McBroom v. BOPA (2025 MT 64): No Equitable Tolling of the Six-Month ULP Deadline During CBA Grievance; Parallel Filing with BOPA Permitted and Expected

Introduction

In McBroom v. Montana Board of Personnel Appeals, 2025 MT 64, the Montana Supreme Court addressed whether employees who chose to pursue contract-based grievance procedures under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) could equitably toll the six-month statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice (ULP) charge with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA). The case arose from disciplinary measures imposed by the Missoula Urban Transportation District (MUTD) on two bargaining-unit members, Mitchell McBroom and Barbara Lewis‑Baca (the Employees), for union-related activity concerning a proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU).

After nearly a year of grievance processing ended in a settlement between the Union and MUTD—one the Employees contend the Union accepted without their consent—the Employees filed a ULP with BOPA, outside the statutory six-month window. They argued that their reliance on the CBA’s grievance process should equitably toll the limitations period. Both BOPA and the Fourth Judicial District Court rejected that position. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, clarifying the interplay between statutory ULPs, CBA grievance procedures, and equitable tolling.

The decision has significant implications for Montana public-sector labor relations: it confirms that employees must protect statutory ULP claims by timely filing with BOPA even while a grievance is pending, especially where the CBA expressly excludes statutory claims from the grievance and arbitration process.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the District Court’s order upholding BOPA’s dismissal of the ULP as time-barred under § 39‑31‑404, MCA, which imposes a six-month limitations period for ULP filings.
The Court rejected equitable tolling based on pursuit of the CBA grievance procedure. Montana law and BOPA regulations contemplate parallel proceedings, permitting the filing of a ULP while a grievance runs its course.
Relying on Small v. McRae and Winchester v. Mountain Line, the Court emphasized that where a CBA explicitly excludes statutory claims from the grievance/arbitration process, employees may—and should—file statutory ULPs directly with BOPA without exhausting contractual remedies.
Because the Employees’ CBA contained such an exclusion for statutory claims, there was no legal or policy basis to defer or toll the ULP filing deadline pending the grievance outcome.
The Court underscored that equitable tolling is applied sparingly and is not available for “garden-variety” neglect; the Employees could have filed within six months and sought a stay under BOPA’s rules.

Factual and Procedural Background

On June 26, 2022, MUTD imposed three-day unpaid suspensions on several employees, including McBroom and Lewis‑Baca, for engaging in union activity at work regarding a proposed MOU adjusting work and operation hours. The Employees and their Union (Teamsters Local 2) grieved the discipline under the CBA on June 30, 2022. On May 4, 2023, the Union and MUTD settled the grievances by reducing the discipline to written warnings and providing backpay. The Employees objected, claiming the Union accepted the settlement without their consent.

On June 29, 2023, the Employees filed a ULP with BOPA alleging discrimination and interference with protected activity under state labor statutes. A BOPA Board Agent dismissed the charge as untimely under the six-month limitations period in § 39‑31‑404, MCA, and Admin. R. M. 24.26.1201(2). BOPA affirmed, concluding the grievance process did not toll the limitations period. The District Court agreed. The Employees appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, asserting equitable tolling based on public policy favoring exhaustion of grievance procedures.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 651 P.2d 982 (1982):
Small stands for the general proposition that bargaining-unit employees typically must exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in a CBA before pursuing contract-based claims in court. Its rationale is to maintain the integrity of bargained-for processes and prevent employees from “sidestepping” agreed dispute-resolution mechanisms. Importantly, Small recognized an exception: if it is “certain” the arbitration clause is not susceptible to covering the dispute, an employee need not exhaust CBA procedures.
Winchester v. Mountain Line, 1999 MT 134, 982 P.2d 1024, 294 Mont. 517:
Applying Small’s exception, Winchester held that where the CBA expressly excluded violations of state statutes from the grievance and arbitration process, an employee could pursue statutory claims (including ULPs) directly with the appropriate state agency. The Court faulted BOPA for deferring to the CBA’s arbitration procedure in the face of the CBA’s explicit carve-out. Notably, the CBA language in McBroom mirrors the Winchester clause almost verbatim.
Lake County v. State, 2024 MT 284, 419 Mont. 201, 559 P.3d 1263:
Articulates Montana’s equitable-tolling framework. When a party in good faith pursues one of several possible remedies, tolling may be considered only if three conditions are met: (1) timely notice to the defendant within the original limitations period via the first claim, (2) lack of prejudice in defending the second claim, and (3) good-faith and reasonable conduct in filing the second claim. The doctrine is exceptional, not routine.
Weidow v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 2010 MT 292, 359 Mont. 77, 246 P.3d 704:
Emphasizes equitable tolling is to be applied “sparingly” and not to excuse “garden-variety” neglect. Also reiterates that statutes of limitation serve the purpose of preventing surprise and ensuring fairness.
Hughes v. Blankenship, 266 Mont. 150, 879 P.2d 685 (1994):
Directs courts to give CBA terms their ordinary meaning—relevant here to read the CBA’s exclusion of statutory claims as written.
Watson v. Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2023 MT 239, 414 Mont. 217, 539 P.3d 1126:
Describes the standard of review for administrative decisions: correctness for legal conclusions and clear error for factual findings.
Statutes and Regulations:
- § 39‑31‑401(1), MCA: Defines ULPs by public employers (interference, restraint, coercion).
- § 39‑31‑404, MCA: Six-month statute of limitations for filing ULPs.
- Admin. R. M. 24.26.1201(2) (2020): Mirrors the six-month filing deadline.
- Admin. R. M. 24.26.1202 (2020): Authorizes BOPA Board Agents to stay informal ULP investigations while related grievance/arbitration proceeds, and to dissolve stays when appropriate.
- § 2‑4‑704, MCA: Judicial review of agency decisions (MAPA).
- § 39‑31‑402, MCA: Duty of fair representation—potential recourse if the union mishandled representation, referenced by the Court in footnote 3.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

There is no categorical exhaustion requirement for statutory ULPs—particularly where the CBA excludes them from the grievance/arbitration process.
The Employees contended that public policy mandated exhausting the CBA grievance procedure before filing a ULP. The Court rejected this argument, distinguishing Small. Small’s exhaustion requirement applies to contract-governed disputes. By contrast, the Employees’ ULP alleged violations of state statutes—§§ 39‑31‑201, -305, and -401, MCA—and, critically, the CBA’s Section 6.02 explicitly excluded “alleged violations of applicable State statutes” from grievance/arbitration, directing such claims to the “appropriate Federal and State agencies.” This is the Winchester scenario: it is “certain” the arbitration clause does not cover these statutory disputes, so the Small rule does not block direct filing with BOPA.
Montana’s labor-law framework anticipates and facilitates parallel proceedings.
The BOPA rules expressly contemplate that a ULP may be filed while a grievance proceeds, with the Board Agent empowered to stay the ULP investigation to avoid duplicative or premature action. Admin. R. M. 24.26.1202(1), (5). That regulatory structure undercuts any argument that equitable tolling is needed to accommodate grievance timelines; rather, the system expects employees to preserve statutory claims within six months and seek a stay if needed.
Equitable tolling does not apply on these facts.
Applying Lake County and Weidow, the Court reiterated that equitable tolling is a narrow doctrine. Even assuming the grievance provided some notice to the employer (a point the Court did not need to resolve), the Employees could have filed a ULP within six months of the disciplinary action and then requested a stay. Their decision to forego filing—despite a CBA that channeled statutory claims away from grievance/arbitration and despite rules allowing a stay—did not constitute the kind of good-faith, reasonable pursuit of remedies that warrants tolling. The statutory purpose of limitations—to prevent surprise and ensure timely litigation—would be undermined if employees could let the six months pass while waiting for a grievance outcome that their CBA did not require them to exhaust for statutory claims.

Why Small and Winchester Matter Here

The Employees hoped to invoke Small’s exhaustion principle as a policy basis for tolling. But the Court read Small and Winchester together to draw a bright line:

When a dispute is contract-governed and arguably within the scope of the CBA’s grievance/arbitration process, Small counsels employees to use that bargained procedure.
When the CBA expressly excludes statutory claims from grievance/arbitration and directs them to state or federal agencies, Winchester confirms that employees should file those statutory claims directly with the appropriate agency—here, BOPA—without waiting for contract remedies to conclude.

Because the McBroom CBA mirrors Winchester’s exclusionary language, the Employees fell squarely within the Winchester exception to Small’s general exhaustion requirement. That alignment was decisive against equitable tolling.

Impact and Practical Implications

McBroom delivers clear operational guidance for Montana public-sector labor relations:

Strict six-month clock for ULPs: Employees alleging statutory ULPs under Title 39, chapter 31 must file within six months of the alleged unfair practice (often the date of discipline). Waiting for a grievance to conclude risks forfeiture.
Parallel filing is the safe harbor: File the ULP timely and request a stay under Admin. R. M. 24.26.1202 if a grievance/arbitration on related issues is underway. BOPA can hold the ULP in abeyance and later lift the stay.
Read the CBA carefully: If the CBA—like the one here—expressly excludes statutory claims from grievance/arbitration, employees are not required (and are ill-advised) to wait for contract processes to wrap up before filing statutory claims.
Union representation concerns travel a different path: If an employee believes the union compromised their rights in settling a grievance, the remedy may be a duty of fair representation claim under § 39‑31‑402, MCA, not a late ULP against the employer. The Court noted the Employees did not pursue such a claim.
Employer predictability preserved: The decision reaffirms that limitation periods prevent surprise and preserve evidence integrity. Employers can expect that ULPs will be filed promptly, not after extended grievance processes.
Agency deference and process clarity: BOPA’s stay authority is central to harmonizing statutory claims with contract remedies, reducing forum conflict without sacrificing timeliness.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

Unfair Labor Practice (ULP): An employer or union action that violates statutory labor rights, such as interfering with employees’ rights to organize, engage in protected concerted activity, or be free from discrimination due to union activity. Public-sector ULPs in Montana are governed by § 39‑31‑401, MCA.
Statute of Limitations: A legal deadline to file a claim. For Montana public-sector ULPs, it is six months (§ 39‑31‑404, MCA). Missing the deadline generally bars the claim.
Equitable Tolling: A narrow doctrine that can pause a limitations period in exceptional circumstances—typically where a plaintiff diligently and in good faith pursued another viable remedy and the defendant had timely notice, with no prejudice resulting. It is not a cure for ordinary delay.
Exhaustion of Grievance/Arbitration: Many CBAs require employees to use internal grievance and arbitration procedures for contract-based disputes before going to court or other forums. But if the CBA expressly excludes statutory claims from those procedures, employees can file such claims directly with the appropriate agency without exhausting.
Parallel Proceedings and Stay: Filing a ULP with BOPA while also pursuing a grievance is allowed. BOPA can “stay” (temporarily pause) its investigation to let grievance/arbitration proceed, then resume as appropriate (Admin. R. M. 24.26.1202).
Duty of Fair Representation (DFR): Unions must fairly and in good faith represent all members of the bargaining unit. If a member believes the union betrayed or inadequately represented their interests (for example, by accepting an unwanted settlement), the DFR claim is the usual vehicle for recourse (§ 39‑31‑402, MCA).

Conclusion

McBroom v. BOPA cements a crucial clarification in Montana labor law: pursuing a CBA grievance does not equitably toll the six-month statute of limitations for filing a statutory ULP with BOPA—especially where the CBA expressly excludes such statutory claims from grievance and arbitration. Montana’s regulatory framework anticipates parallel filings and provides a stay mechanism to coordinate proceedings without sacrificing timeliness.

The decision refines the relationship between Small’s general exhaustion principle and Winchester’s exception for statutory claims, signaling to employees, unions, employers, and practitioners that timely statutory filings are indispensable. The path forward is now unmistakable: file ULPs within six months, request a stay if needed, and consider DFR claims when the grievance representation itself is at issue. In doing so, McBroom upholds both the integrity of contractual dispute-resolution systems and the predictability of statutory limitation periods.