McClendon El v. Washington: Clarifying the Absence of a Liberty Interest in Avoiding Sex-Offender Programming under Michigan’s Discretionary Parole System

1. Introduction

In Anthony McClendon El v. Heidi Washington, No. 24-1849 (6th Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a familiar yet unsettled question at the intersection of prison administration, parole, and constitutional due-process doctrine: Does an incarcerated individual, previously convicted of a sex offense, possess a Fourteenth-Amendment liberty interest in refusing to participate in a prison sex-offender treatment program when completion of that program is functionally required for parole eligibility?

The appellant, Anthony McClendon El (“McClendon”), serving a life sentence for second-degree murder (with earlier convictions, including third-degree criminal sexual conduct), challenged Michigan prison officials’ recommendation that he complete the Michigan Sexual Abuse Prevention Program. He argued that labeling him a “sex offender” and conditioning parole on completion of the program—without a separate hearing—violated his right to due process.

The Sixth Circuit, affirming the district court’s dismissal, held that McClendon failed to identify any cognizable liberty interest—neither a right to avoid the “sex-offender” designation nor a right to parole under Michigan’s discretionary framework—thereby foreclosing his § 1983 claim. Judge Murphy authored the opinion, joined by Judges Kethledge and Mathis.

2. Summary of the Judgment

No Liberty Interest in Avoiding Sex-Offender Label Alone. Government “speech” recommending or classifying an inmate for treatment is, without more, not a deprivation of liberty.
No Liberty Interest in Parole under Michigan Law. Because Michigan’s statute vests substantial discretion in the parole board, an inmate enjoys no state-created entitlement to release.
No Liberty Interest in Avoiding Treatment as a Parole Condition for a Convicted Sex Offender. Where an individual has already been convicted of a sex offense, circuits agree that additional process is unnecessary before imposing sex-offender programming as a condition to enjoy a discretionary benefit (e.g., parole).
Outcome. Complaint dismissed; district court affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)
Established the “atypical and significant hardship” test for state-created liberty interests. The court invoked Sandin to differentiate ordinary incidents of prison life from restraints triggering due-process protections.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005)
Demonstrated that extremely restrictive “Supermax” confinement and parole ineligibility can create a liberty interest. The Sixth Circuit used Wilkinson as the counter-example—McClendon’s scenario was far less onerous.
Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) & Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
Stand for the proposition that a state may create a liberty interest in parole only if statutory language mandates release upon satisfaction of objective criteria. Michigan’s discretionary scheme fails this test.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
“Stigma-plus” doctrine—defamation alone is not a liberty deprivation absent a tangible alteration of legal status. The Sixth Circuit analogized the sex-offender designation to reputational harm insufficient to create a liberty interest.
Circuit split cases on sex-offender treatment conditions:
- Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999)
- Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997)
- Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004)
- Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006)
The court acknowledged, but sidestepped, the nuanced disagreement over inmates without prior sex-offense convictions, noting unanimity that convicted sex offenders lack such an interest.
Sixth-Circuit specific precedents: Sweeton v. Brown (en banc), Crump v. Lafler, Wershe v. Combs, and Bridges v. Michigan Parole Board (unpublished) – all confirming no liberty interest in Michigan parole decisions and approving program conditions for sex-offense parolees.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds through the established three-step due-process inquiry:

Identification of a Protected Interest. Prisoners retain a limited “residuum of liberty,” but only interests either (a) inherent in the concept of liberty or (b) created by state law qualify. The court systematically rejected each candidate interest:
- Freedom from labeling. Government speech is not itself a deprivation absent stigma-plus.
- Right to parole. Michigan’s statute is discretionary; no substantive entitlement exists.
- Freedom from program participation. For a prisoner already convicted of a sex offense, program attendance is an “expected” incident of confinement, not an atypical hardship.
Deprivation. Even assuming a deprivation, the criminal conviction supplied all process due—mirroring the reasoning of Neal and Jennings.
Process Provided. McClendon had a prior guilty plea with full procedural safeguards; the Constitution required no additional hearing before imposing treatment as a parole prerequisite.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Sixth-Circuit Doctrine. Reinforces a bright-line rule: Convicted sex offenders have no liberty interest in avoiding rehabilitative programming conditions within Michigan’s discretionary parole system.
Narrows Viable § 1983 Claims. Inmates challenging sex-offender treatment must now allege (i) absence of a prior sex offense, and (ii) an atypical hardship or mandatory-parole language—an uphill battle in the Sixth Circuit.
Administrative Latitude. Prison officials retain broad discretion to recommend or require programming without triggering extra procedural hoops, streamlining correctional management.
Parole Board Decision-making. Confirms that Michigan’s board can leverage program non-completion as a legitimate basis for denial absent constitutional scrutiny.
Possible Supreme-Court Review? By noting, yet declining to resolve, the inter-circuit split for non-convicted inmates, the opinion positions the issue for potential high-court clarification though leaves the split undisturbed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Liberty Interest: A right protected by the Due Process Clause. Can be inherent (e.g., freedom from bodily restraint) or created by state law (e.g., mandatory parole statutes).
“Atypical and Significant Hardship”: A test from Sandin asking whether the prison condition is dramatically harsher than everyday prison life. Only such hardships create a liberty interest.
Discretionary vs. Mandatory Parole: Discretionary: Parole board may grant or deny release regardless of statutory criteria—no liberty interest.
Mandatory: Statute uses words like “shall” or “must,” requiring release if criteria met—liberty interest exists.
Stigma-Plus Doctrine: Reputational harm (“stigma”) must pair with a tangible change in legal status (“plus”) to implicate due process.
Sex-Offender Treatment Program: A behavioral therapy curriculum aimed at reducing sexual-offense recidivism. Participation may entail housing in specialized units and group therapy sessions.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in McClendon El v. Washington cements a straightforward rule: within Michigan’s discretionary parole framework, an inmate previously convicted of a sex offense has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in rejecting sex-offender programming, nor in obtaining parole itself.

By aligning with the consensus that prior conviction supplies all requisite process, the court shields prison officials and parole boards from a swath of potential § 1983 litigation, while simultaneously narrowing the pathways through which prisoners can challenge rehabilitative conditions. The decision’s lasting significance will be its utility as a precedent for quick dismissal of similar due-process challenges and its reinforcement of administrative discretion in correctional treatment decisions.