Post‑Election Ballot‑Title Contests: A Chapter 116 Defect Must Also “Cast Doubt” Under Section 115.593; Single‑Subject/Clear‑Title Attacks Lie Outside the Missouri Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction

1. Introduction

McCarty v. Secretary of State is a post-election challenge to the voter-approved Initiative Petition No. 2024-038 (“Proposition A”), a statutory measure increasing Missouri’s minimum wage and creating paid sick leave requirements, among other provisions. The contestants (plaintiffs) sued the Missouri Secretary of State and related defendants in an original action in the Missouri Supreme Court, invoking the election contest statutes (sections 115.555 and 115.593).

The case presented two categories of issues:

1. Election-process issues: whether the ballot title (the Secretary of State’s summary statement and the State Auditor’s fiscal note summary) was so inaccurate or misleading that it constituted an “irregularity” warranting a new election.
2. Substantive validity issues: whether Proposition A violated the Missouri Constitution’s “single subject” and “clear title” requirements (Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 50).

The Court ultimately upheld the election result and dismissed the constitutional validity counts for lack of original jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

• It has original jurisdiction over post-election election contests alleging ballot-title “irregularities” under chapter 115, reaffirming Dotson v. Kander, Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, and Lucas v. Ashcroft.
• The summary statement for Proposition A was sufficient and fair under chapter 116 and therefore did not constitute an election “irregularity.”
• The fiscal note summary was not materially inaccurate or seriously misleading: omission of private-employer cost estimates was permissible under section 116.175.3, and omission of Clay County’s $2,000 estimate was de minimis and not an irregularity “of sufficient magnitude” to cast doubt on the election under section 115.593.
• The Court lacked original jurisdiction over the single subject and clear title counts; those claims were dismissed without prejudice.

Separate opinion: Judge Ransom reiterated the jurisdictional view expressed in her dissent in Lucas v. Ashcroft, stating this Court lacks original jurisdiction over post-election ballot title contests of this nature, though she agreed the principal opinion’s merits analysis would be correct if jurisdiction existed and agreed the Court lacked original jurisdiction over the single subject and clear title counts.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Jurisdiction and post-election ballot-title contests

• Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. banc 2015): Recognized the Court’s original jurisdiction over a chapter 115 election contest challenging ballot-title sufficiency post-election, and framed the idea that a chapter 115 “irregularity” premised on a ballot title requires an underlying chapter 116 violation. McCarty uses Dotson as both the jurisdictional anchor and the analytic bridge between chapter 116 ballot-title standards and chapter 115 election-contest relief.
• Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171 (Mo. banc 2015): Reinforced that the Missouri Supreme Court may hear a post-election contest in an original action. McCarty treats Shoemyer as part of the settled jurisdictional line.
• Lucas v. Ashcroft, 688 S.W.3d 204 (Mo. banc 2024): The Court’s most recent and extensive treatment of (i) its original jurisdiction over post-election contests and (ii) the heightened post-election burden under section 115.593. McCarty leans heavily on Lucas to reject renewed attacks on Dotson/Shoemyer and to articulate the two-step post-election framework: even if chapter 116 is violated, relief requires an additional showing that the irregularity casts doubt on the election’s validity.

B. The initiative process and judicial restraint

• No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft, 638 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. banc 2022): Cited for the importance of Missouri’s initiative and referendum tradition. McCarty uses it to emphasize that courts should be cautious in interfering with direct democracy.
• Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. banc 1990): Provides the oft-quoted admonition that courts must act “with restraint, trepidation and a healthy suspicion” of partisan litigation seeking to derail initiatives. McCarty uses Blunt to justify a disciplined approach that avoids invalidating an election absent a truly consequential defect.

C. Standards for summary statements (chapter 116)

• Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637 (Mo. banc 2012): Establishes that a summary statement must be “sufficient and fair,” and must state consequences without bias, deception, or favoritism. McCarty applies Brown to evaluate whether Proposition A’s summary statement fairly conveyed central features without misleading omissions.
• Mo. Mun. League v. Carnahan, 303 S.W.3d 573 (Mo. App. 2010): Cited for the principle that, given the 100-word limit, a summary statement need not detail every peripheral question. McCarty deploys this to reject demands for extensive enumeration of exemptions, varied caps, and enforcement mechanisms.
• Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. App. 2020): Cited for the proposition that the summary statement should inform voters of the “central feature[s]” of the measure. McCarty uses this as the metric for whether omitted details about sick leave or enforcement rendered the summary statement unfair.
• Asher v. Carnahan, 268 S.W.3d 427 (Mo. App. 2008): Reinforces that the test is not whether the “best language” was used but whether the summary fairly and impartially summarizes the purpose. McCarty echoes this to reject critiques focused on drafting improvements rather than material deception.
• Mo. Mun. League v. Carnahan, 364 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. App. 2011): Cited for the point that referencing something already in Missouri law does not automatically make a proposal unfair or prejudicial; the question is whether it deceives or misleads. McCarty uses this to resolve the CPI indexing dispute.
• Hill v. Ashcroft, 526 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. App. 2017): Supports that a summary statement can use broad language and need not list every detail, so long as it is not deceptive, misleading, or argumentative. McCarty uses Hill to validate broad phrasing for sick leave features.
• Protect Consumers’ Access to Quality Home Care Coal., LLC v. Kander, 488 S.W.3d 665 (Mo. App. 2015): Cited both for summary statement drafting latitude and for fiscal-note principles, including that the Auditor need not investigate impacts beyond statutory requirements. McCarty leans on this to reject the argument that private-employer impacts must be included.

D. Fiscal note summary principles and post-election “magnitude” inquiry

• Lucas v. Ashcroft again: McCarty uses Lucas to draw two key lines:
  1. The Auditor has discretion within the 50-word limit but may not craft a summary that “departs in material respects” from the fiscal note.
  2. Post-election relief requires more than a chapter 116 defect; the defect must rise to an “irregularity” that casts doubt on the election under section 115.593.
  McCarty distinguishes Lucas on scale and character: Lucas involved a stark contradiction (a substantial local cost reported in the fiscal note versus “no additional costs” in the fiscal note summary), while McCarty involves an omission of (i) non-required private costs and (ii) a very small local estimate.

E. Subject-matter jurisdiction and limits on Supreme Court original jurisdiction

• McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. banc 2009): Cited for basic jurisdictional principles and the propriety of dismissal when subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. McCarty uses it to underscore that joinder rules cannot expand constitutional/statutory jurisdiction.
• J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009): Cited for the proposition that Missouri courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction is governed directly by the Missouri Constitution. McCarty uses it to support the conclusion that this Court’s original jurisdiction is limited and cannot be enlarged via civil rules.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The two-step post-election framework: chapter 116 defect + section 115.593 “doubt”

McCarty treats post-election challenges as qualitatively different from pre-election ballot-title litigation. Under the Court’s approach:

1. A contestant must first show a chapter 116 violation—i.e., that the summary statement or fiscal note summary was not “sufficient and fair” (summary statement) or was not a non-prejudicial, accurate synopsis of governmental fiscal impacts (fiscal note summary).
2. Even if that showing is made, the contestant must also prove the defect constitutes an “irregularity” that is “of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of the initial election” (section 115.593), justifying the extraordinary remedy of setting aside the people’s vote and ordering a new election.

This second step is the key “election stability” safeguard: it prevents minor drafting imperfections—common in word-limited ballot language—from automatically voiding enacted laws.

B. Summary statement: “central features,” not exhaustive detail

The Court rejected the contestants’ principal theory that the summary statement misled voters by (i) suggesting CPI indexing was a change when similar indexing already existed and (ii) omitting or blurring details of sick leave coverage, exemptions, uses (including domestic violence/sexual assault/stalking), criminal enforcement, and local enforcement. Applying the “central features” line of cases, the Court held that the summary statement adequately conveyed that Proposition A would (1) raise the minimum wage on a fixed schedule, (2) index it beginning in 2027, and (3) require paid sick leave accrual at one hour per 30 hours worked, while identifying oversight/enforcement and relevant exemptions.

The Court’s reasoning reflects two institutional judgments embedded in chapter 116 jurisprudence: (i) the word limit necessarily compresses detail, and (ii) “better drafting” is not the legal standard—material deception is.

C. Fiscal note summary: statutory focus on governmental fiscal impacts; materiality matters

The Court addressed two claimed omissions:

1. Private costs: The contestants argued the fiscal note summary should have included the Missouri Budget Project’s private-employer cost estimates contained in the full fiscal note. The Court held section 116.175.3 requires the fiscal note and summary to state estimated costs or savings “to state or local governmental entities,” and that neither the statute nor precedent requires inclusion of private-sector costs. On the Court’s account, omission of private costs was therefore not materially inaccurate or seriously misleading.
2. Clay County’s $2,000 estimate: Although included in the fiscal note, the estimate was omitted from the fiscal note summary. The Court treated the omission as not material in context—less than one percent of the $256,000 annual state estimate cited in the fiscal note summary—and also noted the cost depended on discretionary enforcement of criminal/civil provisions. This combination led the Court to conclude there was no materially misleading departure and, in any event, no irregularity “of sufficient magnitude” to cast doubt on the election.

Importantly, McCarty resists converting Lucas into a categorical “any omission voids the election” rule. It frames Lucas as addressing a large, direct contradiction about governmental cost, whereas McCarty involves either non-required categories (private costs) or a minor local estimate (Clay County).

D. Jurisdictional boundary: election-process review versus substantive validity review

The Court drew a sharp line between:

• Matters “relating to the election process” (within original jurisdiction under Mo. Const. art. VII, sec. 5 and section 115.555), including ballot-title irregularities; and
• Substantive validity claims such as Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 50 single-subject and clear-title challenges, which the Court held are not election irregularities and therefore not within its original jurisdiction in a chapter 115 contest.

The Court rejected the argument that joinder and compulsory counterclaim rules can bootstrap jurisdiction. Because the Missouri Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is limited, the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot enlarge it.

3.3 Impact

A. Reinforcement of Lucas’s “election stability” approach

McCarty strengthens the practical force of Lucas by emphasizing that post-election relief is exceptional and requires more than identifying arguable imperfections in ballot language. Litigants challenging a voter-approved measure based on ballot-title language should expect the Court to ask not merely “was it ideal?” but “was it materially misleading, and did it plausibly undermine the election’s validity?”

B. Fiscal note summary litigation: materiality and statutory scope

The decision likely narrows post-election fiscal-note attacks by:

• Confirming the Auditor’s statutory mandate centers on governmental fiscal impacts (not private compliance costs).
• Treating small local costs as unlikely to satisfy section 115.593’s “sufficient magnitude” requirement absent a compelling showing that the omission affected election validity.

C. Forum/channeling consequences for constitutional “validity” attacks

By dismissing the single subject and clear title counts without prejudice, McCarty signals that contestants must pursue such constitutional validity challenges in a court with appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction (typically circuit court), rather than appending them to a chapter 115 Supreme Court election contest. This channeling may reduce “kitchen-sink” post-election litigation in the Supreme Court and separate election-process questions from substantive constitutional review.

D. Continuing jurisdictional controversy

Judge Ransom’s separate opinion, grounded in her dissent in Lucas v. Ashcroft, highlights that original jurisdiction over post-election ballot-title challenges remains contested within the Court. For now, however, McCarty treats Lucas/Dotson/Shoemyer as binding under stare decisis, making jurisdiction stable unless revisited by a future majority or constitutional/statutory change.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ballot title: For statewide measures, Missouri voters see a ballot title rather than full statutory text. Here, it consists of (i) the Secretary of State’s summary statement (a ≤ 100-word question) and (ii) the Auditor’s fiscal note summary (a ≤ 50-word synopsis).
• “Sufficient and fair” (summary statement): A legal standard requiring a neutral description of the measure’s purpose and consequences—no bias, deception, or favoritism—focused on the measure’s central features.
• Fiscal note summary limits: Section 116.175.3 requires estimating costs/savings to state or local governmental entities. The Auditor has drafting discretion but cannot create a materially misleading synopsis of what the fiscal note says about governmental fiscal impacts.
• Election “irregularity” (post-election): Not every ballot-title flaw justifies undoing an election. Under section 115.593, the defect must be serious enough to cast doubt on the validity of the election.
• Original jurisdiction: A court’s power to hear a case first (rather than on appeal). The Missouri Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is limited and must be grounded in the Missouri Constitution and statutes.
• Single subject / clear title (Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 50): Constitutional drafting rules for legislation/initiatives—generally, measures must address one main subject and the title must clearly reflect the measure. McCarty holds these are not “election irregularity” issues within the Court’s original jurisdiction in a chapter 115 contest.
• Dismissed “without prejudice”: The claims are not decided on the merits; the plaintiffs may refile them in a proper court.
• De minimis: Too small to matter legally. The Court treated Clay County’s $2,000 estimate as de minimis relative to the disclosed statewide governmental costs.

5. Conclusion

McCarty confirms a robust, election-stabilizing rule for post-election initiative challenges: contestants must do more than identify arguable deficiencies in ballot-title drafting. They must establish a chapter 116 defect and then satisfy the higher, outcome-protective threshold of section 115.593—showing an “irregularity” of sufficient magnitude to cast doubt on election validity. At the same time, the Court draws a jurisdictional boundary, holding that substantive constitutional validity claims (single subject and clear title) do not fall within the Missouri Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in a chapter 115 election contest and must be pursued elsewhere.