Metellus v. Jolly (2d Cir. 2025): Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction, Judicial Immunity, and the Limits of Trademark and Copyright Claims Against State Courts

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Metellus v. Jolly, No. 24‑2546‑cv (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2025), though explicitly non‑precedential under the court’s Local Rule 32.1.1, provides a compact but instructive treatment of several recurring procedural and substantive issues:

• How to distinguish between a true lack of federal subject‑matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a viable federal claim, particularly in Lanham Act cases involving alleged trademarks in personal names.
• The scope of absolute judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity when state judicial officers are sued for money damages under federal trademark and copyright theories.
• The “use in commerce” requirement for Lanham Act infringement claims, especially when the alleged use occurs in judicial proceedings.
• The non‑copyrightability of personal names.
• The standards governing sua sponte dismissal of a paid complaint as frivolous, and the treatment of pro se litigants where there are notice defects in the magistrate judge report‑and‑recommendation (“R&R”) process.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s reasoning, situates it within existing precedent, and assesses its practical implications, particularly for pro se litigants who seek to repurpose intellectual property statutes to attack state court judgments and processes.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Parties and Claims

The plaintiff, Sam Albert Metellus, proceeding pro se, sued several Queens County Family Court judicial officers:

• Family Court Judges (including Anne‑Marie Jolly, sued “d/b/a Anne‑Marie Jolly”), and
• A support magistrate.

Metellus alleged that these judicial officers violated federal intellectual property law by using his personal name, “SAM ALBERT METELLUS,” which he claimed as a trademark, in court filings and orders without his permission. He also alluded to copyright infringement.

He sought:

• Money damages, and
• Declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at stopping or rectifying the alleged infringement by these state judicial officers.

The challenged conduct arose entirely from family court child support proceedings against Metellus—i.e., from the judges’ and magistrate’s judicial acts in adjudicating his case and issuing orders that necessarily used his name.

B. District Court Proceedings

The case was filed in the Eastern District of New York and referred to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the complaint be dismissed sua sponte:

• As frivolous, and
• Alternatively, for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

See Metellus v. Jolly, No. 23‑cv‑6147, 2024 WL 4250315 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2024).

The district judge (Gujarati, J.) adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action:

• Formally: Without prejudice for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction; and
• Substantively: Confirming that even if jurisdiction existed, the court would still dismiss on the alternative grounds articulated in the R&R (frivolousness and failure to state a claim).

A notable procedural wrinkle is that the R&R sent to Metellus was returned to the court as undeliverable. As a result, he did not file objections, and the district court reviewed the R&R only for “clear error,” rather than de novo. On appeal, Metellus asserted he never received the R&R.

C. Appeal to the Second Circuit

Metellus appealed pro se to the Second Circuit. The State, through the New York Attorney General, defended the judgment on multiple grounds:

• Lack of jurisdiction;
• Frivolousness of the complaint;
• Judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunities; and
• Failure to state a cognizable Lanham Act or copyright claim.

The Second Circuit (Livingston, C.J., Raggi and Park, JJ.) affirmed the dismissal, but with an important modification to the district court’s jurisdictional reasoning.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Subject‑matter jurisdiction existed. The district court erred in concluding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff did not allege a federally registered mark or copyright. That issue goes to the sufficiency of the claim, not to the court’s power to adjudicate.
2. Nonetheless, dismissal was proper because the complaint was frivolous and failed to state a claim.
   • Claims for money damages were barred on the face of the complaint by absolute judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.
   • Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief failed on the merits of the Lanham Act and copyright theories:
     • The judges had not “used” the claimed mark “in commerce” as required by the Lanham Act.
     • To the extent plaintiff alleged copyright infringement, a personal name is not protected expression under the Copyright Act.
3. Procedural errors below were harmless.
   • Because the R&R was returned as undeliverable, the Second Circuit declined to treat Metellus’s failure to object as a waiver of appellate review.
   • Given that circumstance, the district court should have reviewed the R&R de novo, not merely for clear error; but the appellate court’s own de novo review confirmed that sua sponte dismissal was warranted, rendering the error harmless.
4. The complaint was properly dismissed sua sponte. Even though Metellus paid the filing fee, the district court had authority to dismiss a frivolous complaint on its own motion, consistent with Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment, but clarified that the case should be understood as a dismissal for frivolousness and failure to state a claim, rather than for want of jurisdiction.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction vs. Merits in Lanham Act Claims

The district court had dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction on the ground that Metellus did not allege federal trademark registration or federal copyright protection. The Second Circuit held this was a categorical error:

“The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Metellus did not allege that he had any federally registered trademark or copyrights that would be protected by federal laws. However, the question of whether Metellus's infringement claims were based on a state or federal trademark more appropriately went to whether Metellus stated a claim rather than the court's jurisdiction.”

This distinction draws on:

• Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397 (2d Cir. 2025), which likewise addressed a personal‑name “trademark” claim and analyzed the sufficiency of the Lanham Act allegations on the merits, even where only state registration was alleged.
• Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), which emphasized the “subject‑matter jurisdiction/ingredient‑of‑claim‑for‑relief dichotomy” and cautioned courts against mislabeling substantive deficiencies as jurisdictional defects.

In other words:

• The mere fact that a plaintiff’s federal theory is weak, or fails on an element such as federal registration, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction so long as the complaint invokes federal law in a non‑frivolous way.
• The question “Is this a federally protectable mark?” is an element of a Lanham Act claim, not a condition on the court’s Article III power.

The court thus corrected the district court’s approach but affirmed on alternative grounds, illustrating the common appellate practice of “affirming on any ground supported by the record,” while also aligning the lower court with Arbaugh’s framework.

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal and Standard of Review

The Second Circuit framed the standard of review as follows:

• Dismissal for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction: reviewed de novo, citing Digitel, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 239 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2001).
• Dismissal for failure to state a claim: also reviewed de novo, citing Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2020).
• Frivolousness in a fee‑paid case: the court reiterated Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000), which held that district courts may dismiss frivolous complaints sua sponte even when the filing fee has been paid. The Second Circuit again noted that it has not resolved whether such dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, but treated the outcome as the same under either standard.

In determining frivolousness, the panel echoed the test from Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998), that a complaint may be deemed frivolous when it:

• “lacks an arguable basis in law,” or
• “a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.”

Here, the existence of judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity on the face of the complaint rendered the damages claims frivolous.

C. Judicial Immunity and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1. Absolute Judicial Immunity for Damages

The court held that Metellus’s claims for money damages against the family court judges and support magistrate were frivolous because “it is clear on the face of the complaint” that they are barred by absolute judicial immunity:

“It is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.” (citing Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Key points:

• Scope: Judicial immunity shields judges from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity—even if those acts are alleged to be wrong, malicious, or in excess of authority—so long as they are not performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
• Application here: Issuing orders, entering judgments, and using a litigant’s name in court documents are classic judicial acts performed within the jurisdiction of a family court. They are squarely protected.
• Result: Because the complaint challenged only judicial acts in ongoing or past child support proceedings, the immunity defense was dispositive on the face of the complaint.

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity for Official‑Capacity Damages Claims

The Second Circuit next confirmed that the Eleventh Amendment also barred Metellus’s damages claims to the extent the defendants were sued in their official capacities:

“As the court further reasoned, Metellus's claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. ‘The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.’” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001)).

The court then restated the core rule:

• Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity only when:
  • it expresses a clear, unequivocal intent to do so, and
  • acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.
• As relevant here, the Lanham Act does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. The court cited College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999), which specifically addressed sovereign immunity in the context of federal trademark and unfair competition claims.

Thus:

• Family court judges and magistrates, when sued in their official capacities, are treated as arms of the state.
• Absent consent or an applicable abrogation (which the Lanham Act does not supply), they cannot be sued for damages under the Lanham Act in federal court.

Combined, judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity made the damages claims not merely weak, but legal non‑starters, justifying their characterization as “frivolous.”

D. Failure to State a Claim for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

While immunities bar damages, they do not automatically bar all requests for injunctive or declaratory relief. The Second Circuit accordingly addressed the merits of Metellus’s claims for equitable relief under both the Lanham Act and copyright law.

1. Lanham Act: No “Use in Commerce”

To state a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the Second Circuit reiterated the familiar test from 1‑800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406–07 (2d Cir. 2005):

“To prevail on a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, ‘a plaintiff must establish that (1) [he] has a valid mark that is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act; and that (2) the defendant used the mark, (3) in commerce, (4) in connection with the sale . . . or advertising of goods or services, (5) without the plaintiff's consent.’”

The court focused on the third and fourth elements—use in commerce and connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services. It held:

“Here, Metellus did not plausibly allege that the defendants ‘used his claimed mark in commerce.’” (quoting Dieujuste, 125 F.4th at 400).

Critically:

• The use of a person’s name in judicial orders, opinions, or court filings is not a commercial use in the ordinary trademark sense.
• Without “use in commerce” in relation to goods or services, the Lanham Act does not apply, even assuming arguendo that “SAM ALBERT METELLUS” could be a protectable mark for some commercial context.

The Second Circuit’s reliance on Dieujuste is significant. In that case, the court addressed an analogous attempt to treat a personal name, used in a non‑commercial context, as a trademark for purposes of suing state actors. The panel treats Dieujuste as settling that these types of governmental or judicial uses are not “uses in commerce.”

2. Copyright: Names as Unprotected Facts

The opinion also addressed the implicit or explicit copyright claim:

“Moreover, to the extent that Metellus's complaint alleges copyright infringement, he failed to state a claim because ‘federal copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” not facts such as one's name.’” (quoting Dieujuste, 125 F.4th at 399, which in turn quotes 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).

Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), copyright protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” such as:

• Literary works,
• Musical works,
• Artistic works,
• Motion pictures, etc.

A personal name, standing alone, is:

• A fact or identifier, not an expressive work; and
• Well outside the scope of copyrightability absent additional original creative expression.

Thus, regardless of how strongly a person feels about their name, its mere replication in court documents cannot constitute copyright infringement.

E. Pro Se Litigants, Notice of R&R, and Waiver

The court gave careful attention to the procedural issue arising from Metellus’s failure to object to the magistrate judge’s R&R.

• The R&R was returned as undeliverable to the district court, and Metellus asserted he never received it.
• Ordinarily, under Second Circuit case law, a party’s failure to object to an R&R can result in waiver of appellate review, provided the party was properly notified of the consequences. See Small v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989).
• The Second Circuit emphasized that the waiver rule is non‑jurisdictional and can be excused “in the interest of justice,” citing Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2022).

In light of the failed service:

• The panel declined to deem appellate review waived.
• It further noted that, given this notice issue, the district court likely erred in reviewing the R&R only for clear error, instead of conducting a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s recommendations.
• However, any error was harmless, because the Second Circuit itself conducted de novo review and concluded that sua sponte dismissal was warranted. The court cited Nambiar v. C. Orthopedic Grp., 2025 WL 3007285, at *1 (2d Cir. 2025), for the harmless‑error approach to such procedural missteps.

Finally, the court reaffirmed the special solicitude owed to pro se litigants:

“Because Metellus ‘has been pro se throughout, his pleadings and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.’” (quoting Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024)).

Even under this liberal construction, the court found no viable claim.

V. Role of the Key Precedents Cited

The opinion sits at the intersection of several doctrinal lines, drawing heavily on both Supreme Court and Second Circuit authority.

A. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction and Claim Elements

• Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006):
  • Distinguishes truly jurisdictional requirements from elements of a claim.
  • Guides courts to treat federal statutes’ threshold conditions as non‑jurisdictional unless Congress clearly states otherwise.
  • Used here to underscore that whether a mark is federally protectable is an ingredient of a Lanham Act claim, not a jurisdictional precondition.
• Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397 (2d Cir. 2025):
  • Involved a “similar trademark infringement claim” in which the plaintiff asserted rights in a personal name with only state‑level registration.
  • Addressed the merits—especially “use in commerce”—rather than treating the absence of federal registration as jurisdictional.
  • Supplies the specific language on both “use in commerce” and the non‑copyrightability of names, upon which Metellus relies.

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal and Frivolousness

• Digitel, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 239 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2001):
  • Standard of review: dismissals for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.
• Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2020):
  • Standard of review: Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are likewise reviewed de novo.
• Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2000):
  • Recognizes a district court’s authority to dismiss a complaint as frivolous sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
  • Notes that the Second Circuit has not definitively chosen between de novo and abuse‑of‑discretion review for such dismissals—a point reiterated in Metellus.
• Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2d Cir. 1998):
  • Defines a frivolous claim (in the in‑forma‑pauperis context) as one that “lacks an arguable basis in law” or where “a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.”
  • Used in Metellus to justify labelling the damages claims frivolous due to absolute immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity.

C. Immunities

• Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2009):
  • Affirms that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for monetary damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity.
  • Provides the broad statement quoted by the panel.
• Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001):
  • Articulates the core principle of Eleventh Amendment immunity: non‑consenting states may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.
  • Clarifies conditions under which Congress can abrogate that immunity.
• College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999):
  • Holds that the Lanham Act does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, constraining trademark and unfair competition suits against states and their instrumentalities.
  • Directly applied in Metellus to bar Lanham‑act damages claims against state judicial officers in their official capacities.

D. Trademark and Copyright Substantive Law

• 1‑800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005):
  • Sets out the elements of a Lanham Act infringement claim, emphasizing “use in commerce” and commercial context.
  • Forms the template the panel applies to Metellus’s allegations.
• 17 U.S.C. § 102(a):
  • Enumerates the categories of works eligible for copyright protection as “original works of authorship” fixed in a tangible medium.
  • Through Dieujuste, supports the holding that “facts such as one’s name” are not protected by the Copyright Act.

E. Pro Se Procedure and Waiver

• Small v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989):
  • Discusses the notice required before a pro se litigant can be deemed to have waived appellate review by failing to object to an R&R.
• Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2022):
  • Clarifies that the waiver rule is non‑jurisdictional and may be relaxed “in the interest of justice.”
  • Applied here to excuse Metellus’s lack of objection in light of the undisputed notice failure.
• Nambiar v. C. Orthopedic Grp., 2025 WL 3007285 (2d Cir. 2025):
  • Demonstrates the Second Circuit’s willingness to treat procedural missteps in R&R review as harmless error where the appellate court itself conducts the necessary de novo analysis.
• Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024):
  • Restates the requirement to construe pro se pleadings liberally and to interpret them as raising the strongest claims they fairly suggest.
  • Used to clarify that even under this generous standard, Metellus’s filings did not state a viable claim.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction vs. Failure to State a Claim

• Subject‑matter jurisdiction is the court’s legal power to hear a type of case (e.g., cases “arising under” federal law).
• A court lacks jurisdiction if the claim does not fall within any statutory or constitutional grant of authority.
• Failure to state a claim means that, even assuming the facts are true, the plaintiff cannot meet the elements of the legal theory invoked.
• In Metellus, because the plaintiff invoked the Lanham Act and Copyright Act, the case fell under federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331). The problem was not that the court lacked power, but that his allegations did not satisfy the elements of those statutes.

B. Absolute Judicial Immunity

• Judges are absolutely immune from suits for money damages for actions taken in their judicial capacity—even if those actions are alleged to be wrong, biased, or malicious.
• This immunity:
  • Protects judicial independence by preventing constant fear of personal liability.
  • Applies unless a judge acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” (a very narrow exception).
• Using parties’ names in orders and judgments is obviously within a judge’s normal functions and jurisdiction.

C. Eleventh Amendment / State Sovereign Immunity

• The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, bars suits for money damages in federal court against:
  • States themselves, and
  • State agencies and officials sued in their official capacities, except in narrow circumstances.
• There are limited exceptions, including:
  • Consent by the state to suit, and
  • Valid congressional abrogation of immunity.
• The Supreme Court has held that the Lanham Act does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity, so states and their instrumentalities cannot generally be sued for damages under that statute.

D. “Use in Commerce” Under the Lanham Act

• The Lanham Act protects trademarks against commercial misuse.
• “Use in commerce” generally means:
  • Use as a brand or source identifier for goods or services,
  • In the marketplace,
  • In connection with sales, offers, or advertising.
• Merely mentioning or printing a name (even a registered trademark) in a non‑commercial context—such as:
  • news reporting,
  • academic commentary, or
  • governmental or judicial documents—
  typically is not “use in commerce” and does not infringe the mark.
• Thus, the family court’s use of “Sam Albert Metellus” in its orders is not remotely commercial.

E. Copyright and Names

• Copyright law protects creative expression, not the underlying facts or ideas.
• A standalone personal name:
  • Is a fact (an identifier), not an expressive work.
  • Is therefore not eligible for copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
• Even if a person designs a logo or original artwork incorporating their name, the artistic expression might be protected, but the bare textual name “SAM ALBERT METELLUS” would not be.

F. Frivolousness and Sua Sponte Dismissal

• A claim is “frivolous” if:
  • It has no arguable basis in law, or
  • A clear, dispositive defense appears on the face of the complaint (e.g., absolute immunity).
• Courts can dismiss such claims on their own motion, even without a motion from the defendants, in order to conserve judicial resources and prevent abuse of the judicial process.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Clarifying the Jurisdiction–Merits Divide in Federal Trademark Cases

While the order is non‑precedential, it reinforces a growing line of authority cautioning district courts against conflating:

• Jurisdictional questions (Does the case fall within federal judicial power?), with
• Substantive elements of a statutory claim (Has the plaintiff alleged all required elements of a Lanham Act cause of action?).

By correcting the district court’s “no federal registration = no jurisdiction” reasoning, the Second Circuit:

• Encourages lower courts to treat similar deficiencies as grounds for dismissal on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6), not as jurisdictional dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1).
• Aligns with Arbaugh’s insistence on precise labeling of jurisdictional rules, which has downstream consequences for:
  • Whether dismissals are with or without prejudice, and
  • Whether they are subject to claim preclusion (res judicata).

B. Reaffirming Limits on Using IP Law to Attack State Court Proceedings

Metellus, especially when read alongside Dieujuste, sends a clear message:

• Pro se litigants cannot use the Lanham Act or Copyright Act as back‑door mechanisms to challenge state‑court judgments or routine judicial processes.
• Merely appearing in court records—identifying a party by name—does not constitute:
  • Trademark “use in commerce,” or
  • Copyright infringement.

This has practical importance, as federal courts frequently confront pro se complaints that “federalize” local disputes through creative but legally unfounded intellectual property theories.

C. Immunity as a Basis for Frivolousness

By labeling the damages claims “frivolous” due to judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court underscores:

• That suing sitting judges for damages over their judicial acts is almost always doomed from the outset.
• That such suits may justify summary, sua sponte dismissal to deter repetitive, meritless attacks on the judicial system.

This reinforces a doctrinal and institutional interest in protecting judges from harassing litigation and preserving courtroom independence.

D. Procedural Fairness to Pro Se Litigants

At the same time, the panel takes care to:

• Excuse the failure to object to the R&R due to lack of notice,
• Insist on de novo-level review of the allegations, and
• Apply the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants, per Sharikov.

This dual approach—substantive firmness combined with procedural solicitude—signals how the Second Circuit expects district courts to treat similar cases:

• Ensure notice and basic fairness,
• But do not hesitate to dismiss meritless or frivolous claims, even sua sponte.

E. Non‑Precedential but Persuasive Guidance

Because this is a summary order, it “do[es] not have precedential effect.” However, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited, and it offers:

• Concrete guidance on the treatment of jurisdictional mislabeling,
• Authoritative restatements of existing immunity and IP doctrines, and
• A practical template for handling similar filings by pro se litigants.

Future district court decisions, especially within the Second Circuit, are likely to rely on Metellus as persuasive authority when confronted with:

• Lanham Act and copyright claims targeting state court documents or orders,
• Suits for damages against judges for judicial acts, and
• Questions about sua sponte dismissal of facially immune or frivolous claims.

VIII. Conclusion

Metellus v. Jolly is a succinct but instructive summary order with several key takeaways:

• Jurisdiction vs. merits: Defects in the plaintiff’s trademark or copyright allegations (e.g., lack of federal registration or absence of “use in commerce”) go to the merits of the claim, not to federal subject‑matter jurisdiction, consistent with Arbaugh.
• Immunities: Claims for damages against state judges and magistrates for judicial acts are barred by both absolute judicial immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, rendering such claims frivolous on their face.
• Lanham Act limits: Using a litigant’s name in court filings and orders is not “use in commerce” in connection with goods or services and thus cannot support a Lanham Act infringement claim.
• Copyright limits: A personal name, without more, is an uncopyrightable fact, not a protected “work of authorship.”
• Procedural fairness: Even when a case is meritless, courts must ensure proper notice to pro se litigants and correctly apply standards of review for magistrate judge recommendations; yet procedural errors can be harmless where dismissal is clearly warranted under de novo scrutiny.

In the broader legal landscape, Metellus reaffirms longstanding doctrines while clarifying their application to a contemporary pattern of pro se litigation: attempts to use intellectual property law to challenge or penalize routine court activity. Although not precedential, it offers clear, persuasive guidance on the proper handling of such claims and reinforces the boundaries between federal judicial power, substantive federal rights, and the protective shields of judicial and state sovereign immunity.