Meaningful Access, Not Physical Access: Fifth Circuit Upholds Courthouse Restrictions, Declines Bivens Expansion, and Rejects ADA Title II Claims Against Federal Courts

Meaningful Access, Not Physical Access: Fifth Circuit Upholds Courthouse Restrictions, Declines Bivens Expansion, and Rejects ADA Title II Claims Against Federal Courts

Case: Garces v. Biery, No. 25-50648 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (summary calendar, per curiam, unpublished)

Introduction

In Garces v. Biery, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se litigant’s constitutional and disability-based claims challenging a district judge’s order restricting his physical access within the federal courthouse following disruptive conduct. The appellant, Matthew Andrew Garces, sued U.S. District Judge Fred Biery, two unidentified U.S. Marshals, the Chief U.S. Marshal (in official capacity), and the U.S. Marshals Service, alleging First Amendment retaliation, a Fourth Amendment seizure claim under Bivens, procedural due process violations, and disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The central issues were whether:

  • a courthouse-access order that bars a litigant from the Clerk’s Office but leaves open multiple filing channels violates the First Amendment right of access to the courts or procedural due process;
  • a Bivens remedy should be extended to the courthouse-security context; and
  • Title II of the ADA (or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) provides a vehicle for claims against federal judicial actors and entities under these facts.

The district court granted in forma pauperis status and, after screening, dismissed for failure to state a claim; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit held:

  • No Bivens extension: The court declined to recognize a new Bivens cause of action for Garces’s claims against federal officials in the courthouse-security context, which falls outside the three established Bivens contexts.
  • No constitutional deprivation alleged: Garces’s right of access to the courts was not curtailed because the order left open multiple filing avenues—by U.S. Mail, in person at the Court Security Officers’ station, and (as the panel observed) electronically. Thus, his First Amendment retaliation and procedural due process theories failed.
  • No right to preferred physical spaces: There is no constitutional right to enter a preferred space within a courthouse (such as the Clerk’s Office) or to use specific restrooms, particularly after disruptive conduct on federal property.
  • ADA Title II inapplicable to federal entities: Title II’s definition of “public entity” does not include federal agencies, so Garces’s ADA claim fails as a matter of law.
  • Rehabilitation Act limits: While § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act can apply to federal grantees, there is no individual-capacity liability for federal officials under that statute, and Garces could not plausibly allege denial of “meaningful access” given his continued prolific filings after the order.
  • Judicial immunity not the basis for dismissal: The district court did not rely on judicial immunity, and the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance rested on the failure to state a claim.

The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971): Recognized an implied damages remedy for Fourth Amendment violations by federal officers. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that Bivens remedies remain limited and are not to be expanded into new contexts.
  • Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), and Oliva v. Nivar, 973 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2020): The Fifth Circuit reiterated that the Supreme Court recognizes only three Bivens contexts: (1) Fourth Amendment search/seizure (Bivens itself), (2) Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination by a congressman (Davis v. Passman), and (3) Eighth Amendment prison medical care (Carlson v. Green). Anything beyond those is a “new context.”
  • Goldey v. Fields, 606 U.S. 942 (2025) (per curiam): Reaffirmed that expanding Bivens is a “disfavored judicial activity.” The panel relied on this to decline Garces’s invitation to create a courthouse-security variant of Bivens.
  • Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979): Recognizes that access to the courts is a First Amendment–protected interest. The panel invoked this line of authority to frame Garces’s theory but ultimately found no curtailment of access.
  • Reitz v. Woods, 85 F.4th 780 (5th Cir. 2023): A First Amendment retaliation claim requires some showing that the plaintiff’s speech or petitioning activity was curtailed. Because Garces still had and used multiple filing channels, his claim failed that essential element.
  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Procedural due process protects against deprivations of life, liberty, or property interests. The panel cited Mathews to emphasize that Garces failed to identify a protected interest of which he was deprived—especially given the preserved filing options.
  • 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1): Defines “public entity” for ADA Title II. Federal agencies are excluded; hence the ADA claim against federal defendants fails categorically.
  • Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1999): Government officials cannot be sued in their individual capacities under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act route does not rescue Garces’s claims against individuals.
  • Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985): Establishes the “meaningful access” standard for disability-discrimination claims involving public benefits or services. The court observed that Garces filed 14 new cases after the order—strong evidence that meaningful access to the courts was not denied.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii): Permits dismissal at screening for failure to state a claim, even when the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal under this standard.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a): After one amendment as of right, further amendments require leave of court or consent. The district court properly disregarded Garces’s serial amended complaints filed without leave.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Bivens refusal: The panel declined to create a new implied damages remedy for alleged Fourth or First Amendment violations in the context of courthouse security and access enforcement. Invoking Goldey and the Fifth Circuit’s own “new context = no Bivens claim” refrain, the court found the claims far afield from Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. This foreclosed Garces’s Bivens theories against the federal officers.
  2. No curtailed access—no First Amendment retaliation: A retaliation claim fails absent an adverse action that curtails the protected activity. The order left open: (a) filing by U.S. Mail; (b) in-person filings at the Court Security Officers’ station (with Clerk staff to retrieve papers); and (c) electronic filing (as noted by the panel). Garces’s continued litigation—14 new suits after the order—undercut any plausible allegation of curtailed access or chilled petitioning activity.
  3. No due process deprivation: Due process protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property interests. Garces identified no protected interest infringed by a location-based restriction that still preserved the ability to file and litigate cases. The order did not bar him from court; it regulated how and where he could interact with Clerk’s Office personnel after “creating havoc.” The show-cause mechanism for contempt further underscores process if sanctions were ever pursued.
  4. No constitutional right to preferred spaces or restrooms: The court emphasized there is no subsidiary constitutional entitlement to access a particular physical area (such as the Clerk’s Office) or specific restrooms inside a federal courthouse. Especially following disruptive conduct, reasonable place-and-manner restrictions are permissible and do not infringe court-access rights.
  5. ADA Title II inapplicability: Because Title II covers state and local (but not federal) public entities, claims against the federal judiciary or federal agencies under Title II fail as a matter of statutory definition.
  6. Rehabilitation Act limits and failure of proof: Shifting to § 504 does not salvage the claim. First, there is no individual-capacity liability. Second, even considering an official-capacity or entity claim, Garces cannot plausibly allege denial of “meaningful access,” given the open filing channels and his prolific activity post-order.
  7. Procedural posture reinforced the outcome: At § 1915(e) screening, the court had authority to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court also correctly enforced Rule 15(a) by disregarding multiple unauthorized amended complaints beyond the first as-of-right amendment.

Impact and Significance

  • Courthouse management and security: The decision confirms that federal courts may impose reasonable, tailored physical-access restrictions on disruptive litigants so long as meaningful avenues for filing and case participation remain. Such orders can channel interactions through security personnel without violating constitutional rights.
  • Bivens remains tightly cabined: The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to extend Bivens to courthouse-access enforcement tracks the Supreme Court’s continued retrenchment. Plaintiffs should not expect damages remedies against federal officials for novel contexts absent clear precedent.
  • Disability claims against federal courts: Litigants must use the Rehabilitation Act, not ADA Title II, when suing federal entities. Even then, they must:
    • name an appropriate defendant (not an individual in personal capacity), and
    • show denial of meaningful access to services by reason of disability.
    Merely preferring in-office filing or restroom access does not suffice where operative filing channels remain open and effective.
  • First Amendment retaliation claims narrowed by facts: Demonstrable ongoing access—such as numerous filings after the challenged order—can decisively defeat the “curtailment” element of a retaliation claim.
  • Vexatious or disruptive litigants: The case offers a model short of prefiling injunctions: limit in-person and telephonic contact that disrupts court administration, while preserving multiple filing routes. Such measures are more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
  • Unpublished but persuasive: Although nonprecedential, the opinion is a practical roadmap for trial courts in the Fifth Circuit (and beyond) confronted with similar courthouse-order challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Bivens: A judge-made remedy that lets people sue federal officers for certain constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has only approved it in three specific situations. Courts are very reluctant to create new ones. Here, the Fifth Circuit refused to create a new Bivens remedy for courthouse security/access enforcement.
  • First Amendment retaliation: To win, a plaintiff must show (1) they engaged in protected activity (like filing lawsuits), (2) the government took an adverse action that would deter a typical person from continuing, and (3) the action was because of the protected activity. If the plaintiff continues filing many suits, it is hard to show their access was curtailed or chilled.
  • Procedural due process: Protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property interests without fair procedures. If no protected interest is taken away—e.g., the person can still file lawsuits—there may be no due process claim at all.
  • Meaningful access: In disability-law cases, the question is whether the person can effectively use the service (here, the courts). If mail, electronic filing, or secure in-person drop-off works, there is typically meaningful access.
  • Individual vs. official capacity: Suing an official in their individual capacity seeks personal liability; in official capacity, it is effectively a suit against the agency. Under the Rehabilitation Act, federal officials cannot be sued personally for damages.
  • ADA Title II vs. Rehabilitation Act: Title II applies to state and local governments, not the federal government. For federal defendants, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the proper statute, but it has its own limits (no individual-capacity liability; need to show denial of meaningful access by reason of disability).
  • Judicial immunity vs. merits: Judges are generally immune from damages for judicial acts, but the Fifth Circuit did not need to reach that issue; it affirmed because the complaints failed to state a claim on the merits.
  • IFP screening and Rule 15: Courts screen in forma pauperis complaints and can dismiss those that fail to state a claim. After one amendment as a matter of right, further amendments require permission; courts may disregard serial amendments filed without leave.
  • Summary calendar, unpublished: A streamlined appeal resolved without oral argument, and the resulting opinion is nonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit (though still potentially persuasive).

Conclusion

Garces v. Biery underscores a practical and legally sound boundary: the Constitution protects meaningful access to the courts, not unfettered access to every physical space inside a courthouse. Where a security-driven order preserves multiple ways to file and pursue cases, First Amendment and due process claims will falter. The opinion also reinforces two well-settled constraints: (1) courts will not extend Bivens to new settings like courthouse-access enforcement, and (2) ADA Title II does not reach federal entities, while the Rehabilitation Act does not permit individual-capacity suits and requires proof of lost meaningful access by reason of disability.

Although unpublished, the decision offers a clear template for managing disruptive litigants: narrowly tailor restrictions to conduct and preserve effective filing alternatives. For litigants, the case is a reminder that successful constitutional or disability claims must show real impairment of the ability to litigate—not merely a preference for particular modes or locations of access within the courthouse.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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