MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign EEZs and the Waiver Effect of Guilty Pleas:
Commentary on United States v. Jose Hugo Estupinan (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025)

I. Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished decision of the Eleventh Circuit—United States v. Jose Hugo Estupinan, with co-appellants Ramon Bautista-Feliciano and Alcibiades Jimenez-Flores—sits squarely in the rapidly developing body of case law under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508.

The case’s central significance lies in two areas:

• It reaffirms, in light of very recent precedent, that the MDLEA constitutionally applies to conduct in another nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) and that such conduct need not have any nexus to the United States.
• It reiterates that a valid, unconditional guilty plea broadly waives pre-plea, non-jurisdictional constitutional challenges—including claims based on delay in presentment to a magistrate and denial of counsel at a critical stage.

Although “Not for Publication,” the opinion is important because it shows how the Eleventh Circuit is implementing its new, binding, published precedents—especially United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)—in day-to-day MDLEA litigation.

II. Overview and Procedural Background

The three defendants were prosecuted in the Southern District of Florida for:

• Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
• Possession with intent to distribute cocaine while on board such a vessel,

in violation of the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(b).

From the opinion, several key background points emerge:

• The case arises out of interdiction of a cocaine-laden vessel on the high seas, within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ.
• The United States proceeded under the MDLEA, which criminalizes drug trafficking on vessels “without nationality” or otherwise “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
• All three defendants were convicted. Two (Estupinan and Bautista-Feliciano) raised pre-plea constitutional and procedural objections; all three attacked the court’s jurisdiction under the MDLEA; and two (Bautista-Feliciano and Jimenez-Flores) raised due process “nexus” arguments.

On appeal, they advanced five principal arguments:

1. Delay-related dismissal (Bautista-Feliciano): that his indictment should be dismissed because of the government’s delay in (a) presenting him to a magistrate judge and (b) obtaining a criminal complaint.
2. Right-to-counsel dismissal (Estupinan): that his indictment should be dismissed because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage.
3. MDLEA jurisdiction in a foreign EEZ (all appellants): that the MDLEA could not be constitutionally applied because the conduct occurred in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ rather than the “high seas,” and thus that Congress lacked power under the Felonies Clause.
4. Statelessness of the vessel (Jimenez-Flores): that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the government did not prove the vessel was “without nationality.”
5. Due process / nexus (Bautista-Feliciano and Jimenez-Flores): that their due process rights were violated because their offenses had no connection to the United States.

The Eleventh Circuit, applying binding precedent, rejected all five arguments and affirmed the convictions.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Waiver by guilty plea: The court held that Estupinan and Bautista-Feliciano’s valid, unconditional guilty pleas waived their pre-plea constitutional challenges relating to delay in presentment and denial of counsel. Under settled law, such non-jurisdictional defects cannot be raised on appeal after an unconditional guilty plea unless the validity of the plea itself is attacked—and it was not.
2. MDLEA jurisdiction in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ: The court rejected the argument that the United States lacked authority to prosecute felonies committed in a foreign EEZ. Relying heavily on Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, the panel reiterated that EEZs are treated as part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Article I Felonies Clause power and that enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is constitutionally proper.
3. Statelessness of the vessel: As to Jimenez-Flores’s argument that the government failed to prove the vessel was stateless, the panel held that the government met its burden. The defendant admitted in his factual proffer and in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that the vessel had no indicia of nationality, that no one claimed to be master or captain, and that no claim of nationality was made. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent (e.g., Nunez), those facts are sufficient to establish a “vessel without nationality” and thus MDLEA jurisdiction.
4. No nexus requirement / due process: The panel rejected due process challenges premised on the absence of a U.S. nexus, holding that these arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that MDLEA prosecutions for drug trafficking on the high seas do not require proof of any nexus to the United States, because “universal” and “protective” jurisdiction principles support the statute’s extraterritorial reach.

On each of these issues, the court treated itself as bound by its own prior published decisions under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule and declined to entertain attempts to revisit those questions.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standards of Review and the Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

The court opens by reciting familiar standards:

• Abuse of discretion governs review of the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment (United States v. Gayden, 977 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005)).
• De novo review applies to constitutional, jurisdictional, and statutory-interpretation questions (United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024)).

Critically, the panel highlights the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, relying on United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1381 (11th Cir. 2025). Under that rule:

• A published holding by an earlier Eleventh Circuit panel is binding on all subsequent panels unless it is overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.
• The court has “categorically rejected” any exception based on the idea that earlier panels “overlooked” an argument or reason. In other words, a new panel cannot circumvent precedent simply by raising previously unarticulated theories.

This rule frames the entire opinion: the court treats the major issues—MDLEA’s constitutionality in EEZs, the absence of a nexus requirement, and the meaning of “vessel without nationality”—as already decided by recent, binding decisions such as Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar.

B. Waiver of Pre-Plea Constitutional Claims by Guilty Plea

1. The governing doctrine

The panel’s discussion of waiver by guilty plea draws on both Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit authority:

• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018): A valid guilty plea ordinarily renders irrelevant “the constitutionality of case-related government conduct that takes place before the plea,” meaning such claims cannot be raised on appeal. Class carved out a narrow exception for post-plea challenges to the facial constitutionality of the statute of conviction or claims that the admitted conduct is not criminal—but that is not what the defendants argued here.
• United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997): An unconditional, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to the conviction, including most constitutional claims relating to pre-plea events.
• United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 2018): A defendant who does not dispute the validity of his guilty plea “cannot complain about the specific facts of his detention.”
• United States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022): A valid guilty plea may waive even claims characterized as “structural error.”

Together, these cases stand for a stringent rule: an unconditional, valid guilty plea effectively closes the door on most pre-plea litigation, leaving only challenges to:

• the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea itself, or
• the facial validity or applicability of the statute of conviction (as in Class).

2. Application to Estupinan and Bautista-Feliciano

Against this legal backdrop, the court concludes that:

• Estupinan’s claim that the government delayed his presentment to a magistrate and the filing of a criminal complaint, and
• Bautista-Feliciano’s claim that he was denied counsel at a critical stage,

are both non-jurisdictional challenges to pre-plea government conduct, and thus waived.

Key points in the court’s reasoning:

• Neither defendant challenged the validity of his guilty plea—i.e., neither argued that his plea was involuntary, unknowing, or the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.
• The pleas were unconditional; no plea agreement or record indication preserved these issues for appeal.
• Under De La Garza, Pierre, and Castillo, that is sufficient to extinguish appellate review of such claims.
• By citing Williams, the panel underscored that even potentially “structural” errors (such as some categories of right-to-counsel violations) can be waived by an unconditional guilty plea.

The panel therefore affirms as to these issues “without reaching their merits.” For practitioners, this underscores the critical importance of:

• Using conditional guilty pleas (if permitted and agreed to by the government and court) when the defendant wishes to preserve specific pretrial rulings for appellate review; and
• Expressly attacking the validity of the plea itself if the theory is that the pre-plea constitutional violation infected the plea’s voluntariness or intelligence.

C. MDLEA Jurisdiction Over Conduct in a Foreign State’s EEZ

1. The constitutional framework: Article I, § 8, cl. 10

The opinion reiterates that Congress’s authority to enact the MDLEA rests on the so-called “Define and Punish” clause of the Constitution:

“The Congress shall have Power … To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” — U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.

As the court summarizes (following Alfonso):

• Piracies Clause – power to define and punish piracies;
• Felonies Clause – power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas;
• Offences Clause – power to define and punish offences against the law of nations.

The MDLEA has consistently been upheld as a valid exercise of at least the Felonies Clause power, and the panel explicitly relies on that line of cases.

2. EEZs as “high seas”: Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar

The defendants argued that the Dominican Republic’s EEZ is not part of the “high seas,” and that therefore Congress lacked authority under the Felonies Clause to criminalize their conduct. The panel treats this argument as foreclosed by two recent, published decisions:

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024):
  • Involved defendants seized in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ who challenged the MDLEA’s constitutionality under the Felonies Clause.
  • The Eleventh Circuit “repeatedly” upheld the MDLEA as a valid exercise of the Felonies Clause.
  • Crucially, the court held that “international law does not limit the Felonies Clause” and concluded that a nation’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause in Article I of the Constitution.”
  • Thus, MDLEA enforcement in EEZs is constitutionally proper.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025):
  • Involved vessels intercepted 37 nautical miles north of Panama and 145 nautical miles north of Colombia.
  • Defendants argued that the MDLEA exceeded Congress’s Felonies Clause power and that Colombia’s EEZ was not “high seas.”
  • The court reaffirmed Alfonso, rejecting the claim that Congress was constrained by international law when defining “stateless” vessels or the scope of “high seas.”
  • The court also rejected the argument that Congress could not reach conduct merely because it occurred in Colombia’s EEZ rather than further out.

In Estupinan, the panel simply applies these holdings: because Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar have not been overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc, they are binding under the prior-panel-precedent rule. EEZs remain treated as “high seas” for purposes of the Felonies Clause and MDLEA jurisdiction.

3. Application in Estupinan

The defendants’ jurisdictional challenge—based on the theory that the Dominican Republic’s EEZ is not “high seas”— is thus dismissed as squarely foreclosed. The panel does not revisit the underlying constitutional reasoning; instead, it:

• Reaffirms the binding nature of Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar;
• Notes that “enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper”; and
• Holds that the district court had jurisdiction over the offenses, even though interdiction occurred within the Dominican Republic’s EEZ.

For future MDLEA prosecutions within the Eleventh Circuit, this virtually forecloses any Felonies Clause challenge premised solely on the EEZ location of the interdiction.

D. Stateless Vessels and Proof of MDLEA Jurisdiction

1. Statutory framework

The MDLEA criminalizes drug trafficking on board a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” which expressly includes “a vessel without nationality.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A).

The statute defines “vessel without nationality” to include, among other things:

• “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States … to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel,” § 70502(d)(1)(B), and
• “a vessel aboard which no individual, on request of an officer … claims to be the master or is identified as the individual in charge, and that has no other claim of nationality or registry” under § 70502(e)(1)–(2), § 70502(d)(1)(D).

A “claim of nationality or registry” can be made by:

• Possession and production of registration documents aboard the vessel, or
• Flying a national flag (ensign), among other methods. 46 U.S.C. § 70502(e)(1)–(2).

The MDLEA also provides that jurisdictional issues—whether a vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”—are “preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge,” § 70504(a), and, as the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016), not elements of the offense to be decided by the jury.

2. Role of customary international law: Nunez

The panel cites United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021), which held that § 70502(d)(1) is not an exhaustive catalog of all circumstances in which a vessel is “without nationality.” In Nunez:

• The Coast Guard approached a vessel with four men on board.
• They were asked who was the pilot or master; one said they all took turns; no one claimed to be master.
• There were no registration papers, no flag, and no markings indicating nationality.

The Eleventh Circuit held:

• In such circumstances, the vessel is stateless under customary international law, even if not fitting neatly into one enumerated statutory category.
• International law has no rigid checklist of questions authorities must ask to determine statelessness.
• Authorities are not required to inquire about nationality where there is no master and no indicia of nationality.

Nunez thus provides a flexible, fact-based approach: if a vessel is manifestly without flag, papers, or national markings, and no one claims to be master or claims nationality, it may properly be deemed stateless.

3. Fact patterns from earlier MDLEA cases

The panel draws on several earlier cases to illustrate statelessness and establish a consistent evidentiary standard:

• United States v. De La Cruz, 443 F.3d 830 (11th Cir. 2006):
  • The vessel flew no flag, carried no registration paperwork, and bore no national markings.
  • The “captain” concealed himself among the crew and never identified himself or the vessel’s nationality.
  • The crew made no claim of nationality or registry, despite repeated questioning.
  • The court found the vessel stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B).
• United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2008):
  • The defendant stipulated that the vessel had no flag and no indicia of nationality.
  • He pleaded guilty after acknowledging that the United States was claiming jurisdiction.
  • The court held that such admissions were sufficient to establish statelessness.
• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020):
  • The Coast Guard asked the crew to identify the master; no one did.
  • When asked individually whether anyone wished to make a claim of nationality for the vessel, no one responded.
  • The vessel lacked any indicia of nationality.
  • The court held that the Coast Guard’s questioning was legally sufficient, even though officers did not use the exact statutory phrase “individual in charge.”

These cases collectively show a pattern: lack of flag, papers, and markings; failure to identify a master; and absence of any claim of nationality strongly support a finding of statelessness.

4. Jurisdiction as a question for the judge: Iguaran and § 70504(a)

As noted, § 70504(a) assigns MDLEA “jurisdiction” questions to the judge as preliminary legal issues. In Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2016), the Eleventh Circuit:

• Confirmed that “whether a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is not an element of the offense, but a jurisdictional question for the court.
• Held that parties may stipulate to the facts underlying jurisdiction (e.g., no flag, no documents), but may not stipulate to “jurisdiction” as a legal conclusion.

The Estupinan panel applies these principles by emphasizing that the district judge, not a jury, properly determined statelessness on the basis of stipulated or admitted facts—particularly those conceded in the factual proffer and PSR.

5. Application to Jimenez-Flores

Jimenez-Flores argued that the government failed to prove the vessel was without nationality, and thus that the court lacked “subject matter jurisdiction.” The panel characterizes this as a challenge to MDLEA jurisdiction and resolves it as follows:

• In his factual proffer and PSR, Jimenez-Flores admitted that:
  • The vessel had no indicia of nationality (no flag, documents, or markings);
  • No one on board claimed to be the master or captain; and
  • No claim of nationality was made for the vessel.
• Under Nunez and similar cases, these facts are sufficient to establish a stateless vessel.
• Because the vessel is stateless, it is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” within the meaning of the MDLEA.

Notably, the panel accepts that such admissions—combined with the legal framework—are enough to resolve the jurisdictional question, without requiring a contested evidentiary hearing in this case. It therefore affirms the district court’s jurisdictional ruling.

E. Due Process and the Absence of a Nexus Requirement

1. The due process challenge

Bautista-Feliciano and Jimenez-Flores argued that their due process rights were violated because:

• They are foreign nationals;
• Their conduct occurred on a foreign or stateless vessel in another state’s EEZ; and
• There was no demonstrated “nexus” or connection between their drug trafficking and the United States.

They contended that it is fundamentally unfair—and therefore a violation of due process—for the United States to criminally prosecute such extraterritorial conduct absent some U.S. nexus.

2. The Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of a nexus requirement

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected this kind of due process nexus argument in MDLEA cases:

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2014): The court held that due process does not require proof of a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the United States when applying the MDLEA to foreign nationals on the high seas. The court relied on two principles:
  • Universal jurisdiction: Certain crimes, historically piracy and now sometimes drug trafficking, are treated as offenses against the global commons, for which any state may assert jurisdiction.
  • Protective principle: A state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct threatening its security or governmental functions, even if not occurring within its territory.
• United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 587 (11th Cir. 2020): The court again rejected an as-applied challenge to the MDLEA under the Felonies Clause and due process, holding that there is no nexus requirement for drug-trafficking offenses on the high seas.
• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 2025): One appellant expressly argued that the MDLEA violates due process because it allows prosecution of foreign nationals for conduct lacking a U.S. nexus. The court acknowledged that it had “rejected similar arguments” before, and treated this claim as “foreclosed by our binding precedent,” citing Campbell and emphasizing again that a nexus is not required.

Estupinan follows this same path. The panel notes that it has “explained repeatedly” that:

“the conduct proscribed by the MDLEA need not have a nexus to the United States because universal and protective principles support its extraterritorial reach.”

3. Application in Estupinan

The panel therefore treats the due process arguments of Bautista-Feliciano and Jimenez-Flores as “foreclosed by controlling authority.” It holds:

• The MDLEA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power for drug-trafficking offenses on the high seas, even without any proven nexus to the United States.
• As-applied challenges contesting the absence of nexus have already been rejected in prior Eleventh Circuit cases.

In short, within the Eleventh Circuit, MDLEA defendants cannot obtain relief on due process grounds simply because their conduct occurred abroad, involved foreign nationals, and had no direct connection to U.S. territory or citizens.

V. Explanation of Key Concepts (Simplified)

A. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) vs. High Seas

Under modern international law:

• A coastal state’s territorial sea typically extends up to 12 nautical miles from its baseline. Within this belt, the state exercises sovereignty similar to that over its land territory.
• The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) generally extends from 12 to 200 nautical miles from the coast. The coastal state has special rights to exploit and manage natural resources (like fishing and oil), but does not enjoy full sovereignty in the same way as the territorial sea.
• The high seas are the waters beyond the territorial sea where no state has full sovereignty. Many states—and now the Eleventh Circuit—treat the EEZ, for certain constitutional purposes, as part of this “high seas” regime.

In Estupinan, by relying on Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, the Eleventh Circuit effectively says: for purposes of the Constitution’s Felonies Clause and MDLEA jurisdiction, the EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas.”

B. Stateless Vessels

A stateless vessel is a ship that does not validly claim nationality from any state. Indicators of statelessness include:

• No national flag flown.
• No registration documents onboard.
• No visible markings or numbers indicating registry.
• No one aboard claims to be the master or claims nationality when asked by enforcement authorities.

Under both the MDLEA and customary international law, stateless vessels occupy a kind of legal vacuum. Because no state accepts responsibility for them, they are widely considered fair game for interdiction and enforcement by all states. That is why the MDLEA’s jurisdiction covers stateless vessels so broadly.

C. Guilty Pleas and Waiver of Rights

A guilty plea is more than just an admission of the facts; it is a waiver of trial and many associated rights. If the plea is:

• Knowing,
• Voluntary, and
• Unconditional (not specifically reserving issues for appeal),

then the defendant typically waives:

• Most constitutional challenges to what happened before the plea (searches, arrests, interrogations, delays, etc.);
• Many claims of procedural error; and
• Even some errors classified as “structural.”

The main things still potentially open after a valid unconditional guilty plea are:

• Challenges to the plea’s own validity (e.g., coercion, misunderstanding, ineffective assistance of counsel); and
• Facial attacks on the constitutionality of the statute or claims that the admitted conduct is not criminal (as recognized in Class).

In Estupinan, the two defendants did not challenge their pleas’ validity; therefore, their pre-plea complaints about delay and denial of counsel were deemed waived.

D. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

Within the Eleventh Circuit, the prior-panel-precedent rule is strict:

• If a published decision of a three-judge panel decides an issue, that holding binds all future panels in the circuit.
• Only the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc (the full court) can overrule that earlier panel decision.
• The fact that an earlier panel did not expressly discuss a specific argument or policy consideration does not allow a later panel to disregard the earlier holding.

In Estupinan, this rule compelled the panel to follow Alfonso, Canario-Vilomar, Campbell, Cabezas-Montano, and related cases, regardless of any new angles raised by the defendants.

E. Universal and Protective Principles of Jurisdiction

When the Eleventh Circuit says that “universal and protective principles support [the MDLEA’s] extraterritorial reach,” it is referencing two concepts in international law:

• Universal jurisdiction: Some offenses—historically piracy, and now sometimes drug trafficking—are so widely condemned that any state may prosecute them, regardless of where the conduct occurred or the nationality of the offenders or victims.
• Protective principle: A state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that poses a threat to its security, governmental functions, or other essential interests (e.g., large-scale drug trafficking aiming at its market).

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly invoked these principles to justify the MDLEA’s broad reach without a specific nexus requirement to the United States.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

Even though Estupinan is unpublished and therefore not itself binding precedent, its importance lies in how faithfully it applies—and thus confirms—the trajectory of recent, binding MDLEA decisions. Several practical implications stand out.

• EEZ-based Felonies Clause challenges are effectively closed in the Eleventh Circuit.
  After Alfonso, Canario-Vilomar, and now Estupinan, defendants intercepted in any foreign state’s EEZ within the Eleventh Circuit’s geographical reach (e.g., Caribbean interdictions routed through the Southern District of Florida) should expect Felonies Clause and EEZ-based constitutional challenges to be rejected.
• Due process nexus arguments are foreclosed.
  Campbell, Cabezas-Montano, Canario-Vilomar, and Estupinan form an unbroken line holding that MDLEA prosecutions do not require proof of a U.S. nexus. Defense strategies that rely on the lack of nexus are unlikely to succeed in this circuit, short of Supreme Court intervention or an en banc reversal.
• Statelessness will often be established by relatively simple factual showings.
  The panel’s reliance on factual proffers and PSR admissions—absence of flag, documents, national markings, and claims of nationality or master—confirms that the bar to prove statelessness is not high. Defendants should be cautious about factual stipulations or unchallenged PSR statements that may conclusively establish jurisdiction.
• Guilty-plea strategy is critical in MDLEA prosecutions.
  Estupinan is a textbook illustration of how unconditional guilty pleas foreclose a large swath of potentially significant constitutional claims. Counsel should:
  • Consider conditional pleas when the government and court are amenable and when preserving issues is important;
  • Ensure that clients understand the breadth of rights waived by unconditional pleas; and
  • Frame appellate issues carefully, targeting the validity of the plea or the statute itself when appropriate.
• The judge-centric jurisdictional model under the MDLEA is reaffirmed.
  By once again treating MDLEA “jurisdiction” as a preliminary question for the judge (per § 70504(a) and Iguaran), the court reinforces a procedural structure in which the jury never decides whether the vessel was subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This has implications for:
  • The scope of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury on “all elements” of the offense; and
  • The types of factual disputes that can be resolved at pretrial hearings rather than at trial.

As a whole, Estupinan underlines the Eleventh Circuit’s commitment to a broad, robust application of the MDLEA and a strict enforcement of procedural doctrines such as guilty-plea waiver and prior-panel precedent.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Estupinan is not a watershed decision in its own right, but it is a clear and consequential application of the Eleventh Circuit’s rapidly evolving MDLEA jurisprudence. The opinion:

• Holds that unconditional, valid guilty pleas by Estupinan and Bautista-Feliciano waived their pre-plea challenges based on delayed presentment and denial of counsel;
• Confirms that the Dominican Republic’s EEZ is treated as “high seas” under the Felonies Clause, validating MDLEA application there;
• Affirms that the vessel in question was stateless for MDLEA purposes, based largely on admitted facts about the absence of indicia of nationality and claims of mastery;
• Reiterates that the MDLEA does not require any nexus between the drug-trafficking conduct and the United States, and that due process challenges premised on the absence of such a nexus are foreclosed.

In the broader legal context, Estupinan exemplifies how lower courts operate in a regime of strong stare decisis: once the Eleventh Circuit has spoken through published opinions like Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, later panels view themselves as bound, even when confronted with sophisticated or novel arguments. For practitioners in MDLEA cases within the Eleventh Circuit, the doctrinal landscape after Estupinan is clear: EEZ prosecutions and non-nexus prosecutions are firmly within the circuit’s conception of Congress’s constitutional power, and guilty-plea strategy will often determine which issues survive to appeal.