Medley: Louisiana Endorses Narrow Ban on Knowing Falsehoods in Judicial Campaigns and Confirms Commission Authority to Sanction Serious Campaign Finance Misconduct

Introduction

In In re: Judge Jennifer M. Medley, No. 2025-O-00879 (La. Oct. 24, 2025), the Supreme Court of Louisiana imposed a 30-day suspension without pay on an Orleans Parish civil district court judge for campaign-related misconduct. The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana charged Judge Medley with four counts of ethical violations arising from a contentious 2020 judicial election against then-incumbent Judge Christopher Bruno. The Court found clear and convincing evidence of violations on two counts: knowingly false campaign statements in a “deadbeat dad” advertisement (Count II) and unreported campaign expenditures made via personal electronic transfers (Count IV). It dismissed two counts: a “scorned woman” advertisement about one of Judge Bruno’s cases (Count I) and an alleged attempt to circumvent campaign finance limits through a third-party personal loan later used to fund her campaign (Count III).

The opinion sets important guardrails for judicial campaign speech and campaign finance compliance. It clarifies that:

Louisiana’s Canon 7A(9) constitutionally prohibits judicial candidates from knowingly making false statements about opponents, a narrow restriction that survives strict scrutiny.
The Judiciary Commission may treat serious violations of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (CFDA) as judicial misconduct under La. Const. art. V, § 25(C), even though the Board of Ethics enforces the CFDA—i.e., Commission authority is not ousted by the Board’s jurisdiction.
Discipline cannot rest on mere “appearance” of legal circumvention or on uncharged theories; the Commission must prove charged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence and provide fair notice of the specific allegations.

Summary of the Opinion

After receiving referrals and complaints, the Judiciary Commission prosecuted four counts. Following stipulated facts and a waiver of hearing, the hearing officer found violations on all counts. The Commission recommended a 30-day suspension without pay and reimbursement of $5,494.81 in costs.

The Supreme Court:

Count II (Deadbeat Dad Ad): Affirmed violations of Canons 7A(9), 7B(1), 7B(3) and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Judge Medley knowingly made false statements about opponent Judge Bruno’s child support history and discovery conduct, and allowed those statements to be echoed on campaign social media. The First Amendment does not protect knowing falsehoods by judicial candidates.
Count IV (Unreported Zelle Reimbursements): Affirmed a violation of Canon 7B(1) and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Judge Medley made two personal electronic payments ($700 and $500) to a campaign video participant to reimburse campaign-related expenses, failed to report them on campaign finance filings, and did not maintain the required records. The Commission may treat serious CFDA reporting failures as judicial misconduct.
Count I (Scorned Woman Ad): Dismissed. The Court held the video conveyed a litigant’s perception and the Commission failed to prove that Judge Medley knowingly made false statements about Judge Bruno’s bias. The Commission also could not discipline for a statement (“Actual Rape Victim” chyron) that was not included in the formal charges, honoring due-process notice requirements.
Count III (Loan from IV Capital): Dismissed. The Board of Ethics found insufficient evidence of a CFDA violation, and the Commission conceded no clear CFDA breach. The Court rejected discipline premised on an “appearance” of circumventing the law or exploitation of a “loophole” absent clear and convincing proof of misconduct.

Sanction: 30-day suspension without pay and partial cost assessment ($2,747.41), reflecting that only half of the charges were proven.

Chief Justice Weimer concurred, underscoring heightened First Amendment protection for judicial campaign speech, cautioning against over-sanctioning, noting that knowing falsehoods can be sanctioned, and flagging excessive delay in the proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and State v. Burgess, 543 So. 2d 1332 (La. 1989): Frame the constitutional standard for false speech about public officials—actual malice (knowing falsity or reckless disregard). While Sullivan operates in the tort context, the Court uses it to demarcate the boundary between protected and sanctionable political speech.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995): Political speech, including campaign advocacy, is “core” speech entitled to exacting or strict scrutiny; government must narrowly tailor restrictions to a compelling interest. The Court acknowledges this gold-standard protection.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2016): These cases inform the permissible scope of regulating judicial campaign speech. The Court aligns with Winter’s holding that a ban on conscious falsehoods is narrowly tailored and constitutional, while broader bans on “misleading” or negligent misstatements are suspect.
In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000), on reh’g, 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001): Offered by Medley as a multi-step approach for adjudicating alleged false campaign speech. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not adopt Chmura’s framework; instead, it focused on Canon 7A(9)’s text (knowing falsity) and Winter’s strict-scrutiny-approved narrow prohibition.
Bruno v. Medley, 310 So. 3d 580 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2020): The Fourth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against Medley’s “deadbeat dad” ad, finding actual malice. The Supreme Court leaned on that record in concluding Medley knowingly advanced false statements.
In re Cascio, 683 So. 2d 1202 (La. 1996): Public censure for misrepresenting incumbency; used for sanctioning guidance emphasizing the harm wrought by misrepresentations about a candidate’s identity or qualifications.
In re Decuir, 654 So. 2d 687 (La. 1995): Public censure for campaign finance reporting failures; instructive for treating CFDA noncompliance as judicial misconduct when serious.
In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259 (La. 1989): Provides the non-exhaustive factors for tailoring judicial discipline (pattern, frequency, context, acknowledgment, prior history, effect on the judiciary, etc.).
Advanced Benefits Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, 392 So. 3d 308 (La. 2024): Cited by Medley for an exclusive-jurisdiction argument. The Court rejected exclusivity, clarifying that the Commission can address conduct as judicial misconduct even if another body (here, the Board of Ethics) enforces the underlying statute.
Constitutional and Canonical Provisions: La. Const. art. V, § 25(C) (judicial discipline; willful misconduct and bringing office into disrepute); Canon 7A(9) (no knowing false statements about candidate/opponent); Canon 7B(1) (dignity, impartiality, integrity, independence); Canon 7B(3) (reasonable measures to prevent prohibited campaign activities by others).

Legal Reasoning

1) The constitutional boundary: a narrow, strict-scrutiny-compliant prohibition

The Court threads a careful First Amendment needle. It recognizes that judicial campaign speech is core political speech and thus merits strict scrutiny. Yet it endorses Winter v. Wolnitzek’s conclusion that a ban on knowing falsehoods is narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of preserving judicial integrity. Crucially, Canon 7A(9) targets only knowing false statements. The Court expressly notes the Canon does not criminalize negligent misstatements or mere “misleading” content—both of which risk chilling protected speech and fail narrow tailoring in analogous cases.

2) Applying the rule to Count II: knowing falsehoods about child support and discovery

The “deadbeat dad” ad accused Judge Bruno of refusing to pay child support for thirteen years and obstructing discovery of his income. That was contradicted by the divorce record (which showed retroactive support beginning in 2007 via a 2009 consent judgment, credits for payments, and payments of tuition and health insurance). Medley testified she reviewed the record and knew facts inconsistent with the ad’s claims. She also admitted there was no evidence anyone else called Bruno a “deadbeat dad.” Those admissions, coupled with the injunction record (affirmed with an actual-malice finding), supported the conclusion that her statements were knowingly false. Thus, the Court found violations of Canons 7A(9), 7B(1), and 7B(3), and willful misconduct under La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).

On the TRO component, while a contempt finding did not issue below, the Court emphasized that the lack of contempt did not transform knowingly false speech into protected speech nor immunize repeating false assertions on social media.

3) Count I dismissal: perception, fair notice, and the limits of discipline

The “scorned woman” video presented the first-person perspective of a litigant from Doe v. Lewis. Although the JCOC faulted the ad and the Commission argued bias and falsehood, the Supreme Court found:

The video conveyed the litigant’s perception. On this record, the Court could not say Medley knowingly made false statements.
The Commission expanded its theory to include the “Actual Rape Victim” chyron, but that allegation had not been charged. Under In re Quirk, due process demands fair notice of charges; sanctioning on an uncharged theory is impermissible.

The dismissal signals that campaign rhetoric and characterizations—without proof of knowing falsity and with notice defects—will not sustain discipline.

4) Count IV: serious CFDA failures as judicial misconduct

Medley made two personal Zelle payments to the Doe v. Lewis plaintiff to cover campaign-related expenses and failed to report them as expenditures or maintain required EFT records, as mandated by the CFDA. The Commission discovered them only after subpoenas. Medley admitted the omission and delayed amending until 2025. The Court held that, notwithstanding the Board of Ethics’ enforcement role, the Commission can discipline serious CFDA violations when they reflect willful misconduct inconsistent with Canon 7B(1)’s integrity requirement and La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Here, the totality showed knowing non-reporting with an apparent intent to conceal, warranting discipline.

5) Count III dismissal: compliance with law and the insufficiency of “appearance”

Medley obtained a secured personal loan from IV Capital, then loaned the same amount to her campaign. The Board of Ethics declined to proceed, and the Commission conceded no clear CFDA violation. The Court rejected the Commission’s reliance on the “appearance” of circumvention or “loophole” exploitation. Judicial discipline requires clear and convincing proof of charged misconduct. Compliance with the letter of the law—without more—is not sanctionable. The Court also rejected Medley’s claim that the Board of Ethics has exclusive jurisdiction, clarifying concurrent spheres: the Commission may adjudicate judicial misconduct that involves serious CFDA breaches, but not penalize mere optics or policy objections to lawful conduct.

6) Sanction and Chaisson factors

Applying the Chaisson factors, the Court weighed campaign-phase misconduct against the integrity of the judiciary, noted Medley’s prior 2022 admonition (unrelated courtroom contempt), and recognized the Commission’s significant delay but found it not sufficiently mitigating. It imposed a 30-day suspension and half costs ($2,747.41), reflecting that only Counts II and IV were proven.

Impact

Speech regulation narrowed and clarified: Louisiana firmly adopts a strict-scrutiny-compliant rule: judicial candidates may be disciplined for knowing false statements about an opponent. Broader prohibitions on “misleading” or negligent statements are disfavored, reducing chilling effects while protecting voters from conscious deception.
Campaign finance enforcement overlap: Even though the Board of Ethics enforces the CFDA, the Commission may treat serious CFDA violations as judicial misconduct under La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Expect the Commission to pursue unreported or concealed expenditures and record-keeping lapses that reflect on integrity. Conversely, lawful structuring—even if politically controversial—will not be disciplined absent proof of misconduct.
Charging discipline demands specificity: The Court reaffirmed that judges must receive fair notice of the particular statements or acts alleged to be unethical. Agencies must avoid expanding theories midstream. This will shape how Notices of Hearing are drafted and litigated.
Social media caution: Reposting or amplifying knowingly false assertions on campaign platforms can constitute Canon 7 violations, even where contempt for violating a TRO is not found. Campaigns must align digital messaging with ethical constraints.
Sanction benchmark: A 30-day suspension for two sustained counts (knowing falsehood and serious unreported expenditures) provides a reference point for future discipline involving both speech and finance misconduct.
Procedural timeliness: The concurring opinion’s concern about delay may drive process reforms or heightened scrutiny of prolonged disciplinary timelines, especially in election-sensitive contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strict Scrutiny: The most demanding constitutional test for restrictions on speech. The government must show a compelling interest (here, judicial integrity) and that the restriction is narrowly tailored (here, a ban on knowing falsehoods, not broader “misleading” speech).
Knowing Falsehood vs. Misleading/Negligent Statements: A “knowing” falsehood is a statement made with awareness of its falsity. “Misleading” or negligent statements may be mistaken or imprecise; they generally remain protected to ensure “breathing space” for political debate.
Actual Malice (Sullivan standard): In defamation law, “actual malice” means the speaker knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for truth. While a tort concept, it helps mark the boundary between protected and sanctionable campaign speech.
Clear and Convincing Evidence: A heightened standard of proof requiring the factfinder to be firmly convinced of the truth of the allegations—more than a preponderance but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. It governs judicial discipline in Louisiana.
Canon 7A(9), 7B(1), 7B(3): Louisiana’s judicial ethics canons governing campaign conduct. 7A(9) bars knowingly false statements about candidates; 7B(1) demands dignity and integrity; 7B(3) requires reasonable measures to prevent others (campaign staff, surrogates) from engaging in prohibited acts on the candidate’s behalf.
La. Const. art. V, § 25(C): The constitutional basis for judicial discipline, covering willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the office into disrepute.
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (CFDA): Louisiana’s statutory framework (La. R.S. 18:1481 et seq.) for disclosing contributions and expenditures, ensuring transparency. The Board of Ethics enforces it, but serious violations can also be treated as judicial misconduct.
TRO/Preliminary Injunction: A TRO temporarily restrains conduct (e.g., airing an ad) until a court can hold a fuller hearing. A preliminary injunction extends restraint pending final adjudication if the movant shows likely success and irreparable harm.
Fair Notice in Discipline: Due process requires that judges be specifically informed of the alleged misconduct. New or expanded theories not noticed cannot support sanctions.

Conclusion

In re Medley significantly shapes Louisiana’s law at the intersection of judicial campaign speech and ethics enforcement. The Supreme Court:

Affirmed that Canon 7A(9)’s narrow ban on knowing false statements about an opponent passes strict scrutiny, and that such falsehoods can support discipline alongside duties to preserve dignity and to restrain campaign surrogates’ conduct (Canons 7B(1) and 7B(3)).
Confirmed that the Judiciary Commission may treat serious CFDA violations as willful judicial misconduct under the Constitution, without relying on exclusive Board of Ethics jurisdiction.
Insisted on due-process specificity in charge drafting and rejected discipline predicated on an “appearance” of illegality or on lawful conduct disfavored as a “loophole.”

The Court’s measured approach protects robust political speech in judicial elections while preserving a vital backstop against conscious deception and serious opacity in campaign finances. For judicial candidates and their counsel, Medley supplies a clear compliance blueprint: vet claims rigorously, avoid knowing falsehoods, police campaign team messaging, and scrupulously disclose and document all campaign expenditures. For the Commission and the Board of Ethics, it delineates complementary roles and evidentiary rigor. The 30-day suspension serves as both sanction and signal: Louisiana will not tolerate knowing falsehoods or serious reporting failures that corrode public confidence in an impartial, dignified judiciary.