Materiality of Undisclosed Child Sexual Abuse in Naturalization Fraud: Commentary on United States v. Chavez (11th Cir. 2025)

Materiality of Undisclosed Child Sexual Abuse in Naturalization Fraud: Commentary on United States v. Chavez (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Orlando Chavez, No. 25‑10314 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), affirming convictions for:

  • Procuring citizenship or naturalization unlawfully, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a); and
  • Misuse of evidence of citizenship or naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1423.

Although marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” and therefore non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, the opinion is a significant application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335 (2017), and of the “good moral character” requirements under the Immigration and Nationality Act. It clarifies how undisclosed, uncharged sexual abuse of a minor can be treated as a material misrepresentation in naturalization proceedings and how such conduct feeds into a criminal prosecution under § 1425(a) and, derivatively, § 1423.

The case sits at the intersection of criminal law, immigration law, and appellate review standards. It also illustrates:

  • How the “investigation-based theory” of materiality under Maslenjak functions in practice;
  • How “good moral character” is evaluated when the disqualifying conduct predates any conviction; and
  • How plain error review can sharply limit defendants’ ability to re‑frame sufficiency arguments on appeal.

II. Overview of the Case

A. Parties and Charges

The United States prosecuted Orlando Chavez on two federal charges:

  1. 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) – procuring naturalization unlawfully (“knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship”).
  2. 18 U.S.C. § 1423 – misuse of evidence of citizenship or naturalization (“knowingly uses for any purpose any … certificate of naturalization … unlawfully issued or made…”).

The essence of the prosecution was that Chavez:

  • Had sexually abused his seven‑year‑old daughter around 2014;
  • Committed that abuse during the statutory “good moral character” period relevant to his later naturalization;
  • Failed to disclose that conduct in his naturalization application filed in 2017; and
  • Subsequently used the naturalization certificate obtained through that nondisclosure to apply for a U.S. passport.

B. Procedural Posture

At trial in the Southern District of Florida, a jury convicted Chavez on both counts. Chavez moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction. The district court denied the motion.

On appeal, Chavez argued:

  1. The evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly failed to disclose his sexual abuse of his daughter and that this omission was material under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) and Maslenjak – i.e., that a reasonable immigration officer, if informed, would have denied the application or would have investigated and uncovered disqualifying facts.
  2. Because the government allegedly failed to prove § 1425(a), it necessarily failed to prove that his naturalization certificate was “unlawfully issued” for purposes of § 1423, which in turn meant there was insufficient evidence of misuse of evidence of naturalization.

Importantly, the Eleventh Circuit treated part of Chavez’s sufficiency challenge as unpreserved because, for the first time on appeal, he argued that:

  • His later child‑abuse conviction did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” under immigration law; and
  • He had not been convicted of that offense at the time he filed his naturalization application.

This re‑framing triggered plain error review for those aspects of his sufficiency argument.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the denial of the Rule 29 motion and the convictions.

A. Key Holdings

  1. Sufficiency of the evidence under § 1425(a): The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that:
    • Chavez sexually abused his seven‑year‑old daughter in 2014 (by inserting his penis into her vagina);
    • He committed that abuse during the “good moral character” period applicable to his 2017 naturalization application;
    • He failed to disclose this conduct on his application; and
    • That failure was material because the immigration officer testified that, had Chavez disclosed this conduct, she would have investigated further and ultimately denied the application.
  2. Application of Maslenjak’s materiality standard: The court applied the Supreme Court’s framework in Maslenjak v. United States, accepting an “investigation-based” theory of materiality:
    • The misrepresentation (omission of the abuse) was sufficiently relevant to a naturalization criterion (good moral character) to prompt further investigation by a reasonable official; and
    • That investigation would have “predictably disclosed” facts (the child sexual abuse) constituting legal grounds to deny the application.
  3. Good moral character and criminal conduct without a prior conviction: Relying on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1101(f), and United States v. Jean‑Baptiste, the panel emphasized that:
    • “Good moral character” is required by statute for naturalization;
    • Certain categories (including “aggravated felonies” such as sexual abuse of a minor) automatically preclude good moral character; but
    • Even if a person does not fit any of the enumerated categories, the “catch‑all” in § 1101(f) allows a determination that the person lacks good moral character for other reasons.

    Hence, the lack of a conviction at the time of the application did not insulate Chavez: the underlying conduct itself was enough for a reasonable jury to conclude he was not a person of good moral character.

  4. Derivative sufficiency as to § 1423: Having sustained the § 1425(a) conviction, the court found the evidence equally sufficient to support the § 1423 conviction:
    • Once the jury could reasonably find that Chavez’s naturalization was procured “contrary to law” (via material misrepresentation), the resulting certificate was “unlawfully issued”; and
    • Chavez’s use of that certificate to secure a U.S. passport satisfied the elements of misuse under § 1423.

B. Standard of Review

The court:

  • Reviewed the denial of the Rule 29 motion and preserved sufficiency challenges de novo, asking whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
  • Reviewed new grounds raised for the first time on appeal (i.e., whether the prior conviction was an aggravated felony and the impact of the timing of the conviction) only for plain error.

Ultimately, the panel found no error at all, let alone plain error, in the district court’s denial of the motion for acquittal.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Appellate Review: Sufficiency of the Evidence

  • United States v. Beach, 80 F.4th 1245 (11th Cir. 2023) – cited for the de novo standard for reviewing sufficiency challenges and denials of Rule 29 motions. The Eleventh Circuit reiterated:
    • It must uphold a Rule 29 denial if “a reasonable trier of fact could conclude” that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
    • It must view “all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the government;” and
    • It will not overturn a jury’s verdict if there is “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supporting guilt.
  • United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) – underscored that a verdict must be sustained if there is a “reasonable basis in the record” for it.
  • United States v. Guevara, 894 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2018) – reinforced that no special skepticism attaches to circumstantial evidence in sufficiency review; direct and circumstantial evidence are weighed the same way.

Collectively, these authorities set a highly deferential standard toward jury verdicts: the appellate court does not re‑weigh evidence or reassess credibility but asks only whether a rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Plain Error Review

  • United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016) – established that when a defendant challenges sufficiency on a ground not raised in the Rule 29 motion, the new ground is reviewed only for plain error.
  • United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) – articulated the four-part plain error standard:
    1. There must be an error;
    2. The error must be “plain” (clear or obvious);
    3. The error must affect substantial rights (typically meaning it affected the outcome); and
    4. Even if all three are met, the appellate court exercises discretion to correct only those errors that seriously affect “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
  • United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) – sharpened the meaning of “plain”: when “the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue” and there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit directly on point, there can be no plain error.

In Chavez, these cases allowed the panel to confine full, de novo review to arguments raised at trial and to give only limited, deferential scrutiny to newly framed appellate arguments about:

  • Whether Chavez’s child‑abuse conviction qualified as an aggravated felony; and
  • The significance of the fact that he was not convicted at the time of his application.

3. The Substantive Naturalization Fraud Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)

The key interpretive authority was:

  • Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).

Maslenjak held, in essence, that:

  • A person “knowingly procures” naturalization “contrary to law” under § 1425(a) only if the false statement is material to the naturalization decision;
  • A falsehood is material if, had the truth been known, it would have “influenced” the award of citizenship given proper application of naturalization law by a reasonable official; and
  • The government can prove materiality in at least two ways:
    1. Direct disqualification theory: the misrepresented fact itself makes the applicant ineligible for citizenship under the substantive naturalization rules; or
    2. Investigation-based theory: the misrepresented fact, if truthfully disclosed, would have led a reasonable immigration officer to investigate further, and that investigation would have predictably revealed disqualifying facts.

Maslenjak also recognized a powerful defense: even if the government proves a material misrepresentation under the investigation-based theory, the defendant can avoid conviction by proving that he was, in fact, legally qualified for citizenship despite the misstatement.

The Eleventh Circuit in Chavez faithfully tracks this framework, explicitly invoking:

  • The two theories of materiality; and
  • The burden‑shifting structure under the investigation-based theory (government’s burden to show what a reasonable officer would do; defendant’s opportunity to prove actual eligibility).

4. Misuse of Evidence of Citizenship: 18 U.S.C. § 1423

The statute provides that a person violates § 1423 by knowingly using, for any purpose, a certificate of naturalization (or similar document) that was “unlawfully issued or made.”

The Eleventh Circuit did not cite prior § 1423 cases; instead, it treated § 1423 as conceptually downstream of § 1425(a): once naturalization is shown to have been procured “contrary to law,” any certificate issued on that basis is “unlawfully issued,” and using it for a passport application suffices for § 1423.

5. Immigration Law: Good Moral Character and Aggravated Felonies

The opinion references several immigration statutes:

  • 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) – requires that a naturalization applicant be “a person of good moral character.”
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) – defines categories of individuals who cannot be found to have good moral character, including:
    • Those convicted of certain offenses (e.g., an “aggravated felony” as defined in § 1101(a)(43)); and
    • A residual “catch‑all” provision stating that the listed categories “shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons an individual is or was not of good moral character.”
  • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) – defines “aggravated felony” to include “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”

The court also relied on:

  • United States v. Jean‑Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2005).

In Jean‑Baptiste, the Eleventh Circuit held that:

  • A naturalized citizen who committed a drug offense before taking the naturalization oath, but who was not indicted, arrested, or convicted until afterwards, lacked good moral character during the relevant period;
  • Therefore, he had been ineligible for naturalization and was subject to denaturalization; and
  • The “catch‑all” language of § 1101(f) is “expansive,” illustrating that the enumerated categories of disqualifying conduct are not exhaustive.

Chavez extends this reasoning to criminal prosecution (as opposed to civil denaturalization), emphasizing that:

  • Actual conviction is not necessary for purposes of evaluating good moral character; and
  • The underlying conduct (here, sexual abuse of a minor) during the statutory period can itself render an applicant ineligible for citizenship and make nondisclosure material under § 1425(a).

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standards of Review Applied

The court carefully distinguished between:

  • Arguments preserved below – These triggered de novo review of sufficiency. For those, the question was: could any rational jury, viewing the evidence in the prosecution’s favor, find Chavez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
  • New arguments on appeal – Particularly, the contention that:
    • The child‑abuse conviction was not an “aggravated felony”; and
    • The absence of a conviction in 2017 precluded reliance on that offense for materiality or moral-character analysis.
    These were reviewed for plain error only.

Footnote 1 explicitly states that plain error review applies “because Chavez argues for the first time on appeal that his child abuse conviction does not rise to the level of an aggravated felony and that he had not been convicted at the time he filed his application for naturalization. At trial, Chavez argued that he pled guilty to the child abuse charge to be released from jail, not because he was guilty of the offense.”

By drawing that line, the court avoided reaching novel legal questions about the exact classification of Chavez’s state offense as an aggravated felony; instead, it focused on whether there was any error at all in letting the jury use the sexual abuse conduct as a basis for finding material misrepresentation and unlawful naturalization.

2. Application of Maslenjak: Material Misrepresentation

The court explicitly adopts Maslenjak’s materiality framework for § 1425(a), including:

  • The requirement that false statements be material – they must influence the naturalization decision;
  • The distinction between:
    • Misrepresentation about facts that are in themselves disqualifying; and
    • Misrepresentation that would have led a reasonable officer to investigate and discover other disqualifying facts (the investigation-based theory).

In Chavez’s case, the government’s theory is primarily investigation-based:

  1. The misrepresentation: Chavez failed to disclose that, in 2014, he had sexually abused his seven‑year‑old daughter by inserting his penis into her vagina.
  2. Relevance to naturalization criteria: This conduct is highly pertinent to the “good moral character” requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), whether or not it is classified as an aggravated felony.
  3. Reasonable officer response: The immigration officer testified that, had Chavez truthfully disclosed this conduct, she would:
    • Have conducted further investigation; and
    • Ultimately have denied the application.
  4. Predictable discovery of disqualifying facts: An investigation into the alleged sexual abuse would have uncovered the underlying conduct (and ultimately did, as shown by the later conviction), which is plainly inconsistent with good moral character.

Based on this evidentiary record, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find:

  • The omitted conduct was “sufficiently relevant to a naturalization criterion” (good moral character) that a reasonable officer would investigate; and
  • That investigation would “predictably disclose” a legal disqualification, satisfying Maslenjak’s test for investigation-based materiality.

Notably, the court did not require:

  • Expert testimony on what a “reasonable” immigration officer would do; it accepted the testifying officer’s account;
  • Proof that the offense was classified as an aggravated felony at the time of the application; it sufficed that the conduct itself would render Chavez ineligible under the good-moral-character requirement.

3. Good Moral Character and the Timing of Criminal Conduct

The opinion specifically states:

“Based on the evidence, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Chavez committed a crime during his statutory good moral character period … for which he had not been arrested in 2017, when he applied for naturalization and failed to disclose this information.”

Two key points emerge:

  1. Focus on conduct, not just conviction – Drawing on Jean‑Baptiste, the Eleventh Circuit reinforces that “good moral character” analysis is not confined to convictions. The underlying behavior—here, sexual abuse of a minor—committed during the statutory period is enough to undermine good moral character, even if the arrest or conviction comes later.
  2. The statutory “good moral character period” – While the opinion does not spell out the length, under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) this is typically the five years immediately preceding the application (or three years in certain marriage‑based cases). By specifying 2014 conduct and a 2017 application, the court makes clear that the abuse fell squarely within the relevant period.

The court further notes that § 1101(f) includes an expansive catch‑all provision, so even if the offense were not technically an “aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(A), the nature of the conduct (sexual abuse of a minor) is plainly the kind of behavior that can defeat a finding of good moral character.

4. Chavez’s Materiality Argument and Plain Error

On appeal, Chavez tried to re‑cast the materiality question by arguing:

  • His child abuse conviction is not an aggravated felony; and
  • He had not been convicted at the time of the naturalization application, making the conduct non‑disqualifying.

Under Baston, this was a new ground and thus subject to plain-error review. But the court essentially short‑circuited the analysis by finding:

  • No “error” in the first place, since the underlying conduct was itself criminal and occurred within the good-moral-character period;
  • No basis to treat the government’s reliance on that conduct as an obvious legal mistake, particularly in light of Jean‑Baptiste and § 1101(f)’s catch‑all.

The panel also recited the Chau rule: without explicit statutory language or binding precedent directly resolving an issue, there is no “plain” error. Given the broad language of the immigration statutes and precedents treating pre‑naturalization conduct as relevant regardless of conviction timing, Chavez could not demonstrate a clear or obvious error.

5. The § 1423 Conviction as Derivative of § 1425(a)

Section 1423 punishes anyone who:

“knowingly uses for any purpose any … certificate of naturalization … unlawfully issued or made…”

Once the court affirmed the § 1425(a) conviction—that is, once it held that Chavez had procured naturalization “contrary to law” via a material misrepresentation—the rest followed:

  • The certificate of naturalization was therefore “unlawfully issued or made;” and
  • Chavez’s use of that certificate to secure a U.S. passport satisfied the “knowing use” element of § 1423, because he knowingly used the certificate for the passport application.

The panel summarized succinctly:

“Because the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Chavez procured his U.S. citizenship by making false statements and that Chavez used his naturalization certificate to procure his U.S. passport, the jury also had sufficient evidence to convict Chavez of misusing evidence of naturalization.”

The opinion does not parse whether “knowingly” in § 1423 modifies only “uses” or also “unlawfully issued,” nor does it require proof that Chavez subjectively knew his certificate was unlawfully issued. In practice, the court treats § 1423 as an almost automatic corollary: if the jury finds the naturalization itself unlawful and the defendant later uses the certificate, the § 1423 offense is established.

C. Impact and Doctrinal Significance

1. Reinforcement of Maslenjak in the Eleventh Circuit

Chavez is a straightforward but important application of Maslenjak. It confirms within the Eleventh Circuit that:

  • Materiality under § 1425(a) requires a causal connection between the falsehood and the naturalization decision, using an objective reasonable‑officer standard; and
  • The investigation-based theory is fully available and can rest on:
    • The nature of the misrepresented conduct (here, sexual abuse of a minor); and
    • Testimony from an actual immigration officer about what she would have done if properly informed.

Though unpublished, the case demonstrates the lower courts’ comfort operationalizing Maslenjak and aligns naturalization-fraud prosecutions squarely with that Supreme Court framework.

2. Use of Uncharged Conduct in Naturalization Fraud Prosecutions

One of the more practically significant aspects of Chavez is its explicit reliance on:

  • Serious criminal conduct that predated any arrest or conviction;
  • That occurred within the statutory good-moral-character period; and
  • That was omitted from the naturalization application.

The case underscores that:

  • The government can base a § 1425(a) charge on underlying conduct that had not yet resulted in a conviction at the time of naturalization;
  • Later conviction for that same conduct may serve as powerful corroborating evidence at trial; but the core disqualification stems from the conduct itself, not the conviction;
  • The “good moral character” requirement is broad enough, via § 1101(f)’s catch‑all, to capture serious uncharged (or not‑yet‑charged) conduct.

For prosecutors, this decision legitimizes a strategy of investigating past criminal conduct during the good‑moral‑character period, even if the conduct did not lead to an arrest or conviction until after naturalization. For defense counsel, it highlights the risk of any significant discrepancy between an applicant’s true past conduct and the information provided on immigration forms.

3. Emphasis on Immigration Officer Testimony

Materiality in investigation-based cases can be challenging: courts must predict whether a hypothetical “reasonable officer” would investigate and discover disqualifying facts.

Chavez shows that:

  • Testimony from the actual adjudicating officer—stating that she would have investigated and denied the application if she had known of the abuse—can be sufficient evidence for the jury;
  • The court does not require separate expert testimony or policy evidence to establish what a “reasonable officer” would do; the officer’s testimony, combined with the obviously serious nature of the misconduct, suffices.

This will likely encourage prosecutors to call naturalization officers at trial to provide such testimony. It also signals to defense attorneys that cross‑examination on what “reasonable” officers do and on actual agency policies can be critical to undermining the government’s materiality proof.

4. Interaction Between Criminal and Immigration Law

Chavez blurs the line between civil denaturalization (as in Jean‑Baptiste) and criminal prosecution under § 1425(a). It confirms:

  • The same underlying immigration concepts—good moral character, aggravated felonies, the catch‑all—govern both;
  • An individual whose conduct would justify denaturalization may also be exposed to criminal liability if the naturalization was obtained via misrepresentation or concealment.

The case thus contributes to a broader trend of using criminal statutes to enforce immigration rules, especially in cases involving serious misconduct such as child sexual abuse.

5. Procedural Lesson: The Cost of Not Preserving Legal Theories

From a procedural standpoint, Chavez is also a cautionary tale about appellate strategy. By raising a new argument about whether the offense was an aggravated felony and about conviction timing only on appeal, Chavez triggered plain error review, dramatically narrowing his chances of success.

The opinion emphasizes:

  • Sufficiency challenges must be made with sufficient specificity at the Rule 29 stage to preserve legal theories for full appellate review;
  • Under Chau, the lack of on‑point precedent cuts against defendants claiming plain error, not in their favor.

For trial practitioners, this underscores the importance of:

  • Raising detailed objections to the government’s materiality and eligibility theories at trial; and
  • Developing a record (including expert testimony if necessary) about the immigration consequences of particular offenses.

V. Complex Concepts Explained in Plainer Terms

1. “Procures Naturalization Contrary to Law” – 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a)

In ordinary language, § 1425(a) makes it a federal crime to:

  • Obtain U.S. citizenship by lying or hiding important facts; or
  • Help someone else obtain citizenship in that way.

But not every lie or omission counts. Under Maslenjak, the false statement must be:

  • Knowingly false (not an innocent mistake); and
  • Material – it must matter to the government’s decision to grant citizenship. If the truth would not have changed the outcome, there is no criminal violation.

2. Materiality and the “Investigation-Based” Theory

Materiality asks this question:

“If the truth had been told, would it likely have changed how the naturalization process turned out?”

There are two main paths to “yes”:

  1. Direct disqualification: The lie hides something that, by itself, makes the person ineligible. Example: concealing a murder conviction.
  2. Investigation-based disqualification: The lie hides something that would cause a reasonable immigration officer to ask more questions and dig deeper, and that investigation would be expected to uncover something disqualifying.

In Chavez, the second path was key: hiding sexual abuse of a minor would cause any reasonable officer to investigate—and that investigation would uncover disqualifying conduct.

3. “Good Moral Character” and the Look‑Back Period

For naturalization, the law requires that the applicant has been a person of “good moral character” for a certain number of years (typically the five years before applying).

This does not mean “perfect.” But certain serious crimes—or patterns of bad behavior—can show that the person does not meet this standard. The immigration statute lists examples (like aggravated felonies) but also says:

“Even if you don’t fit any of the listed categories, you can still be found to lack good moral character for other serious reasons.”

Crucially, conduct matters, not just convictions. If someone committed a serious crime during that period, and it’s later proven, that can show they lacked good moral character at the time, even if they hadn’t yet been arrested or convicted when they applied.

4. “Aggravated Felony” and Sexual Abuse of a Minor

In immigration law, an “aggravated felony” is a term of art that covers a long list of serious crimes. One category is:

  • “Murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”

Being convicted of an aggravated felony generally means:

  • You cannot show good moral character; and
  • You are often subject to mandatory removal (deportation) and permanent bars on many immigration benefits.

In Chavez, the defendant argued on appeal that his child abuse conviction was not such an aggravated felony and that it post‑dated his application. The court did not need to resolve those technical classification questions because the underlying conduct itself—sexual abuse of a seven‑year‑old—was sufficiently serious to defeat good moral character.

5. Plain Error Review

Plain error review is a strict standard applied when a party raises a new legal argument for the first time on appeal. To win under plain error, a defendant must show:

  1. The district court made a legal mistake;
  2. The mistake was “plain” – clear or obvious under current law;
  3. The error likely affected the outcome of the trial; and
  4. The error seriously undermines the fairness or reputation of the judicial process, such that the appeal court should step in even though the issue was not properly preserved.

In Chavez, this standard doomed his new aggravated‑felony and timing arguments: there was no obvious error in relying on his underlying conduct to evaluate good moral character and materiality.

6. Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

A Rule 29 motion asks the trial judge to set aside the jury’s guilty verdict (or to refuse to submit the case to the jury) because, even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge in Chavez denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, finding that:

  • The evidence of the abuse was sufficient to support a finding that Chavez committed a crime during the good‑moral‑character period;
  • The nondisclosure of that conduct on the naturalization application was established; and
  • The immigration officer’s testimony on how she would have responded made the misrepresentation material under Maslenjak.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of United States v. Chavez

United States v. Chavez is an unpublished decision, but it provides a clear and instructive example of how federal courts and prosecutors are using § 1425(a) and § 1423 in tandem with immigration law concepts to address serious concealed misconduct in the naturalization process.

The decision:

  • Reaffirms the central role of Maslenjak’s materiality requirement in naturalization-fraud prosecutions, notably through the investigation-based theory;
  • Clarifies that serious criminal conduct committed during the statutory good-moral-character period can be disqualifying even absent a contemporaneous conviction, and that later convictions can corroborate such conduct;
  • Demonstrates how the expansive “catch‑all” for good moral character in § 1101(f) empowers immigration authorities—and juries in criminal cases—to treat uncharged but serious conduct as disqualifying;
  • Shows how § 1423 operates almost derivatively from § 1425(a): once naturalization is found unlawful, subsequent use of the certificate readily supports a misuse conviction; and
  • Underscores the importance of preserving sufficiency theories in Rule 29 motions, given the narrowness of plain‑error review.

More broadly, Chavez fits into a growing body of jurisprudence that treats the naturalization process as a serious federal proceeding whose integrity must be protected both through civil denaturalization actions and criminal prosecutions where applicants obtain citizenship by concealing grave misconduct. By affirming Chavez’s convictions on a record of concealed child sexual abuse, the Eleventh Circuit sends a strong signal that material omissions of such conduct will support both the invalidation of citizenship and criminal liability for the misuse of that status.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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