MFIJ) and Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC) challenged the Attorney General’s decision to discard MFIJ’s proposed Statement and substitute his own version.

The decision establishes or sharpens several important principles in Montana election and administrative law:

Only the statutory “proponent” of a specific ballot issue may bring an original proceeding under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, to challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statements.
A proponent does not waive its statutory right to judicial review of ballot statements merely by initially “accepting” the Attorney General’s revision.
Most importantly, the Attorney General may not rewrite a proponent’s Statement simply to “improve” or “better explain” it. Under § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA, he must first determine in writing that the Statement clearly does not comply with the specific statutory criteria in § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, and must articulate how. A conclusory declaration of noncompliance is not enough.
When the Attorney General exceeds his statutory authority, the Court may certify the proponent’s own Statement if it independently satisfies § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.

This opinion therefore both constrains the Attorney General’s discretion over ballot text and reinforces the statutory framework governing Montana’s initiative process, with implications for future initiative proponents, opponents, and for the Attorney General’s office itself.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and the Proposed Initiative

CI‑131 would make a minimal but important textual addition to Article VII, Section 8(1) of the Montana Constitution. As proposed, the provision would read (added language in context): “Supreme court justices and district court judges shall be elected in nonpartisan elections by the qualified electors as provided by law.”

MFIJ submitted CI‑131 and its proposed ballot statements to the Secretary of State on July 29, 2025. After statutory review by the Legislative Services Division, the proposal went to the Attorney General for legal sufficiency review under § 13‑27‑226, MCA.

MFIJ proposed the following Statement of purpose and implication:

This constitutional initiative would require that Montana Supreme Court and district court elections remain nonpartisan. Since 1935, state law has required that these elections be held without political party affiliation. This amendment would add that rule to the Montana Constitution, so it could only be changed by another constitutional amendment approved by voters.

The Attorney General found CI‑131 legally sufficient but rejected this Statement. He substituted the following revised Statement:

CI‑[131], if passed, mandates Montana supreme court and district court elections be non‑partisan. A non‑partisan election prohibits labeling candidates on the ballot according to the political party the candidate aligns with including labels like independent.

MFIJ and MNC challenged the Attorney General’s revision in an original proceeding under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, contending that (1) the Attorney General lacked authority to rewrite the Statement because he never made the required written determination of noncompliance with § 13‑27‑212, MCA, and (2) his substituted Statement was misleading and prejudicial. They also asked the Court to certify MFIJ’s original Statement.

B. Issues Presented

The Court framed four questions:

Is Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC) a proper party to this original proceeding?
Did MFIJ’s apparent acceptance of the Attorney General’s revised Statement foreclose judicial review?
Did the Attorney General have authority to revise the Statement under § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA?
Should the Court certify MFIJ’s proposed Statement to the Secretary of State?

C. Holdings

MNC is not a proper party. The statutory cause of action in § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, is available only to the “proponents” of the specific ballot issue in question, as defined in §§ 13‑27‑214 and ‑218, MCA. MNC, which merely had a generalized interest in similar initiatives, lacked standing in this original proceeding and was dismissed.
MFIJ did not waive its statutory right to review. An email from MFIJ’s treasurer stating that MFIJ “accepts” the Attorney General’s new Statement did not waive or foreclose MFIJ’s statutory right to bring an original proceeding under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, especially where the petition was timely filed.
The Attorney General exceeded his authority in revising the Statement. Under § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA, the Attorney General may rewrite a proponent’s Statement only after he has determined in writing that the Statement does not comply with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA. A conclusory assertion that the Statement “fails to comply” is insufficient, particularly where the Attorney General’s stated rationale was merely to “improve readability” and “explain” the measure. He identified no statutory deficiency (inaccuracy, partiality, lack of clarity, argumentativeness, or prejudice) at the time of his decision.
The Court certified MFIJ’s original Statement. Independently reviewing MFIJ’s Statement under § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, and guided by its recent decision in Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen, 2025 MT 267, the Court held that MFIJ’s Statement is true, impartial, written in plain, easily understood language, and non‑argumentative. The Court therefore certified it to the Secretary of State under § 13‑27‑605(3)(c)(ii), MCA.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Statutory Framework: §§ 13‑27‑212, ‑214, ‑218, ‑226, and ‑605, MCA

The opinion turns heavily on the interlocking provisions of Montana’s ballot initiative statutes:

§ 13‑27‑212(1), MCA – Defines the substantive standard for a Statement of purpose and implication:
- It must express a “true and impartial explanation” of the proposal;
- It must be in “plain, easily understood language”; and
- It must not be “argumentative or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue.”
§§ 13‑27‑214, ‑218, MCA – Identify and define the “proponent” for a ballot measure and assign the role of submitting the initiative and draft ballot statements to the Secretary of State.
§ 13‑27‑226(3)(a), (3)(c), MCA – Governs the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency review:
- After a finding of legal sufficiency, the Attorney General must review the ballot statements to determine if they comply with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.
- If he determines, in writing, that the Statement does not comply, he “shall prepare a statement” that does.
- § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA, crucially requires that the Attorney General’s authority to rewrite is triggered only where the original Statement “clearly does not comply with the relevant requirements” of § 13‑27‑226(3)(a), MCA.
§ 13‑27‑605(1), (2), (3)(c)(ii), MCA – Establishes original proceedings before the Supreme Court:
- Subsection (1) gives “the proponents of a statewide ballot issue” the right to file an original proceeding to challenge the adequacy of the Attorney General’s ballot statements.
- Subsection (2) separately allows “opponents” to challenge the Attorney General’s statements.
- Subsection (3)(c)(ii) authorizes the Court to certify ballot statements that it finds meet the requirements of § 13‑27‑212, MCA.

The Court’s reasoning is in large part an exercise in close statutory reading: who may sue, under what circumstances the Attorney General may alter proponents’ language, and what role the Supreme Court plays as the final arbiter of ballot statement adequacy.

2. Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 2010 MT 79, 356 Mont. 41, 230 P.3d 808

MNC relied on Aspen Trails Ranch to argue that, because at least one plaintiff (MFIJ) clearly possessed standing, the case could proceed without dismissing MNC. In Aspen Trails Ranch, the Court held that a district court civil action need not be dismissed if at least one identically aligned plaintiff has standing, even if others do not.

The Court carefully distinguished that principle. Aspen Trails Ranch addressed Article III standing and prudential considerations in an ordinary civil case. It did not expand the class of parties who are given a statutory cause of action. In contrast, proceedings under § 13‑27‑605, MCA, are “creatures of statute,” and the Legislature has expressly limited who may invoke them. Thus, the presence of one proper proponent-plaintiff (MFIJ) did not confer statutory standing on another organization (MNC) that fell outside the class to whom § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, grants a cause of action.

3. Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen (MSRR), 2024 MT 67

MSRR v. Knudsen is the central precedent on the Attorney General’s authority to rewrite Statements. There, the Attorney General rejected MSRR’s proposed Statement for a reproductive rights initiative and prepared his own. In his legal sufficiency memorandum, he set forth three concrete reasons why MSRR’s Statement did not comply with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, including failures to describe how the initiative would change current law, to define key terms, and to identify the initiative’s effect on certain state enforcement powers.

In MSRR:

The Court affirmed that the Attorney General has the authority to determine whether a proponent’s Statement meets § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, and, if not, to prepare a compliant alternative (§ 13‑27‑226(3)(a), (c), MCA).
The Court ultimately rejected the Attorney General’s revised statement as failing its own statutory duties, but it also agreed that the proponent’s original Statement was deficient in some respects.
Critically, the Attorney General in that case made a substantive written determination identifying how the proponent’s statement violated § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.

In MFIJ’s case, the Attorney General argued that MSRR rejected any notion of a “necessary threshold” before rewriting a Statement. The Court flatly rejected that reading. It clarified that MSRR rejected only the specific proponent’s claim that their own statement “simply” could not be seen as noncompliant; it did not hold that no threshold exists. Here, the Court expressly identified the threshold: a written determination that the Statement does not meet the criteria in § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, specifying how.

4. Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen, 2025 MT 267

This companion case, decided shortly before MFIJ, involved a similar initiative (CI‑132) by Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC), also addressing nonpartisan judicial elections. MNC proposed a concise, one‑sentence Statement:

“CI‑[132] amends the Montana Constitution to require that judicial elections remain nonpartisan.”

In that case:

The Court again rejected the Attorney General’s revised statement as noncompliant with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.
It found MNC’s one‑sentence Statement to be fully compliant with the statute and certified it.

The Court uses Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts in MFIJ’s case as a benchmark: if MNC’s shorter, similar Statement passes statutory muster, then MFIJ’s slightly more detailed Statement—which describes current law and clarifies the effect of constitutionalizing that rule—also passes.

5. Montanans Against Tax Hikes v. State, 2018 MT 201, 392 Mont. 344, 423 P.3d 1078, and Harper v. Greeley, 234 Mont. 259, 763 P.2d 650 (1988)

The Court invokes these decisions for two key propositions about ballot language:

Voter comprehension standard. Ballot statements must identify the measure so that a Montana voter, drawing on both official and unofficial sources of information, can exercise informed political judgment.
No “better statement” test. The Court will not invalidate a ballot statement merely because a superior version could be written.

This principle undercuts the Attorney General’s argument that he could rewrite MFIJ’s Statement simply to “improve readability” or offer more explanation. The statutory scheme requires adequacy, not maximal optimization, and the Attorney General’s role is limited to correcting noncompliance—not to perfecting the proponent’s language.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Proper Parties and Statutory Standing: Limiting Access to § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA

The first issue was whether MNC could be a co‑petitioner under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA. MNC argued it had a “constitutionally and statutorily protected interest” because:

It was the proponent of other initiatives concerning nonpartisan judicial elections; and
It shared with MFIJ a policy interest in ensuring clear, neutral Statements and preventing the Attorney General from rewriting Statements without the required written justification.

The Court held that such generalized or parallel interests are legally insufficient here. The key points in its reasoning:

Textual limitation. § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, grants the cause of action specifically to “the proponents of a statewide ballot issue” who challenge the ballot statements “approved by the attorney general.” Read in conjunction with §§ 13‑27‑214 and ‑218, MCA, this refers to the specific proponent that submitted that specific measure and statements to the Secretary of State.
No extension to aligned organizations. The statute does not provide a mechanism for organizations aligned with the proponents (but not themselves designated as proponents of that measure) to seek relief under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA.
Opponents vs. allied proponents. The Legislature explicitly created a separate mechanism for “opponents” to challenge the Attorney General’s statements (§ 13‑27‑605(2), MCA). The absence of a similar mechanism for co‑supporters reinforces the conclusion that allied organizations like MNC are excluded.
Statutory original jurisdiction. Because original proceedings under § 13‑27‑605, MCA, are purely statutory, the Court emphasizes it must respect legislative limits on who may invoke them. General standing principles do not override explicit statutory restrictions.

The Court thus dismisses MNC as a party but allows the case to proceed solely on MFIJ’s petition.

2. Effect of MFIJ’s “Acceptance” of the Attorney General’s Revised Statement

The Attorney General argued that MFIJ had “accepted” his revised Statement through a September 25, 2025 email from MFIJ’s treasurer to the Secretary of State stating that MFIJ “accepts the Montana Attorney General’s new statement of purpose and implication.” On that basis, the Secretary of State had prepared and circulated sample petitions containing the revised Statement.

While acknowledging that the email showed initial acquiescence, the Court held:

The statute, § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, expressly preserves the proponent’s right to challenge the Attorney General’s approved Statements within the statutory timeframe.
MFIJ complied with all time requirements; therefore, the statutory right was properly invoked.
The Attorney General identified no authority stating that informal “acceptance” of revised ballot language operates as a waiver or estoppel against the exercise of this statutory right.

The Court therefore treats the email as, at most, contextual background and makes clear that proponents retain their statutory right to judicial review even after such communications, unless the Legislature or controlling precedent says otherwise—which it does not.

3. The Core Issue: Limits on the Attorney General’s Authority to Rewrite Statements

a. The statutory “threshold” requirement

The central legal question was whether the Attorney General validly invoked § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA, to rewrite MFIJ’s Statement. The Court focuses on the statutory condition:

If the attorney general determines in writing that the statement of purpose and implication does not comply with 13‑27‑212… the attorney general shall prepare a statement that complies… (§ 13‑27‑226(3)(a), (3)(c), MCA; paraphrased)

And, as emphasized in the opinion, § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA, characterizes the Attorney General’s rewriting authority as contingent on a determination that the original statement “clearly does not comply with the relevant requirements.”

Those requirements are found in § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA:

The statement must be true and impartial;
It must be in plain, easily understood language;
It must not be argumentative or prejudicial.

The Court clarifies that the “necessary threshold” is not whether the Attorney General personally believes he can draft a better statement. Instead, it is whether he has determined — and documented in writing at the time of his decision — that the proponent’s Statement violates one or more of these statutory criteria.

b. What the Attorney General did (and did not) do

In his legal sufficiency memorandum, the Attorney General:

Stated, in a conclusory fashion, that MFIJ’s proposed Statement “fails to comply” with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA; and
Said he was submitting a new Statement “to improve readability, explain that [CI‑131] imposes a new constitutional requirement, and the practical implication to voters on seeing a non-partisan ballot versus a partisan ballot.”

In later litigation, he argued that this was sufficient to satisfy the “written determination” requirement and that no “magic words” were necessary.

The Court disagreed on two levels:

Substantive deficiency of the determination itself. The memorandum did not identify which element of § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, was violated, nor did it explain how the Statement was inaccurate, partial, unclear, argumentative, or prejudicial. Merely asserting noncompliance is circular and fails to meet the statutory requirement of a meaningful “determination in writing.”
Improper rationale for rewriting. The reasons actually given— improving readability and explaining “practical implications”—do not correspond to any statutory deficiency. They indicate an attempt to optimize language and contextual explanation, rather than to cure a violation of § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA. The Attorney General’s authority does not extend to rewriting statements for improvement alone.

The Court underscores that the written determination must be more than a formulaic conclusion. Referring back to MSRR, where the Attorney General provided concrete, contemporaneous reasons explaining how the proponent’s statement was deficient, the Court finds a clear contrast: in MFIJ’s case, no such rationale was articulated at the time of the decision.

c. The Court’s articulation of the new/clarified rule

The Court crystallizes a key point of law:

A conclusory assertion that a proponent’s Statement “fails to comply” with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, is inadequate under § 13‑27‑226(3)(c), MCA.
To “determine[] in writing” that a Statement does not comply, the Attorney General must:
- Identify which statutory criterion(s) is violated (truth, impartiality, clarity, non‑argumentativeness, non‑prejudice); and
- Explain the basis for that conclusion in the written record contemporaneous with the decision.
Only then is the Attorney General empowered to discard the proponent’s Statement and draft a substitute.

The Court therefore concludes the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to revise MFIJ’s Statement and that his substituted Statement is legally unauthorized, regardless of its content.

4. Certification of MFIJ’s Statement

Having determined that the Attorney General exceeded his authority, the Court next addresses whether to certify MFIJ’s Statement itself. Under § 13‑27‑605(3)(c)(ii), MCA, the Court must certify any Statement that it finds compliant with § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.

The Court’s reasoning is straightforward:

In Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen, the Court approved an even more concise Statement (“CI‑[132] amends the Montana Constitution to require that judicial elections remain nonpartisan.”) as statutorily sufficient.
MFIJ’s Statement uses similar neutral language and:
- Accurately states that CI‑131 would require Supreme Court and district court elections to remain nonpartisan;
- Correctly notes that since 1935, Montana law has required those elections to be held without party affiliation; and
- Accurately explains that constitutionalizing this rule would make future changes possible only by constitutional amendment.
The language is clear, easily understood, and non‑argumentative. It does not contain emotional language, exhortations, or value-laden claims.

The Court explicitly finds that the Statement:

“expresses the true and impartial explanation of CI‑131 in plain, easily understood language and is not argumentative or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue.”

Accordingly, the Court certifies the following Statement to the Secretary of State:

This constitutional initiative would require that Montana Supreme Court and district court elections remain nonpartisan. Since 1935, state law has required that these elections be held without political party affiliation. This amendment would add that rule to the Montana Constitution, so it could only be changed by another constitutional amendment approved by voters.

C. Likely Impact of the Decision

1. Constraining the Attorney General’s Discretion Over Ballot Language

The most immediate impact is a firm constraint on how freely the Attorney General may alter proponents’ Statements. The opinion:

Reinforces that the Attorney General’s role is corrective, not creative. He is a reviewer of statutory compliance, not a co-author or editor-in-chief of ballot language.
Requires the Attorney General’s office to produce a contemporaneous written analysis whenever it rejects proponents’ Statements—identifying specific statutory deficiencies and reasoning.
Establishes that policy preferences or stylistic preferences cannot justify rewriting a Statement; only violations of § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, can.

In practical terms, this will likely:

Increase the care with which the Attorney General’s office documents its reasons when rejecting ballot statements;
Reduce the frequency of unilateral rewrites, as such actions now carry a higher litigation risk if the written record lacks specificity; and
Empower initiative proponents to defend their own neutral, accurate wording against unwarranted alteration.

2. Clarifying Who May Litigate Ballot Statement Disputes

The decision clarifies the procedural landscape for challenges to ballot statements:

Proponents of a specific measure may challenge the Attorney General’s statements as proponents under § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA.
Opponents of that measure may challenge them under § 13‑27‑605(2), MCA.
Organizations aligned with proponents but not designated as the measure’s “proponent” cannot use § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, as plaintiffs, although they might still participate as amici or through other procedural avenues where allowed.

For advocacy coalitions, this means structuring campaigns with clear awareness of which entity is the formal “proponent” for statutory purposes, as only that entity will be able to directly invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction as a supporter of the measure.

3. Stability and Predictability in the Ballot Initiative Process

Together with MSRR and Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts, this case contributes to a growing body of law that:

Delineates clear, predictable standards for what ballot Statements must contain and how they are evaluated;
Limits opportunities for partisan manipulation of ballot language by state officials; and
Reassures both voters and proponents that ballot question wording will be driven primarily by neutral statutory criteria rather than political strategy.

Because ballot statements shape voters’ first and often primary exposure to a measure at the polls, these decisions have structural importance for Montana’s system of direct democracy.

4. Specific Effects on Judicial Election Initiatives

On the substantive policy question—nonpartisan judicial elections—this opinion, combined with Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts, effectively ensures that:

Voters will see relatively straightforward, neutral descriptions of initiatives proposing to entrench or maintain nonpartisan judicial elections in the state constitution.
The Attorney General cannot reframe such initiatives by introducing his own language about “practical implications” (e.g., emphasizing party labels or their prohibition) unless he can first show that the proponents’ own explanations fall short of statutory standards.

While the opinion does not weigh in on the merits of nonpartisan versus partisan judicial elections, it removes a potentially powerful tool by which the executive branch could have influenced public perception of such reforms via ballot text.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a “Statement of Purpose and Implication”?

Montana requires that statewide ballot measures include a short explanation on the petition (and ultimately on the ballot) that tells voters:

What the measure does (its “purpose”); and
What it means in practice (its “implication”).

By law, this explanation must:

Be accurate and neutral (“true and impartial”);
Use everyday, understandable language (no legal jargon or confusion); and
Refrain from arguing for or against the measure (no slogans, scare language, or persuasion).

The purpose is to give every voter a fair, digestible statement of what they are actually voting on.

2. Who Is a “Proponent” and Why Does it Matter?

In Montana’s initiative process, the proponent is the person or organization that:

Drafts and submits the initiative text and proposed ballot statements to the Secretary of State;
Communicates with the Legislative Services Division and other officials as the proposal moves through the statutory review process.

Being the “proponent” matters because:

Only the proponent may use § 13‑27‑605(1), MCA, to challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statements as a supporter of the measure.
Other groups that support the measure but are not the formal “proponent” cannot directly bring such a challenge under that subsection, though they might have other ways to participate (e.g., as amici).

3. What Is an “Original Proceeding” Before the Supreme Court?

An original proceeding means the case starts directly in the Montana Supreme Court, rather than moving up from a district court. The Legislature sometimes assigns the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over certain issues that require swift or authoritative resolution, including:

Disputes over ballot statements under § 13‑27‑605, MCA;
Other election-related questions where time is short and statewide uniformity is critical.

Because this jurisdiction is “a creature of statute,” the Court insists it can only be invoked by the parties and in the manner the statute prescribes—hence the careful limitation to “proponents” (and separately, “opponents”) as defined by law.

4. “Determined in Writing” – What Does That Really Require?

The phrase “determines in writing” appears simple but is crucial here. The Court interprets it to mean that, before the Attorney General can rewrite a Statement, he must:

Make a recorded, contemporaneous decision; and
Provide substantive reasons in that written record explaining why the proponent’s Statement fails the statute’s requirements (e.g., why it is inaccurate, biased, unclear, or argumentative).

A mere statement that “it doesn’t comply” is circular and insufficient. The determination must allow the Court (and the public) to see what specifically is wrong and why it violates § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA.

V. Conclusion

MFIJ v. Knudsen is a pivotal decision in Montana’s ballot initiative jurisprudence. It sharpens previously announced principles in MSRR and Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts and adds important new clarity.

The key takeaways are:

Only the statutory “proponent” of a specific ballot issue (and, in a separate subsection, opponents) may invoke the Montana Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under § 13‑27‑605, MCA, to challenge ballot statements.
Informal acceptance of the Attorney General’s revised Statement does not waive the proponent’s statutory right to later seek judicial review within the statutory deadline.
The Attorney General’s authority to rewrite a Statement is strictly conditioned on a substantive written determination that the proponent’s Statement fails one or more specific statutory criteria (truth, impartiality, clarity, non‑argumentativeness, non‑prejudice). A conclusory label of “noncompliant” is not sufficient.
The Attorney General cannot rewrite Statements simply to “improve” them or to supply additional explanation; his role is to ensure statutory adequacy, not to perfect or reframe proponents’ messaging.
Where the Attorney General exceeds his authority, the Court itself will review the proponent’s language and, if it meets § 13‑27‑212(1), MCA, certify that Statement to the Secretary of State, as it did with MFIJ’s explanation of CI‑131.

By insisting on rigor in the Attorney General’s written determinations and by limiting who can invoke original jurisdiction, the Court reinforces both the integrity of Montana’s direct-democracy mechanisms and the rule of law governing the initiative process. Proponents now have clearer protections for their neutral, accurate ballot language; the Attorney General has clearer constraints; and voters are better ensured of receiving fair and statutorily compliant explanations of the measures on which they are asked to decide.

MFIJ v. Knudsen: Requiring a Substantive Written Determination Before the Attorney General May Rewrite Montana Ballot Statements