Mandatory Five-Year PRS on DVSJA Determinate Sentences for Class A‑I Felonies and Enforceable Appeal Waivers: People v. Hernandez

Introduction

In People v. Hernandez, 2025 NY Slip Op 05874 (Oct. 23, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals resolved two recurring issues at the intersection of the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) and New York’s determinate sentencing framework:

• Whether a court may (or must) impose a term of post-release supervision (PRS) when it sentences a DVSJA-eligible defendant convicted of a class A‑I felony (here, second-degree murder) to a determinate sentence; and
• Whether the defendant’s appeal waiver was valid and therefore barred Appellate Division review of an excessive-sentence claim.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Rivera held that a five-year PRS term is required by Penal Law § 70.45 when a determinate sentence is imposed for a class A‑I felony under the DVSJA, and that the defendant’s appeal waiver was valid—thus foreclosing review of her excessive-sentence challenge. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division.

Case Background

Rosemary Hernandez was charged with second-degree murder and related offenses. Absent the DVSJA, a class A‑I felony conviction would ordinarily require an indeterminate sentence of at least 15 years to life (Penal Law § 70.00[2][a]; [3][a][i]). Through plea negotiations, Hernandez agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for a DVSJA sentence of 10 years’ determinate imprisonment plus five years’ PRS and an appeal waiver. The sentencing court stated on the record that, had it conducted a hearing, it would have found Hernandez eligible for DVSJA treatment and therefore imposed the negotiated sentence.

On appeal, Hernandez argued that the five-year PRS term was illegal because DVSJA sentencing for a class A felony purportedly does not authorize PRS, and that her appeal waiver was invalid—leaving her excessive-sentence claim reviewable. The Appellate Division (First Department) rejected both arguments and affirmed (224 AD3d 415 [1st Dept 2024]). The Court of Appeals granted leave and now affirms.

Summary of the Opinion

• PRS is mandatory for DVSJA determinate sentences on class A‑I felonies. Penal Law § 60.12(3) permits a determinate prison term of five to fifteen years for qualifying DVSJA defendants convicted of a class A felony. When a court imposes a determinate sentence, Penal Law § 70.45(1) requires the court also to impose PRS. Because class A‑I felonies are not within the enumerated categories providing reduced PRS ranges, the default five-year PRS term in § 70.45(2) applies. The Court rejected the defense reading of the DVSJA’s “notwithstanding” clause as precluding PRS.
• Appeal waiver is valid and bars excessive-sentence review. The plea colloquy and written waiver established that Hernandez knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, including any excessive-sentence claim. Although an appeal waiver does not foreclose a challenge to the legality of a sentence, the PRS term here was lawful, and the waiver therefore blocked review of excessiveness.
• Affirmance. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

Analysis

Statutory Framework and the Court’s Holding

The DVSJA, reflected in Penal Law § 60.12, authorizes judges to impose lower incarceration terms than otherwise required when defendants are survivors of domestic violence and meet statutory criteria. For class A felonies, § 60.12(3) allows a determinate sentence between five and fifteen years—departing from the typical indeterminate “15 to life” sentencing structure for class A‑I violent felonies.

PRS, however, is governed by a different statute: Penal Law § 70.45. Section 70.45(1) mandates that when a court imposes a determinate sentence, it “shall” also impose an additional period of PRS. Section 70.45(2) sets a default PRS term of five years unless the crime falls into specified categories that allow shorter PRS ranges. Those enumerated categories expressly include DVSJA sentences for class B, C, D, and E felonies—but not for class A‑I felonies. Accordingly, for a DVSJA determinate sentence imposed on a class A‑I felony (here, second-degree murder), the default five-year PRS term applies.

The Court rejected the defense argument that the DVSJA’s opening “notwithstanding any other provision of law” clause in § 60.12(1) silently displaces PRS. The Court explained that the “notwithstanding” clause ensures § 60.12 preempts conflicting sentencing provisions on the carceral component, but there is no conflict with § 70.45, which separately and uniformly governs PRS whenever a determinate sentence is imposed. The two provisions operate in tandem: § 60.12 adjusts incarceration ranges for eligible survivors; § 70.45 adds PRS calibrated by offense class and statutory categories.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• People v. Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1 (1989) – Establishes that while appeal waivers are generally enforceable, a defendant cannot waive the right to challenge the legality of a sentence. The Court used Seaberg to make clear it could review Hernandez’s illegality argument notwithstanding her valid waiver.
• People v. Galindo, 38 NY3d 199 (2022); Riley v. County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455 (2000); Majewski v. Broadalbin‑Perth CSD, 91 NY2d 577 (1998) – Articulate core principles of statutory interpretation: primacy of text, plain meaning, and legislative intent. These cases framed the Court’s textual analysis of §§ 60.12 and 70.45.
• People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192 (1979) – Confirms that statutes should be read as a whole, with sections construed together. The Court applied this to harmonize the DVSJA and PRS statutes.
• People v. Mitchell, 15 NY3d 93 (2010) – Interprets “notwithstanding” clauses as a tool to preempt conflicting laws, not as a blanket override of non-conflicting provisions. This was central to rejecting the defense’s “notwithstanding” argument.
• People v. Brenda WW., — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03643 (2025) – Describes the DVSJA’s purpose: addressing the “national epidemic” of domestic violence by allowing judges to fully account for abuse in sentencing. The Court used this to confirm that the DVSJA’s focus is calibrated reductions in incarceration, not elimination of PRS.
• People v. Jones, 26 NY3d 730 (2016); People v. Francis, 30 NY3d 737 (2018) – Emphasize separation-of-powers limits on judicial policymaking. The Court invoked these to explain that any policy choice to reduce or eliminate PRS for DVSJA class A‑I sentences is for the Legislature, not the courts.
• People v. Lopez, 6 NY3d 248 (2006); People v. Callahan, 80 NY2d 273 (1992); People v. Bisono, 36 NY3d 1013 (2020) – Set the standards for valid appeal waivers: they must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; adequately described on the record; and not mischaracterize the rights being waived. These cases supported the Court’s finding that Hernandez’s waiver was valid.

Legal Reasoning

1. Textual primacy and statutory harmony.

   The Court began with text. Section 60.12(3) sets a determinate incarceration range for DVSJA-eligible class A felonies but is silent on PRS. Section 70.45(1) is categorical: when a determinate sentence is imposed, a PRS term must also be imposed. Section 70.45(2) specifies reduced PRS ranges for several enumerated categories, including certain DVSJA sentences—but it conspicuously omits DVSJA class A‑I felonies. Thus, the default five-year PRS applies. Reading the provisions together gives each force: the DVSJA tailors incarceration; § 70.45 supplies PRS for determinate sentences.

2. “Notwithstanding” clause does not negate PRS.

   Relying on Mitchell, the Court held that § 60.12(1)’s “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language resolves conflicts; it does not silently override complementary statutory schemes. Because § 60.12 (incarceration range) and § 70.45 (PRS attachment to determinate sentences) do not conflict, the “notwithstanding” clause does not bar PRS.

3. Legislative history confirms incarceration-focused relief.

   Citing the Assembly Memorandum in Support, the Court found that the DVSJA was designed to ameliorate “long, unfair prison sentences” for survivors by permitting alternative, reduced terms of imprisonment. Nothing in the history suggests an intent to eliminate PRS when a determinate sentence is imposed for a class A‑I felony.

4. Rejection of the “frontloading” theory.

   The defendant argued that the Legislature intended to “frontload” punishment for DVSJA class A‑I felonies through longer incarceration and shorter PRS, unlike lesser felonies. The Court found no support in the statutory structure, which generally scales both incarceration exposure and PRS ranges with offense seriousness. As examples, the opinion highlighted that:

   • For a DVSJA class E violent felony, incarceration is capped at 1.5 years and PRS ranges from 1.5 to 3 years.
   • For a DVSJA class C violent felony, incarceration is capped at 3.5 years and PRS ranges from 2.5 to 5 years.

   By contrast, for DVSJA class A‑I felonies, the incarceration range is 5–15 years, and PRS defaults to five years—consistent with a severity gradient, not a “frontloading” inversion.

5. Appeal waiver validity and scope.

   Applying Lopez, Callahan, and Bisono, the Court concluded the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The judge explained the separate and independent nature of the right to appeal and specified issues that would survive; counsel confirmed the discussion; and a written waiver expressly noted that excessiveness challenges were being relinquished. Although a legality challenge is non-waivable (Seaberg), that point benefited Hernandez only to the extent the Court then held the PRS term lawful on the merits.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Sentencing clarity for DVSJA class A‑I felonies.

  Hernandez provides definitive guidance: when a court imposes a determinate sentence under the DVSJA for a class A‑I felony (e.g., second-degree murder), a five-year PRS term is mandatory. Courts lack discretion to shorten PRS below five years absent legislative change or a plea to a different offense category that carries a reduced PRS range.

• Plea bargaining and advisals.

  Defense counsel must advise DVSJA-eligible clients charged with class A‑I felonies that PRS is not negotiable below five years if a determinate sentence is contemplated. If minimizing PRS is a priority, negotiations must focus on charge reductions into categories where § 70.45(2) allows shorter PRS ranges (e.g., DVSJA sentencing on class B–E felonies).

• Resentencing under the DVSJA.

  Although this case involves initial sentencing, the logic applies equally to DVSJA resentencings: once a determinate sentence is imposed for a class A‑I felony, § 70.45 attaches a five-year PRS term. Petitioners and courts should account for this in assessing potential relief.

• Appeal waivers post-Hernandez.

  The decision reinforces best practices: clear on-the-record explanations, confirmation that counsel has reviewed surviving issues, and a written waiver expressly addressing excessiveness claims make waivers enforceable. Excessive-sentence challenges will be barred where waivers are valid, but illegality claims remain reviewable.

• Separation of powers and policy debates.

  By declining to tailor PRS for DVSJA class A‑I felonies judicially, the Court signals that any reform to PRS for domestic violence survivors sentenced to determinate terms on the most serious offenses must come from the Legislature.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) (Penal Law § 60.12): Allows courts to impose reduced prison terms where a defendant is a domestic violence survivor and the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the offense. For class A felonies, it authorizes a determinate term between 5 and 15 years.
• Determinate vs. indeterminate sentences: A determinate sentence is a fixed term (e.g., 10 years) followed by PRS. An indeterminate sentence is a range (e.g., 15 years to life) with potential parole; PRS applies only to determinate sentences.
• Post-Release Supervision (PRS) (Penal Law § 70.45): A mandatory period of supervision following determinate imprisonment. Default is five years unless the statute provides a shorter range for specific offense categories.
• “Notwithstanding” clause: A drafting device signaling that the provision prevails over conflicting statutes. It does not nullify non-conflicting statutes on related topics.
• Illegal sentence vs. excessive sentence: An illegal sentence violates law and can be challenged even if waived. An excessive sentence is lawful but argued to be too harsh; a valid appeal waiver forecloses appellate reduction on excessiveness grounds.
• Appeal waiver: A defendant may waive the right to appeal if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Courts must avoid mischaracterizing what rights are relinquished; the record should make the scope clear.

Conclusion

People v. Hernandez establishes a clear rule for New York sentencing under the DVSJA: when a DVSJA-eligible defendant convicted of a class A‑I felony receives a determinate sentence, the court must also impose a five-year term of PRS under Penal Law § 70.45. The DVSJA’s “notwithstanding” clause does not displace PRS because § 60.12 and § 70.45 address different components of the sentence and do not conflict. The Court also reaffirms the enforceability of properly explained and documented appeal waivers, which bar excessive-sentence challenges even as they leave room for review of alleged illegality.

The decision harmonizes the DVSJA with the determinate sentencing framework, promotes clarity in plea negotiations and sentencing advisals for domestic violence survivors, and preserves legislative primacy over policy choices concerning PRS. In the broader legal landscape, Hernandez offers definitive guidance: DVSJA relief recalibrates incarceration for survivors but does not eliminate statutorily mandated PRS on determinate sentences for the most serious crimes.