Mere Jackknife and Sudden Tire Failure Are Not Evidence of Negligence: No‑Evidence Summary Judgment and Unavoidable Accidents in Texas Trucking Cases

I. Introduction

In Osvanis Lozada and TELS, Inc. v. Cesar R. Posada, No. 23‑1015 (Tex. June 20, 2025) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed when a plaintiff’s minimal evidentiary showing in a trucking collision case is insufficient to survive a no‑evidence motion for summary judgment. The case arises from a pre‑dawn collision between two commercial tractor‑trailers on Interstate 10 in foggy conditions after one truck experienced a sudden loss of tire pressure, jackknifed, and came to rest across both lanes.

The dispute centered on whether the mere fact that the defendant’s tractor‑trailer ended up jackknifed across both lanes of travel—following an undisputed, sudden tire failure—constituted “more than a scintilla” of evidence that the driver breached his duty of care. The plaintiff also pressed negligence per se theories based on alleged violations of Texas Transportation Code provisions governing safe speed and stopping on a roadway, and he argued that the defendant should have been required to seek “traditional” rather than “no‑evidence” summary judgment because he had invoked inferential rebuttal theories such as “unavoidable accident” and “excuse.”

The Supreme Court reversed a divided decision of the El Paso Court of Appeals that had revived the plaintiff’s claims. The Court reinstated the trial court’s take‑nothing judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence of breach, and clarifying several important doctrines:

the limits of inferring negligence from the mere occurrence of an accident, particularly in sudden mechanical‑failure cases;
the operation of no‑evidence summary judgment in negligence and negligence per se claims; and
the allocation of burdens regarding “unavoidable accident” and “excuse,” and the continued narrow scope of res ipsa loquitur.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The plaintiff, Cesar Posada, sued truck driver Osvanis Lozada and his employer, TELS, Inc., after Posada’s tractor‑trailer crashed into Lozada’s jackknifed rig on I‑10. Posada alleged negligence and negligence per se, and sought to impose vicarious liability on TELS. After discovery, Lozada and TELS moved for no‑evidence summary judgment on breach and proximate cause; the trial court granted their motions and denied Posada’s motions for new trial.

On appeal, a divided court of appeals reversed, reasoning that a jury could infer breach and proximate cause from the fact that Lozada’s rig blocked both lanes of travel. The dissenting justice found the plaintiff’s proof legally insufficient and would have affirmed.

The Supreme Court of Texas:

held that Posada’s summary‑judgment response—consisting solely of limited excerpts from Lozada’s deposition and two photographs—failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on breach, and thus failed on both negligence and negligence per se theories;
stressed that “accidents happen when something has gone wrong, but not all accidents are evidence of negligence,” and that the mere fact of Lozada’s jackknifed truck across the highway—following a sudden tire failure—was legally no evidence of breach;
rejected Posada’s attempt to rely on the defendant’s self‑interested testimony as creating a credibility issue for the jury, explaining that clear, positive, direct, and uncontroverted testimony from an interested witness can support summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c);
clarified that “unavoidable accident” and “excuse” do not shift the burden of proof to the defendant at trial, and therefore do not bar the use of a no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i); and
did not reach proximate cause because the absence of any evidence of breach was dispositive; accordingly, the vicarious liability claim against TELS necessarily failed under the derivative‑liability rule of G & H Towing Co. v. Magee.

Without hearing oral argument, the Court granted the petition, reversed the court of appeals, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing all claims against Lozada and TELS with prejudice. See Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, 60.2(c).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Posada, as required on review of summary judgment, the Court recounted the following:

Lozada, a TELS driver, was traveling on I‑10 in the early morning, in fog, “under the speed limit” at approximately 72 mph in the left lane.
His right front tire “separated from the rim” and began to lose air “very fast,” pulling the truck to the right and causing the tractor‑trailer to jackknife.
Lozada lost control but brought the truck to rest across both lanes of the interstate, without striking any other vehicles as he did so.
Before he could move the rig out of the roadway, Posada’s tractor‑trailer collided with Lozada’s truck.
Lozada testified that the tires had appeared to be in good condition before the trip, the failed tire was “new,” the weather was “plenty cold,” and there was fog.

Posada’s petition alleged that Lozada, acting within the scope of his employment, suddenly veered, spun, and stopped so as to completely block the highway, and that Posada could not avoid the collision, sustaining serious injuries. Lozada and TELS generally denied liability and pleaded, among other things, that the occurrence was an “unavoidable accident” and “was excused.”

After depositions, Lozada moved for no‑evidence summary judgment on breach and proximate cause. TELS filed its own no‑evidence motion, predicated on the absence of any underlying liability by Lozada. In response, Posada submitted:

limited excerpts of Lozada’s deposition, and
two photographs of the scene showing two tractor‑trailers on the highway after the crash.

He did not rely on his own deposition testimony, any expert testimony, or any other evidence; some additional materials were excluded by the trial court and were not challenged on appeal. The trial court granted both no‑evidence motions and denied Posada’s motions for new trial.

The court of appeals (2–1) reversed, holding that the record contained a scintilla of evidence of breach and proximate cause. The dissent stressed that the position of Lozada’s vehicle alone was not evidence of negligence and that Posada had not controverted Lozada’s account. The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and reversed.

B. No‑Evidence Summary Judgment Standard Applied

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), a party may move for no‑evidence summary judgment “after adequate time for discovery” on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial. The Court reiterates the familiar standards from King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003), and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997):

No‑evidence summary judgment is proper when there is a complete absence of evidence on a vital fact, or when the evidence is no more than a “mere scintilla.”
“Less than a scintilla” means evidence “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of the fact. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983).
“More than a scintilla” exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair‑minded people to differ in their conclusions.”

Because Lozada’s motion challenged breach and proximate cause—elements on which Posada bore the burden at trial—the question was whether Posada’s response raised a genuine issue of material fact on those elements. If it did not, summary judgment was mandatory.

C. Duty and Alleged Breach in Negligence and Negligence Per Se

1. Common‑law duty of care

The Court began by recognizing that Lozada owed the common‑law duty applicable to motorists: “to act as a reasonably prudent person . . . toward others on the road.” Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. 1998). That foundational duty was not in dispute. The question was whether Lozada breached it when his tire suddenly lost air pressure, leading to a jackknife.

2. Statutory standards and negligence per se

Posada also invoked statutory standards that can give rise to negligence per se when unexcused:

Speed appropriate to conditions – Tex. Transp. Code § 545.351(a), (c)(5), which prohibits driving “at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing,” and requires an “appropriate reduced speed” when special hazards exist, including weather or roadway conditions.
Stopping/parking on roadway – Tex. Transp. Code § 545.303(a), which requires that an operator who stops or parks on a two‑way roadway must do so with the right‑hand wheels parallel to and within 18 inches of the right‑hand curb or edge of the roadway.

Under Texas law, “[i]t is the unexcused violation of a penal standard which constitutes negligence per se.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1973) (emphasis added). Thus, Posada had to raise evidence both that Lozada violated one of these provisions and that any violation was unexcused.

Posada argued that a jury could find Lozada breached his duty (both common‑law and statutory) by:

driving at an excessive speed for the foggy, cold, wet conditions;
over‑correcting when the truck began to pull to the right; and
allowing his truck to jackknife and block both lanes of traffic.

The Supreme Court flatly rejected this, concluding that Posada’s sparse summary‑judgment record—Lozada’s deposition excerpt and two photographs—was legally insufficient to constitute more than a scintilla of evidence of breach.

3. “Accidents happen” is not code for strict non‑liability

The Court quoted and reaffirmed a key negligence principle from Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1986): “Accidents happen when something has gone wrong, but not all accidents are evidence of negligence.” The Court emphasized that “something else was needed.” Its analysis can be summarized as follows:

The undisputed evidence was that Lozada was driving under the speed limit, in the left lane, in foggy conditions, when the right front tire suddenly and rapidly lost air.
The loss of air pulled the vehicle to the right, leading to a jackknife; nevertheless, Lozada managed to avoid colliding with any other vehicle as he lost control.
There was no evidence that Lozada drove at a speed that was actually unreasonable under the circumstances, nor any evidence of what speed would have been appropriate in those particular weather and roadway conditions.
There was no evidence suggesting that Lozada’s steering or braking maneuvers in response to the sudden tire failure were inconsistent with what a reasonably prudent driver would have done.
There was likewise no evidence that Lozada had any reasonable opportunity to remove the truck from the lanes of travel before Posada’s impact, or that § 545.303(a)’s stopping/parking rule was violated in any way bearing on negligence.

The Court expressly agreed with the appellate dissent that one cannot infer negligence simply “from the mere fact that Lozada’s truck was jackknifed across two lanes” following an unforeseen tire failure. It was Posada’s burden to identify “evidence of some circumstance supporting the conclusion that Lozada acted negligently.” He did not.

D. Circumstantial Evidence and Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Court acknowledged that there are limited situations where the “circumstances surrounding an accident constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s negligence” to support a finding of breach, even without identifying a specific negligent act. See Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Tex. 1974). Those cases employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Res ipsa can “relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving a specific act of negligence” when the sequence of events is impossible for the plaintiff to determine or when the defendant has superior knowledge. See Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982). But the Court, citing its recent decision in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ceasar, 670 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex. 2023), stressed that “[t]he doctrine applies only rarely.”

In this case:

Posada expressly disclaimed any reliance on res ipsa, conceding that this was not a situation where negligence is presumed from the “mere occurrence of an injury” without evidence of the defendant’s actual conduct.
Even if Posada had invoked res ipsa, the record would still be insufficient, because the undisputed evidence identified a sudden, rapid tire deflation as the immediate cause of the loss of control, and there was no evidence suggesting that the blowout itself resulted from negligent inspection or maintenance.

The Court bolstered its conclusion with the Restatements:

“There are many types of accidents which commonly occur without the fault of anyone. The fact that a tire blows out . . . is not, in the absence of anything more, enough to permit the conclusion that there was negligence in inspecting the tire . . . because it is common human experience that such events all too frequently occur without such negligence.”

– Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added).

“If the evidence more specifically shows . . . that the car swerved because of a sudden deflation of a tire, that evidence largely leaves the motorist off the res ipsa loquitur hook.”

– Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 17 cmt. d reporters’ note (2010) (emphasis added).

By relying on these formulations, the Court effectively announces a clear evidentiary rule: when the evidence specifically shows that a vehicle swerved or jackknifed because of a sudden tire deflation, the bare fact of that swerving or jackknifing, without more, generally cannot support an inference of negligence. Plaintiffs must come forward with additional facts suggesting negligent maintenance, inspection, operation, or response.

E. Rejecting the Court of Appeals’ Inferences

The court of appeals had suggested in a footnote that a jury could infer negligence because Lozada:

was driving at 72 mph in foggy weather,
remained in the left lane even after the tire began losing pressure,
attempted to “correct” when the truck pulled right, and
ultimately lost control and blocked both lanes.

The Supreme Court held that none of these circumstances, alone or together, amounted to evidence of a deviation from the reasonably prudent driver standard. At most, they allowed a jury to speculate that Lozada might have done something different, but they did not identify what a reasonably prudent driver would have done under the same conditions that Lozada failed to do.

Thus, inferring negligence from those facts would “create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact,” which King Ranch and its predecessors forbid as a basis for defeating summary judgment. The evidence remained, in legal terms, “no more than a mere scintilla.”

F. Use of the Defendant’s Testimony and Credibility Arguments

Posada attempted to avoid summary judgment by attacking Lozada’s credibility, characterizing his explanation as emotional and self‑serving. He argued that Lozada’s testimony “only creates issues of fact” for a jury, and that assessing an interested witness’s credibility is exclusively the jury’s function.

The Court responded by invoking Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), which provides that summary judgment may rest on “uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness” if:

the testimony is clear, positive, and direct,
“otherwise credible,”
“free from contradictions and inconsistencies,” and
“could have been readily controverted.”

Here, Lozada’s account of the sudden tire failure was:

positive and direct as to what occurred,
internally consistent,
not contradicted by any other evidence in the record, and
capable of being controverted (for example, by expert testimony, additional photographs, physical evidence, or Posada’s own testimony).

Crucially, it was Posada himself who offered Lozada’s deposition testimony as part of his response to the no‑evidence motion. Yet he did not introduce any controverting evidence. The Court underscored that potential evidence was readily imaginable—expert analysis of the tire, accident reconstruction, maintenance records, independent witnesses, or Posada’s own recollection—but none of it was placed into the record for this motion.

Citing R. T. Herrin Petroleum Transportation Co. v. Proctor, 338 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. 1960), the Court rejected the notion that a jury could simply treat Lozada’s testimony as evidence of “the exact opposite of what [he] said” without any supporting circumstances. There must be “some circumstance supporting the conclusion that a situation opposite to that depicted by the [interested] witness actually existed.” No such circumstances were shown.

Accordingly, Lozada’s uncontroverted account was properly considered in evaluating whether Posada had any evidence of breach—and that account, if anything, negated the suggestion of negligence.

G. No‑Evidence vs. Traditional Summary Judgment; Unavoidable Accident and Excuse

Posada further contended that Lozada could not use a no‑evidence motion because Lozada had pleaded “unavoidable accident” and “excuse,” which Posada characterized as defenses on which Lozada bore the burden of proof. Based on dicta in Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 187 n.6 (Tex. 2022), Posada argued that because a party with the burden at trial cannot use a no‑evidence motion to prove its own affirmative claims or defenses, Lozada should have been required to file a traditional motion instead.

The Supreme Court rejected this premise and clarified the burden allocation:

Unavoidable accident. In Hicks v. Brown, 151 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1941, opinion adopted), the Court held that a plaintiff bears “the burden of proving that his injuries were not the result of [an unavoidable] accident.” In other words, showing that the incident was not an unavoidable accident is part and parcel of proving negligence, not an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the ultimate burden.
Excuse and negligence per se. Under Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro, negligence per se arises from the unexcused violation of a penal statute. Establishing an unexcused violation is thus an element that remains on the plaintiff’s side of the ledger.

The Court’s prior commentary on inferential rebuttal instructions in Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995), and Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperative, 157 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2005), was harmonized with this allocation. Those decisions explain that an unavoidable‑accident instruction is a “defensive theory” that tells the jury that some accidents occur without anyone’s negligence, but they do not invert the burden of proof.

The Court also noted that Posada cited no authority requiring a defendant to conclusively establish “unavoidable accident” or “excuse” as a condition to obtaining summary judgment. It contrasted this with Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. 2021), where a defendant seeking traditional summary judgment on limitations must conclusively negate any asserted tolling doctrines; there, limitations is itself the ground on which the defendant seeks judgment, and tolling is a direct response to that ground.

Here, however:

Lozada’s ground for summary judgment was Posada’s lack of evidence on elements of Posada’s own claims (breach and proximate cause), not a desire to prove an independent affirmative defense.
Because Posada retains the burden at trial to prove that his injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident and that any statutory violations were unexcused, Lozada was entitled to file a no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i) squarely attacking those elements.

The Court succinctly concluded: “We agree with Lozada that Posada’s own undisputed evidence, ostensibly the best evidence he had, defeats any ability to escape summary judgment.”

H. Proximate Cause and Vicarious Liability

Having determined that Posada failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence that Lozada breached any duty (common‑law or statutory), the Court found it unnecessary to address proximate cause. Under Texas negligence law, duty, breach, causation, and damages are each required elements; the failure to raise a fact issue on breach is dispositive. See Nabors Drilling, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009).

The derivative nature of vicarious liability then resolved TELS’s liability. Citing G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 295 (Tex. 2011), the Court reiterated that “an employer cannot be vicariously liable in tort when its agent or employee has not engaged in tortious conduct.” Because there was no triable claim that Lozada was negligent or negligent per se, the vicarious liability claim against TELS necessarily failed.

I. Precedents and Authorities Cited: Their Role in the Decision

The Court’s reasoning draws heavily on, and refines, several strands of Texas case law:

King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983) – These cases supply the core framework for “no‑evidence” review and define when evidence amounts to no more than a “mere scintilla” or “surmise or suspicion.” The Court applies this framework to hold that the jackknife and post‑accident position of the truck, plus Lozada’s uncontroverted testimony of sudden tire failure, are legally insufficient to raise a fact issue on breach.
Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998) – Cited for the basic proposition that motorists owe a duty to act as reasonably prudent persons toward others on the road, providing the duty element for the negligence analysis.
Nabors Drilling, Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. 2009) – Recited for the elements of negligence and the structure of the cause of action: duty, breach, causation, and damages.
Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1986) – Quoted for the principle that not every accident is evidence of negligence. This case anchors the Court’s insistence that the mere fact of a collision or unfortunate outcome cannot substitute for proof of breach.
Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974); Jones v. Tarrant Utility Co., 638 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. 1982); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ceasar, 670 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. 2023) – These authorities define and sharply limit the scope of res ipsa loquitur as an evidentiary doctrine. The Court uses them to underscore that res ipsa applies “only rarely,” and that the circumstances here—where a sudden tire failure is specifically identified—do not justify inferring negligence without additional proof.
R. T. Herrin Petroleum Transportation Co. v. Proctor, 338 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1960) – Used to reject the argument that a jury may simply disbelieve an interested witness and infer the opposite of what that witness says, absent some supporting circumstance.
Hicks v. Brown, 151 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1941, opinion adopted) – Central to the burden‑of‑proof analysis, it establishes that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his injuries were not the result of an unavoidable accident. This supports the Court’s conclusion that unavoidable accident is not an issue on which a defendant bears the Rule 166a(i) burden.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973) – Clarifies that negligence per se requires an unexcused violation of a penal statute, again placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff rather than the defendant.
Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995); Dillard v. Texas Electric Cooperative, 157 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2005) – These cases discuss “unavoidable accident” as an inferential rebuttal jury instruction and acknowledge it as a “defensive theory.” The Court uses them to confirm that this label does not alter the fundamental burden allocation: the plaintiff still must establish negligence, and the defendant may highlight the possibility that no one was negligent.
Mitchell v. MAP Resources, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. 2022) – Cited for the technical point that a party who bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense may not use a no‑evidence motion to establish it. The Court explains why this principle does not apply here, because Lozada’s motion attacked elements Posada had the burden to prove.
Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. 2021) – Used by analogy to illustrate when a defendant must meet a higher summary‑judgment burden (e.g., conclusively negating tolling when asserting the statute of limitations as a ground for traditional summary judgment). The Court contrasts that situation with unavoidable accident and excuse, where the defendant is not required to conclusively establish those concepts to obtain no‑evidence relief.
G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. 2011) – Supplies the principle that vicarious liability requires underlying tortious conduct by the employee. With no viable negligence claim against Lozada, TELS could not be vicariously liable.

The Court also relies on the Texas Transportation Code and the Restatements of Torts, using them to frame both the statutory duties involved and the evidentiary treatment of tire blowouts and sudden mechanical failures.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. No‑Evidence Summary Judgment (Rule 166a(i))

A no‑evidence summary judgment motion is a procedural device allowing a defendant—after adequate time for discovery—to challenge the plaintiff to produce some affirmative evidence on specific elements of the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant does not have to produce any evidence initially; instead, the motion asserts that there is no evidence of, for example, breach or proximate cause.

If the plaintiff then fails to bring forward at least a “scintilla” of admissible evidence on the challenged elements, the court must grant summary judgment. No‑evidence motions are powerful tools in negligence cases where plaintiffs rely only on the occurrence of the accident itself, rather than on concrete evidence of improper conduct.

B. “Scintilla” of Evidence

The “scintilla” concept is a threshold test:

Less than a scintilla – Evidence that is so weak it merely gives rise to a suspicion or speculation that a fact might be true. Suspicion is not enough.
More than a scintilla – Evidence that is sufficient for reasonable and fair‑minded people to reach different conclusions about a disputed fact.

In this case, the Court concluded that the facts Posada pointed to—the jackknifed position of the truck and the circumstances described by Lozada—could only support speculative inferences of negligence, not reasoned disagreement among fair‑minded jurors.

C. Res Ipsa Loquitur

“Res ipsa loquitur” is Latin for “the thing speaks for itself.” It is an evidentiary doctrine that, in rare cases, allows a jury to infer negligence from the very nature of the accident, without proof of a specific negligent act. It typically requires:

an event that ordinarily does not happen absent negligence; and
instrumentalities under the defendant’s control.

Texas courts treat res ipsa very narrowly. When there is specific evidence of a non‑negligent cause—for example, a sudden tire deflation that commonly occurs without negligence—res ipsa usually does not apply. Plaintiffs then must produce traditional direct or circumstantial evidence of breach.

D. Unavoidable Accident and Inferential Rebuttal Theories

An “unavoidable accident” is an occurrence that happens without negligence from any party, despite the exercise of ordinary care. It is not a freestanding defense that alters burdens; rather, it is a way of explaining to the jury that the law recognizes some accidents as blameless. In terms of proof:

The plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff’s injuries were not due to an unavoidable accident.
The defendant may argue in closing, or request an instruction, that the evidence supports a conclusion of unavoidable accident.

This case confirms that because unavoidable accident is embedded in the plaintiff’s burden to show negligence, a defendant can use a no‑evidence motion to argue that the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence suggesting that the accident was avoidable or attributable to the defendant’s breach.

E. Negligence Per Se

Negligence per se uses a statute or regulation to set the standard of care. If a defendant violates a relevant penal statute designed to protect a class of persons (including the plaintiff) against a particular type of harm, the violation can substitute for the common‑law “reasonable person” standard. But in Texas:

The violation must be unexcused; and
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the violation and the absence of a legally recognized excuse.

Here, even assuming the Transportation Code provisions applied, Posada produced no evidence that Lozada violated them (e.g., by driving at an unreasonable speed or improperly stopping) and no evidence negating potential excuses such as sudden mechanical failure. The negligence per se claims therefore fell with the ordinary negligence claim on the element of breach.

F. Vicarious Liability

Vicarious liability (also known as respondeat superior) holds an employer responsible for certain wrongful acts of its employees committed within the scope of employment. It is derivative:

If the employee is not liable in tort, the employer is generally not vicariously liable.
A plaintiff cannot use vicarious liability to circumvent a failure of proof on the underlying tort.

Because the Court held that Posada had no triable claim against Lozada, TELS’s potential vicarious liability necessarily disappeared as well.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Tightening the Evidentiary Threshold in Mechanical‑Failure Collisions

The most immediate impact of this decision is in motor‑vehicle and trucking litigation involving sudden mechanical failures, particularly tire blowouts or rapid deflations. The Court’s opinion, aligning with the Restatements, sets a strong default rule:

Evidence that a tire rapidly and unexpectedly lost air, causing a vehicle to swerve or jackknife, without more, is not evidence of negligence in inspection, maintenance, or operation.
The mere position of a vehicle after such a failure—even if it is obstructing lanes of travel—is not itself evidence of breach, absent additional circumstances suggesting negligent conduct.

Practically, defendants in similar cases can more confidently file no‑evidence summary judgment motions if the plaintiff relies only on the occurrence of the accident and sparse circumstantial details. Plaintiffs, in turn, will be pressed to develop:

expert testimony on tire failure modes and reasonable maintenance practices;
maintenance and inspection records;
data on speed, braking, and steering pre‑ and post‑failure;
evidence about visibility, reaction times, and available evasive options; and
any deviation from company policies or industry standards.

Absent such evidence, courts are now instructed to treat collisions after sudden mechanical failures as prime candidates for no‑evidence summary judgment.

B. Clarifying Burdens on Unavoidable Accident and Excuse

The decision also provides important clarity on “defensive theories” such as unavoidable accident and excuse in negligence per se:

They do not impose on defendants a burden to conclusively prove those theories as affirmative defenses in order to obtain summary judgment.
They remain, in substance, part of the plaintiff’s burden to show negligent conduct and a lack of excuse; when a plaintiff fails to meet that burden, a defendant may use Rule 166a(i) to obtain judgment without resorting to a traditional evidence‑based motion.

This clarification forecloses a line of argument that would have significantly restricted the availability of no‑evidence summary judgment in negligence cases whenever a defendant mentions unavoidable accident or statutory excuse. The Court has now squarely held that defendants need not carry that extra burden.

C. Reaffirming the Limited Role of Res Ipsa Loquitur

By emphasizing that res ipsa loquitur applies “only rarely” and by invoking the Restatements’ treatment of tire blowouts, the Court reaffirms that res ipsa is a narrow and exceptional doctrine. The decision signals that:

In modern mechanical‑failure cases where specific non‑negligent causes can be identified, res ipsa will almost never be appropriate.
Courts should be wary of allowing plaintiffs to substitute the mere occurrence of a serious accident for evidence of breach.

This will likely discourage plaintiffs from stretching res ipsa into domains—such as complex vehicle systems and equipment failures—where other explanatory mechanisms are common and not necessarily negligent.

D. Strengthening Summary Judgment as a Case‑Management Tool

The opinion reinforces the central role of summary judgment in weeding out negligence claims that rest solely on the fact of an accident:

Defendants are encouraged to use no‑evidence motions to challenge breach and causation after adequate discovery, especially where plaintiffs have not developed expert or concrete factual support.
Plaintiffs are on notice that a bare narrative of how the accident unfolded, without evidence of how the defendant’s conduct diverged from reasonable care, will not suffice to reach a jury.

This strengthens predictability in litigation and may reduce the number of marginal cases reaching trial, particularly in high‑stakes trucking collisions where defendants can document sudden equipment failures.

E. Implications for Negligence Per Se and Transport Regulations

The case also subtly constrains negligence per se theories in traffic cases. By holding that:

there was no evidence of what “reasonable and prudent” speed would have been in the actual conditions,
the fact of driving at 72 mph in fog was not, without more, evidence of excessive speed, and
the post‑accident position of the truck did not constitute evidence of a statutory stopping/parking violation or any unexcused violation,

the Court makes clear that plaintiffs cannot rely on abstract appeals to safety statutes without matching them to concrete, case‑specific proof of violation and lack of excuse. Negligence per se remains a potent tool but cannot be invoked in a vacuum.

VI. Conclusion

Lozada v. Posada is a significant clarification of Texas negligence law in several respects. It firmly holds that the mere fact a truck jackknifed and came to rest blocking both lanes of an interstate, following an undisputed sudden tire deflation, is legally insufficient to create a fact issue on breach. Even in a serious collision, plaintiffs must point to some circumstance—beyond the occurrence of the accident itself—that suggests the defendant’s conduct fell below that of a reasonably prudent driver.

The decision also:

reaffirmed the strict “more than a scintilla” threshold for surviving a no‑evidence motion under Rule 166a(i);
reinforced the limited and exceptional role of res ipsa loquitur, especially in mechanical‑failure contexts;
confirmed that unavoidable accident and excuse do not shift the burden of proof to defendants nor preclude no‑evidence summary judgment; and
underscored that vicarious liability cannot exist without underlying employee tortious conduct.

In the broader legal landscape, this opinion strengthens the role of summary judgment as a filter for negligence and negligence per se claims that lack concrete evidentiary support. It sends a clear message to practitioners: in Texas, an accident—even a catastrophic one—is not itself proof of negligence. Plaintiffs must be prepared, at the summary‑judgment stage, to present real evidence of breach, or their claims will not reach a jury.