Mere Observation and Incidental Touch Do Not Amount to Seizure:
The “Larremore Rule” on Fourth-Amendment Encounters

Introduction

United States v. Larremore, No. 24-50431 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025), pits a rural sheriff’s deputy against a suspected human-smuggler in the lonely expanse of West Texas. After Brewster County Deputy Christopher Colona followed James Eric Larremore’s pickup-and-trailer for a short stretch of U.S. Highway 385, Larremore voluntarily stopped on the shoulder. Minutes later, three undocumented aliens were found locked inside the trailer, and Larremore confessed. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that: (1) he had been seized without reasonable suspicion; and (2) the deputy’s brief physical contact with his truck constituted an unconstitutional trespassory search, tainting all downstream evidence. The district court denied suppression, and the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel majority (Judge Guidry, joined by Judge Engelhardt) held:

1. No seizure occurred until nearly seven minutes into the encounter—after Deputy Colona had already articulated reasonable suspicion of smuggling—because:
   • (a) merely following a motorist who independently steers onto the shoulder is not a “show of authority”;
   • (b) a handshake coupled with resting an arm on the truck door is de minimis contact, not a use of force with intent to restrain; and
   • (c) the deputy’s statement “hang on a sec for me” was a conversational pause, not a command.
2. Reasonable suspicion existed, once the deputy voiced his concern about smuggling, based on:
   • the timing (Border Patrol shift change),
   • the location (a remote checkpoint notorious for smuggling),
   • the unusual trailer configuration, and
   • Larremore’s inconsistent answers and nervous behavior.
3. The deputy’s incidental touch did not amount to a Jones-type trespassory search; therefore, viewing an open alcohol container in plain view was lawful, and the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine never engaged.
4. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to suppress and the 37-month sentence were affirmed.

Chief Judge Elrod dissented in part, finding that the directive to “hang on” transformed the encounter into a seizure without reasonable suspicion, thus requiring suppression of the confession and the physical evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) – Central “free-to-leave” test for seizures; cited to frame the show-of-authority analysis.
• Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) – Police following alongside a suspect was held non-coercive; majority analogized Deputy Colona’s brief pursuit to this scenario.
• Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) – Defined seizure by physical force or by show of authority plus submission. Used to differentiate incidental contact from intentional restraint.
• United States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524 (5th Cir. 2023) & United States v. Morris, 40 F.4th 323 (5th Cir. 2022) – Both involved unmistakable commands (emergency lights / visual signals). Majority distinguished them to show why no seizure occurred here.
• United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) – Trespassory search doctrine; majority held the slight touch here lacked the requisite “investigatory trespass.”
• United States v. Richmond, 915 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2019) – Leaning on a vehicle while questioning is not a Jones trespass; quoted as direct authority.
• Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2010), United States v. Roper, 63 F.4th 473 (5th Cir. 2023) – Cited to validate the mosaic of suspicion built from location, timing, and inconsistent answers.

Legal Reasoning of the Majority

1. Sequencing the Encounter. The court painstakingly separated the timeline into (i) purely consensual interaction, (ii) a Terry stop, and (iii) a full arrest after the confession. By placing the seizure later in time, the court ensured that reasonable suspicion had already ripened.
2. No Show of Authority. Key facts: no lights/siren, no blocking, no commands, and deputy’s conversational tone. The majority viewed the driver’s voluntary pull-over as a self-initiated welfare check scenario, aligning with Chesternut.
3. Incidental Touch ≠ Trespassory Search. Following Richmond, the court required a physical trespass plus investigatory purpose. Leaning on the door to shake hands lacked the latter element.
4. Reasonable Suspicion Findings. The “totality” included: (a) notorious smuggling corridor at shift change; (b) unusual trailer with locked compartment; (c) inconsistent, nervous answers; (d) origin in a border town; and (e) tip about smuggling. The court emphasized that any single fact is innocent, but together they created a reasonable inference of crime.
5. Plain-View Doctrine. Because the deputy was lawfully positioned, the alcohol can was legitimately seen; reference to Horton v. California principles, though not expressly cited.

Impact of the Decision

• Clarifies limits of “seizure” in the Fifth Circuit. Officers may follow, approach, converse, and even lean on a vehicle without automatically triggering Fourth-Amendment detention—unless they use explicit signals or commands.
• Dials back the reach of Jones in vehicle contexts. Reinforces that minor, non-investigatory touching is below the trespass threshold, safeguarding routine conversational contacts.
• Provides a blueprint for border-area policing. The opinion confirms that timing, location, and shifting checkpoint schedules legitimately factor into reasonable suspicion analysis.
• Creates a circuit split potential. Other circuits (e.g., the Second Circuit in Poller, 2025) view investigatory intent more broadly; litigants may seek Supreme Court review to reconcile standards.
• Practical training takeaway. Agencies can instruct officers: keep tones conversational, avoid commands, and document voluntary stops; simultaneously, defense counsel must marshal evidence of any implied restraint.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Consensual Encounter

Voluntary conversation with police; you remain free to walk away.

Show of Authority

Police action (lights, siren, commands, or positioning) that would make a reasonable person think they must comply.

Terry Stop

A temporary detention based on “reasonable suspicion” that crime is afoot; named after Terry v. Ohio (1968).

Reasonable Suspicion

Specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity—less than probable cause, more than a hunch.

Trespassory Search (Jones)

Physical intrusion onto private property to obtain information. Requires both a trespass and a purpose to gather data.

Plain-View Doctrine

If officers are lawfully present and see contraband in plain sight, they may seize it without a warrant.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Evidence derived from an unlawful search or seizure is generally inadmissible.

Conclusion

United States v. Larremore crystallizes a nuanced boundary: friendly roadside conversation—accompanied by incidental physical contact and an informal “hang on a sec”—does not, ipso facto, equal a Fourth-Amendment seizure in the Fifth Circuit. Only when officers escalate to explicit demands or demonstrable restraint does the constitutional clock start ticking. The ruling also limits the reach of the Jones trespassory doctrine in vehicular contexts, confirming that minor, non-investigatory touches are constitutionally benign. Going forward, prosecutors will invoke the “Larremore Rule” to defend consensual roadside encounters, while defense lawyers will scrutinize officer tone, positioning, and language to show implied restraint. Whether the Supreme Court will ultimately harmonize divergent interpretations among the circuits remains to be seen, but for now, the Fifth Circuit has offered law enforcement a clear—though carefully circumscribed—roadmap for border-area stops.