Mandatory PLRA Dismissal Does Not Require Prejudice: Commentary on Nakyrra Hogan v Wayne County

I. Introduction

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in Nakyrra Hogan v Wayne County, 167262 (Dec. 19, 2025), marks an important clarification of Michigan’s Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq. At its core, the decision answers a deceptively simple but high-stakes procedural question:

• When a prisoner fails to meet the PLRA’s procedural requirements (such as disclosure of prior litigation), must the case be dismissed with prejudice, permanently barring the claim?

The Court’s answer: no. The PLRA mandates dismissal of noncompliant actions, but it does not mandate that such dismissal be with prejudice. Trial courts retain discretion to decide whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, based on the circumstances.

The Court also addressed, in a narrower but practically significant ruling, the definition of “prisoner” under the PLRA as it applies to plaintiff Krista Anson. The Court held that there is an unresolved factual question whether Anson was “subject to incarceration or detention” at the time the complaint was filed, and remanded for fact-finding on that point.

Substantively, the underlying lawsuit is a putative class action brought under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., alleging a sexually hostile environment in the Wayne County Jail. Procedurally, however, the case has become a key vehicle for clarifying:

• How strictly Michigan courts must apply the PLRA’s procedural bars; and
• Who qualifies as a “prisoner” for PLRA purposes at the moment a civil action is filed.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Order

The Court, in an order entered in lieu of granting full leave to appeal, did the following:

1. Reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the extent it held that failure to comply with the PLRA’s procedural requirements requires dismissal with prejudice.
2. Held that:
   • Under MCL 600.5507(3)(b), courts must dismiss a noncompliant prisoner’s civil action, but the statute does not require that the dismissal be with prejudice.
   • Likewise, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement in MCL 600.5503(1) does not itself dictate that non-exhausted claims be dismissed with prejudice.
   • Trial courts retain their ordinary discretionary authority to dismiss with prejudice as a sanction where appropriate, but that is not compelled by the PLRA itself.
3. Identified a factual dispute as to plaintiff Krista Anson’s status as a “prisoner” under MCL 600.5531(e) at the time the complaint was filed, and:
   • Held that the lower courts had not resolved whether Anson was “subject to incarceration or detention” at the filing time.
   • Remanded to the Wayne Circuit Court to determine this fact question.
4. Left undisturbed the Court of Appeals’ other PLRA-related holdings, including:
   • Individuals on probation or parole but not physically incarcerated at filing are not “prisoners” under the PLRA.
   • Individuals incarcerated elsewhere (but not in Wayne County Jail) at the time of filing are still “prisoners” for PLRA purposes.
5. Denied leave to appeal in all other respects and did not retain jurisdiction.

Additionally, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion in the Supreme Court to substitute the personal representative of deceased plaintiff Anson’s estate, but did so without prejudice to renewal in the circuit court on remand.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Civil Rights Claims

The plaintiffs are current and former inmates of the Wayne County Jail. Bringing a putative class action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, they allege that:

• Wayne County, the Wayne County Sheriff, and a Wayne County Deputy Sheriff created or allowed a sexually hostile prison environment in violation of the ELCRA.
• The plaintiffs experienced harassment, abuse, or hostile conditions while detained in the Wayne County Jail.

Because many plaintiffs were in custody at the time of filing, the PLRA’s procedural requirements were triggered, creating a separate threshold battle: could these ELCRA claims be heard at all, given alleged PLRA noncompliance?

B. Trial Court Proceedings

In 2020, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Wayne Circuit Court. On April 27, 2022, the trial court issued a pivotal order:

• It granted defendants’ renewed motion for summary disposition as to all plaintiffs except one (plaintiff Arneata Cobbs).
• As to those plaintiffs, the court held that they were “prisoners” under the PLRA at the time of filing and had failed to comply with:
  • The PLRA’s requirement to disclose prior litigation, MCL 600.5507(2); and/or
  • The PLRA’s requirement to exhaust all available administrative remedies, MCL 600.5503(1).
• It dismissed those plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice, viewing PLRA noncompliance as a terminal defect.
• As to plaintiff Cobbs, the court found that she was not subject to the PLRA because she had been released from custody and completed her sentence when the complaint was filed, and therefore denied summary disposition as to her claims.
• The court also denied plaintiffs’ second renewed motion for class certification.

C. Court of Appeals Decision

The Court of Appeals granted leave and issued an unpublished per curiam opinion, Hogan v Wayne Co, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 362259). It:

1. Affirmed in part, holding:
   • The trial court correctly dismissed, with prejudice, claims brought by plaintiffs who were “prisoners” for PLRA purposes when the lawsuit was filed, because they failed to comply with PLRA disclosure requirements.
   • Relying on Doe v Dep’t of Corrections, 312 Mich App 97 (2015), vacated in part on other grounds 499 Mich 886 (2016), the panel reasoned that the PLRA’s use of “shall dismiss” in MCL 600.5507(3)(b) required dismissal with prejudice.
2. Reversed in part, holding:
   • Plaintiffs who were on probation or parole and not physically incarcerated at filing were not “prisoners” under the PLRA, and their claims should not have been dismissed on PLRA grounds.
   • Plaintiffs who were no longer in Wayne County Jail but were incarcerated elsewhere at filing were still “prisoners” under the PLRA and had to satisfy its requirements.

The Court of Appeals did not address whether plaintiff Krista Anson was a “prisoner” under the PLRA; the trial court had treated her as such.

D. Proceedings in the Supreme Court

Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address:

• Whether the PLRA requires dismissal with prejudice when its procedural requirements are not satisfied; and
• Whether plaintiff Anson was a “prisoner” under the PLRA at the time of filing.

After hearing argument, the Court issued the December 19, 2025 order reversing in part, clarifying the law, and remanding.

IV. Legal Framework

A. The Michigan PLRA and Its Key Provisions

Michigan’s PLRA, MCL 600.5501 et seq., is modeled in part on the federal PLRA. Its overarching goal is to regulate and limit prisoner litigation concerning prison conditions by imposing heightened procedural requirements before such suits may proceed.

Two key provisions are central in Hogan:

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies – MCL 600.5503(1)
   This subsection provides that a prisoner may not file a civil action regarding prison conditions until they have exhausted all available internal administrative remedies offered by the correctional institution.
2. Disclosure of Prior Litigation and Mandatory Dismissal – MCL 600.5507(2)–(3)
   
   • MCL 600.5507(2) requires a prisoner to disclose certain information about previous civil actions and appeals they have initiated.
   • MCL 600.5507(3)(b) then provides:

     “The court shall dismiss a civil action or appeal at any time, regardless of whether the complaint or appeal has been served on the adverse party, if the court finds … [t]he prisoner fails to comply with the disclosure requirements of subsection (2).”

The statutory text is explicit that dismissal is mandatory upon noncompliance with disclosure requirements, but it is silent as to whether that dismissal must be with or without prejudice.

B. The Definition of “Prisoner” – MCL 600.5531(e)

Only a “prisoner” is subject to the PLRA’s restrictions. MCL 600.5531(e) defines “prisoner” as:

“a person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a prison who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for violations of state or local law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or a diversionary program.”

Key phrases:

• “subject to incarceration, detention, or admission” – more expansive than “currently confined”; encompasses those who are in custody or under a legal regime that could result in incarceration.
• The statute requires analyzing status at the time the civil action is filed.

C. Dismissal “With Prejudice” vs “Without Prejudice”

Understanding the Court’s holding requires clarity on this distinction:

• Dismissal with prejudice:
  • Operates as an adjudication on the merits.
  • Bars the plaintiff from refiling the same claim.
  • Has res judicata effect.
• Dismissal without prejudice:
  • Terminates the current lawsuit but leaves the plaintiff free to refile the action (subject to statutes of limitation and other defenses).
  • Does not resolve the merits of the claim.

The central question in Hogan is whether MCL 600.5507(3)(b) itself mandates that PLRA-based dismissal be with prejudice. The Supreme Court holds that it does not.

V. The Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Textual Interpretation of MCL 600.5507(3)(b)

The Court begins with the core principle of Michigan statutory interpretation:

“The principal goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and the most reliable evidence of that intent is the plain language of the statute.”
— South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 360–361 (2018).

Applying this principle, the Court notes:

• MCL 600.5507(3)(b) uses the phrase “shall dismiss a civil action” if the prisoner fails to comply with disclosure requirements.
• This language:
  • Makes dismissal mandatory – the trial court has no discretion to allow the noncompliant case to proceed.
  • Does not say “shall dismiss with prejudice.”

From that silence, the Court draws a careful distinction:

• The Legislature compelled dismissal, but it did not prescribe the type of dismissal (with or without prejudice).
• Courts may not read into the statute words (“with prejudice”) that the Legislature did not include.

The Court explicitly rejects the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that the mandatory nature of “shall” implies dismissal with prejudice:

• “Shall” governs whether dismissal is required, not whether the dismissal bars future refiling.
• Interpreting “shall dismiss” as “shall dismiss with prejudice” would impermissibly “insert an additional requirement into the statute that the Legislature did not include,” contrary to Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304 (2002), where the Court emphasized:

  “Because the proper role of the judiciary is to interpret and not write the law, courts simply lack authority to venture beyond the unambiguous text of a statute.”

The Court further bolsters its textual analysis with a legislative-contrast argument: in other statutes, the Legislature has expressly required dismissal “with prejudice,” demonstrating that it knows how to do so when it wishes:

• MCL 600.2955b(1) – requiring courts to “dismiss with prejudice” certain actions for injuries incurred during the commission of a felony.
• MCL 780.133 – in the 180-day rule context, directing that “the court shall enter an order dismissing … with prejudice” under specified conditions.

From these comparators, the Court applies the canon articulated in Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210 (1993):

“Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there.”

In other words, because the Legislature specified “with prejudice” elsewhere but did not do so in the PLRA, courts must respect that choice.

B. Clarifying the Role of Prior Case Law – Doe, Ottgen, and Others

The Court of Appeals relied on Doe v Dep’t of Corrections, 312 Mich App 97 (2015), to justify dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Court corrects this reliance:

• Doe held that dismissal was required under the plain terms of MCL 600.5507(3), but it did not determine that the dismissal had to be with prejudice.
• The Court of Appeals in Hogan therefore extended Doe beyond its actual holding.

The Court also notes that its conclusion aligns with federal precedent under the federal PLRA. It cites Does 8–10 v Snyder, 945 F3d 951, 955 (6th Cir. 2019), reflecting federal courts’ general practice of treating failure to exhaust or other PLRA procedural defects as grounds for dismissal, typically without automatically requiring prejudice.

At the same time, the Court emphasizes that its ruling does not strip trial courts of their ordinary sanctioning powers:

• In Ottgen v Katranji, 511 Mich 223, 238–240 (2023), the Court reaffirmed that trial courts possess discretionary authority to dismiss cases with prejudice as a sanction for serious procedural misconduct.
• Hogan explicitly preserves that discretion. It only holds that the PLRA itself does not mandate such a sanction; it does not foreclose it where independently justified.

Thus, the new rule is a narrow but important one: PLRA noncompliance requires dismissal, but it does not, by itself, require a dismissal that permanently extinguishes the claim.

C. Application to Exhaustion – MCL 600.5503(1)

The Court notes a parallel silence in the PLRA’s exhaustion statute, MCL 600.5503(1):

• That subsection requires that prisoners exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit.
• However, the statute is silent on the consequences of non-exhaustion—much like MCL 600.5507(3)(b) is silent on the prejudice question.

By extension of the Court’s reasoning:

• Non-exhaustion requires dismissal (because filing before exhaustion contravenes the statute), but
• It does not automatically require that the dismissal be with prejudice. Courts must look to other doctrines or sanctions, not the PLRA text, to justify a with-prejudice dismissal in such situations.

D. The “Prisoner” Question as to Plaintiff Anson

The second major issue concerns whether plaintiff Krista Anson was a “prisoner” under MCL 600.5531(e) at the time the complaint was filed.

The timeline is critical:

• The complaint was filed on December 16, 2020, at 1:25 p.m.
• Anson’s booking sheet indicates she was booked into the Wayne County Jail later that day at 8:43 p.m.
• The record does not show precisely when she was first “subject to incarceration or detention” on that date (for example, at the moment of arrest or physical custody).

The PLRA’s definition of “prisoner” focuses on whether the person is “subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a prison” for a qualifying offense or violation at the time the civil action is filed. Thus:

• If Anson was already in custody or otherwise legally “subject to detention” before 1:25 p.m., she likely qualified as a “prisoner” and fell under the PLRA.
• If she was not arrested, detained, or otherwise subject to incarceration until after the complaint was filed, she would not have been a “prisoner” at filing, and the PLRA would not apply to her claims.

The Supreme Court observes that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this timing in sufficient detail. Accordingly, it finds an “unresolved question of fact” and remands for the trial court to decide this factual issue.

This underscores the precision required in PLRA cases: the relevant status is measured at the moment of filing, and the phrase “subject to incarceration or detention” may encompass a broader temporal window than formal booking time alone.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v DEQ, 502 Mich 349 (2018)

Cited for the core principle that statutory interpretation begins and ends with clear statutory language as the best evidence of legislative intent. In Hogan, this supports the Court’s refusal to infer a “with prejudice” requirement where the text is silent.

B. Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc, 466 Mich 304 (2002)

Used to reinforce judicial restraint in interpretation:

Courts cannot “venture beyond the unambiguous text of a statute” to add requirements not expressed by the Legislature.

In Hogan, this underpins the rejection of the Court of Appeals’ attempt to graft “with prejudice” onto the PLRA’s mandatory dismissal provision.

C. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201 (1993)

Provides the principle that courts may not assume legislative omission was inadvertent and then effectively “correct” the statute by adding missing language.

Hogan uses this to reason that because the Legislature expressly mandated dismissal “with prejudice” in other statutes, its failure to do so in the PLRA must be treated as a deliberate choice.

D. Doe v Dep’t of Corrections, 312 Mich App 97 (2015), vacated in part 499 Mich 886 (2016)

The Court of Appeals had relied on Doe to support PLRA dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Court clarifies:

• Doe held that under MCL 600.5507(3) the court must dismiss if the prisoner fails to comply with disclosure rules.
• It did not hold that the dismissal must be with prejudice.

Thus, Hogan narrows and corrects the misreading of Doe, ensuring that its rule is not extended beyond what the statutory text supports.

E. Ottgen v Katranji, 511 Mich 223 (2023)

Ottgen affirmed that Michigan courts have inherent and rule-based authority to impose dismissal with prejudice as a sanction, for example in cases of:

• Repeated failures to comply with court orders;
• Bad faith litigation conduct; or
• Other serious procedural abuses.

In Hogan, the Court cites Ottgen to stress that its holding is limited:

• The PLRA itself does not require with-prejudice dismissal.
• But nothing in the decision strips judges of discretionary power to impose that severe sanction where facts warrant, independent of the PLRA text.

F. Federal Analogue – Does 8–10 v Snyder, 945 F3d 951 (6th Cir. 2019)

The Court briefly references this federal case to observe that its approach is consistent with federal PLRA practice, where:

• Failure to exhaust administrative remedies typically results in dismissal; but
• Such dismissals are often without prejudice, particularly where administrative remedies remain available.

Although the Michigan PLRA is a distinct statute, the Court’s alignment with federal practice bolsters the reasonableness and workability of its interpretation.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Prisoner-Plaintiffs and Civil Rights Litigants

The decision significantly affects how prisoner-plaintiffs must navigate PLRA requirements and what happens when they fail to do so:

• No automatic lifetime bar:
  • If a prisoner fails to disclose prior litigation or to exhaust administrative remedies and the court dismisses pursuant to the PLRA, that dismissal is not automatically with prejudice.
  • In many cases, the prisoner may be able to correct the procedural defect (e.g., properly exhaust grievances, fully disclose litigation history) and refile the claim, subject to statutes of limitation.
• Incentive to cure and refile:
  • Prisoners whose claims were dismissed solely for PLRA procedural reasons now have a clearer pathway to pursue their substantive rights, especially under statutes like the ELCRA.
  • This is particularly important in systemic or class actions alleging serious constitutional or civil rights violations, where procedural missteps might otherwise permanently foreclose redress.

However, plaintiffs must still take PLRA requirements seriously:

• Dismissal is mandatory for noncompliance.
• Persistent or bad-faith violations could justify a discretionary dismissal with prejudice under the court’s inherent authority.

B. For Governmental Defendants and Correctional Institutions

For counties, sheriffs, and other defendants in prison-conditions cases, the ruling recalibrates expectations:

• PLRA defenses remain potent but less absolutely preclusive:
  • Failure to exhaust or disclose remains a strong defense that can terminate the current action.
  • But defendants cannot assume that such a dismissal will forever bar the claim.
• Early motion practice still critical:
  • Motions for summary disposition based on PLRA noncompliance remain an important tool to screen suits.
  • But defendants must be prepared to face refiling where the plaintiff cures the PLRA defect, particularly in serious civil rights cases.

C. For Trial Courts

The decision provides clear guidance for trial courts applying the PLRA:

• Step 1 – Determine “prisoner” status at filing:
  • Courts must make factual findings, when disputed, about whether a plaintiff was “subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a prison” at the time the complaint was filed.
  • Hogan underscores that this may require granular scrutiny of arrest, custody, and booking times, as in Anson’s case.
• Step 2 – Determine PLRA compliance (disclosure and exhaustion):
• Step 3 – If noncompliance, dismiss the action:
  • Dismissal is mandatory under MCL 600.5507(3)(b) or by implication under MCL 600.5503(1).
• Step 4 – Decide prejudice as a matter of discretion, not statutory command:
  • Courts may dismiss with prejudice where independent grounds justify it (e.g., repeated violations, abuse of process), but not simply because the PLRA says “shall dismiss.”
  • In many routine PLRA noncompliance cases, dismissal without prejudice will be the default, leaving room for proper refiling.

D. Clarification of “Prisoner” Status – Beyond Anson

The Court leaves intact the Court of Appeals’ broader interpretation of “prisoner” status, which now stands as the governing law (subject to future review):

• Not prisoners:
  • Individuals on probation or parole who are not physically incarcerated at the time of filing are not “prisoners” for PLRA purposes.
• Still prisoners:
  • Individuals formerly held in the Wayne County Jail but incarcerated elsewhere at filing are “prisoners” because they are still “subject to incarceration or detention.”

Hogan thus reinforces that “prisoner” status turns on actual custody or detention status at the filing moment, rather than on the location of incarceration or the mere existence of a criminal conviction or supervision.

E. Relationship to Class Actions and Systemic Litigation

Because Hogan arises from a putative class action alleging a sexually hostile jail environment, its PLRA holdings have special significance for systemic litigation:

• Named plaintiffs and PLRA coverage:
  • Some named plaintiffs in a prison-conditions class action may be prisoners, others may not.
  • The PLRA applies plaintiff-by-plaintiff; non-prisoner plaintiffs are not bound by its procedural barriers.
• Preservation of viable representatives:
  • Where some prisoner-plaintiffs are dismissed for PLRA noncompliance, remaining non-prisoner plaintiffs may still press class claims.
  • Clarifying that dismissal need not be with prejudice reduces the risk of extinguishing all possible representations of a putative class solely due to curable PLRA defects.

VIII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several legal concepts in the opinion may be unfamiliar to non-lawyers. The following brief explanations may help:

• Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA):
  • A statute designed to regulate lawsuits filed by prisoners about prison conditions.
  • It imposes procedural hurdles (like exhaustion of grievances and disclosure of prior lawsuits) to discourage frivolous filings but does not abolish meritorious claims.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies:
  • Before suing in court, a prisoner must first use the prison’s internal grievance or complaint procedures fully.
  • Skipping these steps—or not finishing them—generally requires the court to dismiss the suit.
• Disclosure of Prior Litigation:
  • Prisoners must list earlier lawsuits they have filed when they bring a new case about prison conditions.
  • If they fail to do so, the PLRA requires the court to dismiss the new case.
• Dismissal “with prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”:
  • With prejudice – the case is over permanently; the plaintiff cannot bring the same claim again.
  • Without prejudice – the plaintiff can correct the problem (for example, exhaust remedies, fix disclosures) and file a new case, as long as other legal deadlines are met.
• Putative Class Action:
  • A lawsuit filed by one or more people on behalf of a larger group (a “class”) with similar claims.
  • “Putative” means the class has been requested but not yet formally certified by the court.
• Subject to incarceration or detention (in the definition of “prisoner”):
  • Refers to individuals who are actually in custody or who are in the process of being detained or admitted to a jail or prison.
  • The exact timing can matter—such as whether a person was arrested before or after a civil complaint was filed.

IX. Conclusion: Significance of Hogan in Michigan PLRA Jurisprudence

Nakyrra Hogan v Wayne County makes two central contributions to Michigan law:

1. Clarification of PLRA Dismissal Consequences:
   • The Michigan PLRA mandates dismissal of prisoner lawsuits that fail to satisfy key procedural requirements such as disclosure of prior litigation and exhaustion of administrative remedies.
   • However, the statute does not require that such dismissals be with prejudice.
   • Dismissal with prejudice remains available as a discretionary sanction under general judicial authority (e.g., as recognized in Ottgen), but it cannot be treated as an automatic consequence of the PLRA’s “shall dismiss” language.
2. Refinement of “Prisoner” Status at Filing:
   • The opinion emphasizes that “prisoner” status—and thus PLRA applicability—turns on whether a person was “subject to incarceration or detention” at the exact time the civil action was filed.
   • In plaintiff Anson’s case, the timing of her custody relative to the complaint filing is a factual matter that must be resolved on remand.
   • The Court leaves in place the Court of Appeals’ broader conclusions that:
     • Probationers or parolees not physically incarcerated at filing are not PLRA “prisoners”; and
     • Individuals incarcerated elsewhere remain PLRA “prisoners.”

Doctrinally, Hogan reinforces textualist statutory interpretation: courts may not add sanctions (“with prejudice”) that the Legislature did not clearly impose. Practically, it moderates the harshness of PLRA procedural defaults, preserving room for prisoners to correct curable defects while upholding the Legislature’s mandate that noncompliant suits be dismissed.

For Michigan PLRA jurisprudence, Hogan will likely become a leading precedent on the scope and consequences of PLRA compliance, guiding trial courts, litigants, and counsel in future prisoner-rights litigation, especially in complex civil rights and class action contexts like those arising from alleged systemic abuse in correctional settings.