Mandatory Joinder of Vacancy-Filling Committees in Election Challenges: A Commentary on Matter of Wohl v. Bruen (2025)

1. Introduction

In Matter of Wohl v. Bruen, 238 A.D.3d 818 (2d Dep’t 2025), the Appellate Division, Second Department, dealt with twin questions that have long animated New York election law disputes: (1) Who is a “necessary party” in an Election Law §16-102 proceeding aimed at invalidating a certificate of substitution, and (2) can a candidate who has declined a prior designation be re-substituted by the same committee for the same office? Although the court acknowledged lingering doctrinal uncertainty on the second issue, it ultimately affirmed dismissal of the challenge on the procedural ground that the petitioner failed to join the Committee to Fill Vacancies—rendering the proceeding “jurisdictionally fatal.”

2. Summary of the Judgment

Petitioner Lauren M. Wohl sought to invalidate a certificate of substitution that re-designated David Bruen as the Democratic candidate for Clarkstown Town Clerk after Bruen had previously declined the initial designation.
The Supreme Court (Zugibe, J.) dismissed the petition, finding that the Committee to Fill Vacancies was a necessary party that had not been joined.
On appeal, the Second Department affirmed without costs, holding:
- The Committee to Fill Vacancies is “inequitably affected” by any determination regarding the validity of its certificate; therefore, joinder is mandatory under CPLR 1001(a).
- Because the non-joinder deprived the court of jurisdiction, the petition was properly dismissed.
- While the court reiterated prior case law suggesting that a substituting candidate must be “a person other than the person originally named,” it expressly disagreed with that interpretation but felt bound by stare decisis until the Court of Appeals revisits the question.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Matter of Morgan v. de Blasio, 29 N.Y.3d 559 (2017) – Clarified the definition of “necessary parties” under CPLR 1001(a). The court imported this civil-practice standard into election litigation.
Matter of Nestler v. Cohen, 242 A.D. 726 (1st Dep’t 1934) – Origin of the “other-than-the-person-originally-named rule,” later adopted sub silentio by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Garfinkel v. Power, 309 N.Y. 779 (1955).
Other Appellate Department Decisions – Angletti v. Morreale, Proud v. Relin, Curtin v. Mahoney, and Rosenbaum v. Power, all reaffirming the Nestler rule; contrasted with Bockman v. Sachs, 59 A.D.2d 516 (1st Dep’t 1977), which narrowed Nestler to identical-office, identical-petition situations.
Matter of Becker v. Shapiro, 110 A.D.3d 874 (2d Dep’t 2013) – Example where non-joinder was excused; cited by the court to signify that, unlike in Becker, the Committee’s interests could not be protected without joinder.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Necessary Party Doctrine: Applying CPLR 1001(a), the court held that any entity whose authority or certificate is challenged is indispensable. As the petitioner targeted the Committee’s act of substitution, the Committee’s absence deprived the court of jurisdiction. This embraces a functional analysis keyed to potential “inequitable effect.”
Statutory Interpretation of Election Law §6-148(1):
- Text only requires filing a certificate that states “the name and address of the candidate newly designated.” It is silent on who that candidate may be.
- The Nestler line of cases grafted a non-textual limitation (“a person other than...”), which the Second Department now views as doubtful.
- Nevertheless, because Nestler has been repeatedly followed (and once affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion), the panel applied stare decisis and declined to overturn it.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

Procedural Rigor in Election Challenges: Litigants must join every committee or person whose certificate or designation is under attack. Expect Boards of Elections to invoke Wohl to seek quick dismissal where committees are omitted.
Substantive Uncertainty Preserved: Though the court voiced skepticism, the Nestler rule remains binding statewide. Candidates who decline and then seek re-designation for the same office under the same petition remain vulnerable.
Invitation to the Court of Appeals: By openly questioning Nestler’s textual foundation, the Second Department signaled a readiness for higher-court clarification, potentially liberalizing ballot access and aligning textual statutory interpretation with modern jurisprudence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Substitution: A form filed by a Committee to Fill Vacancies naming a replacement candidate when an original designee dies, is disqualified, or—most commonly—declines to run.
Designating Petition: The signature petition that places a candidate on the primary ballot. Each petition names a Committee to Fill Vacancies empowered to act if a vacancy occurs.
Committee to Fill Vacancies: A group of party members, listed on the designating petition, who have statutory authority to select a replacement candidate.
Necessary Party: Under CPLR 1001(a), an individual or entity so essential that the court cannot accord complete relief or risk inequitable results without their presence. Non-joinder usually mandates dismissal.
Stare Decisis: The doctrine that courts should follow controlling precedent unless there is a compelling reason to overrule it.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Wohl v. Bruen reinforces a procedural commandment in New York election law: when challenging a certificate of substitution, the Committee to Fill Vacancies must be named. Failure to do so is not a curable defect but a “jurisdictionally fatal” omission demanding dismissal. Substantively, the Second Department aired significant doubts about the long-standing Nestler rule prohibiting self-substitution, yet adhered to it out of respect for precedent. The decision therefore serves a dual role: (1) as a bright-line procedural directive for litigants and courts alike, and (2) as a measured call for the Court of Appeals (or the Legislature) to re-examine whether Election Law §6-148(1) truly bars a declined candidate from being re-designated. Until such clarification arrives, practitioners must scrupulously join all committees involved and continue to navigate the tension between statutory text and entrenched judicial gloss.