Medication-Compliance Language May Clarify, Not Expand, an Oral Mental-Health Condition; Reasonable-Suspicion Electronic-Device Search Conditions Upheld Where the Record Shows E-Communications

Case: United States v. Woods, No. 23-6012 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2025) (Amended Summary Order)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judges Wesley, Park, Robinson)

Disposition: Judgment affirmed

Note on Persuasive Status: This is a Second Circuit “summary order.” Under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but does not have precedential effect. It nonetheless offers practical guidance on two recurrent issues: (1) how a written judgment may clarify an orally imposed supervised-release condition, and (2) how and when electronic-device search conditions survive procedural and substantive challenge.

Introduction

The Second Circuit affirmed a sentence imposed by the Southern District of New York (Briccetti, J.) on Tishawn C. Woods, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). He received 240 months’ imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release with six special conditions.

On appeal, Woods challenged two special conditions of supervised release:

• Special Condition Two (Mental Health Treatment and Medication Compliance): Participation in an outpatient mental-health program “approved by the Probation Office” and to “continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the health care provider.”
• Special Condition Three (Electronic-Device Search Authority): Submission of his computers, other electronic communication or data-storage devices, and cloud storage/media to searches “at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner,” “upon reasonable suspicion” of a supervision violation or unlawful conduct.

The appeal raised two central issues familiar to post-sentencing practice: (1) when “clarifying language” in a written judgment conflicts with, or permissibly explicates, an oral pronouncement; and (2) when electronic search conditions are sufficiently justified and narrowly tailored under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).

Summary of the Opinion

• Mental-health condition (Special Condition Two): The court held there was no impermissible variance between the oral and written sentences. Because the sentencing judge expressly stated the exact wording would be “spelled out” in the written judgment using his “standard language,” and because outpatient mental-health treatment “plainly includes” the possibility of prescription medication, the medication-compliance clause was a permissible clarification—not a new or more burdensome condition. The panel found no error even under de novo review.
• Electronic-device search condition (Special Condition Three): The court rejected both procedural and substantive challenges. Procedurally, even absent particularized findings, the justification was “self-evident” from the record: Woods coordinated with co-conspirators via Facebook Messenger to execute a violent robbery spree. Substantively, the condition was narrowly tailored—limited by reasonable suspicion and reasonableness in time and manner—and consistent with the reduced privacy expectations during supervised release. No plain error was found.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008): Establishes the district court’s broad discretion in imposing supervised-release conditions, generally reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010), and United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010): When a defendant fails to object at sentencing, review is for plain error under the four-part Marcus test. The panel applied plain-error review to Special Condition Three.
• United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2018), and United States v. Rosado, 109 F.4th 120 (2d Cir. 2024): If a defendant lacks notice of a sentencing term (e.g., if it first appears in the written judgment), the appellate court reviews de novo despite no contemporaneous objection. Woods arguably lacked notice of the medication clause, but the panel found no error even under de novo review.
• United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1999): The oral sentence generally controls over the written judgment. However, written judgments may permissibly “clarify” ambiguous oral pronouncements without adding new, burdensome terms.
• United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by United States v. Maiorana, No. 22-1115-CR, 2025 WL 2471027 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025), and United States v. Moyles, 724 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983):
  • Moyles allowed written judgments to resolve ambiguities absent material variance.
  • Truscello had permitted adding certain supervised-release conditions in the written judgment as “clarifications.”
  • Maiorana narrows this: courts cannot use “clarification” to add discretionary supervised-release conditions not articulated orally. The Woods panel harmonizes this landscape: a written judgment may still clarify an ambiguous oral condition, but may not add new, discretionary conditions. The medication-compliance clause fell on the “clarification” side.
• United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2018) (polygraph condition): A written judgment’s addition of polygraph testing as part of sex-offender treatment was impermissible because polygraphs are burdensome and “not a necessary or invariable part” of treatment. The panel contrasts this with medication compliance as a natural, foreseeable feature of outpatient mental-health treatment.
• United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018) and United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Special conditions must be reasonably related to statutory factors and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary; district courts should provide individualized assessments, though appellate courts may affirm where the rationale is “self-evident” from the record.
• United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025); United States v. Washington, No. 22-688-CR, 2024 WL 2232464 (2d Cir. May 17, 2024) (summary order); United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104 (2d Cir. 2025): The Second Circuit has “frequently approved” electronic-search conditions where the offense conduct involved electronic devices or communications, and sometimes even when it did not, provided the record supports the need and the condition is tailored.
• United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024): Reiterates the district court’s wide latitude to impose conditions deemed appropriate.
• United States v. Oliveras, 96 F.4th 298 (2d Cir. 2024), and Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514 (2019): Supervised release carries a “conditional liberty”; supervisees have a diminished expectation of privacy relative to ordinary citizens.
• United States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2025): Upholds similarly tailored electronic-search conditions as consistent with § 3583(d)’s requirements.

Legal Reasoning

I. Special Condition Two (Mental-Health Treatment and Medication Compliance)

The sentencing colloquy is decisive. Woods explicitly requested mental-health treatment—“every program possible”—and his counsel recommended evaluations and treatment for childhood trauma. The district judge announced he would “accept” that recommendation, and, critically, stated on the record that the “exact language” would be set out in the written judgment, using “standard language” the judge had “imposed in the past.”

Against that backdrop, the panel framed the doctrinal question: under the oral-vs.-written rule, may a written judgment include a medication-compliance clause when the oral pronouncement imposed outpatient mental-health treatment but left the details for the written judgment? Applying A-Abras, Moyles, and the Truscello-Maiorana line, the court held that:

• The oral pronouncement contained “genuine ambiguity” because it deferred the precise wording to the written judgment and invoked “standard language.”
• The medication-compliance clause “merely clarified” the treatment condition; it did not impose a “new burdensome” restriction or create a “substantive discrepancy.”
• Outpatient mental-health treatment “plainly includes the possibility” of prescribed medication; unlike polygraphs in Washington (2018), medication is a foreseeable, ordinary component of clinical treatment and not an “invariable” but burdensome add-on.

On standard of review, the panel did not need to resolve whether plain-error or de novo review applied because it found no error even under de novo review. That approach reflects Washington and Rosado: if a defendant lacked notice of a sentencing term that first appeared in the written judgment, de novo review may be appropriate; here, even on that more stringent standard, the clarification stood.

II. Special Condition Three (Electronic-Device Search Authority)

Woods mounted both procedural and substantive challenges to the electronic-search condition. He argued the district court insufficiently explained the need for device searches given that the offenses were violent, not cyber-based; and he characterized the search authority as an “unfettered” intrusion on liberty.

The panel rejected both contentions:

• Procedural sufficiency (“self-evident” rationale): Although sentencing courts should make individualized findings, appellate courts may affirm where the rationale is clear from the record. Here, it was “self-evident”: Woods coordinated the robbery conspiracy with co-conspirators using Facebook Messenger, and the spree included four gun-point robberies, one a home invasion, with two discharges and near-fatal injury. The link between electronic communications and offense conduct justified the search condition.
• Substantive reasonableness and tailoring: The condition was cabined by “reasonable suspicion” of criminal or supervision violations, and by “reasonable time” and “reasonable manner” limits. Supervisees’ privacy expectations are diminished. In line with Lewis, Robinson, and Lawrence, this tailoring satisfied § 3583(d)’s “no greater deprivation than necessary” requirement. The panel expressly rejected the “unfettered ability” characterization.

Because Woods did not object at sentencing, the panel reviewed for plain error and found none.

Impact and Practical Significance

Though not precedential, Woods offers concrete, citable guidance on two recurring supervised-release issues:

• Clarification vs. Addition in Written Judgments (Post-Maiorana):
  • District courts may use written judgments to clarify the details of an ambiguously phrased oral condition—particularly when the court says at sentencing that standard wording will follow—without running afoul of the “oral controls” rule.
  • However, after Maiorana, courts should avoid adding discrete, discretionary conditions in the written judgment that were not embraced in substance at sentencing. Woods shows how to remain on the safe side: medication compliance tied to an already-imposed outpatient mental-health condition, with clinical discretion (“unless otherwise instructed by the health care provider”).
• Medication-Compliance Language:
  • When outpatient mental-health treatment is ordered, requiring compliance with medications prescribed by a licensed provider—subject to professional modification—will generally be viewed as part and parcel of the treatment condition, not a separate, burdensome penalty.
  • Defense counsel who want limits should seek explicit on-the-record qualifiers (e.g., medication decisions rest with the clinician; no particular drug class mandated; periodic medical review) and should object if such terms appear for the first time in the written judgment.
• Electronic-Device Search Conditions:
  • Where the record shows any meaningful nexus between offense conduct and electronic communications (even in “non-cyber” crimes), a search condition limited by reasonable suspicion, and reasonable time/manner, is likely to be sustained.
  • District judges should articulate the nexus and the tailoring; but where the connection is obvious from the record, the Second Circuit may affirm under the “self-evident” rationale.
  • To withstand substantive challenge, include safeguards—reasonable suspicion, time/manner reasonableness, and scope tailored to the risk and offense history.
• Standards of Review and Preservation:
  • Unobjected-to conditions trigger plain-error review; objections matter. If the written judgment adds a term without notice, de novo review may be available—but success still depends on showing an impermissible variance rather than a permissible clarification.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release vs. Probation: Supervised release follows a term of imprisonment. It imposes conditions enforced by probation officers. Violating conditions can lead to revocation and reimprisonment.
• Special Conditions: Beyond “standard” conditions, courts can impose individualized “special” conditions if reasonably related to offense conduct, defendant characteristics, deterrence/public protection needs, and treatment/rehabilitation goals, and if they do not deprive liberty more than necessary.
• Oral Pronouncement Controls: The sentence pronounced in court (in the defendant’s presence) generally controls over later-written terms. But if the oral language is ambiguous, the written judgment may clarify it—so long as it does not add new, burdensome conditions.
• Plain Error (appellate standard): If no objection was made below, the appellant must show a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• De Novo Review: The appellate court reviews the issue anew, without deference, commonly used where the defendant lacked notice of a sentencing term added only in the written judgment.
• Reasonable Suspicion (search context): A specific, articulable basis to believe a supervision violation or unlawful conduct occurred or is occurring. It is less than probable cause but more than a mere hunch, and it meaningfully limits officers’ discretion.
• Hobbs Act Robbery: A federal robbery offense affecting interstate commerce, often used to prosecute robbery conspiracies and related violent conduct.
• 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Provides mandatory consecutive penalties for using, carrying, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, with higher penalties for brandishing and higher still for discharging.

Conclusion

United States v. Woods underscores two practical points for supervised-release jurisprudence in the Second Circuit. First, when a sentencing court imposes outpatient mental-health treatment and explicitly defers to “standard language” for the written judgment, incorporating a medication-compliance clause is a permissible clarification—not an impermissible expansion—so long as clinical discretion remains with the provider. This approach aligns with the oral-controls principle as refined by A-Abras, Rosado, and post-Maiorana jurisprudence, and distinguishes truly burdensome, non-inherent additions like polygraph testing in Washington (2018).

Second, electronic-device search conditions will generally withstand challenge when (i) the record demonstrates a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and electronic communications, and (ii) the condition is limited by reasonable suspicion and reasonable time/manner. The panel’s reliance on the offense’s use of Facebook Messenger, combined with the condition’s safeguards and the supervisee’s diminished privacy, demonstrates how tailored digital search conditions can be both procedurally sound (“self-evident” from the record) and substantively reasonable.

Although this is a non-precedential summary order, it provides persuasive, citable guidance on common sentencing and supervised-release issues: drafting and preserving the record at sentencing, drawing the line between permissible clarifications and forbidden additions in written judgments, and tailoring electronic-search conditions to the offense, the defendant, and the statutory requirements of proportionality and necessity.