Medina v. Bauby: Reinforcing the Exhaustion Imperative for Federal Habeas Corpus under § 2241

Introduction

Case Name: Delano Medina v. August Bauby & Jennifer Hansen
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: April 1, 2025
Docket No.: 24-1495 (D. Colo. No. 1:24-CV-02104-LTB-RTG)

Delano Medina, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenged the calculation of his sentence for parole‐eligibility purposes. The Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) respondents moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the petition without prejudice for non‐exhaustion, denied a certificate of appealability (COA) and in forma pauperis (IFP) status, and deemed any appeal not taken in good faith. Mr. Medina appealed, and the Tenth Circuit denied COA, denied IFP, and dismissed the matter as frivolous.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Medina failed to make the “substantial showing” required for a COA under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He did not challenge the district court’s finding that he had not exhausted a federal constitutional claim in a complete round of state appellate review, as mandated by O’ Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Instead, his briefing raised issues never presented below (the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Rule 60(b) motion to reopen another habeas petition). Because those issues were forfeited and he failed to show jurists of reason could debate the district court’s procedural ruling, the Tenth Circuit denied COA, denied IFP, and dismissed the appeal as frivolous.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999): Established that, for exhaustion, a habeas petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” The court applied this rule to require finality in state post‐conviction proceedings before federal habeas review.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973): Held that federal prisoners challenging the fact or duration of confinement must proceed via habeas corpus, not § 1983. The Tenth Circuit cited this in a prior Medina decision to reject turning a parole‐calculation challenge into a § 1983 claim.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Articulated the COA standard, requiring a showing that “jurists of reason could disagree” on the district court’s resolution of constitutional or procedural questions.
Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2000): Interpreted § 2253(c)(1)(A) to encompass challenges to state‐court detention orders under § 2241.
James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013): Reminds that pro se filings are liberally construed but a court need not act as advocate.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three stages:

Exhaustion Requirement: Because Mr. Medina sought relief under § 2241, he had to exhaust state remedies by presenting his federal constitutional claim through a full round of appeals in the Colorado courts. At the time of filing, one state post‐conviction case was pending and not finally resolved. His two prior state petitions were not factually or legally identical to the federal claim now pressed.
COA Standard: Under § 2253(c), the court must issue a COA if the petitioner makes a “substantial showing” of the denial of a constitutional right. Where a petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show both that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim” and “whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484.
Forfeiture of New Arguments: Mr. Medina raised in his COA application: (a) that § 1983 could redress his parole eligibility claim and (b) that the district court erred in refusing to reopen a separate habeas petition under Rule 60(b). These arguments were litigated and rejected in two earlier appeals, and—in any event—were never presented to the district court in this case. They are therefore not properly before the Tenth Circuit, and do nothing to demonstrate error in the non-exhaustion ruling.

Impact

This decision, although non-precedential for binding purposes, underscores key lessons:

Strict Adherence to Exhaustion: Pro se habeas petitioners must ensure that every federal constitutional claim has been fairly presented and finally decided (or withdrawn) in state court before seeking § 2241 relief. Ongoing state proceedings bar federal filings under the exhaustion doctrine.
Procedural Discipline in COA Applications: A COA brief must squarely address the district court’s grounds for dismissal. Attempting to relitigate old issues or raising new ones not argued below will not satisfy the “jurists of reason” standard.
Limits on § 1983 for Sentence Calculation Claims: Reinforces that challenges to the length or computation of confinement remain within the exclusive domain of federal habeas corpus, not § 1983.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exhaustion Doctrine: Before a federal court will review a habeas petition, the petitioner must first give state courts a full and fair opportunity to decide his federal claims—a requirement designed to respect state judicial processes and conserve judicial resources.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A procedural gatekeeping device ensuring that only petitions raising debatable constitutional errors or procedural mistakes proceed on appeal. The petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists” could disagree with the district court’s ruling.
In Forma Pauperis (IFP): Permits an indigent litigant to proceed without prepaying court fees, but requires showing both financial inability and a nonfrivolous legal argument.
Pro Se Liberal Construction: Courts interpret filings by unrepresented litigants broadly, but will not manufacture arguments or serve as counsel.

Conclusion

Medina v. Bauby reaffirms the bedrock principle that state prisoners seeking relief in federal habeas corpus must exhaust all available state remedies, including completing the state appellate process on each constitutional claim. The denial of a COA underscores the necessity of targeting the district court’s actual grounds for dismissal and avoiding collateral or previously decided contentions. While non-precedential under Tenth Circuit rules, the decision carries persuasive force, reminding habeas petitioners—especially those proceeding pro se—to adhere strictly to procedural prerequisites and to frame their appeals precisely. In the broader context, the ruling preserves the balance between federal habeas review and state‐court adjudication of federal constitutional issues.