Mandatory License Revocation Under § 28-905(3)(b): A New Precedent in Felony Sentencing

Introduction

In the case of State of Nebraska v. Detron L. Perry (318 Neb. 613), decided on March 14, 2025, the Nebraska Supreme Court reconsidered several critical components surrounding Fourth Amendment protections as well as mandatory sentencing provisions for felony convictions, particularly regarding the revocation or impoundment of a driver's license under § 28-905(3)(b). At issue were Perry's assertions regarding the legality of the initial traffic stop, evidence suppression, and the sufficiency of the evidence leading to his convictions for driving under suspension (a Class III misdemeanor) and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest (a Class IV felony). Central to this case was a disputed interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-905(3)(b), which, as the court ultimately held, mandates a 2-year license revocation or impoundment without discretion when a felony is involved.

The parties in the case included Detron L. Perry, represented by public defenders and law students, as the appellant challenging both evidentiary rulings and sentencing; and the State of Nebraska, represented by the Attorney General’s office, arguing not only for the sufficiency of the evidence but also for the correct imposition of the mandatory license revocation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Perry’s convictions for both driving under suspension and operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest, finding that the trial court properly applied the appropriate evidentiary standards and factual findings. However, the court determined there was plain error in sentencing, based on the failure to impose the mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment required under § 28-905(3)(b). In summation, while the appellate review rejected Perry’s contentions regarding the evidence and constitutional claims, it remanded the case for resentencing due to the error regarding mandatory penalties.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment cites a number of precedents that have helped shape the court’s analysis:

State v. Anderson, 317 Neb. 435, 10 N.W.3d 334 (2024) – Establishing a two-part standard of review with clear error for factual findings and an independent review of constitutional questions, which was essential in evaluating the motion to suppress evidence.
State v. Barbeau, 301 Neb. 293, 917 N.W.2d 913 (2018) – Employed in confirming that even a minor traffic violation, such as a malfunctioning turn signal, can give law enforcement sufficient probable cause for a traffic stop.
State v. Shiffermiller, 302 Neb. 245, 922 N.W.2d 763 (2019) – Underlined that determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause in investigatory stops are reviewed de novo.
State v. Npimnee, 316 Neb. 1, 2 N.W.3d 620 (2024) – Confirmed that the sufficiency standard for criminal convictions requires that any rational trier of fact could, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Collins, 307 Neb. 581, 950 N.W.2d 89 (2020) and State v. Janis, 32 Neb.App. 49, 992 N.W.2d 772 (2023) – These cases were influential in interpreting the scope of mandatory license revocation requirements and distinguishing discretionary elements in statutory language.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning in this decision hinges on several key legal principles:

Review of Fourth Amendment Issues: The court adopted a two-part standard when reviewing the trial court's decisions on the motion to suppress. While historical findings were subject to clear error review, whether the facts triggered a violation of the Fourth Amendment was considered as a question of law. Ultimately, the fact that the officer reasonably interpreted the turn signal’s behavior provided sufficient probable cause for the stop.
Establishing Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Relying on case law such as State v. Barbeau, the court emphasized that even minor traffic violations confer probable cause. In this instance, the officer’s observation of a malfunctioning turn signal (despite some evidence of operation) was deemed sufficient for a lawful seizure.
Interpretation of Statutory Language: A critical aspect of the court’s analysis focused on the plain meaning of statutory language in § 28-905(3)(b). The court noted that the use of the term "shall" unequivocally signals a mandatory requirement, despite Perry’s argument that the subsequent language introducing discretion could mitigate that force. Consequently, the sentence had to include a mandatory 2-year license revocation or impoundment as an integral part of the conviction for operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest.
Plain Error Doctrine in Sentencing: The court reviewed whether failure to impose the mandated license revocation constituted plain error—an error clearly evident from the record that could undermine the fairness and integrity of the judicial process. The conclusion was affirmative, leading to the vacatur of Perry’s sentence for resentencing.

Impact

This Judgment has significant implications for the administration of sentencing in cases involving driving under suspension and related felony offenses. By definitively asserting that the revocation or impoundment of a driving license is mandatory under § 28-905(3)(b) when certain felony criteria are met, the decision limits judicial discretion in this context. This precedent ensures that:

Future cases involving similar statutory language will be adjudicated with a clear understanding that mandatory penalties cannot be sidestepped by focusing on secondary language that allegedly provides discretion.
The decision reinforces the principle that statutory mandates, once clearly expressed, carry a binding force, thereby promoting consistency and fairness in sentencing.
The outcome may influence how law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion are exercised in traffic-related offenses, especially in cases involving compounded offenses or evidentiary disputes related to vehicle stops.

Complex Concepts Simplified

The Judgment employs several complex legal concepts that warrant simplification:

Two-Part Standard Review: This refers to the appellate process where factual determinations made by lower courts are given deference (reviewed for “clear error”), but questions of law—including the interpretation of constitutional rights—are evaluated independently.
Plain Error: A plain error is a mistake in a trial that is obvious from the record and so significant that ignoring it would harm the judicial process’s fairness and integrity. In this case, the failure to impose a mandatory sentence mandated by statute qualifies as such an error.
Mandatory vs. Discretionary Language: The crux of Perry’s argument focused on the perceived discretion provided by the statute. However, the court clarified that the imperative “shall” in the first sentence of § 28-905(3)(b) leaves no room for judicial discretion regarding whether the penalty should be imposed—the timing or method might be negotiable, but the penalty itself is compulsory.

Conclusion

In summation, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in State of Nebraska v. Detron L. Perry not only reaffirms established standards regarding Fourth Amendment protections and evidentiary sufficiency but also sets an important precedent regarding mandatory sentencing under § 28-905(3)(b). The Judgment is significant because it emphasizes that when a statute employs unequivocal language—such as the mandatory "shall"—the corresponding penalty must be imposed regardless of any conflicting secondary language. Although Perry’s challenges concerning evidence and constitutional claims were rejected, the plain error identified in the sentencing process necessitates a resentencing. This ruling is likely to guide future interpretations of statutory mandates in traffic and felony-related cases, ensuring that the intent of the legislature is applied uniformly and without dilution by judicial discretion.

Overall, this Judgment not only delineates the boundaries of appellate review in constitutional and evidentiary matters but also reinforces the primacy of clear statutory language, thereby promoting consistency, fairness, and accountability in Nebraska's legal system.