McNair v. Pratt (6th Cir. 2025): No Clearly Established Eighth Amendment Violation for a Ground Takedown of a Handcuffed, Noncompliant Inmate When the Officer Is Alone—And a Sharp Reminder on Record-Handling at Summary Judgment

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Not Recommended for Publication)

Decision Date: September 3, 2025

Panel: Boggs, J. (majority, joined by Nalbandian, J.); Gibbons, J. (dissent)

Introduction

This appeal sits at the intersection of two recurring issues in civil rights litigation: (1) the relentlessly fact-specific nature of qualified immunity in prison excessive-force cases, and (2) the unforgiving procedural rules governing what the appellate court may review at the summary judgment stage. In McNair v. Pratt, a Michigan inmate (McNair) alleged that a corrections officer (Pratt) violated the Eighth Amendment by slamming him face-first onto the floor while he was handcuffed. The district court denied qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that (i) on the record properly before the court, the plaintiff failed to show a violation of a clearly established right under the Eighth Amendment as of June 11, 2019, and (ii) video evidence that might have been decisive could not be considered because it was not properly filed and thus was not part of the appellate record.

The case is “Not Recommended for Publication,” meaning it is nonprecedential within the Sixth Circuit. Even so, it provides a consequential clarification and a pointed practice lesson: absent record evidence that a handcuffed inmate was compliant and under control, Sixth Circuit cases like Cordell and Erickson do not clearly establish that a forceful takedown is unconstitutional—especially where the officer is alone and lacks immediate backup; and failing to file video evidence correctly can be outcome determinative at summary judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

Procedural posture: The district court denied Pratt’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. Pratt took an interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.
Record constraints: The plaintiff cited a USB drive with security-camera videos. But the magistrate judge expressly refused to consider it because it was not properly filed as an exhibit. The district court adopted that ruling. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reiterated that it could consider only the record as it existed below (FRAP 10(a)), so the videos were out.
Qualified immunity holding: The panel decided the second prong first and held that McNair failed to identify clearly established law prohibiting Pratt’s takedown on the uncontested summary-judgment record, which reflected a noncompliant, resistant inmate and an officer who was alone at a locked segregation-door area without immediate backup. The court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s narrowing of Cordell in Burnett and the court’s later discussion in Erickson to conclude that Cordell clearly establishes a violation only when the inmate is compliant and under control.
Outcome: Reversed. The panel granted summary judgment to Pratt on qualified-immunity grounds. The majority expressly declined to decide whether the conduct violated the Eighth Amendment in the abstract; it held only that the law was not clearly established as of June 11, 2019.
Dissent (Gibbons, J.): The dissent would have affirmed, emphasizing that at summary judgment the court must credit the nonmovant’s version. McNair’s deposition supports that he was slammed immediately after replying “fuck you” to Pratt’s alleged threat to make him “kiss concrete,” which—if true—could constitute gratuitous, malicious force in violation of clearly established Eighth Amendment law under Whitley, Hudson, Cordell, and Hope.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Qualified Immunity Framework

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Courts may resolve qualified immunity by addressing either the constitutional-violation question or the clearly established prong first.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018): The “clearly established” inquiry demands specificity. Existing precedent must place the question “beyond debate,” and general statements of the law will not suffice in fact-intensive excessive-force contexts.
Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994): Appellate courts should decide clearly established law based on the full body of precedent, even if not cited by the parties.

Excessive Force—Eighth Amendment

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986): Governing Eighth Amendment standard—force violates the Constitution when applied “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992): Injury and force are imperfectly correlated; malicious and sadistic force violates the Eighth Amendment even without severe injury.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010): Reaffirms that the absence of serious injury does not defeat an excessive-force claim where force is gratuitous and malicious.
Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014): Denied qualified immunity to an officer who slammed a compliant, restrained inmate’s head into a wall. Key to the holding was the inmate’s compliance and the officer’s lack of need to use violent force in a secure area among other officials.
Burnett v. Griffith, 33 F.4th 907 (6th Cir. 2022): Narrowed Cordell. Granted qualified immunity where a handcuffed inmate attempted to pull away and a deputy slammed him facedown. Cordell clearly establishes a violation only for compliant, restrained inmates in areas controlled by officers.
Erickson v. Gogebic County, 133 F.4th 703 (6th Cir. 2025): Denied qualified immunity where video showed a substantial use of force against a compliant inmate; frames the pivotal question as whether the inmate was “under control.” Reinforces Burnett’s limitation.
Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014): For the dissent’s view: using mace without penological justification can violate clearly established Eighth Amendment law.
Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008); Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2023): Cases giving officers leeway to apply force to regain control of resistant inmates.

Summary Judgment and Appellate Record

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): Burden shifting at summary judgment—the moving party points to the absence of evidence; the nonmovant must then cite specific record material showing a genuine factual issue.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986): The “scintilla” rule; a genuine dispute must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Video can be dispositive at summary judgment—if it is part of the record.
FRAP 10(a) and Sixth Circuit practice: The appellate record is confined to what was properly filed below. See also Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1303 (6th Cir. 1992); Clark v. Warden, 934 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2019).
Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992): Violations of departmental policy do not automatically equate to constitutional violations (though they may inform the officer’s state of mind).
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014): Emphasizes that, at summary judgment, courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant—relied upon by the dissent.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Step-two first: “Clearly established” law

The panel exercised its discretion under Pearson to address the “clearly established” prong first. The court ruled that the plaintiff had not carried his burden to identify controlling precedent (Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit) that, as of June 11, 2019, would have put every reasonable officer on notice that forcefully taking a handcuffed but noncompliant inmate to the ground at a segregation-entry area—while alone and without backup—was unconstitutional.

b) The compliance/noncompliance line controls in this circuit

Relying on Burnett and Erickson, the court framed the dispositive inquiry as whether the inmate was compliant and under control. Cordell clearly established a violation for force used against a compliant, restrained prisoner in an area controlled by officers. By contrast, where the inmate is actively resisting or attempting to pull away, Burnett grants qualified immunity and signals that Cordell does not clearly govern. Here, on the record that could be considered, McNair did not cite evidence showing he was compliant; indeed, he did not refute Pratt’s assertions that McNair was resisting, attempting to pull away, and trying to spit. That was fatal to defeating qualified immunity under Sixth Circuit law as it has evolved after Cordell.

c) Officer alone and without backup: a further distinction

The court emphasized a second limiting factor: Pratt was alone at a locked segregation door, calling out for assistance but unable to rely on immediate backup. This setting materially distinguishes Cordell, where multiple officers escorted the inmate in a controlled area. The court underscored that its cases do not clearly establish how much force an isolated officer may use to regain control of a resistant inmate in the absence of other officials.

d) The record problem and the USB videos

Although video often resolves excessive-force disputes (Scott), the panel refused to consider the USB drive because it was not properly filed, served, or docketed in the district court. Under FRAP 10(a), appellate review is confined to the record below. The magistrate judge explicitly declined to consider the thumb drive; the district court adopted that ruling. Thus, despite the plaintiff’s references to the videos in appellate briefing, the court deemed them a nullity for purposes of summary judgment and appellate review. This dramatically constrained the factual universe, magnified the import of burden-shifting under Celotex, and left the court to treat several of Pratt’s accounts of resistance as essentially unrefuted.

e) The plaintiff’s two record citations were insufficient for “clearly established” law

“Kiss concrete” threat: The panel accepted that this alleged threat, if credited, could be relevant to the subjective Eighth Amendment inquiry (malicious and sadistic intent). But it does not answer the “clearly established” question keyed to inmate compliance and control under Burnett/Erickson.
MDOC policy violations and termination: These may inform intent but do not map onto constitutional standards. A department can set a higher internal standard than the Constitution. Violations of policy are not themselves dispositive of constitutional violations or of clearly established law.

f) The court stops short of deciding the merits

Importantly, the majority did not declare that Pratt’s conduct complied with the Eighth Amendment. It held only that, as of June 11, 2019, the law was not clearly established that an officer in Pratt’s position could not perform such a takedown.

3) The Dissent’s View

Judge Gibbons would affirm the denial of summary judgment. She emphasizes that summary judgment requires crediting the nonmovant’s (McNair’s) sworn account: McNair consented to the cuffs, was slammed right after he replied “fuck you” to Pratt’s alleged threat to make him “kiss concrete,” and did not resist. On that version, a reasonable jury could find sadistic, retaliatory force—gratuitous violence without penological justification—in violation of clearly established Eighth Amendment law (Whitley, Hudson, Cordell). She also points to Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), to argue that a plaintiff need not find a case with materially identical facts; the “fair warning” standard allows liability in novel factual contexts where the unlawfulness is clear.

Impact and Practical Significance

Doctrinal impact (within the Sixth Circuit)

Further entrenchment of the compliance/noncompliance line: McNair reinforces that the critical determinant for clearly established Eighth Amendment law in takedown cases is whether the inmate was compliant and under control (Cordell scenario) versus resisting or attempting to break away (Burnett scenario).
Context matters—officer alone without backup: The court adds a significant contextual factor: an isolated officer’s attempt to regain control at a locked entry point without immediate assistance pushes the case out of Cordell’s clearly established zone.
General standards (Whitley/Hudson) won’t carry the day on the “clearly established” prong: Plaintiffs must supply fact-specific circuit or Supreme Court authority—not just broad Eighth Amendment principles—to defeat qualified immunity.

Litigation practice impact

Record discipline is decisive: Videos are often case-dispositive at the summary judgment stage. If they are not properly filed, they do not exist for appellate purposes. File the media as an exhibit, serve it, and ensure the docket reflects this. If a court below excludes the evidence, cure the defect or seek reconsideration before appeal.
Meet your Celotex burden with citations: Once the movant carries its initial burden, the nonmovant must cite specific, admissible record materials creating a genuine dispute. Sparse record citations that do not address the linchpin issue (here, compliance vs. resistance) will fail.
Tailor your “clearly established” cases: In excessive-force suits, plaintiffs should identify controlling cases with close factual alignment on the controlling axis (compliance/control, the setting, availability of backup, orientation of the force used).

Substantive policy concerns

Risk of insulating misconduct where records are thin: The decision illustrates how qualified immunity can result from evidentiary gaps rather than exonerating facts. Where the record does not demonstrate compliance, courts may grant qualified immunity without deciding the merits.
Training and policies vs. constitutional baselines: Internal disciplinary findings (like MDOC’s in this case) remain relevant to intent and institutional standards but are not substitutes for constitutional law in the clearly established analysis.

Limits of the decision

Unpublished and fact-bound: This opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication,” limiting its precedential weight. It turns heavily on the specific (and sparse) record at summary judgment.
Time-stamped: The holding is anchored to what was clearly established on June 11, 2019. Subsequent decisions (including Erickson, which the court cites) may continue to shape the contours of clearly established law for later incidents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A defense shielding officials from damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. “Clearly established” means there is controlling precedent with sufficiently similar facts putting the unlawfulness beyond debate.
Eighth Amendment Excessive Force: Two components:
- Subjective: Did the officer act “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, or in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline?
- Objective: Was the force used sufficiently serious in context? Severe injury is not required if force was malicious and gratuitous.
Compliance vs. Noncompliance (the Sixth Circuit’s axis): Cordell applies where the inmate is compliant and under control; Burnett grants qualified immunity where the inmate is resisting or trying to pull away. Whether an inmate is “under control” is the key question.
Collateral-Order Doctrine: Allows immediate appeal of a denial of qualified immunity when the issue is legal (e.g., whether the right was clearly established), even before a final judgment at trial.
Appellate Record (FRAP 10(a)): The court of appeals can consider only what was properly filed, served, and docketed below. Evidence referenced but not properly filed (like an unfiled video) is out of bounds.
Departmental Policy vs. Constitution: Breaching internal policy can support inferences about intent, but policy is not the constitutional standard; the Constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling.

Conclusion

McNair v. Pratt underscores two enduring truths. First, the “clearly established” inquiry in Eighth Amendment force cases in the Sixth Circuit turns on whether the inmate was compliant and under control. Burnett narrows Cordell to compliant-inmate scenarios; Erickson follows suit. Absent record evidence of compliance, Cordell does not clearly prohibit forceful takedowns. Context matters, and an officer’s isolation without backup is a salient distinction.

Second, procedure drives outcome. The court could not consider the video footage because it was not properly made part of the record. Without that evidence, the plaintiff’s limited citations did not create a triable dispute on compliance. The result: qualified immunity, without a merits ruling on whether the Eighth Amendment was actually violated.

The dissent voices a different and important message: at summary judgment, courts must credit the nonmovant’s version, and gratuitous, retaliatory violence has long been clearly established as unconstitutional even absent severe injury. That tension—between the need for fact-specific, on-point precedent and the “fair warning” principle from Hope—will continue to animate qualified-immunity disputes.

For practitioners, the takeaways are concrete: build the record meticulously, file and authenticate video evidence correctly, engage the compliance/control axis directly with case-matched precedent, and be prepared to meet the “clearly established” prong with specificity. For correctional institutions, the case is a reminder that internal policy discipline can coexist with qualified immunity; agency standards may exceed constitutional minima, but courtroom success turns on what the Constitution clearly prohibited at the time—and what the record actually shows.