Measured Delay Does Not Defeat the Emergency Exception to Warrantless Home Entry

Case: People v Edwards, 2026 NY Slip Op 00171 (App Div, 3d Dept Jan. 15, 2026)

1. Introduction

People v Edwards concerns the constitutionality of a warrantless entry and ensuing protective sweeps of a home after police were dispatched for a welfare check. The key question was whether the “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement justified entry into defendant Rashad Edwards’ apartment—where police found the victim deceased—based on: (i) a missing adult and child reported last known to be at defendant’s residence, (ii) information about prior domestic violence and possible arguing, (iii) cellphone “pinging” near the residence, and (iv) defendant’s sudden appearance at a nearby hospital with multiple stab wounds.

The appeal targeted only the suppression ruling: defendant argued there was no emergency and, notably, that the sergeant’s brief decision to wait for another officer before entering undermined any claim of exigency. The Third Department affirmed, holding that the totality of circumstances supported emergency entry and that a short, safety-oriented delay did not negate the emergency.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and upheld denial of suppression. The court concluded:

• Police had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed and immediate assistance was needed to protect life (the missing victim and child).
• A brief, measured delay to await another officer did not negate the emergency; thoughtful restraint is consistent with the doctrine.
• There was a reasonable basis associating the emergency with defendant’s residence, even if individual data points (like cellphone ping precision) were not certain; the doctrine requires reasonableness, not certitude.
• The entry was not primarily motivated by intent to arrest or seize evidence (to the extent that prong remains applicable under the New York Constitution).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Holding)

• People v Jenkins and People v Sears and People v Alberts: These cases supply the baseline: warrantless home searches are presumptively unreasonable, subject only to “carefully drawn and narrow exceptions.” Edwards uses them to frame the emergency exception as a true exception requiring proof, not a generalized “welfare check” license.
• People v Weber and People v Gibson: Edwards adopts the familiar three-part emergency test as quoted in Weber (reasonable grounds of an emergency; not primarily motivated by arrest/evidence; reasonable basis linking emergency to the place). Gibson reinforces that “reasonable grounds” is evaluated from circumstances confronting officers—often ambiguous and fast-moving—rather than with hindsight.
• People v Mitchell: Mitchell is the doctrinal anchor for New York’s emergency analysis, particularly the insistence on “objective, empirical facts.” Edwards cites Mitchell to validate the trial court’s finding that the officers acted on concrete information (missing victim/child, DV history, cellphone ping, defendant stabbed) rather than speculation.
• People v Musto: Musto is used both for the “objective facts” requirement and to signal that the “motive” prong remains relevant “to the extent” it applies under the New York Constitution. Edwards treats Musto as support for retaining a stricter state-law inquiry than federal Fourth Amendment doctrine may require.
• People v Doll: Doll provides the key explanatory principle Edwards deploys to reject defendant’s certainty-based objections: “the emergency doctrine is premised on reasonableness, not certitude.” This directly answers the argument that police could not be sure the stabbing occurred at the residence or that the ping guaranteed the victim was inside.
• People v Samuel: Samuel underscores why emergency doctrine tolerates rapid action: emergencies can be fatal if police must act with “calm deliberation.” Edwards uses this to contextualize urgent entry given the missing adult and child and the defendant’s stabbing.
• People v Molnar and People v Greenleaf: These are central to Edwards’ “delay” holding. Molnar rejects a rigid definition of emergency that would incentivize premature break-ins; measured delay to exhaust reasonable alternatives (or, here, to await backup) should not be treated as illegality. Greenleaf supports that a brief delay does not negate emergent circumstances.
• People v Mormon: Mormon is cited as a contrast (“compare”)—signaling that in some cases a delay may undermine an emergency claim. The Third Department distinguishes Edwards by characterizing the delay as short and reasonable, not inconsistent with urgency.
• People v Junious and People v Holmes and People v Rossi and People v Manning: These cases bolster that missing-person/welfare-check-type scenarios can satisfy the first prong where facts point to imminent danger, and they reinforce that associating the emergency with a location is a common, fact-intensive inference.
• People v Ringel: Ringel is another contrast (“compare”), reflecting that when factual linkages are thinner or the claimed emergency is less supported, courts may reject warrantless entry. Edwards signals that its facts—missing victim and child, DV history, ping, and defendant’s stabbing—clear that threshold.
• People v Radcliffe and People v Rodriguez: Radcliffe supports the proposition that welfare/emergency entries can be justified where facts link an endangered person to a location. Rodriguez is used for the pragmatic point that emergency decisions are made “swiftly” without “intense scrutiny” of each ambiguity (such as technical limitations of phone tracking).
• Michigan v Fisher: Fisher provides federal Fourth Amendment reinforcement that officers may enter to render emergency aid when facts suggest someone inside may need immediate assistance. Edwards uses it to validate the inference of danger based on the totality of circumstances.
• Brigham City v Stuart, People v Dallas, and People v Carey: These appear in the court’s brief discussion of the “motive” prong. Brigham City reflects the federal trend toward objective reasonableness rather than subjective officer intent; Edwards notes that New York may still consider motive “to the extent” applicable. Dallas and Carey are cited to situate that ongoing New York constitutional inquiry.
• People v McKnight: McKnight supports evaluating the non-investigatory nature of the entry based on the hearing testimony—i.e., whether the officers’ actions were aimed at locating and protecting persons rather than collecting evidence.
• Colao v Mills: Although a civil case, it is cited alongside criminal emergency-entry cases to reinforce broader acceptance of emergency-based actions when immediate safety concerns predominate.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Prong One: Reasonable Grounds of an Emergency

The court treated the emergency question as an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. The “objective, empirical” facts included: (a) the victim and young child were missing and last known to be at defendant’s residence, (b) phone “pinging” placed the victim near that residence, (c) information about prior domestic violence and possible arguing, and (d) the pivotal development that defendant arrived at a nearby hospital with multiple abdominal stab wounds.

Importantly, the court refused to treat the sergeant’s short wait for another officer as inconsistent with an emergency. Relying on People v Molnar, it characterized the delay as a measured, safety-oriented response that should not be penalized—otherwise doctrine would perversely incentivize rash entry to “look” emergent.

2) Prong Three: Reasonable Basis Linking the Emergency to the Place

Edwards rejects defendant’s attempt to atomize and discount each fact (e.g., uncertainty about where defendant was stabbed; uncertainty about ping precision). Citing People v Doll, the court emphasized that the doctrine demands “reasonableness, not certitude.” The linkage to the apartment was reasonable because the victim said she was going there, she and the child never returned, her phone was near the location, and defendant’s stabbing strongly suggested a violent event connected to that setting.

3) Prong Two: Not Primarily Motivated by Arrest/Evidence

Although not a focal point of defendant’s argument, the court addressed it and found an objective basis to conclude the entry was for protection of life, not evidence gathering. By citing People v Musto and the federal cases Brigham City v Stuart and Michigan v Fisher, Edwards situates the inquiry within an evolving overlap between federal “objective reasonableness” and New York’s historically stricter three-part formulation.

C. Impact

Edwards’ practical contribution is not a new three-part test, but a clarifying application with operational guidance:

• Measured delay can strengthen, not weaken, reasonableness. The decision reinforces that waiting briefly for backup or exhausting reasonable means of access does not negate an emergency; courts will not require performative urgency at the expense of safety and judgment.
• “Reasonableness, not certitude” is outcome-determinative in mixed-information cases. Where some facts are probabilistic (cellphone ping) and others are stark (defendant stabbed; missing child), the totality can justify entry even if no single fact proves the emergency.
• Phone-location data is treated as one factor, not a prerequisite. Edwards suggests courts will not demand technical validation of tracking accuracy during fast-moving emergencies; the question is what officers reasonably believed at the time.
• New York’s “motive” prong remains relevant in practice. By explicitly addressing motivation “to the extent” it applies, Edwards encourages litigants to develop hearing records on officers’ purpose and on-scene conduct.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Warrantless entry is presumptively unconstitutional: Police usually need a warrant to enter a home. Exceptions exist, but they are narrow and must be justified.
• Emergency exception: Allows entry without a warrant to prevent death/serious injury or protect property when immediate help is needed.
• “Objective, empirical facts”: Courts look for concrete facts known at the time (missing persons, reports of violence, visible injuries), not after-the-fact rationalizations.
• Totality of the circumstances: Courts assess all facts together; a case can be strong even if each individual fact has some uncertainty.
• Protective sweep / subsequent sweeps: Quick checks of spaces where a person (here, a missing child) might be found; permissible when tied to the emergency purpose and not used as a pretext to search for evidence.
• “Reasonableness, not certitude”: Police need not be sure; they must be reasonable given what they know in the moment.

5. Conclusion

People v Edwards reaffirms New York’s emergency exception framework and adds a practical, litigation-relevant clarification: a brief, safety-driven delay (such as waiting for another officer) does not defeat an emergency entry when the totality of facts reasonably indicates immediate danger. The decision emphasizes that courts will evaluate emergency entries through a realistic lens—one that tolerates ambiguity and demands reasonableness rather than perfect information—while still requiring an objective factual basis and a genuinely protective purpose.