Masters v. Dawson: Missouri Requires Explicit Preservation of the Jury-Trial Right in Post-Trial Motions; Piecemeal Incorporation Is Insufficient

1. Introduction

Masters v. Dawson (Supreme Court of Missouri, Apr. 1, 2025) arises from a dispute over possession of multiple vehicles. Masters sued Dawson in circuit court alleging replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment after Dawson refused to surrender the vehicles. The litigation became prolonged and procedurally fraught: Dawson failed to respond to discovery (including requests for admissions), failed to comply with court orders (including an order to surrender the vehicles), cycled through multiple attorneys who withdrew, and ultimately failed to appear at a pretrial conference shortly before a jury trial on damages.

The appeal presented two practical issues that frequently recur in civil litigation:

Preservation: What must a party do in a motion for new trial (or similar post-trial motion) to preserve a constitutional jury-trial claim for appellate review?
Sanctions/case management: When does a trial court abuse its discretion by imposing a severe sanction—here, canceling a scheduled jury trial and proceeding to a damages determination—because of a party’s nonappearance and broader contumacious conduct?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

On Dawson’s Points II–IV (asserting denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial under Mo. Const. art. I, section 22(a), and misapplication of Rule 62.01), the Court held the claims were unpreserved because Dawson did not raise them in his motion for new trial (or motion to vacate/amend/modify), and a footnote reference in a supporting memorandum was inadequate.
On Dawson’s Point I (challenging the sanction of canceling the jury trial after he missed the pretrial conference), the Court held the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, emphasizing Dawson’s extensive pattern of delay and noncompliance and the trial court’s inherent authority to enforce orders and manage its docket.

Notably, the Court expressly stated it did not decide whether canceling the jury trial would have violated Dawson’s jury-trial right had the issue been preserved.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built on two doctrinal pillars: (1) preservation of error (especially constitutional claims) and (2) trial-court discretion to impose sanctions and manage proceedings. The Court relied on the following authorities:

1) Preservation and adequacy of post-trial motions

Mayes v. Saint Luke's Hosp. of Kan. City, 430 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2014)
The Court quoted Mayes for the central preservation principle: a party cannot complain on appeal about an error it did not clearly present to the trial court, because doing so deprives the trial judge of the opportunity to correct the alleged error. In Masters, Mayes supplied the “opportunity to rule” rationale: Dawson’s failure to squarely present a jury-trial claim in his motion meant the circuit court was never fairly asked to address it.
Brandt v. Csaki, 937 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Sherrer v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 609 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2020)
Brandt provided a more technical preservation rule: allegations in a motion for new trial must be sufficient on their face to permit correction “without requiring the court to resort to aid extrinsic to the motion.” Masters applies this to reject Dawson’s attempt to preserve a constitutional claim by pointing to a footnote in a supporting memorandum—effectively “extrinsic” to the motion’s stated grounds. The Court’s parenthetical—“abrogated on other grounds”—signals Brandt remains usable for this preservation proposition, even if another aspect was later displaced by Sherrer.
Sherrer v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 609 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2020)
Sherrer is cited only to clarify that Brandt was “abrogated on other grounds.” The Court uses Sherrer as a housekeeping citation: it preserves Brandt’s relevance for the proposition used here (the motion itself must disclose the claim) while acknowledging doctrinal evolution elsewhere.
Sutton v. McCollum, 421 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. App. 2013) and Greco v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. App. 1988)
These cases support the Court’s practical enforcement rule: a “passing reference” in supporting suggestions is not enough to alert the trial court. Masters uses Sutton and Greco to reject preservation-by-oblique-mention, reinforcing that appellate courts will not treat a stray citation (here, a footnote to art. I, section 22(a)) as a properly raised constitutional issue.

2) Sanctions, inherent authority, and abuse-of-discretion review

Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. banc 2017)
Holm supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard and its high bar: reversal occurs only when the ruling is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances,” “arbitrary,” and “unreasonable.” Masters uses Holm to frame the deference owed to the circuit court’s sanction decision.
Mitalovich v. Toomey, 217 S.W.3d 338 (Mo. App. 2007)
Mitalovich is the opinion’s core authority for the trial court’s “broad array of inherent powers,” including enforcing compliance with reasonable orders and imposing sanctions justified by the conduct of parties and counsel. Masters uses it to ground the circuit court’s authority to respond to persistent obstruction and missed appearances.
Foster v. Kohm, 661 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. App. 1983)
Foster supports the proposition that trial judges should have authority to move cases expeditiously and control their courts. In Masters, Foster counterbalances the constitutional importance of jury trial by recognizing legitimate docket-control authority—especially salient given the case’s age and Dawson’s repeated derailments.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s preservation holding: “Say it in the motion” (not in a footnote)

Dawson argued on appeal that the circuit court denied his jury-trial right by misapplying Mo. Const. art. I, section 22(a) and Rule 62.01. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits because it found Dawson failed to preserve the issue in the required way.

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Identify the preservation vehicle: A motion for new trial (and related post-trial motions) is where alleged trial-court error must be stated with enough specificity to permit correction.
Apply the adequacy rule: The motion itself must contain the claim; it cannot require the judge to search through “extrinsic” materials to discover it. The Court treated Dawson’s approach—relying on a footnote in a memorandum—as precisely the kind of “piecemeal pleading” that forces the court to “hunt and pick through documents.”
Enforce the consequence: Because the constitutional claim was not raised in the motion’s grounds (and not argued at the motion hearing), the appellate court will not review it.

The key doctrinal move is the Court’s insistence that incorporation by reference (or indirect mention) is not merely stylistically disfavored—it is functionally inadequate because it defeats the trial court’s chance to correct error.

2) The Court’s sanction holding: pattern-based justification and deference

Dawson challenged the sanction of canceling the jury trial after he failed to attend the pretrial conference, asserting “mistake” because he did not open email attachments from counsel listing the date. The Court rejected this narrow framing and evaluated the sanction against the full litigation record.

Applying Holm’s abuse-of-discretion standard and Mitalovich’s inherent-powers doctrine, the Court highlighted:

the case’s multi-year duration;
Dawson’s repeated failures to respond to discovery and motions;
noncompliance with orders (including failure to surrender vehicles and alleged obstruction of towing);
repeated attorney withdrawals tied to nonpayment and ethical concerns;
multiple continuances and last-minute disruptions; and
the missed pretrial conference four days before trial as the “latest” in a pattern of contumacious conduct.

The Court characterized the situation as “rare,” concluding the sanction was not illogical, arbitrary, or unreasonable in light of the sustained obstruction. Importantly, the Court acknowledged the constitutional status of jury trial but treated the issue as procedurally unavailable (unpreserved) and therefore analyzed the cancellation as a discretionary sanction rather than a constitutional violation.

C. Impact

1) Preservation practice in Missouri: clearer, stricter, and more formal

The opinion strengthens a practical rule for Missouri litigators: to preserve an issue—especially a constitutional one—the claim must be plainly stated in the motion for new trial (or comparable post-trial motion). A citation buried in suggestions, a memorandum footnote, or an “incorporation” strategy invites a finding of waiver.

Likely effects include:

More detailed post-trial motions that expressly enumerate constitutional claims and supporting grounds;
Less tolerance for incorporation-by-reference drafting practices;
Increased appellate dismissals/affirmances on preservation grounds where claims were only indirectly signaled.

2) Sanctions and docket control: reinforced authority in extreme noncompliance cases

Masters underscores that Missouri trial courts retain broad inherent authority to impose significant sanctions to maintain judicial efficiency and enforce orders. While the Court did not bless jury-trial cancellation as constitutionally permissible in all circumstances, it did hold that—on this record—the sanction decision fell within permissible discretion.

Future litigants should expect:

Pattern evidence matters: courts may evaluate a missed conference in context, not isolation;
“Mistake” explanations may carry little weight when the record shows repeated, strategic, or reckless noncompliance;
Sanction review remains highly deferential under Holm, particularly where the trial court is managing chronic delay.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Replevin: a lawsuit seeking return of specific personal property (here, vehicles), not just money.
Conversion: civil “wrongful control” over someone else’s property—treating it as your own.
Unjust enrichment: a claim that someone unfairly benefited at another’s expense and should restore the value received.
Request for admissions / “deemed admitted”: a discovery tool asking the other side to admit or deny statements; if not answered on time, the statements can be treated as admitted facts.
Partial summary judgment: a pretrial ruling resolving some issues (e.g., right to possession) because no genuine factual dispute exists as to those issues.
Writ of replevin: a court order authorizing seizure/return of the property to the party entitled to possession.
Contumacious conduct: stubborn, willful disobedience of court authority—behavior that undermines the court’s ability to manage the case.
Preservation (of error): the requirement that a party clearly raise a claim in the trial court (in the right place and time) so it can be corrected there; otherwise appellate courts generally will not consider it.
Abuse of discretion: a deferential appellate standard; the appellate court does not ask whether it would have ruled differently, but whether the trial court’s decision was irrational or unjustifiable under the circumstances.
Punitive damages / “clear and convincing”: additional damages intended to punish and deter, requiring a higher evidentiary standard than “more likely than not.”

5. Conclusion

Masters v. Dawson delivers two durable lessons. First, Missouri appellate review of constitutional jury-trial claims is gated by strict preservation: the issue must be clearly stated in the motion for new trial (or comparable post-trial motion), and courts will not treat a memorandum footnote or incorporation-by-reference as sufficient. Second, the decision reaffirms trial courts’ inherent authority to impose serious sanctions—including measures that effectively eliminate a scheduled jury trial—when justified by a sustained pattern of obstructive, noncompliant conduct, with appellate courts applying highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review.