MDLEA Jurisdiction Extends to Foreign EEZ Interdictions; “Statelessness” and No-Nexus Theories Rejected; Safety-Valve Disqualification Is Triggered by Any § 3553(f)(1) Prong

I. Introduction

In United States v. Alberto Peguero (consolidated with an appeal by codefendant Roberto Peralta Ibarra), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed MDLEA convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances aboard a vessel deemed subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The interdiction occurred in non-territorial waters near Colombia described by appellants as Colombia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

The appeals raised a cluster of recurring MDLEA issues: (1) whether an EEZ counts as “high seas” for constitutional purposes; (2) whether Congress may define “stateless” vessels more broadly than international law; (3) whether due process requires a U.S. nexus for prosecuting foreign nationals; (4) whether statutory jurisdiction was established under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) given the wording of the factual proffers; (5) whether “nominal” U.S. involvement in a “Dutch-interdiction” undermines constitutional application of the MDLEA; and (6) whether the district court correctly denied defendant Peguero “safety valve” relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that binding circuit precedent treats an EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis, and that international law does not limit Congress’s power to criminalize and define MDLEA jurisdictional concepts (including “statelessness”). The Court reiterated that the MDLEA requires no nexus between the offense and the United States. It also concluded that the stipulated facts established statutory jurisdiction because, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “nationality” and “registry” are interchangeable terms within the MDLEA scheme. Finally, it rejected the “nominal involvement” due process argument and held that Peguero was safety-valve ineligible under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 3553(f)(1) in United States v. Pulsifer.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025)
Role in this case: Decisive on the “EEZ vs. high seas” question. The panel treated Alfonso as controlling authority that an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power, and that international law does not restrict that constitutional grant. Because the appellants were interdicted in Colombia’s EEZ, Alfonso foreclosed the jurisdictional/constitutional attack premised on the “not on the high seas” framing.
United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2025)
Role in this case: Not an MDLEA merits authority, but it reinforced the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. The panel used Kluge to emphasize it was bound to follow Alfonso unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2025 WL 2824488 (Oct. 6, 2025)
Role in this case: Foreclosed two constitutional attacks: (i) that § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of “stateless” vessels exceeds Congress’s Felonies Clause authority because it is broader than international law; and (ii) that due process requires a nexus to the United States before prosecuting foreign nationals under the MDLEA. The panel relied on Canario-Vilomar to reiterate that international law does not limit Congress’s definitional choices and that nexus arguments are “plainly foreclosed.”
United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
Role in this case: Quoted (via Canario-Vilomar) for the proposition that “universal and protective principles” support the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach, undermining due-process nexus objections.
United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023)
Role in this case: Controlled the statutory-jurisdiction dispute about “registry” versus “nationality.” Although Gruezo involved a different subsection, the panel used it for its broader interpretive point: the MDLEA treats “nationality” and “registry” as interchangeable throughout § 70502, including in the logic of § 70502(d)(1)(C). Thus, a stipulation that the master made a “verbal claim of Dominican nationality” could satisfy the statute’s “claim of registry” concept as the Eleventh Circuit reads the MDLEA.
United States v. Pulsifer, 601 U.S. 124 (2024)
Role in this case: Dispositive on safety-valve eligibility under § 3553(f)(1). Pulsifer held that § 3553(f)(1)’s three criminal-history disqualifiers operate as an eligibility “checklist,” such that failing any one prong renders a defendant ineligible. The panel applied Pulsifer to conclude Peguero was disqualified based on an undisputed prior three-point offense under § 3553(f)(1)(B).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. EEZ Interdictions as “High Seas” for Felonies Clause / MDLEA Purposes

The appellants framed the interdiction location—Colombia’s EEZ—as outside the “high seas,” arguing that the MDLEA therefore could not constitutionally or jurisdictionally apply. The panel rejected that framing as already answered by United States v. Alfonso, which held that an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and that international law does not constrain the Felonies Clause. Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule (supported by United States v. Kluge), the panel treated Alfonso as controlling, and held the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction and the MDLEA applied.

2. Congress’s Power to Define “Stateless” Vessels Beyond International Law

Appellants argued that the MDLEA’s definition of “stateless” vessels in 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) exceeds Congress’s authority because it goes further than international law. Relying on United States v. Canario-Vilomar, the panel rejected the premise that international law caps Congress’s authority to define “stateless” for MDLEA purposes. The Court therefore upheld § 70502(d)(1)(C) as a constitutional exercise of legislative power.

3. No Due-Process Nexus Requirement for Foreign Nationals Prosecuted Under the MDLEA

Appellants contended that prosecuting foreign nationals without any nexus to the United States violates due process and exceeds congressional power. The panel treated this as settled: under United States v. Canario-Vilomar (quoting United States v. Campbell), “universal and protective principles” support the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach, and Eleventh Circuit precedent has “plainly foreclosed” the nexus-based due process challenge.

4. Statutory Jurisdiction Under § 70502(d)(1)(C): “Registry” vs. “Nationality” in Stipulated Facts

The appellants attacked statutory jurisdiction by parsing § 70502(d)(1)(C) to argue it requires an initial “claim of registry,” while their factual proffers described only a “verbal claim of Dominican nationality.” The panel treated this as a semantic distinction rejected by Eleventh Circuit interpretive doctrine. Under United States v. Gruezo, the MDLEA uses “nationality” and “registry” interchangeably, and § 70502(d)(1)(C) itself links the two by making the “claim of registry” turn on whether the named country confirms “nationality.” Because parties may stipulate to facts bearing on jurisdiction (even though they cannot stipulate to jurisdiction itself), the stipulated facts were enough to establish statutory jurisdiction.

5. “Nominal” U.S. Involvement in a “Dutch-interdiction” Does Not Bar Prosecution

The appellants argued that because Dutch authorities “ran” the interdiction, the United States’ “nominal involvement” made an MDLEA prosecution constitutionally improper and violative of due process. The panel rejected this for two reasons:

No supporting authority: The appellants cited no case law establishing that prosecutorial authority under the MDLEA depends on the degree of U.S. operational involvement in interdiction or detention, and the panel found none.
Treaty context supports cooperative enforcement: The panel pointed to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (CAIT), especially Article 17’s command that parties “co-operate to the fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea,” including requesting and rendering assistance, and provisions encouraging “joint teams.” In the panel’s view, that treaty framework “countenance[s] this exact arrangement.”

The panel also noted that appellants did not raise a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search/seizure claim, limiting the relevance of authorities they cited in that vein.

6. Safety Valve: Any One § 3553(f)(1) Disqualifier Bars Relief

Peguero challenged the district court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). The panel applied United States v. Pulsifer, which held the three subparts of § 3553(f)(1) function as an eligibility “checklist”: the defendant must satisfy each requirement, and failing any one makes the defendant ineligible. Because it was undisputed Peguero had a prior three-point conviction under § 3553(f)(1)(B), the panel held the district court correctly denied safety-valve relief.

C. Impact

EEZ-based challenges in the Eleventh Circuit remain largely foreclosed: By treating Alfonso as binding, the opinion reinforces that defendants interdicted in foreign EEZs face an uphill battle arguing they were not on the “high seas” for MDLEA/Felonies Clause purposes.
International-law limitations arguments continue to fail: The opinion extends the practical reach of Canario-Vilomar’s approach—international law does not constrain Congress’s power in defining MDLEA jurisdictional concepts, at least as the Eleventh Circuit frames the constitutional inquiry.
Statutory jurisdiction is easier to prove where stipulations track “nationality” rather than “registry”: By leaning on Gruezo’s interchangeability principle, the opinion reduces the force of textual parsing aimed at exploiting “registry” language in § 70502(d)(1)(C) where the record otherwise shows a claimed flag/nationality that was not confirmed.
Operational-control arguments are unlikely to gain traction: The “nominal involvement” theory—asserting that a partner nation’s leading role negates U.S. prosecutorial authority—was rejected in categorical terms (no authority; CAIT supports cooperation). Future defendants raising similar arguments will need a fundamentally different legal hook (e.g., specific constitutional violations tied to the defendant’s own seizure, if preserved).
Safety-valve litigation is narrowed by Supreme Court guidance: Pulsifer’s interpretation of § 3553(f)(1) continues to remove discretion where any single criminal-history disqualifier applies, affecting many MDLEA defendants who face mandatory minimums.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime area beyond a country’s territorial sea where that country has certain economic rights (like fishing and resource extraction). It is not the same as territorial waters, and under the Eleventh Circuit’s Felonies Clause analysis (per Alfonso), an EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for MDLEA purposes.
Felonies Clause: The constitutional provision authorizing Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads this power broadly in the MDLEA context, not limited by international law as argued by defendants here.
“Stateless” vessel (MDLEA): A vessel treated as having no valid nationality for enforcement jurisdiction. Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), if a claimed nationality is not confirmed by the named country, the vessel can be treated as “without nationality,” supporting U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
Nexus requirement: A theory that due process requires some tie between the defendant’s conduct and the prosecuting country. The Eleventh Circuit’s MDLEA cases reject that requirement.
Safety valve: A statutory mechanism that can allow a judge to sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum if the defendant meets strict criteria. After Pulsifer, failing any single criminal-history prong in § 3553(f)(1) bars relief.

V. Conclusion

This opinion consolidates and applies a line of binding authorities that collectively broaden (or, more precisely, sustain) the MDLEA’s practical reach in the Eleventh Circuit: interdictions in foreign EEZs are treated as occurring on the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; international law does not limit Congress’s MDLEA definitions of jurisdictional status (including “statelessness”); due process does not require a U.S. nexus for foreign defendants; and statutory jurisdiction can be established without formalistic insistence on “registry” wording where “nationality” is stipulated. On sentencing, it confirms that United States v. Pulsifer governs safety-valve criminal-history disqualification: any one prong is enough to bar relief.