Matter of White: Waiver of Reciprocal‑Discipline Defenses and Strict Limits on Resignation While Charges Are Pending

1. Introduction

The decision in Matter of White, 2025 NY Slip Op 06383 (App Div 3d Dept, Nov. 20, 2025), arises from a reciprocal-disciplinary proceeding brought against Andrew Steven White, an attorney admitted in New York, Connecticut, and (formerly) California. The case sits at the intersection of several important regulatory mechanisms in New York’s attorney disciplinary system:

reciprocal discipline based on misconduct adjudicated in another state (22 NYCRR 1240.13),
the procedures and substantive requirements for resignation while charges are pending (22 NYCRR 1240.10), and
the aggravating role of chronic registration delinquency under Judiciary Law § 468-a and related orders.

White was admitted in New York in 1990, after a 1989 admission in Connecticut. He later became administratively suspended in California (2009) and, more importantly for this decision, was suspended in New York in 2014 for failing to comply with attorney registration requirements beginning in 2008. Despite that suspension, he continued to maintain a business address with the New York Office of Court Administration while practicing in Connecticut.

In November 2024, the Superior Court of Connecticut (Judicial District of Waterbury) suspended White for six months, with additional conditions, based on:

failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, and
failure to promptly deliver to a client funds the client was entitled to receive,

in violation of Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3 and 1.15(e). The misconduct involved his long-term representation of a dentist in debt-collection matters, where he repeatedly failed both to pursue matters diligently and to remit settlement funds promptly.

When the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (“AGC”) sought reciprocal discipline in New York under 22 NYCRR 1240.13, White responded not by contesting the application, but by cross-moving to resign from the New York bar under 22 NYCRR 1240.10. The Third Department thus confronted two core issues:

What are the substantive requirements and limits on an attorney’s ability to resign while a disciplinary matter is pending?
How should New York respond, in terms of sanction, to foreign discipline imposed on an attorney who is already long suspended and registration‑delinquent in New York?

The decision answers both questions in ways that reinforce and refine existing doctrine, especially in the context of reciprocal discipline and attorney resignation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department, per curiam, resolves the matter in two main steps:

2.1 Denial of Resignation While Charges Are Pending

First, the court denies White’s cross-motion to resign from the New York bar under 22 NYCRR 1240.10. The court holds that:

an attorney seeking to resign while a disciplinary proceeding is pending must, among other statutory requirements, specifically set forth the nature of the charges or allegations under investigation in the resignation affidavit; and
White’s affidavit fails this requirement because it does not detail the Connecticut allegations—namely, his failure to act diligently and his failure to promptly deliver client funds.

Relying on Matter of Meagher, 178 AD3d 1351 (3d Dept 2019), the court concludes that this omission is fatal, and thus resignation in lieu of discipline is not permitted.

2.2 Imposition of Reciprocal Discipline

Turning to the AGC’s motion, the court:

invokes 22 NYCRR 1240.13(c), which authorizes discipline in New York based on “misconduct committed in a foreign jurisdiction,”
notes that White does not raise any of the specific defenses available under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) (e.g., lack of due process in the foreign proceeding, infirmity of proof, or nondisciplinary nature of the foreign conduct under New York standards), and instead states he is “not in a position to fight the allegations,”
holds that this failure to assert defenses constitutes a waiver of all available 1240.13(b) defenses, citing Matter of Hediger, 230 AD3d 847 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Brammer, 227 AD3d 1219 (3d Dept 2024), and
determines that the Connecticut misconduct would violate New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3(a) (diligence) and 1.15(e) (safekeeping and prompt delivery of client funds), citing Matter of Beyer, 241 AD3d 1700 (3d Dept 2025).

In assessing sanction, the court emphasizes that it is not bound to mirror the foreign sanction, but must craft a penalty that:

protects the public,
maintains the honor and integrity of the profession, and
deters similar misconduct,

quoting Matter of Radshaw, 213 AD3d 1193 (3d Dept 2023).

Taking into account:

White’s substantial experience as an attorney (an aggravating factor under ABA Standard 9.22(i), and as applied in Matter of Swayze, 230 AD3d 906 [3d Dept 2024]);
his failure to report the Connecticut suspension within 30 days as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d), an aggravator under Matter of Mendelsohn, 230 AD3d 943 (3d Dept 2024);
his longstanding failure to comply with New York registration obligations, leading to an 11‑year suspension and nine consecutive biennial delinquencies (citing Matter of Shedlick, 234 AD3d 1101 [3d Dept 2025]; Matter of Aljaludi, 226 AD3d 1254 [3d Dept 2024]); and
the concrete prejudice to the client, who was deprived of initiating certain collection actions and timely receiving settlement funds (citing Matter of Grey, 122 AD2d 626, 663 [3d Dept 1986] and ABA Standard 4.42(b)),

the court imposes a suspension from the practice of law in New York for “six months and one day”, effective immediately and “until further notice” of the court (see 22 NYCRR 1240.16).

The court issues the standard directives for suspended attorneys, including:

a command to desist and refrain from any practice of law in New York, in any capacity,
a prohibition on holding himself out as an attorney in New York or giving legal opinions,
compliance with 22 NYCRR 1240.15 (rules governing suspended attorneys) with an affidavit of compliance, and
return of any Attorney Secure Pass within 30 days.

In a footnote, the court also notes that, despite White’s failure to assert defenses, it independently confirms that:

he was afforded due process in the Connecticut disciplinary proceeding, and
there was no infirmity of proof, as he participated and agreed to the disposition.

3. Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1 Prior New York Suspension: Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468

White’s disciplinary history in New York begins with Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468, 113 AD3d 1020 (3d Dept 2014). That omnibus proceeding addressed large numbers of attorneys who had failed to comply with Judiciary Law § 468‑a (biennial registration and related fees). In 2014, the Third Department suspended White for conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” due to his failure to register beginning in 2008.

This history is critical in Matter of White for two reasons:

First, his ongoing noncompliance—nine consecutive biennial delinquencies—shows a sustained disregard of New York’s regulatory regime.
Second, the court treats this pattern as evidence of “disinterest” in his status as a New York attorney, a point it explicitly weighs as aggravation in determining the sanction for his Connecticut misconduct.

3.2 Resignation While Charges Are Pending: Matter of Meagher

The denial of White’s cross-motion to resign rests heavily on the procedural standards in 22 NYCRR 1240.10 and their prior application in Matter of Meagher, 178 AD3d 1351 (3d Dept 2019). Section 1240.10(a) requires an attorney seeking to resign while disciplinary charges are pending to submit an affidavit that, among other elements, explicitly:

acknowledges the existence and nature of the pending allegations or investigation, and
“sets forth the specific nature of the charges or the allegations under investigation.”

In Meagher, the Third Department enforced this requirement strictly, insisting that the attorney’s affidavit provide a candid and concrete description of the alleged misconduct. Matter of White follows and reinforces that line:

White’s affidavit failed to describe, in any meaningful detail, the allegations of his lack of diligence and his failure to promptly deliver client funds.
That omission is treated as a direct noncompliance with 1240.10(a), justifying denial of the resignation request.

In effect, White confirms that resignation cannot be used as a vague or sanitized exit strategy from the bar; the applicant must fully and specifically acknowledge the underlying misconduct.

3.3 Reciprocal Discipline and Waiver of Defenses: Hediger and Brammer

Under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b), an attorney facing reciprocal discipline in New York may raise limited defenses, such as:

lack of notice or opportunity to be heard in the foreign jurisdiction (due process),
an infirmity of proof in the foreign proceeding,
that the misconduct established does not constitute misconduct in New York, or
that the imposition of reciprocal discipline would be unjust.

In both Matter of Hediger, 230 AD3d 847 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Brammer, 227 AD3d 1219 (3d Dept 2024), the Third Department held that when an attorney fails to assert these defenses, they are deemed waived.

Matter of White extends this principle. White explicitly states in his affidavit that he is “not in a position to fight the allegations,” and he does not invoke any of the specific 1240.13(b) defenses. The court treats this as:

a complete waiver of all available defenses to reciprocal discipline,
allowing the court to proceed directly to recognition of the foreign misconduct and sanction under New York law.

Notably, in footnote 2, the court still briefly reviews the foreign proceeding, confirming that due process was satisfied and the proof was sound, even though these issues were not raised. This underscores that, while defenses are waived if not asserted, the court remains alert to the fundamental fairness of the foreign process.

3.4 Mapping Foreign Misconduct to New York Rules: Matter of Beyer

A core requirement of reciprocal discipline is that the foreign conduct must be misconduct under New York’s own professional rules. Here, the foreign violations were of:

Connecticut Rule 1.3 – diligence, and
Connecticut Rule 1.15(e) – safekeeping and prompt delivery of client funds.

The Third Department concludes that this conduct corresponds to violations of:

New York Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3(a): requiring diligence and promptness in representing a client; and
New York Rule 1.15(e): requiring prompt delivery to a client of funds or other property the client is entitled to receive.

Citing Matter of Beyer, 241 AD3d 1700 (3d Dept 2025), the court confirms that this type of mapping—comparing functionally equivalent foreign and New York rules—is well-established. The comparison here is particularly straightforward, given the close textual and conceptual alignment between the Connecticut and New York rules.

3.5 Sanctioning Principles: Radshaw, Swayze, Mendelsohn, Shedlick, Aljaludi, and Grey

The court’s sanction analysis invokes a cluster of authorities that collectively articulate its approach to punishment in disciplinary matters.

3.5.1 Matter of Radshaw – Purpose of Sanction

In Matter of Radshaw, 213 AD3d 1193 (3d Dept 2023), the Third Department emphasized that the goal of attorney discipline is not to replicate foreign sanctions or to punish in a purely retributive sense, but rather:

to protect the public,
to maintain the honor and integrity of the profession, and
to deter other attorneys from similar misconduct.

This principle is quoted and applied in White to justify imposing a tailored sanction rather than simply duplicating Connecticut’s six‑month suspension.

3.5.2 Matter of Swayze and ABA Standard 9.22(i) – Experience as Aggravation

ABA Standard 9.22(i) recognizes an attorney’s substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor. In Matter of Swayze, 230 AD3d 906 (3d Dept 2024), the Third Department applied this principle, noting that experienced attorneys are expected to know and abide by professional norms.

In White, the court similarly treats the respondent’s long tenure (admitted in the late 1980s and early 1990s) as an aggravating factor, implicitly indicating:

his longstanding bar membership increases his responsibility to meet professional standards, and
his misconduct is more serious because it occurred despite that experience.

3.5.3 Matter of Mendelsohn – Failure to Report Foreign Discipline

22 NYCRR 1240.13(d) requires attorneys admitted in New York to report foreign discipline within 30 days of its imposition. In Matter of Mendelsohn, 230 AD3d 943 (3d Dept 2024), the Third Department treated failure to make that report as an aggravating factor.

White fell afoul of the same requirement: he did not promptly report his six‑month Connecticut suspension. The court expressly cites Mendelsohn and treats this omission as additional aggravation in fashioning the sanction.

3.5.4 Matter of Shedlick and Matter of Aljaludi – Chronic Registration Delinquency

In Matter of Shedlick, 234 AD3d 1101 (3d Dept 2025), and Matter of Aljaludi, 226 AD3d 1254 (3d Dept 2024), the court dealt with attorneys who had long‑running failures to comply with registration obligations. These cases underscore that:

chronic noncompliance with Judiciary Law § 468-a is treated seriously,
such delinquency can be an aggravating factor in other disciplinary contexts, and
it may reflect a broader pattern of disengagement from professional obligations.

In White, the Third Department uses this reasoning to interpret his 11‑year suspension and nine consecutive registration delinquencies as evidence that he is essentially indifferent to his New York status. This “disinterest” meaningfully influences the severity of the sanction.

3.5.5 Matter of Grey and ABA Standard 4.42(b) – Pattern of Neglect and Client Prejudice

Matter of Grey, 122 AD2d 626, 663 (3d Dept 1986), involved repeated neglect that materially prejudiced clients. It is cited in White alongside ABA Standard 4.42(b), which states that a suspension is generally appropriate where:

a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client.

The court finds those conditions satisfied here, noting:

White’s client was deprived of pursuing multiple collection actions due to his lack of diligence; and
the client did not receive certain settlement funds in a timely manner.

Moreover, citing Grey, the court adopts a suspension of “six months and one day” — a specific length with particular procedural consequences (discussed below).

4. Legal Reasoning and Doctrinal Development

4.1 Resignation in Lieu of Discipline: Candor and Specificity Required

Under 22 NYCRR 1240.10, an attorney may seek to resign while disciplinary charges are pending. This is sometimes perceived as a “clean exit,” but the rule imposes strict requirements to prevent abuse. Among other things, the resignation affidavit must:

acknowledge the existence of charges or investigation,
state that the attorney cannot successfully defend against them, and
set forth the specific nature of those charges or allegations.

The Third Department’s reasoning in White is straightforward but significant:

White’s affidavit did not describe the Connecticut misconduct in any real detail.
He did not explain the particulars of his lack of diligence or his failures to promptly remit client funds.
Absent such specificity, the court could not be satisfied that he fully and candidly acknowledged the misconduct forming the basis of his resignation request.

By citing Meagher and applying 1240.10(a) strictly, the court sends a clear message:

Resignation while charges are pending is not a device to obscure the factual record of misconduct.
The bar and the public are entitled to a transparent account of what led to the attorney’s departure.

Thus, White reinforces a principle: resignation in lieu of discipline demands a fact‑specific, candid description of the underlying allegations, including those arising in foreign jurisdictions.

4.2 Reciprocal Discipline: Waiver of Defenses and Independent Confirmation

22 NYCRR 1240.13 creates a structured regime for reciprocal discipline. Once a foreign jurisdiction has found misconduct and imposed discipline, New York may proceed on the basis of that adjudication, subject to the narrow defenses enumerated in 1240.13(b).

White does not attempt to invoke any of those defenses. By stating that he is “not in a position to fight the allegations,” he effectively:

declines to challenge the fairness of the Connecticut proceeding,
does not assert any infirmity in the evidence, and
does not argue that the conduct is non‑disciplinary under New York standards or that reciprocal discipline would be unjust.

The court, following Hediger and Brammer, holds that this silence constitutes waiver of the defenses under 1240.13(b). Thus, it accepts the Connecticut findings and moves directly to mapping the misconduct against New York rules.

At the same time, the court does not abdicate its oversight role. In footnote 2, it notes that:

White received due process in Connecticut, and
there was no infirmity in the evidentiary basis of the foreign discipline.

This indicates that, even when defenses are waived, the court still sees itself as responsible for ensuring that:

the foreign process met basic fairness standards, and
the record supports the finding of misconduct.

This layered approach reinforces confidence in the reciprocal discipline mechanism while preserving the attorney’s opportunity—if properly invoked—to challenge specific aspects of the foreign proceeding.

4.3 Sanctioning an Already‑Suspended and Registration‑Delinquent Attorney

A distinctive feature of White is that the respondent was already suspended in New York for over a decade due to registration failures. Nonetheless, the court still undertakes a full sanction analysis, culminating in a new fixed-term suspension of six months and one day.

The court’s reasoning reflects several considerations:

Public protection and deterrence still matter even when the attorney is not currently practicing in New York. Formal reciprocal discipline:
- ensures that the New York record accurately reflects the attorney’s full disciplinary history,
- signals to other multi‑jurisdictional practitioners that foreign misconduct will have consequences here, and
- conditions any possible future reinstatement on the resolution of all misconduct.
Aggravating factors are cumulative. The court considers:
- the Connecticut misconduct (diligence and client-funds issues),
- White’s substantial professional experience,
- his failure to report the foreign suspension, and
- his persistent disregard of New York registration rules.
These combine to present a picture of an attorney who has repeatedly failed to meet fundamental professional obligations.
Actual harm to the client matters decisively. The court notes that White’s client suffered concrete prejudice:
- inability to pursue certain collection actions, and
- delayed receipt of settlement funds.
This elevates the seriousness of the misconduct above mere technical or administrative infractions.

Through this analysis, the court underscores that discipline is not rendered moot by existing suspensions or administrative noncompliance. Instead, the overall pattern of conduct and harm informs the imposition of additional discipline.

4.4 The Significance of “Six Months and One Day”

The precise term of suspension—“six months and one day”—is not arbitrary. Under New York’s rules (see generally 22 NYCRR 1240.16), suspensions of more than six months typically require a formal petition for reinstatement, with a showing of fitness and compliance with all conditions. By contrast, shorter suspensions may allow for more automatic or streamlined return.

By setting the term at six months and one day, citing Matter of Grey, the court ensures that:

White cannot simply wait out the suspension; he must affirmatively seek and justify reinstatement, and
the court retains control over whether and under what conditions he could ever resume practice in New York.

For an attorney already suspended and registration‑delinquent, this is particularly consequential. To regain New York status, he would now have to:

cure his registration delinquencies under Judiciary Law § 468-a and related rules; and
successfully petition for reinstatement from this disciplinary suspension, demonstrating rehabilitation and fitness.

Thus, the “six months and one day” formulation functions as a structural safeguard, ensuring that reinstatement is carefully scrutinized rather than automatic.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Reciprocal Discipline

“Reciprocal discipline” occurs when one jurisdiction (here, New York) imposes discipline on a lawyer based on misconduct found and sanctioned in another jurisdiction (here, Connecticut). The idea is to:

avoid relitigating the same facts in multiple states,
maintain consistent public protection across jurisdictions, and
prevent an attorney from escaping the consequences of misconduct by shifting practice locations.

In New York, 22 NYCRR 1240.13 governs this process. Once a foreign discipline is final, New York generally presumes that the foreign findings are correct, subject to specific, limited defenses.

5.2 Defenses Under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b)

An attorney facing reciprocal discipline can challenge it, but only on narrow grounds:

Due process issues – e.g., if the foreign jurisdiction did not provide adequate notice or a fair hearing.
Infirmity of proof – e.g., if the evidence was so weak that it undermines confidence in the foreign finding.
No equivalent misconduct in New York – e.g., if the conduct, though sanctioned elsewhere, would not be a violation of New York rules.
Injustice – e.g., if imposing similar discipline in New York would be unjust under the circumstances.

If the attorney does not raise these defenses, as in White, the court treats them as waived and generally accepts the foreign findings.

5.3 Resignation While Charges Are Pending (22 NYCRR 1240.10)

Attorneys sometimes seek to resign from the bar instead of going through a disciplinary proceeding. In New York, resigning “while charges are pending” is closely regulated:

The attorney must admit that charges or an investigation exist.
The attorney must state that he or she could not successfully defend against the charges if they were prosecuted.
The attorney must describe the specific nature of the allegations.

This process ensures that:

the resignation is informed and voluntary,
the record accurately reflects why the attorney left the bar, and
the public is protected by transparency regarding attorney misconduct.

In White, the resignation request failed because the affidavit did not meet the specificity requirement.

5.4 Registration Delinquency and Administrative Suspension

New York attorneys must register every two years under Judiciary Law § 468‑a and pay associated fees. Failure to do so—especially over multiple cycles—leads to:

“administrative” suspension, which is not based on misconduct like dishonesty or neglect, but on failure to comply with regulatory obligations, and
eventually, inclusion in omnibus proceedings such as Matter of Attorneys in Violation of Judiciary Law § 468.

In White, this background is not the primary misconduct at issue, but it is a powerful aggravating factor showing disregard for legal and professional obligations.

5.5 The Role of ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

The court references two ABA Standards:

Standard 9.22(i) – lists “substantial experience in the practice of law” as an aggravating factor; experienced lawyers are held to a higher expectation of compliance.
Standard 4.42(b) – indicates that suspension is appropriate when a lawyer’s failure to perform services causes injury or potential injury to a client, especially when part of a pattern of neglect.

These standards are not binding law, but New York courts often cite them as persuasive guidance in calibrating sanctions.

5.6 “Six Months and One Day” Suspensions

A suspension of “six months and one day” is significant because it typically:

moves the case into a category where the attorney must file a formal application for reinstatement under 22 NYCRR 1240.16,
requires a demonstration of rehabilitation, fitness, and compliance with all prior orders, and
gives the court a structured opportunity to reassess whether the attorney should be allowed to practice again.

It is a way for the court to underline the seriousness of the misconduct and to retain control over any potential return to practice.

6. Impact and Broader Significance

6.1 For Multi‑Jurisdictional Practitioners

Matter of White is a cautionary decision for attorneys admitted in multiple jurisdictions:

Misconduct in one state will likely lead to discipline in other admitting jurisdictions, even if the attorney is already suspended or non‑active there.
Failure to report foreign discipline within 30 days, as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d), will be treated as an additional aggravating factor.
Efforts to resign from one jurisdiction’s bar to avoid a disciplinary record—especially without full disclosure of the underlying facts—will be closely scrutinized and may be denied.

6.2 Reinforcement of Transparency and Accountability in Resignations

By denying White’s resignation for lack of specificity, the court reinforces a broader principle of transparency:

Attorneys cannot quietly exit the bar during disciplinary investigations without clearly acknowledging what they did wrong.
This promotes confidence in the disciplinary system and ensures that future employers, clients, and regulators can understand the circumstances of an attorney’s departure.

6.3 Integration of Administrative and Disciplinary Noncompliance

The decision also underscores how different types of noncompliance—administrative (registration) and substantive (diligence, client funds)—interact:

Chronic failure to comply with registration requirements is not treated as a trivial technicality; it reflects broader disregard for professional responsibilities.
When substantive misconduct subsequently occurs, the registration history is taken as evidence of an overall pattern and weighed heavily in sanctioning.

6.4 Structural Control Over Reinstatement

Finally, the “six months and one day” suspension, coupled with White’s longstanding administrative suspension, shows the court using its procedural tools to ensure that:

any future return to the New York bar requires active steps by the attorney,
the court can evaluate rehabilitation in light of both foreign and domestic misconduct, and
protection of the public remains central in any reinstatement decision.

7. Conclusion

Matter of White does not revolutionize New York disciplinary law, but it meaningfully clarifies and reinforces several key principles:

Attorneys seeking to resign while charges are pending must provide a detailed, candid account of the specific allegations; failure to do so will bar resignation in lieu of discipline.
In reciprocal discipline proceedings, failure to assert the defenses in 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) results in waiver, and the court will proceed on the basis of the foreign findings.
Foreign misconduct involving lack of diligence and failure to promptly deliver client funds readily maps onto New York Rules 1.3(a) and 1.15(e), warranting significant discipline, especially when clients are harmed.
Chronic registration delinquency, failure to report foreign discipline, and long professional experience each serve as aggravating factors that can elevate the sanction.
The “six months and one day” suspension exemplifies how New York uses procedural thresholds to retain control over reinstatement and to underscore the seriousness of the misconduct.

Taken together, these elements make Matter of White an important reaffirmation of New York’s commitment to:

inter‑jurisdictional accountability,
transparent recordkeeping in attorney departures, and
robust protection of clients and the public in the face of attorney misconduct.