Marital Status under NYCHRL: Distinction Between General Condition and Specific Spousal Relationship

Introduction

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC is a Second Circuit interlocutory appeal that tested the reach of the New York City Human Rights Law’s (“NYCHRL”) prohibition on discrimination “because of marital status.” Plaintiff Kelvin Hunter, Executive Producer of The Wendy Williams Show, sued his employer after he was terminated shortly following his wife’s divorce filing. Hunter alleged that Debmar-Mercury fired him “solely because of his marital status” vis-à-vis Wendy Williams, in violation of the NYCHRL.

The district court denied Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss, relying on a 2018 intermediate appellate state decision (Morse v. Fidessa) that had interpreted “marital status” to include the nature of an employee’s relationship with a specific spouse. The Second Circuit, however, vacated that ruling in light of the New York Court of Appeals’ December 2024 decision in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., which definitively held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to an individual’s general condition—single, married, divorced, separated or widowed—and not to the identity or qualities of one’s spouse.

Summary of the Judgment

On April 8, 2025, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss Hunter’s marital-status discrimination claim. The court held that, as clarified by McCabe, “marital status” under the NYCHRL means the legal condition of being married or unmarried, and does not extend to discrimination based on whom an individual has married or divorced. Because Hunter’s claim rested solely on his relationship to Wendy Williams (and not on the fact of being married or divorced as such), the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board (51 N.Y.2d 506, 1980): The New York Court of Appeals held under the New York State Human Rights Law that “marital status” discrimination protects only the marital condition, not the fact of marriage to a particular person.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (59 N.Y.2d 733, 1983): Confirmed Manhattan Pizza Hut’s construction of “marital status” in the housing context.
Levin v. Yeshiva University (96 N.Y.2d 484, 2001): Reaffirmed the distinction between an individual’s marital condition and the characteristics of the spouse or partner under both the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp. (165 A.D.3d 61, 2018): The First Department of the Appellate Division held that two municipal amendments required reading “marital status” to include relationships with specific persons—an interpretation later repudiated by McCabe.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (N.Y. 3d —, Dec. 17, 2024): The New York Court of Appeals clarified that under the NYCHRL, “marital status” refers only to the legal status of being married or not, without reference to whom one is married.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s decision turns on two pillars of statutory interpretation:

Textual Consistency: The Court of Appeals reasoned that it would be anomalous for the same statutory phrase—“marital status”—to bear different meanings in parallel provisions of the NYCHRL (employment and housing). McCabe emphasized that “marital status turns on whether an individual has participated or failed to participate in a marriage,” not on the spouse’s identity or the nature of the relationship.
Legislative History & Liberal Construction: Although the NYCHRL includes a directive for “uniquely broad and remedial” interpretation (per the 2005 Local Civil Rights Restoration Act and the 2016 amendments), the New York Court of Appeals found no indication that the City Council intended to overturn four decades of precedent limiting “marital status” to a general condition. The Court declined to adopt the Morse court’s expansion, viewing it as unpersuasive in light of McCabe.

3. Impact

The Hunter decision, grounded in McCabe, will have several practical effects:

Clarifies that an employment discrimination claim under NYCHRL cannot be based solely on an adverse action tied to “whom” an employee was married to or divorced from.
Narrows the scope of “marital status” claims, reducing uncertainty for employers and employees in New York City.
Signals to advocacy groups and the City Council that any desire to cover person-specific marital relations must be achieved by explicit legislative amendment, not by judicial expansion.
Reinforces the primacy of New York Court of Appeals’ construction of the NYCHRL over intermediate appellate decisions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory Appeal: A request to a higher court to review a trial court’s ruling before the case is finally decided. In Hunter, interlocutory review was granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Summary Order: A decision issued without full opinion when the panel determines that existing precedents clearly resolve the issue.
NYCHRL vs. NYSHRL: The NYCHRL is New York City’s local anti-discrimination law, interpreted independently and liberally. The NYSHRL is the state counterpart. Both prohibit discrimination “because of marital status,” but have historically been read in tandem.
Marital Status: Legally, the term describes whether a person is single, married, separated, divorced, or widowed. It does not encompass characteristics of the spouse or the specific relationship to that spouse.

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC crystallizes the rule that “marital status” under the NYCHRL is limited to the general legal condition of marriage, divorce, separation or widowhood, and does not extend to discrimination based on an employee’s relationship with a particular spouse or ex-spouse. By vacating the district court’s reliance on the Morse decision and aligning with McCabe, the Second Circuit has ensured doctrinal consistency, upheld the New York Court of Appeals’ guidance, and provided clear direction to litigants and legislators on the scope of marital-status protections in employment.