Mere Noncompliance with a Custody Order Is Not a Material Change Absent Demonstrable Impact on the Child’s Welfare: Cornell v. Mecartney (2025 WY 97)

Mere Noncompliance with a Custody Order Is Not a Material Change Absent Demonstrable Impact on the Child’s Welfare: Cornell v. Mecartney (2025 WY 97)

Introduction

In Kelly Cornell f/k/a Kelly Cornell Mecartney v. David Laurence Mecartney, 2025 WY 97 (Wyo. Sept. 3, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a mother’s petition to modify custody, visitation, and child support on the ground that there was no “material change in circumstances” affecting the child’s welfare since the prior custody orders. The case arises from a post-divorce dispute in which the parents’ 2021 orders contemplated a 15‑month transition to shared custody through reunification efforts. That transition never materialized; the child remained in the mother’s primary care, while the father—after years of unsuccessful efforts—stopped insisting on in-person visitation but continued regular outreach.

The mother argued several developments constituted a material change: her relocation from Jackson to Pinedale; the father’s alleged relocation to Arizona; the practical abandonment of shared custody; and the need to realign child support with de facto primary custody. The district court rejected the petition, finding no material change impacting the child’s welfare and, therefore, no jurisdiction to modify. The Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying an important boundary in Wyoming modification law: mere noncompliance with, or non-implementation of, a custody order is not, by itself, a “material change.” There must be a change that meaningfully affects the child’s welfare, and the baseline comparison remains the circumstances at the time the controlling order was entered.

Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the mother’s modification petition under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑204(c) for failure to show a material change of circumstances affecting the child’s welfare since the 2021 custody orders.
  • The Court emphasized that the material-change threshold is jurisdictional: absent such a showing, a court cannot reopen custody to reach the “best interests” inquiry.
  • Noncompliance with, or non-implementation of, a custody order (here, the failure to realize shared custody) is not per se a material change. The moving party must show the change matters to the child’s welfare.
  • The child’s circumstances at the time of modification mirrored those at the time of the original order: the father–child relationship remained estranged, and the child continued to thrive academically and socially in the mother’s care. No welfare impact was demonstrated.
  • The mother’s relocation from Jackson to Pinedale did not constitute a material change under the relocation framework; nor did she prove the father had relocated to Arizona.
  • Because custody was not modified, child support remained as previously stipulated. The Court noted that the mother’s request was not brought under the 20% recalculation statute (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑311(a)).

Detailed Analysis

1) Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

Reviewing a denial of a custody modification for abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court accords deference to the district court’s principally factual determination whether a material change has occurred. See Brinda v. Walker, 2025 WY 10, ¶ 8, 562 P.3d 841, 844; Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 11, 341 P.3d 377, 381. The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Kelly v. Kelly, 2023 WY 48, ¶ 11, 529 P.3d 494, 497–98. Here, the trial court held a bench trial, heard from multiple witnesses (including the child), and found no material change. The Supreme Court found the decision reasonable and within the bounds of discretion.

2) Statutory Framework and Two-Step Test

Wyoming’s modification statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20‑2‑204(c), imposes a two-step analysis:

  1. Has there been a material change in circumstances since the entry of the controlling custody/visitation order?
  2. If so, would modification be in the child’s best interests under § 20‑2‑201(a)?

The first step is jurisdictional. Courts cannot reach step two unless step one is satisfied. See In re TLJ, 2006 WY 28, ¶ 8, 129 P.3d 874, 876; Meehan-Greer v. Greer, 2018 WY 39, ¶ 25, 415 P.3d 274, 281.

3) The Threshold: Material Change Must Affect the Child’s Welfare

The Court reiterated two bedrock requirements:

  • The change must be assessed relative to the circumstances when the prior order was entered, not relative to subsequent hopes or plans. In re TLJ, ¶ 10.
  • The change must matter to the child; i.e., it must affect the child’s welfare. Kappen, ¶ 15; Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 19, 280 P.3d 1186, 1193.

Conditions existing or contemplated when the decree was entered are generally not material changes later. Sorensen v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 432; Meehan-Greer, ¶ 20; Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 29. The Court applied those principles to four asserted “changes.”

a) Mother’s relocation (Jackson to Pinedale)

Relocation may be a material change, but not invariably. Applying Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, ¶ 39, 293 P.3d 440, 458, and its progeny (Cook v. Moore, 2015 WY 125; Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52; Gutierrez v. Bradley, 2021 WY 139), the Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the move:

  • Did not impair the parties’ ability to maintain the parenting arrangement (which in practice was not being followed anyway);
  • Did not alter the father–child relationship (already estranged at the time of the prior orders);
  • Did not diminish the child’s quality of life or opportunities (the child was flourishing in Pinedale); and
  • Was geographically modest and manageable given the parties’ resources.

Consequently, the relocation was not a material change affecting the child’s welfare.

b) Father’s alleged relocation to Arizona

The mother failed to prove this factual claim at trial. The record supported the trial court’s finding that the father still resided in Jackson. Appellate deference to that factual determination was warranted. Johnson v. Clifford, 2018 WY 59, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 819, 822; Kelly, 2023 WY 48, ¶ 11.

c) Abandonment of efforts to implement shared custody

The father ceased insisting on in-person visits after years of unsuccessful reunification attempts but continued regular, documented outreach (texts, calls, invitations). The child—who had been estranged from the father since before the original decree—continued to refuse engagement.

Crucially, the Court rejected the proposition that failure to realize the shared-custody plan is itself a material change. The distinguishing line is between:

  • “Joint custody is not working,” where both parties ask the court to reopen the order—this can constitute a material change. See Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55; Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99; Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115.
  • “Joint custody is not happening,” where one party seeks modification and the other disputes any material change—this is not a per se change. Johnson v. Clifford, 2018 WY 59, ¶¶ 14–15.

Here, the status quo (estrangement; the child’s refusal to engage; the father’s continued outreach) was contemplated at the time of the original orders. The non-implementation reflected the “natural effects” of the pre-existing estrangement, not a new change. Evans v. Sharpe, 2023 WY 55, ¶ 28.

d) Child support realignment to de facto custody

Because there was no custody modification, the trial court properly left child support as previously stipulated in the State’s earlier § 20‑2‑311 proceeding. See Evans, ¶ 47. The mother’s petition was not a § 20‑2‑311(a) recalculation petition alleging a 20% variance. Moreover, no evidence demonstrated that the existing support level detrimentally impacted the child’s welfare.

4) Precedents and Their Influence

  • In re TLJ, 2006 WY 28: Establishes the res judicata overlay; the material-change threshold “outweighs” society’s interest in finality and is a jurisdictional gateway to reopening custody. The Court hewed closely to this requirement.
  • Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3 and Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98: Require a welfare nexus. The Court repeatedly emphasized that a parent must show not only that a change occurred but also that it matters to the child’s life.
  • Arnott v. Arnott, 2012 WY 167, Cook v. Moore, 2015 WY 125, Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, Gutierrez v. Bradley, 2021 WY 139: Supply the relocation analysis. Applying these factors, the mother’s move did not qualify as material.
  • Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, Roemmich v. Roemmich, 2010 WY 115: Stand for the rule that when both parties agree joint custody is not working and invite judicial intervention, the threshold is met. The Court distinguished those cases because only one party sought modification here and the “problem” was non-implementation, not bilateral dysfunction of a joint arrangement.
  • Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557: A parent’s significant improvement can be a material change. The Court noted the absence of the “180-degree” shift the original order anticipated the mother would make to foster the father–child relationship.
  • Mecartney v. Mecartney, 2021 WY 141 (Mecartney 1): Provides the case history, including findings of the mother’s earlier hostile co-parenting and the child’s deep-seated fear/estrangement, all of which framed the baseline for comparing changes. The current facts largely mirror those earlier conditions.

5) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The reasoning proceeds in three strands:

  • Res judicata and the jurisdictional threshold: Custody orders are final for purposes of modification; reopening requires a material change since the controlling order, one that outweighs finality concerns and affects the child’s welfare. Without that, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify or to reach “best interests.”
  • Mere noncompliance is not enough: The failure to carry out a shared-custody transition, without more, is not a material change. The Court required evidence that noncompliance had a positive or negative effect on the child’s welfare. Here, the child continued to thrive; the estrangement and the child’s refusal to engage were expected risks at the time of the prior orders; the father’s continuing outreach undercut the “abandonment” narrative.
  • Relocation analysis anchored in welfare: Applying the Arnott factors, the Court found no adverse effect on the child’s relationship with the father or quality of life, and no impairment of the parties’ ability to implement the arrangement (which was not being followed anyway).

6) Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

  • Clarification of the “noncompliance” doctrine: The decision cements that in Wyoming, noncompliance or non-implementation of a custody order does not automatically open the door to modification. Litigants must prove a concrete welfare impact tied to the requested change.
  • Distinguishing “not working” from “not happening”: The Court delineates the Gurney/Harshberger/Roemmich line (joint custody acknowledged by both to be unworkable) from cases like this one, where the arrangement simply is not being used. This distinction will likely be outcome-determinative in future petitions.
  • Relocation petitions: The opinion reinforces that relocation alone does not equal material change; counsel must marshal Arnott-factor evidence showing how the move affects the parenting plan and the child’s welfare.
  • Older adolescents and entrenched dynamics: For older teens, courts will heavily weigh actual welfare outcomes and may view estrangement that was already present as part of the contemplated baseline, making modifications harder absent new facts or demonstrable parental change.
  • Custody–support linkage: Parties seeking to align child support with de facto custody must either succeed on custody modification or bring a dedicated § 20‑2‑311(a) support-modification action and satisfy its threshold (e.g., 20% variance). Attempting to leverage support through custody modification without meeting the material-change threshold will likely fail.
  • Parental conduct as a potential change: The Court signaled that a parent’s significant improvement (or deterioration) in co-parenting and support for the other parent’s relationship could constitute a material change in a different case. Litigants should document such changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Material change in circumstances: A meaningful new fact or set of facts arising after the last custody order that matters to the child’s life. It is not enough that something is different; it must affect the child’s welfare and be “significant in relation to the modification sought.”
  • Res judicata effect of custody orders: Final custody orders are presumed correct and stable. Courts won’t re-litigate them unless new, material, child-centered changes justify it.
  • Two-step test: Step 1 asks whether a material change has occurred since the prior order. Only if the answer is yes can the court reach Step 2, the “best interests” analysis.
  • “Not working” vs. “not happening”: If both parents tell the court that a joint arrangement is unworkable, that can be a material change. If one parent complains that the plan isn’t being implemented but cannot show a new, welfare-impacting reason, that is usually not enough.
  • Relocation factors (Arnott): Courts consider whether the move affects the ability to maintain parenting time, the child’s relationship with the other parent, quality of life, the child’s preferences, and comparative opportunities in the new location.
  • Jurisdictional threshold: Without a material change, the court lacks authority to modify custody or to analyze best interests.

Practice Notes

  • Build the welfare record: Tie every alleged change to concrete child outcomes (academic, emotional, social, medical). Testimony from educators, therapists, and neutral observers can be decisive.
  • Document parental change: If seeking to modify based on improved co-parenting or support for the other parent’s relationship, compile specific, corroborated evidence of that “180-degree” shift.
  • Be precise about relocation: Present Arnott-factor evidence—travel burdens, missed parenting time, school/social impacts, comparative resources—not just mileage.
  • Coordinate custody and support strategies: If child support recalibration is the goal, consider a separate § 20‑2‑311(a) petition showing a 20% change, rather than hitching support to a custody modification that may fail at Step 1.
  • Older teen preferences: When a mature child refuses contact, courts will still require a showing of welfare impact and causation. Noncompliance rooted in long-standing estrangement (contemplated at the time of the decree) will rarely satisfy Step 1 absent new facts.
  • When both parties agree joint custody isn’t working: If both parents truly cannot make a shared arrangement function, a joint stipulation or aligned testimony may satisfy the threshold—but be prepared to prove why that dysfunction is new and welfare-relevant.

Conclusion

Cornell v. Mecartney reinforces a disciplined, welfare-centered approach to custody modification in Wyoming. The decision clarifies that failing to implement a custody order—even for a prolonged period—does not automatically constitute a material change. Courts require proof of a new development that affects the child’s welfare and was not contemplated at the time of the prior order. It also tightens the relocation analysis to welfare consequences, distinguishes bilateral admissions that joint custody is unworkable from unilateral claims of noncompliance, and underscores the jurisdictional nature of the material-change threshold.

For practitioners, the opinion offers clear guidance: assemble a record that connects asserted changes to the child’s well-being, be meticulous with relocation factors, and choose the correct procedural vehicle when seeking to adjust child support. In short, stability and finality remain the default; to overcome them, the change must be real, new, and child-centered.

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