Mandatory Forfeiture of Unlicensed Food-Vending Vehicles Triggers Excessive Fines Scrutiny: City of New York v. Jones (2025)

Introduction

City of New York v. Jones (2025 NY Slip Op 04842) is a significant Appellate Division, First Department decision clarifying that New York City’s mandatory forfeiture scheme for unlicensed food vending vehicles is subject to the Excessive Fines Clauses of both the United States and New York Constitutions when the forfeiture is at least partly punitive. The City sought forfeiture of Thomas Stevenson Jones’s food truck after an OATH proceeding in which he admitted to administrative violations and paid fines totaling $2,600. The City invoked Administrative Code §§ 17-321(c)(iii) and 17-322(a), which authorize seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in unlicensed food vending.

The Supreme Court (New York County) denied the City’s motion for summary judgment and set the matter for a hearing on two issues: whether the forfeiture operates as punishment (rather than purely as a remedial public-health measure) and whether the forfeiture would be “grossly disproportional” to the offense under the Excessive Fines Clauses. The First Department, per Gesmer, J., affirmed.

At stake are core questions about the boundary between remedial regulation and punitive sanction in municipal enforcement, and the vitality of constitutional proportionality review in civil in rem forfeiture regimes, especially those with ostensibly mandatory language.

Summary of the Judgment

The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the City and the order setting a hearing to assess, first, whether the forfeiture is at least partly punitive and therefore subject to the Excessive Fines Clauses, and second, if so, whether the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of Jones’s offense.
Anchored in Timbs v. Indiana and County of Nassau v. Canavan, the court held that civil in rem forfeitures, even when labeled “civil” and authorized by “mandatory” statutory language, are subject to excessive fines scrutiny when they advance deterrent or retributive goals.
The record created material issues of fact suggesting a punitive character: the forfeiture is expressly “in addition to” criminal penalties for a misdemeanor; possession of a vehicle is not criminal; property value may vary dramatically (here, approximately $40,000); forfeiture does not correlate to enforcement costs (which the statute separately authorizes to be recouped); and legislative history shows a deterrent purpose.
On disproportionality, issues of fact include the pronounced disparity between the vehicle’s asserted value and the $2,600 in imposed fines, the lack of evidence of public-health harm, and Jones’s affidavit describing severe financial hardship and lost livelihood opportunities.
The court distinguished prior authorities (notably City of New York v. Nadler and Henry v. Alquist) as predating, and therefore not controlling under, the Supreme Court’s and Court of Appeals’ modern excessive-fines jurisprudence.

Analysis

Statutory Framework

The Administrative Code provisions at issue create a two-track enforcement scheme:

Section 17-321 authorizes public health officials and police to enforce vending codes and to seize vehicles and food used by unlicensed vendors. If forfeiture proceedings are not commenced, the City may charge “reasonable costs for removal and storage” prior to release.
Section 17-322(a) provides for the forfeiture of “all property seized” from unlicensed food vendors “in addition to any penalties imposed” under § 17-325.
Section 17-325 classifies unlicensed food vending as a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $1,000, up to three months’ imprisonment, or both, and authorizes additional fines.

The City relied on these provisions to seek forfeiture of Jones’s truck as an automatic consequence of unlicensed vending. The Appellate Division underscored that notwithstanding the apparent mandatory nature of the forfeiture language, constitutional limits apply.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Timbs v. Indiana (586 US 146 [2019]): The Supreme Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause against the states. Timbs confirmed that civil forfeitures can be punitive and, when so, trigger excessive fines scrutiny. This case provides the constitutional gateway for state and municipal forfeiture regimes to be reviewed for excessiveness.
Austin v. United States (509 US 602 [1993]): The Court explained that civil in rem forfeitures have historically been understood as at least partly punitive, and the civil/criminal label is not dispositive. Austin provides the analytical lens: look to purpose and effect (deterrence/retribution vs. remedial objectives).
United States v. Bajakajian (524 US 321 [1998]): Established the “gross disproportionality” standard for excessive fines. Although decided in the context of criminal forfeiture, its proportionality analysis informs civil forfeiture cases when the forfeiture is punitive.
County of Nassau v. Canavan (1 NY3d 134 [2003]): The New York Court of Appeals held that both the federal and state Excessive Fines Clauses apply to civil in rem forfeitures when punitive, and articulated state-law factors to assess gross disproportionality: seriousness of the offense; actual and potential harm; relative value of the property and maximum punishment; and the defendant’s economic circumstances.
Prince v. City of New York (108 AD3d 114 [1st Dept 2013]): This Court held that a civil penalty bearing no relationship to loss to the City and described as a deterrent was punitive; it also recognized that when the underlying conduct is completely barred (as with unlicensed vending), sanctions for engaging in that conduct may be punitive.
City of New York v. Nadler (304 AD2d 491 [1st Dept 2003]): A pre-Canavan decision emphasizing the “mandatory and unqualified” statutory language to order forfeiture. Nadler did not address the Excessive Fines Clauses and thus does not foreclose modern constitutional review.
Property Clerk of NYPD v. Ferris (77 NY2d 428 [1991]): Cited in Nadler regarding the mandatory character of certain forfeiture statutes; it did not involve an excessive fines challenge.
Henry v. Alquist (127 AD2d 60 [2d Dept 1987]): Predating Austin, Bajakajian, Timbs, and Canavan, it affirmed forfeiture based on mandatory statutory language and rejected a cruel-and-unusual punishment claim, explicitly leaving open as-applied constitutional challenges. Alquist’s limited constitutional analysis is not controlling today.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (416 US 663 [1974]): Addressed due process and the innocent owner’s rights, not the Excessive Fines Clause. The First Department noted Alquist’s reliance on Calero-Toledo to emphasize that the latter does not address excessive fines issues.
Property Clerk, NY City Police Dept v. Nurse (185 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2020]): Cited for the proposition that where excessive fines analysis applies, a hearing may be needed to resolve proportionality questions.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two stages, consistent with Timbs, Austin, Bajakajian, and Canavan.

Stage 1: Is the forfeiture at least partly punitive?

A forfeiture is punitive when it serves deterrent or retributive purposes. Several indicators in this case created triable issues on that question:

Express linkage to a crime and “in addition to” penalties: Unlicensed food vending is a misdemeanor under § 17-325, and § 17-322(a) makes forfeiture an additional consequence. This structure mirrors a punishment layered atop criminal penalties.
No inherent criminality of the property: Possession of a vehicle is not a crime. Seizing the vehicle thus does not inherently abate a dangerous instrumentality. That cuts against a purely remedial rationale.
Dramatic variation in value: Vehicles can vary widely in value, and Jones’s truck was claimed to be worth about $40,000. Such variability undermines remedial correlation and suggests punitive character.
Lack of correlation to enforcement costs: The Code already allows recovery of “reasonable costs for removal and storage” upon release if forfeiture proceedings are not commenced. Full forfeiture therefore exceeds documented costs, signaling deterrence rather than cost recovery.
Legislative history emphasizing deterrence: The 1977 enactments were touted as “severe penalties” aimed at “driving … illegitimate peddlers from the city’s streets,” with forfeiture described as a “deterrent.” This history supports a punitive purpose.
Complete bar on unlicensed conduct: Where the conduct is wholly prohibited absent a license, sanctions for engaging in it may reflect punitive aims, as Prince indicates.
Absence of public-health danger in the record: The Health Department did not test food items, received no complaints, and identified no victims. In the absence of evidence that the vehicle’s operation presented an ongoing threat, seizure looks less remedial.

The City’s argument that the scheme merely “ensures compliance” for public health was insufficient, on this record, to establish a purely remedial purpose as a matter of law. Ensuring compliance by imposing severe property loss, when unconnected to averting specific harm, is quintessential deterrence—traditionally punitive in nature.

Stage 2: If punitive, is the forfeiture grossly disproportional?

If the forfeiture is punitive, it must satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, § 5 proportionality standards. Under Canavan’s factors:

Seriousness of the offense: Unlicensed vending is a misdemeanor, but the record lacked evidence of actual or likely harm (no tests, complaints, or safety determinations).
Severity of harm caused or potential harm: The City pointed to none on this record.
Relative value of the property versus maximum punishment: Claimed vehicle value of about $40,000 dwarfs the $2,600 fines actually imposed and exceeds the statutory maximum fine per count; the court will also consider the maximum permissible punishment for the offense.
Economic circumstances of the defendant: Jones averred “extreme financial hardship,” including loss of ability to operate lawfully outside the City. Economic impact matters in New York’s proportionality analysis.

These factors created triable fact issues requiring a hearing. The First Department therefore affirmed the denial of summary judgment and the order setting the matter down for evidentiary development.

What This Decision Clarifies

Mandatory statutory language does not immunize a forfeiture scheme from excessive fines scrutiny. After Timbs and Canavan, courts must look past the “civil” label and statutory commands to the forfeiture’s purpose and effect.
Municipal forfeitures tied to licensing violations can be at least partly punitive, especially where they operate as “in addition to” criminal penalties, are untethered to demonstrated harm or costs, and are justified by deterrence.
When punitive, courts must conduct a proportionality analysis, often requiring a factual hearing on property value, harm, statutory penalties, and the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Impact

City of New York v. Jones recalibrates municipal enforcement in several ways:

Forfeiture programs across New York City and statewide that rely on “mandatory” language will need to incorporate excessive-fines proportionality review whenever forfeiture serves deterrent or retributive purposes.
Agencies should expect evidentiary hearings before obtaining forfeiture judgments, particularly where the seized asset’s value significantly exceeds imposed fines or documented remediation costs, or where there is limited evidence of public harm.
Legislatures may consider tailoring forfeiture statutes to remedial aims: capping forfeiture at demonstrated costs; providing proportionality safeguards; considering innocent-owner defenses; or creating return-upon-compliance pathways where public safety is not threatened.
Defense counsel will have robust grounds to challenge forfeitures: to demand proportionality hearings; to present appraisals, financial records, and evidence of safe operations; and to highlight the absence of public-health risk or victims.
Courts are put on notice that prior pre-Canavan, pre-Timbs decisions emphasizing statutory “mandates” (like Nadler and Alquist) do not obviate constitutional review and must yield to modern excessive-fines doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil in rem forfeiture: A proceeding against the property used in an offense (the “thing”), not against the person. Despite the “civil” label, it can still be punishment.
Punitive vs. remedial sanctions:
- Punitive: Aims to punish or deter (e.g., penalties “in addition to” criminal sanctions; deterrence rhetoric; loss unrelated to abating a specific harm).
- Remedial: Aims to fix a specific harm (e.g., seizing inherently dangerous items; recouping removal/storage costs; abating a nuisance proven to endanger health).
Excessive Fines Clause: The Constitution prohibits fines that are “excessive.” After Timbs, this applies to states and localities. The Clause applies to forfeitures when they are punitive.
Gross disproportionality: A forfeiture is unconstitutional if its severity is grossly out of proportion to the offense’s gravity. New York courts assess seriousness, harm (actual/potential), the property’s value versus authorized penalties, and the defendant’s economic circumstances.
Mandatory statutory language vs. constitutional limits: Even if a statute says forfeiture is mandatory, courts must still ensure the Constitution is satisfied. Statutory commands cannot override constitutional protections.
Innocent owner exception: Including such an exception can indicate a punitive focus on culpability; its absence does not automatically make a forfeiture remedial. The key is the forfeiture’s purpose and effect in the specific case.

Practice Notes

For Municipal Counsel

Build a remedial record: Document concrete health risks, citizen complaints, inspection results, and why seizure is necessary to abate an ongoing hazard.
Correlate remedy to harm: Quantify removal and storage costs; consider seeking those costs instead of forfeiture where public health is not implicated.
Address proportionality: Offer evidence of the vehicle’s fair market value; explain how the forfeiture aligns with statutory penalties and public harms avoided; consider alternatives when the asset’s value vastly exceeds fines.
Anticipate a hearing: Be prepared with witnesses on public health, enforcement costs, and legislative purpose; ensure legislative history supports a remedial—not solely deterrent—aim where possible.

For Defense Counsel

Demand excessive-fines review: Argue that forfeiture is punitive under the factors highlighted by the First Department.
Prove disproportionality: Provide appraisals, proof of hardship, business records showing loss of livelihood, and evidence of safe operations (e.g., absence of complaints or contamination).
Contest remedial claims: Emphasize the lack of testing, absence of victims, and availability of less drastic remedies (fees, compliance orders, conditional return).
Use Canavan factors: Frame the case around seriousness, harm, relative value versus penalties, and economic circumstances.

Conclusion

City of New York v. Jones establishes an important constitutional checkpoint for municipal forfeitures: even where a local law appears to mandate forfeiture for unlicensed food vending, courts must evaluate whether the forfeiture is at least partly punitive and, if so, whether it is grossly disproportional to the offense. The decision synthesizes Timbs, Austin, Bajakajian, and Canavan to reinforce that the Excessive Fines Clauses meaningfully constrain civil in rem forfeitures and require fact-specific hearings on purpose and proportionality.

Practically, Jones reorients enforcement toward evidence-based, remedial justifications and proportional outcomes. Doctrinally, it underscores the supremacy of constitutional safeguards over statutory mandates and clarifies that municipal regulation cannot use forfeiture as a blunt instrument of deterrence without passing the rigorous proportionality scrutiny that the Eighth Amendment and New York’s counterpart demand.