Matthews v. Rasa: Pleading Standards for Pro Se Title VII and ADEA Claims in the Second Circuit

I. Introduction

Matthews v. Rasa, No. 24-2499-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (summary order), is a non‑precedential decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirming the dismissal of a pro se employment discrimination suit at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.

The plaintiff, Susan Matthews, a former employee of the City of New York (working in or with the New York Police Department), sued:

the City of New York (her employer), and
her supervisor, Inspector Paul Rasa, plus “Unknown Employees”

under:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) – race/color discrimination,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) – age discrimination,
the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and
the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

She alleged:

discriminatory failure to promote and denial of higher pay,
a hostile work environment, and
retaliation after she complained of discrimination, including an EEOC filing.

The Southern District of New York (Ho, J.) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), declined supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims, and denied further leave to amend. The Second Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed.

Although the court’s disposition is a “summary order” and therefore not precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and offers a clear, practical illustration of:

what factual detail is required to plead discrimination and retaliation plausibly, even by a pro se litigant,
what does not qualify as an adverse employment action for retaliation purposes, and
when district courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction and deny leave to amend as futile.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Standard of Review and Pleading Framework

The court restated the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard:

Review is de novo. Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023).
All factual allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.
The complaint must plead enough facts to make a claim “plausible on its face,” not just possible or speculative. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals” of elements are not assumed true.

Because Matthews appeared pro se, the court liberally construed her filings to “raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024). But liberal construction does not relax the basic plausibility standard.

B. Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment

The Second Circuit held that Matthews failed to state:

a Title VII discrimination claim,
an ADEA discrimination claim, or
a hostile work environment claim under either statute.

For Title VII discrimination, the court accepted that Matthews is in a protected class and was qualified but found no minimal inference of discriminatory intent:

She alleged that Black and Hispanic colleagues were promoted while she (a white employee) and another white colleague were not,
but she did not plead any facts showing that those promoted colleagues were “similarly situated in all material respects.” Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003).

She also alleged that the NYPD “secretly manufactured” job titles for minority employees to pay them more, but the court deemed these claims conclusory and speculative under Iqbal.

For the ADEA claim, the court held that Matthews did not plausibly allege that she was denied promotion or pay “but for” her age. Her age-discrimination allegations were also conclusory. See Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 303 (2d Cir. 2021).

On hostile work environment under both Title VII and the ADEA, the court emphasized that workplace mistreatment is actionable only when it occurs because of a protected characteristic (race, color, age, etc.). See Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014); Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2007). Matthews failed to plausibly link the alleged conduct to her race, color, or age, so these claims also failed.

C. Retaliation

Matthews alleged that the defendants retaliated against her, including after she filed a complaint with the EEOC. The court applied the same retaliation framework to Title VII and ADEA claims. See Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2006).

To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show:

Participation in a protected activity (e.g., complaining about discrimination, filing an EEOC charge);
Employer knowledge of that protected activity;
an adverse employment action; and
a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005)).

The parties did not dispute that filing an EEOC complaint constitutes protected activity. The Second Circuit did not decide the first two elements because the claim failed at elements (3) and (4):

The only conduct alleged after the EEOC filing related to:
- an “angry and nasty” meeting,
- removal of COVID‑19 barriers in an open area near Matthews’s desk, and
- an instance where a coworker was “staring” at her.
The court held that none of these, individually, constituted an “adverse employment action” in the retaliation sense, i.e., conduct that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” See Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 275 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
The court relied on prior decisions finding that hostile tone in emails driven by workplace policies, yelling, and staring are ordinarily insufficient to constitute materially adverse actions. See Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023); Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 571 (2d Cir. 2011).

Matthews apparently argued a cumulative “constructive discharge” theory, i.e., that the overall post‑complaint treatment forced her to quit. The court rejected this too, citing Spence v. Md. Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993), which holds that mere difficult or unpleasant working conditions do not suffice for constructive discharge.

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction and Leave to Amend

Because the federal Title VII and ADEA claims were properly dismissed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims. That decision is squarely in line with Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The Second Circuit also affirmed denial of further leave to amend as futile, citing Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). In other words, the deficiencies in Matthews’s claims were substantive (lack of any plausible factual basis), not mere technical pleading defects that could be cured with another amendment.

Having rejected Matthews’s remaining arguments, the court affirmed the judgment in full.

III. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. The Pleading Standard and Pro Se Litigants

The Second Circuit’s opening sections underscore the interplay between:

the Twiqbal plausibility standard (Twombly/Iqbal), and
the more forgiving construction of pro se pleadings.

The court repeats that:

All factual allegations are taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.
But legal conclusions and bare assertions are disregarded.
Even for a pro se complainant, the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter” to “nudge” the claims from conceivable to plausible.

The citation to Sharikov reflects modern Second Circuit practice: while courts must interpret self‑represented filings generously, they are not permitted to manufacture factual allegations or accept speculation in lieu of facts. In Matthews, this strictness is especially visible where the court labels allegations of “secretly manufactured” job titles as “conclusory and speculative.”

B. Title VII Discrimination: Comparator Allegations and Inference of Bias

To state a Title VII disparate-treatment claim without direct evidence, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that:

she is a member of a protected class,
she was qualified for the position,
she suffered an adverse employment action (e.g., denial of promotion or pay), and
there is at least minimal support for the inference that the employer acted with discriminatory intent.

This formulation derives from Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2023), which in turn draws on Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove her case or satisfy the full McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework, but she must provide factual content suggesting discriminatory motive.

Matthews attempted to meet this burden by pointing to a set of allegedly comparable co‑workers:

Black and Hispanic colleagues received promotions;
She and another white colleague did not.

The court rejected this as insufficient under Mandell v. County of Suffolk, which requires that a comparator be “similarly situated in all material respects”:

Are the jobs the same or very similar, with comparable duties?
Are the employees subject to the same supervisors and standards?
Are they at a similar level of seniority and performance?

Matthews’s complaint, as described, did not supply these details. It identified race and promotion outcomes but did not show that she and the promoted employees were materially comparable in role or circumstances. Without such detail, the court treated her allegations as essentially:

“Some minority employees were promoted and I was not; therefore the employer discriminated against me.”

Under Iqbal, that sort of inferential leap is too large without supporting facts. The court thus found no “minimal” inference of discrimination and affirmed dismissal.

C. ADEA Discrimination: The “But-For” Causation Requirement

The ADEA requires a stricter causal link than Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard. Relying on Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., the court emphasized that, to survive dismissal, an ADEA plaintiff must plausibly allege that she would not have suffered the adverse action “but for” her age.

Matthews’s pleading, as summarized by the court, did not:

identify any age‑related comments or policies,
describe colleagues treated better specifically because they were younger, or
offer other non‑conclusory facts connecting the denials of promotion or pay to her age.

Her references to age discrimination were purely conclusory, which cannot satisfy the “but‑for” requirement. Again, the court applied Iqbal to filter out legal labels unaccompanied by factual content.

D. Hostile Work Environment: The “Because Of” Requirement

An important conceptual point in the opinion is that not all abusive or unfair workplace behavior is legally actionable:

For Title VII, workplace mistreatment is only actionable if it occurs because of a protected characteristic (e.g., race, color, sex, national origin).
For the ADEA, harassment must occur because of age.

The court cites:

Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)); and
Kassner v. 2nd Avenue Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2007).

Thus, the court did not need to reach questions like whether the work environment was “severe or pervasive” (the usual hostile-environment threshold) because it found that Matthews had not plausibly shown that the mistreatment she alleged was tied to her race, color, or age at all.

In other words, the claims failed at the causation step: there was no non‑conclusory allegation that the alleged hostility was motivated by her protected characteristics.

E. Retaliation: Adverse Action and Timing

1. Protected Activity and Knowledge

The opinion assumes without dispute that filing an EEOC complaint is a protected activity and that the employer was aware of it. The court therefore focused on the latter two elements of retaliation: adverse action and causal link.

2. What Counts as an “Adverse Employment Action” in Retaliation?

Retaliation claims use a broader notion of “adverse action” than discrimination claims. Under Burlington Northern, an action is materially adverse if it is the kind of thing that “might well dissuade a reasonable worker” from complaining of discrimination.

Nonetheless, there is an important line between trivial workplace slights and materially adverse actions. The court reinforces that:

Rudeness, anger in a single meeting, or ordinary workplace friction is not enough.
Removal of physical barriers (here, COVID‑19 partitions) near a desk, absent more, generally does not rise to the level of materially adverse action.
A coworker’s act of “staring” also falls within the realm of ordinary, if unpleasant, workplace behavior that does not deter a reasonable employee from exercising rights.

The Second Circuit’s reliance on:

Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023) (hostile tone in emails, flowing from neutral policies, insufficient); and
Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (yelling and staring do not ordinarily constitute adverse actions),

confirms the court’s continued adherence to a relatively demanding threshold for retaliation even under the more expansive Burlington Northern standard.

3. Timing: Post‑Complaint Conduct Only

Another key aspect of the reasoning is temporal: the court expressly notes that only acts occurring after the EEOC filing “can possibly have a causal relationship with that filing.”

This matters because:

Retaliation presupposes that the employer is responding to the protected activity.
Conduct that occurs before the protected activity, no matter how unfair, cannot logically be in retaliation for that activity (though it may be discriminatory or harassing).

By isolating the post‑complaint conduct and then finding that this conduct did not constitute adverse action, the court effectively disposes of the retaliation theory without reaching whether there was any “pattern” of hostility.

4. Constructive Discharge Theory

Matthews appears to have suggested that the cumulative effect of the alleged conduct forced her to resign, constituting a constructive discharge. The court cites Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993), to reaffirm that:

Constructive discharge requires workplace conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.
Difficult or unpleasant conditions are not enough.

Given that the court had already characterized the post‑EEOC conduct as falling well short of the “materially adverse” threshold for retaliation, it was inevitable that those same allegations could not meet the even higher standard for constructive discharge.

F. Supplemental Jurisdiction and Denial of Leave to Amend

1. Supplemental Jurisdiction over NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Matthews’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims once all federal claims had been dismissed. The Second Circuit reviewed this for abuse of discretion and found none, relying on Kolari and the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

As a practical matter, Second Circuit decisions frequently endorse dismissing state and local claims without prejudice in this situation, particularly at the early stages of litigation, to allow state courts to apply their own (sometimes more expansive) anti‑discrimination statutes.

2. Futility of Further Amendment

The district court denied further leave to amend, and the Second Circuit affirmed under Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000), which holds that:

“The problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it.”

In Matthews, the appellate court agreed that the complaint’s failings were substantive: Matthews did not merely omit details; rather, she had no non‑conclusory factual basis from which discrimination or retaliation could be plausibly inferred. In that posture, further amendments would be futile, and denial of leave was proper.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The decision weaves together a cluster of recent and foundational precedents to reinforce well‑settled doctrinal points:

Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023); Green v. Dep’t of Educ., 16 F.4th 1070 (2d Cir. 2021)
Confirm the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and the requirement to accept factual allegations as true.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
Provides the “plausibility” standard and the rule that courts ignore bare legal conclusions. This underpins the rejection of Matthews’s “secret job title” allegations as conclusory.
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024)
Illustrates how pro se pleadings are construed liberally, but not exempted from plausibility.
Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023); Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015)
Articulate the elements for pleading discrimination under Title VII and the notion of “minimal support” for an inference of discriminatory motivation.
Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2003)
Defines “similarly situated in all material respects,” guiding the court’s rejection of Matthews’s comparator theory.
Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293 (2d Cir. 2021)
Confirms the “but‑for” causation standard for ADEA claims at the pleading stage.
Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2014); Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001)
Emphasize that mistreatment must be “because of” a protected characteristic to be actionable under Title VII.
Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2007)
Extends the “because of” requirement to age-based hostile work environment claims under the ADEA.
Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2006)
Affirms that the same standards and burdens apply to retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA.
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2005)
Provide the classic four‑element test for a prima facie retaliation claim.
Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2023); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
Supply the standard for “materially adverse” actions in retaliation — actions that might dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining.
Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2023); Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 2011)
Explain that hostile tone, yelling, and other ordinary workplace frictions usually do not qualify as adverse actions.
Spence v. Md. Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1993)
Defines constructive discharge and clarifies that merely difficult or unpleasant working conditions are not enough.
Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006)
Governs when federal courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissal of federal claims.
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000)
Articulates the futility standard for denying leave to amend.

These authorities collectively show that the Second Circuit viewed Matthews not as a close or novel case, but as a straightforward application of settled doctrine to a complaint lacking factual content.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Key Statutory Frameworks

Title VII: Prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It also prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose unlawful discrimination or file complaints.
ADEA: Prohibits age discrimination against employees who are 40 years or older, and similarly prohibits retaliation for complaining about age discrimination.
NYSHRL and NYCHRL: State and city analogues with their own standards, often interpreted more liberally (especially the NYCHRL). Here, the federal courts did not reach their merits after dismissing the federal claims.

B. Important Doctrinal Terms

Protected Class: A group legally shielded from discrimination (e.g., race, sex, age 40+). Matthews alleged discrimination based on race/color (white) and age.
Adverse Employment Action:
- For discrimination: typically a materially negative change in the terms and conditions of employment (e.g., firing, demotion, non‑promotion, significant pay cut).
- For retaliation: any action that might dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination (broader than the discrimination standard, but still excludes trivial slights).
Hostile Work Environment: A workplace so permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. Crucially, the hostility must be because of a protected characteristic.
Comparator: A colleague outside the plaintiff’s protected class who is similarly situated in all material respects (same kind of job, similar responsibilities, same supervisor, etc.) but treated more favorably. Comparator evidence can support an inference of discrimination.
“But-For” Causation: The idea that, absent a particular factor (here, age), the adverse action would not have happened. Required for ADEA claims.
Protected Activity (Retaliation): Actions like filing an internal complaint of discrimination, speaking to HR about discriminatory conduct, or filing a charge with the EEOC.
Constructive Discharge: When an employer makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. This is treated legally like an actual termination, but the bar is high.
Rule 12(b)(6): A provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” It tests legal sufficiency, not evidence.
Pro Se: A litigant who represents herself without a lawyer. Courts give pro se pleadings a more generous reading, but they must still allege facts that make legal claims plausible.
Supplemental Jurisdiction: The authority of a federal court to hear state-law claims that are related to federal claims in the same case. If all federal claims are dismissed early, courts often choose not to continue exercising this jurisdiction.
Futility of Amendment: A basis for denying additional chances to amend a complaint. Amendment is futile when, even with better wording, the facts as alleged (or as can reasonably be alleged) cannot establish a legal claim.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Non‑Precedential but Illustrative

Formally, Matthews v. Rasa is a summary order without precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1. However, it remains citable as persuasive authority and is useful in practice because it:

applies up‑to‑date Second Circuit and Supreme Court case law to common employment‑law pleadings, and
signals how strictly federal courts will scrutinize discrimination and retaliation complaints at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage, even for pro se plaintiffs.

B. Pleading Lessons for Discrimination Claims

The decision reinforces that a plaintiff must do more than:

assert membership in a protected class,
identify an adverse outcome (e.g., no promotion), and
point to colleagues of different races or ages who fared better.

To reach plausibility, a complaint should, where possible, also include:

specifics on job titles, duties, qualifications, and supervisors, showing comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects,”
instances of biased comments, policies, or disparate treatment linked to the protected trait, and
facts suggesting that non‑discriminatory explanations are implausible.

Without these details, courts will likely treat discrimination allegations as speculative and dismiss them under Iqbal.

C. Clarifying the Boundaries of Retaliation

On retaliation, Matthews illustrates several important points:

Temporal Causation: Only actions after the protected activity can be retaliatory.
Materiality: Petty workplace frictions, even if annoying or upsetting, are unlikely to be deemed materially adverse under Burlington Northern.
Constructive Discharge: The standard remains demanding; unpleasant conditions seldom suffice.

As a practical consequence, plaintiffs alleging retaliation should emphasize:

clear, tangible employment consequences (suspensions, write‑ups, undesirable reassignments, wage issues, etc.),
tight timing and explicit linkage between the protected activity and the adverse action, and
a pattern of escalating conduct that, taken together, would deter a reasonable person from complaining.

D. Pro Se Litigants and Access to the Courts

The opinion also serves as a cautionary example for self‑represented litigants:

Courts will read their complaints liberally but will still enforce the plausibility standard.
Conclusory claims of “discrimination” or “retaliation” without specific supporting facts are not enough.
Repeated opportunities to amend may not be given if the court perceives the underlying legal defects as incurable.

For courts, the decision shows how to articulate the balance: respect for pro se status while guarding against unsubstantiated claims proceeding to costly discovery.

E. Federal–State Division of Labor in Employment Cases

Finally, the treatment of NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims is consistent with a broader pattern in the Second Circuit:

Where federal claims are dismissed at the threshold, federal courts often decline to adjudicate parallel state or city claims.
This reinforces the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and respects the state courts’ primary role in developing state and local anti‑discrimination law.

Thus, plaintiffs whose federal theories are weak but who wish to rely heavily on NYCHRL’s more expansive protections may need to understand that their state and city claims might ultimately be resolved — or refiled — in state court.

VII. Conclusion

Matthews v. Rasa does not break new doctrinal ground. Instead, it offers a clean synthesis and application of existing Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedents on:

the plausibility standard for discrimination and retaliation claims,
the need to plead specific comparator and causation facts,
the distinction between ordinary workplace conflict and legally actionable adverse actions, and
the circumstances under which supplemental jurisdiction is declined and further amendment deemed futile.

As a citable but non‑precedential summary order, it functions as a practical roadmap of what must be alleged — and what is not enough — for Title VII and ADEA claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, especially when brought by a pro se plaintiff against a public employer.