MDLEA Enforcement in Exclusive Economic Zones and Limits on Minor-Role Reductions:
Commentary on United States v. Robles (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Robles, Nos. 23‑11483, 23‑11498, 23‑11524 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025). The consolidated appeal concerns three codefendants—Wilfredo Robles, Ruben Pushiana, and Jonathan Vasquez— convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for cocaine trafficking on a stateless “go‑fast” vessel intercepted in the Dominican Republic’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential within the Eleventh Circuit’s own hierarchy, the decision is doctrinally important as an application and reaffirmation of several significant strands of Eleventh Circuit law:

The constitutional reach of the MDLEA under the Felonies Clause to conduct occurring in a foreign state’s EEZ;
The continued rejection of any required “nexus” to the United States for MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals on stateless vessels;
The strict, fact‑intensive standard governing minor‑role reductions for maritime drug couriers under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and the framework of United States v. De Varon.

The panel, consisting of Judges Branch, Luck, and Lagoa, affirms the defendants’ convictions and sentences on all grounds.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The interdiction and seizure

In 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a “go‑fast” vessel within the waters of the Dominican Republic’s Exclusive Economic Zone—i.e., within 200 nautical miles of the Dominican coastline, but not within its 12‑nautical‑mile territorial sea.

Key jurisdictional facts:

The vessel displayed no indicia of nationality (no flag, registration, markings).
The crew—including appellants Robles, Pushiana, and Vasquez—refused to answer questions and declined to identify a master or make any claim of nationality for the vessel.
On that basis, the Coast Guard treated the craft as a “vessel without nationality,” i.e., a stateless vessel, which under the MDLEA is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
The Coast Guard seized approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine from the vessel.

B. The charges and plea

A federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida indicted all three defendants on:

One substantive count of possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in violation of:
- 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (MDLEA substantive offense);
- 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a) (penalties);
- 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B) (drug quantity / penalty enhancement);
- 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting).
One count of conspiracy to commit the same MDLEA offense (conspiracy is penalized under 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b)).

The defendants jointly moved to dismiss the indictment on two constitutional grounds:

As‑applied constitutional challenge under the Felonies Clause:
They argued that Congress lacked authority under Article I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Felonies Clause”) to criminalize their conduct because it occurred in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ, which, in their view, is not part of the “high seas.”
Due process / nexus challenge:
They argued their prosecution violated the Due Process Clause and exceeded Congress’s Felonies Clause power because there was no “nexus” or connection between their conduct and the United States.

After a hearing, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. The defendants then pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count; in exchange, the government dismissed the substantive possession count.

C. Sentencing

The U.S. Probation Office prepared Presentence Investigation Reports (PSIs) for each defendant. Each objected to the offense level calculation, claiming entitlement to a two‑level minor‑role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

They argued:

Their roles were limited to transporting the cocaine as couriers;
They lacked knowledge of the full scope of the conspiracy;
Others (recruiters, organizers, owners of the drugs, and downstream traffickers) were far more culpable.

At the joint sentencing:

The government opposed the minor‑role reductions, contending each defendant shared responsibility for operating the vessel and that they were “equally culpable.”
The district court rejected the minor‑role arguments and denied the reductions.

The resulting sentences:

Robles: Guidelines range 108–135 months; imposed 60 months imprisonment (substantial downward variance) and 2 years’ supervised release.
Vasquez: Guidelines range 108–135 months; imposed 60 months imprisonment and 2 years’ supervised release.
Pushiana: Guidelines range 135–168 months (due to prior drug convictions); imposed 144 months imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.

III. Issues on Appeal

The appellants raised three principal issues:

Whether the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied because their conduct occurred in a foreign state’s EEZ, allegedly outside the “high seas,” and thus beyond Congress’s Felonies Clause power.
Whether their prosecution violated due process and exceeded Congress’s Felonies Clause authority because the offense had no nexus to the United States.
Whether the district court erred in denying minor‑role reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).

Importantly, the panel notes that, under Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), a defendant who pleads guilty may still challenge “the Government’s power to constitutionally prosecute” him—thus the constitutional issues were properly preserved despite the guilty pleas.

IV. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit affirms the convictions and sentences in full.

As‑applied constitutional challenge: The court holds that this challenge is squarely foreclosed by binding circuit precedent—principally United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025). Those cases hold that (1) international law does not limit the Felonies Clause, and (2) EEZ waters are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, allowing Congress to reach MDLEA offenses in EEZs.
Nexus / due process challenge: The court holds that this claim is also foreclosed by prior Eleventh Circuit decisions, including United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020). Those decisions consistently hold that the MDLEA is valid even without a U.S. nexus and that due process is not violated when foreign nationals on stateless vessels on the high seas are prosecuted under the MDLEA.
Minor‑role reductions: Applying the fact‑intensive framework from De Varon and Valois, the court concludes the district court did not clearly err in denying minor‑role reductions. The defendants were all essential participants in transporting a large quantity of cocaine, were held accountable for identical conduct and drug quantity, and were properly compared to each other and to their own relevant conduct—not to unknown higher‑level conspirators.

The panel expressly states that even if defendants believe Alfonso (and related precedents) were wrongly decided, that belief cannot override the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule.

V. Analysis

A. Constitutional reach of the MDLEA to conduct in an EEZ

1. Statutory and constitutional framework

The MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508, criminalizes trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including:

Vessels of the United States;
Vessels registered in foreign states that have consented to U.S. enforcement;
Vessels without nationality (stateless vessels).

Congress enacted the MDLEA pursuant in part to Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution, which gives Congress power:

“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”

This clause is commonly parsed into three separate grants:

The “Piracies Clause” (piracies);
The “Felonies Clause” (felonies on the high seas);
The “Offences Clause” (offenses against the law of nations).

The defendants’ argument focuses on the Felonies Clause and the meaning of “high Seas,” asserting that the Dominican Republic’s EEZ is not part of the high seas, so Congress cannot criminalize conduct there under that Clause.

2. The role of United States v. Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar

The panel’s analysis is driven almost entirely by prior binding precedent:

In United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), the Eleventh Circuit rejected the exact argument the appellants now press: that EEZ waters are not the “high seas” and therefore fall outside Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.
Alfonso held:
- “International law does not limit the Felonies Clause”; and
- EEZs are “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause.”
In United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025), the court reaffirmed Alfonso’s conclusion that Congress is not constrained by international law when crafting the MDLEA and that conduct in an EEZ can constitutionally be reached.

The present panel treats these precedents as fully controlling. It notes that the appellants “acknowledge that their claim is foreclosed” but attempt to preserve it for further review (e.g., en banc or Supreme Court review). The panel underscores that:

“Thus, the appellants’ as‑applied constitutional challenge to Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate conduct in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ is squarely foreclosed by circuit precedent.”

3. The prior‑panel‑precedent rule

The court relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior‑panel‑precedent rule, citing United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008):

Under the rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc.”

The panel further emphasizes, via United States v. Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018), that merely arguing a case was “wrongly decided” is legally irrelevant at the panel level; only the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc can depart from a prior published panel decision.

Accordingly, the panel holds the district court did not err in denying the as‑applied constitutional challenge.

4. Impact of this aspect of the ruling

Although unpublished, this decision reinforces a now‑well‑settled line of Eleventh Circuit authority:

For Felonies Clause purposes, the “high seas” includes EEZ waters; and
Congress may constitutionally apply the MDLEA to stateless vessels intercepted in a foreign state’s EEZ.

Practically, MDLEA defendants in the Eleventh Circuit have little room to relitigate EEZ‑based constitutional challenges; any meaningful change would have to come from the en banc court or the Supreme Court.

B. Due process and the “nexus” requirement

1. The defendants’ nexus argument

The appellants claim that:

Their offense conduct had no territorial, personal, or other meaningful connection to the United States;
In the absence of such a nexus, Congress exceeded its authority under the Felonies Clause;
Prosecution without a U.S. nexus violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—particularly for foreign nationals engaged in conduct outside U.S. territory.

2. Controlling precedents: Campbell and Cabezas‑Montano

Again, the panel treats the issue as fully controlled by earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions:

United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014):
Campbell held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power even absent a “nexus” to the United States for drug trafficking crimes on the high seas.
United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020):
This decision collected and reaffirmed a line of cases upholding MDLEA prosecutions without a nexus. It also expressly held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not bar trial and conviction of foreign nationals captured on the high seas while drug trafficking, because:
- The MDLEA gives clear notice that such trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas is criminalized;
- There is a widely recognized international consensus condemning maritime drug trafficking; and
- Stateless vessels lack the protection of any sovereign, making them especially subject to enforcement by all states.

The panel quotes and adopts this rationale, reaffirming that:

“the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause as applied to drug trafficking crimes without a ‘nexus’ to the United States” and that “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not prohibit the trial and conviction of aliens captured on the high seas while drug trafficking because the MDLEA provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.”

3. Application to this case

The court:

Notes that the defendants are foreign nationals,;
Were intercepted aboard a stateless vessel in waters that, under Alfonso, qualify as “high seas” for constitutional purposes; and
Concedes that there was no demonstrated U.S. nexus but finds this irrelevant under binding precedent.

Accordingly, the panel affirms the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on nexus and due process.

4. Broader significance

This case further solidifies an already difficult reality for defendants in maritime drug cases in the Eleventh Circuit:

A nexus to the United States is not a required element of an MDLEA offense;
Due process challenges premised on the absence of nexus are routinely rejected, especially for stateless vessels;
Notice is satisfied by the universal condemnation of maritime drug trafficking and the explicit text of the MDLEA.

While some other circuits have at times suggested nexus considerations in certain extraterritorial contexts, the Eleventh Circuit remains firmly committed to a robust, extraterritorial application of the MDLEA.^*

^* This commentary focuses solely on the Eleventh Circuit decisions cited in the opinion itself.

C. Minor‑role reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2

1. Legal framework: text, commentary, and Dupree

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides for a downward adjustment where a defendant had a reduced role in the offense:

4‑level decrease for a “minimal participant”; and
2‑level decrease for a “minor participant.”

A “minor participant” is defined in the commentary as a defendant:

“who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5.

The panel briefly notes the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023), which held that courts may not defer to commentary where the guideline text is unambiguous. However, here both parties rely on the commentary and do not contest its validity or its interpretation of § 3B1.2. Following United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023), the court therefore applies the commentary.

The defendants bear the burden of proving entitlement to a minor‑role reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 731 (11th Cir. 2019).

2. The De Varon / Valois framework

The Eleventh Circuit’s leading case on this issue is United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), as further refined by Valois, 915 F.3d 717. Together, they establish two core principles:

The court must examine the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable under the Guidelines.
The court must compare his role to that of other participants in that relevant conduct, not necessarily to all participants in the larger criminal enterprise.

Critical limitation: The question is whether the defendant played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which he has already been held accountable—not whether he was a small player in some broader, uncharged or unknown conspiracy.

The commentary to § 3B1.2 (relied on by the court here) instructs courts to consider a non‑exclusive list of factors:

The degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity;
The degree of participation in planning or organizing;
Any decision‑making authority or influence;
The nature and extent of the defendant’s participation, including the acts performed and level of discretion;
The degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity.

Valois clarifies that a district court must consider all applicable factors and commits legal error if it bases the minor‑role decision solely on one factor.

3. Standard of review

A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is a factual finding reviewed only for clear error. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at 937.

Under this deferential standard, the appellate court:

Will not disturb the finding unless left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made (Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016));
Will rarely reverse where the district court’s choice is between two permissible views of the evidence.

4. The defendants’ argument and the court’s response

The appellants contend:

They were mere couriers; they transported the cocaine but did not plan or own it;
They lacked decision‑making authority and were more akin to low‑level laborers than leaders;
Compared to higher‑level conspirators—recruiters, organizers, financiers, owners of the drugs, shore‑side distributors—they were minor participants.

The court rejects this argument for two principal reasons:

Relevant conduct vs. broader conspiracy:
The panel emphasizes that the district court’s task is to measure the defendants’ roles in the relevant conduct for which they were held accountable, not in the larger, unindicted conspiracy. The opinion quotes Valois:
“the inquiry is whether the defendant played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which he has already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy.”
As a result, the district court was “not required to consider the culpability of any unknown conspirators,” such as recruiters, owners, or downstream distributors. The panel cites Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d at 608, which explicitly states that unknown conspirators need not be considered.
Comparison among the known participants and the nature of their conduct:
The record showed:
- All three defendants knowingly participated in transporting a large amount of cocaine (≈ 400 kg);
- They were “critical” to the transportation segment of the trafficking scheme; without them, the drugs would not have been moved;
- They were to be paid for their services;
- They were all held responsible for the same conduct (same load, same trip) and the same drug quantity;
- The government characterized them as “equally culpable,” and the district court accepted that view.
The panel notes that while these facts do not categorically preclude a role reduction, they support the denial. It cites Valois for this point: being an essential courier in a large‑scale drug shipment, held accountable only for that shipment, weighs against minor‑role relief.

The panel concludes that the district court considered the totality of circumstances and each defendant’s arguments, and then exercised its broad discretion to deny the reductions. The appellate court finds no clear error.

5. Practical lessons

For defense counsel in MDLEA and other drug‑courier cases, Robles underscores:

Simply being labeled a “courier” or “mule” does not automatically establish minor‑role status; the real question is how the defendant’s actions compare to:
- The scope of relevant conduct for which he is held accountable; and
- The other participants in that same relevant conduct.
Arguments that focus on the culpability of high‑level, unindicted, or unknown conspirators will have limited traction under De Varon and Cabezas‑Montano.
Where multiple couriers on a vessel share similar responsibilities and are held accountable for the same quantity, they are unlikely to secure minor‑role reductions absent differentiating evidence (e.g., markedly less knowledge or participation).
Even without a minor‑role adjustment, substantial downward variances (as seen for Robles and Vasquez) may still be obtainable via 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) arguments.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA): A federal statute (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508) allowing the United States to prosecute drug trafficking on vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including stateless vessels on the high seas, even when the conduct occurs far from U.S. territory and involves foreign nationals.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources in this zone, but the waters are not considered its full “territorial sea.” Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, EEZ waters are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes.
High seas: In international law, generally refers to all parts of the sea not included in the territorial sea or internal waters of a state. For U.S. constitutional purposes, as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit, this category includes EEZ waters for the Felonies Clause.
Stateless vessel / vessel without nationality: A boat that flies no flag, displays no registration, and whose crew refuses to claim nationality when asked. Such vessels are considered to have no protection from any state and are widely subject to enforcement by all nations. The MDLEA specifically treats them as “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
Felonies Clause: Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” MDLEA prosecutions often rest on this clause.
Due Process and “nexus”: Some extraterritorial criminal statutes require a “nexus” to the U.S.—a real connection between the offense and U.S. interests—to satisfy due process. But in the Eleventh Circuit, the MDLEA does not require such a nexus for conduct on stateless vessels on the high seas. Due process is deemed satisfied because maritime drug trafficking is universally condemned and stateless vessels lack national protection.
Prior‑panel‑precedent rule: An internal rule of appellate decision‑making: once a published panel decision decides an issue, later panels are bound by that decision and cannot overrule it. Only the Supreme Court or the full court sitting en banc can do so.
Minor participant / minor‑role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A 2‑level sentencing reduction for a defendant who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role is not “minimal.” It aims to distinguish lower‑level functionaries from average or more culpable participants. Courts engage in a detailed, fact‑intensive analysis to determine eligibility.
Clear‑error review: A highly deferential standard of appellate review of factual findings. The appellate court will reverse only if, after considering all the evidence, it is left with a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. Close factual calls are left undisturbed.

VII. Broader Impact and Implications

A. MDLEA enforcement strategy

Robles bolsters the U.S. government’s ability to enforce the MDLEA in international waters proximate to the Caribbean and Latin America:

EEZ‑based interdictions remain fully viable in the Eleventh Circuit;
Foreign states’ EEZs—like the Dominican Republic’s—pose no constitutional barrier under current precedent;
Stateless vessels remain especially vulnerable to interdiction and prosecution.

B. Constitutional doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit

The decision illustrates the Eleventh Circuit’s strong view that:

International law does not cabin the domestic meaning of “high Seas” in the Felonies Clause;
Congress’s extraterritorial power over maritime drug felonies is broad;
Due process challenges are unlikely to succeed where conduct involves universally condemned activities on stateless vessels.

For litigants hoping to alter this framework, the opinion makes clear that only en banc or Supreme Court review could overturn Alfonso, Campbell, and Cabezas‑Montano.

C. Sentencing of maritime couriers

On the sentencing front, Robles continues a pattern in which maritime couriers:

Rarely succeed in obtaining minor‑role reductions when they share identical responsibilities with their crewmates, are held accountable for the same shipment, and are essential to the transportation operation;
May nonetheless receive significant variances under § 3553(a), as shown by the 60‑month sentences imposed on Robles and Vasquez despite guideline ranges starting at 108 months.

This dynamic encourages a two‑track defense strategy:

Argue vigorously—but realistically—about minor‑role factors; and
Independently develop robust mitigation and § 3553(a) arguments (personal history, lack of prior record, duress or economic desperation, family responsibilities, etc.) to seek downward variances even if the § 3B1.2 claim fails.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Robles is not a groundbreaking decision in its own right, but it is a clear, concise application of entrenched Eleventh Circuit doctrine in MDLEA cases. It does three things:

It reaffirms that Congress’s Felonies Clause power extends to conduct occurring in foreign EEZs, treating them as part of the “high seas” for constitutional purposes.
It reiterates that MDLEA prosecutions do not require a nexus to the United States and that due process is not violated by prosecuting foreign nationals interdicted on stateless vessels in international waters.
It underscores the narrow path for defendants seeking minor‑role reductions in maritime drug cases: the relevant conduct is the specific shipment for which they are held accountable, and comparison is made to co‑participants in that conduct, not to unindicted higher‑ups.

For practitioners, the opinion serves as a practical roadmap of existing constraints and opportunities in MDLEA litigation and sentencing within the Eleventh Circuit: constitutional challenges to extraterritorial application are effectively foreclosed at the panel level, while sentencing mitigation remains the primary arena in which meaningful relief may be obtained.

MDLEA Enforcement in Exclusive Economic Zones and Limits on Minor-Role Reductions: Commentary on United States v. Robles (11th Cir. 2025)