Mens Rea Challenges to Georgia Aggravated Assault as a Guidelines “Crime of Violence” Are Foreclosed by United States v. Hicks

Introduction

In United States v. Christian Isaiah Carter (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 78-month sentence imposed after Carter pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(8). The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether a prior Georgia aggravated assault conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines, and (2) whether the within-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable.

The case arose from an April 2024 incident involving a stolen vehicle, a high-speed flight from police, and Carter’s possession of a loaded 9mm firearm (15 rounds). The district court adopted a presentence report calculating a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months and imposed the top-of-range sentence, emphasizing the chase, recidivism, and the need to protect the public.

Summary of the Opinion

• Procedural reasonableness / Guidelines issue: The court held the district court did not err in treating Carter’s Georgia aggravated assault conviction as a Guidelines “crime of violence” because United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024)—relying on United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018)—foreclosed Carter’s mens rea-based argument.
• Substantive reasonableness: The court held the 78-month sentence was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances, Carter’s extensive criminal history, the dangerous circumstances of the offense (including the chase), and the district court’s discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A within-Guidelines sentence is ordinarily expected to be reasonable.
• Concurrence (Abudu, J.): While joining the judgment under the deferential standard, Judge Abudu urged courts to more carefully engage with research suggesting that increasing punishment severity has limited deterrent effect, highlighting the statutory “parsimony” principle: a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Guidelines “crime of violence” and mens rea arguments: United States v. Hicks and United States v. Morales-Alonso

Carter’s primary procedural claim was that Georgia aggravated assault is broader than “generic aggravated assault” because (as he framed it) Georgia purportedly reaches “ordinary recklessness,” while the generic offense is narrower; therefore, the prior conviction should not qualify under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) & 4B1.2(a)(2).

The panel treated this as an argument already decided:

• In United States v. Morales-Alonso, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the elements of aggravated assault [under Georgia law] are substantially the same as the elements of generic aggravated assault,” making the Georgia offense a Guidelines “crime[] of violence.”
• In United States v. Hicks, the court addressed a mens rea-based attempt to distinguish Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon from the generic offense and held the argument was foreclosed by Morales-Alonso.

The Carter panel applied the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent practice: because Hicks already rejected the mens rea overbreadth challenge, the district court correctly treated the Georgia conviction as a “crime of violence,” and the panel affirmed without revisiting the merits of Carter’s narrower framing.

2) Standards of review and the procedural/substantive framework

• United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016) supplied the opinion’s two-step framework: (i) procedural reasonableness, then (ii) substantive reasonableness.
• United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256 (11th Cir. 2025) supported de novo review of Guidelines interpretation, including whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence.”

3) Substantive reasonableness, deference, and weighing the § 3553(a) factors

The panel’s reasonableness analysis is anchored in a line of cases emphasizing deferential review and broad district-court discretion:

• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) articulated abuse-of-discretion review and the three principal ways a district court can impose a substantively unreasonable sentence (misweighting, irrelevant factor, clear error of judgment).
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (Opinion of E. Carnes, J.) was quoted for the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” approach—appellate courts do not re-sentence defendants.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) supported the “ordinarily expect” presumption that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable and that being well below the statutory maximum is an additional reasonableness indicator.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) reinforced the abuse-of-discretion structure for substantive review.
• United States v. Castaneda, 997 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2021) reiterated the expectation of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.
• United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014) reinforced that sentences well below the statutory maximum can signal reasonableness.

4) What counts as “consideration” of mitigation and § 3553(a) arguments

• United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007) supported the point that a court does not “ignore” mitigation evidence merely because it does not discuss it at length.
• United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) was cited (through Butler) for the sufficiency of a court’s acknowledgment that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and arguments.
• United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) reinforced that courts need not recite “magic words.”

5) Factual bases at sentencing and reliance on experience

• United States v. Matthews, 3 F.4th 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883 (11th Cir. 2013) supported that sentencing findings may rest on plea admissions, undisputed PSI facts, hearing evidence, and reasonable inferences.
• United States v. Brenes-Colon, 136 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009)) supported the proposition that judges may use experience and common sense, not only empirical studies, when evaluating deterrence and seriousness.

6) Due process / sentencing on false premises and plain error

• Carter invoked the due process concept that sentencing based on unsupportable assumptions can be unconstitutional, citing United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984) and United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
• The opinion noted that, to the extent Carter was raising an unpreserved due process claim, review would be for plain error under United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2022).
• The panel also acknowledged intra-doctrinal labeling friction between “procedural” and “substantive” challenges, citing United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring), but found no reversible error under either framing.

7) The concurrence’s added authorities on deterrence and parsimony

Judge Abudu’s concurrence—while not altering the judgment—situated Carter’s deterrence arguments within broader debates about the marginal deterrent value of longer sentences, citing:

• United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994)) on the discretion “range of choice” concept.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) as an example where the Supreme Court accepted a district court’s reasonable view that imprisonment was not necessary for deterrence or protection in that case.
• The research materials Carter cited (and the concurrence discussed) included the DOJ/National Institute of Justice deterrence summary and other academic/policy sources (e.g., Daniel S. Nagin; Marc Mauer; VERA Institute), underscoring that deterrence may depend more on certainty than severity—an argument the concurrence suggested warrants closer judicial attention in future cases.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why the “crime of violence” enhancement stood

The operative reasoning was straightforwardly hierarchical. Carter conceded the Eleventh Circuit had already held Georgia aggravated assault qualifies as a Guidelines “crime of violence,” but attempted to reframe the issue around mens rea and “generic aggravated assault.” The panel treated that reframing as already resolved by United States v. Hicks, which itself relied on United States v. Morales-Alonso. Accordingly, no procedural error occurred in the Guidelines calculation.

2) Why the top-of-range sentence was affirmed

On substantive review, the court emphasized the breadth of district-court discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. The district court:

• considered offense seriousness beyond “simple possession” due to the high-speed chase and risk to the public;
• considered mitigation (mental health/substance abuse history; family support);
• gave significant weight to aggravation (extensive criminal history, prior prison terms that did not deter, commission while on supervision);
• selected a sentence within the Guidelines and well below the statutory maximum (15 years).

Carter’s main reasonableness attack—that the court relied on an improper “belief” about deterrence—failed because deterrence is an explicit, relevant factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and the district court’s comments were tied to Carter’s individual history (specific deterrence) rather than an irrelevant consideration.

Impact

• Guidelines litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: Even though this opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it illustrates that within the circuit, mens rea-based challenges seeking to relitigate whether Georgia aggravated assault is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) will likely be treated as foreclosed by United States v. Hicks and United States v. Morales-Alonso, absent intervening en banc or Supreme Court authority.
• Sentencing appeals generally: The decision reinforces how difficult it is to overturn a within-Guidelines sentence on substantive grounds in the Eleventh Circuit given the “ballpark” concept and the deference afforded to district courts’ weighing of factors.
• Deterrence research as a sentencing input: Judge Abudu’s concurrence signals an opening—not doctrinally binding, but practically notable—for litigants to more robustly develop records on deterrence and recidivism (and for judges to engage them) when applying the parsimony clause, especially where courts rely on intuitions about longer incarceration producing greater deterrence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Crime of violence” (Guidelines): A Guidelines term that triggers higher offense levels in certain contexts (here, firearm sentencing). Whether a prior state conviction qualifies can substantially increase the advisory range.
• “Generic” offense and overbreadth: When the Guidelines refer to an enumerated offense (like “aggravated assault”), courts often compare the elements of the state statute to the “generic” definition. If the state statute covers more conduct than the generic definition, it can be “overbroad” and not count. Carter argued Georgia’s mental state requirement made it broader; the panel held precedent already rejected this.
• Mens rea: The mental state required for a crime (intent, knowledge, recklessness, etc.). Carter’s theory depended on Georgia aggravated assault allowing conviction with a lower mental state than the generic federal concept.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural review asks whether the court followed correct steps (e.g., correct Guidelines range). Substantive review asks whether the final sentence is reasonable in light of § 3553(a) and the totality of circumstances.
• Parsimony principle (“not greater than necessary”): The statutory command in § 3553(a) that the sentence should be sufficient to achieve the sentencing purposes, but no longer than needed—central to the concurrence’s deterrence discussion.

Conclusion

Carter’s appeal failed for two core reasons. First, his attempt to exclude Georgia aggravated assault from the Guidelines “crime of violence” definition—framed around mens rea and generic aggravated assault—was foreclosed by United States v. Hicks and United States v. Morales-Alonso. Second, his within-Guidelines, top-of-range sentence was affirmed under deferential abuse-of-discretion review, where the district court permissibly emphasized deterrence, public safety, and a lengthy pattern of recidivism while also acknowledging mitigation.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion underscores the practical force of existing Eleventh Circuit authority on Georgia aggravated assault and highlights (through Judge Abudu’s concurrence) an emerging judicial interest in more evidence-driven engagement with deterrence assumptions when applying § 3553(a)’s parsimony mandate.